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THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA" 



J^ii)il SbstJt. 

F. INXOCENTIUS APAP, OP., S.T.M.. 

Censor Theol. 

{mp imalur. 

EDUS. CAXOXICUS SURMONT, 

VicARius Generalis. 

Westmonastirii» 



APPROBATIO ORDINIS. 

J^it)il 0b»tat. 

F. RAPHAEL MOSS, O.P., S.T.L. 
F. LEO MOORE, O.P.. S.T.L. 

Imprauatur. 

F. BEDA JARRETT, O.P., S.T.L., A.M.. 

Prior Provincialis Angli.x. 



LONDINt, 

Die 7 Martii, 1922. 



THE 

A THEOLOGICA 

OF 

ST. THOMAS AQUINAS 



PART I. 
QQ. LXXV.— CII. 



}j 



LITERALLY TRANSLATED BY 

FATHERS OF THE ENGLISH DOMINICAN 

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LETTER FROM THE CARDINAL SECRETARY 

OF STATE. 

Jhe Vatican, 

February 2^th, 1912. 

To the Very Reverend Father Humbert Everest, O.P., 
Prior Provincial of the English Dominican Province. 

Reverend Father, 

I am desired to inform you that the Holy Father has 
been pleased to express his gratitude on receiving from you 
the first volume of the Summa of St. Thomas Aquinas, 
which, with the assistance of your beloved brethren of the 
English Province, you have most wisely determined to 
translate into your mother-tongue. I say 'most wisely,' 
because to translate into the language of one's country the 
immortal works of St. Thomas is to give to its people a 
great treasure of human and Divine knowledge, and to 
afford those who are desirous of obtaining it, not only the 
best method of reasoning in unfolding and elucidating 
sacred truths, but also the most efficacious means of 
combating heresies. Therefore, without doubt, you have 
undertaken a task worthy of religious men— worthy of the 
sons of St. Dominic. 

The Venerable Pontiff, in graciously accepting your gift, 
returns you most cordial thanks, and earnestly prays 
that your task may have a successful result and produce 
abundant fruit. In token of his appreciation, he most 
lovingly imparts to you and your fellow-workers the 
Apostolic Benediction. 

And for myself I extend to you the right hand of fellow- 
ship, and thank you for the special volume of the transla- 
tion which you presented to me. 

I remain, Rev. Father, 

Yours devotedly, 

R. Card. Merry del Val. 



LETTER FROM THE MASTER-GENERAL OF 
THE FRIAR PREACHERS. 

COLLKGIO AnGELICO, 

Roma, May 2Jst, xgii. 

To the E)igJish Translators of the ' Siimma Theologica ' of 

St. Thomas. 

Very Rev. and dear Fathers, 

In translating into English the Summa Theologica of 
St. Thomas, you undertake a work which will bring profit 
to the Church and honour to the Dominican Order, and 
which, I hope, will be acceptable even to the laity ; for 
what was said of the great doctor by his contem.p'oraries is 
true for all time — that everybody can gather fruit from his 
writings, which are within the grasp of all. As a matter of 
fact, St. Thomas appeals to the light of reason, not in order 
to weaken the ground of faith, which is the Divine Reason, 
infinitely surpassing the reason of man, but, on the con- 
trary, in order to increase the merit of faith by making us 
adhere more firmly to His revelation. For we see thereby 
how reasonable is our submission, how salutary it is to the 
mind, how profitable for our guidance, how joyful to the 
heart. 

May your work contribute to this end ! Thus it will be 
a sermon, preached through the press, by reason of its 
diffusion and duration more fruitful than that preached by 
word of mouth. 

I bless you in our Holy Father, St. Dominic, and ask 
the help of your prayers for the Order and for myself. 

Fr. Hyacinth M. Cormier, O.P., 
Master-Getieral. 



VI 



CONTENTS 

TREATISE ON MAN 

QUESTION TAOK 

LXXV. OF MAN WHO IS COMPOSED OF A SPIRITUAL AND A 
CORPOREAL SUBSTANCE : AND IN THE FIRST PLACE, 
CONCERNING WHAT BELONGS TO THE ESSENCE OF 

THE SOUL ------ 3 

LXXVI. OF THE UNION OF BODY AND SOUL - - - 22 

LXXVII. OF THOSE THINGS WHICH BELONG TO THE lOU LKS OK 

THE SOUL IN GENERAL - - - "55 

LXXVHI. OF THE SPECIFIC POWERS OF THE SOUL - - - 75 

LXXIX. OF THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS - - - - 91 

LXXX. OF THE APPETITIVE POWERS IN GENERAL - - 122 

LXXXI. OF THE POWER OF SENSUALITY - - - - I2y 

LXXXII. OF THE WILL -..-.. 13- 

LXXXIII. OF FREE-WILL ----.. i^y 

LXXXIV. HOW THE SOUL WHILE UNITED TO THE BODY UNDER- 
STANDS CORPOREAL THINGS BENEATH IT - - 1 56 

LXXXV. OF THE MODE AND ORDER OF UNDERSTANDING - - 182 

LXXXVI. WHAT OUR INTELLECT KNOWS IN MATERIAL THINGS - 207 

LXXXVIl. HOW THE INTELLECTUAL SOUL KNOWS ITSELF AND ALL 

WITHIN ITSELF - - - . - 2l6 

LXXXVIH. HOW THE HUMAN SOUL KNOWS WHAT IS ABOVE ITSELF 226 

LXXXIX. OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE SEPARATED SOUL - - 236 

XC. OF THE FIRST PRODUCTION OF ^UN'S SOUL - - 254 

XCI. THE PRODUCTION OF THE FIRST MAN'S BODY - - 262 

XCII. THE PRODUCTION OF THE WOMAN ... 274 

XCIH. THE END OR TERM OF THE PRODUCTION OF MAN - 282 

vii 



CONTENTS viii 

«JUBSTION PAGB 

XCIV. OF THE STATF. ANO CONDITION OF THE FIRST MAN AS 

KI-GAKDS HIS INTia.I.KCT ----- 305 

XCV. OF THINGS I'KRTAIMNG TO THE KHtST MAN'S WILL- 
NAMELY, GRACE AND RIGHTEOUSNESS - - - 316 

XCVI. OF THE MASTERSHIP BELONGING TO MAN IN THE STATE 

OF INNOCENCE ------ 326 

XCVII. OF THE PRESERVATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN THE 

PRIMITIVE STATE ------ 335 

XCVIII. OF THE PRESERVATION OF THE SPECIES - . . 344 

XCIX. OF THE CONDITION OF THE OFFSPRING AS TO THE BODY - 350 

C. OF THE CONDITION OF THE OFFSPRING AS REGARDS 

RIGHTEOUSNESS ------ 355 

CI. OF THE CONDITION OF THE OFFSPRING AS REGARDS KNOW- 
LEDGE ------- 360 

ClI. OF man's ABODE, WHICH IS PARADISE - - - 364 



TREATISE ON MAN 



I 4 



THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA" 

FIRST PART. 
TREATISE ON MAN. 

QUESTION LXXV. 

OF MAN WHO IS COMPOSED OF A SPIRITUAL AND A 

CORPOREAL SUBSTANCE : AND IN THE FIRST PLACE, 

CONCERNING WHAT BELONGS TO THE ESSENCE OF 

THE SOUL. 

{In Seven Articles.) 

Having treated of the spiritual and of the corporeal 
creature, we now proceed to treat of man, who is com- 
posed of a spiritual and of a corporeal substance. We shall 
treat first of the nature of man, and secondly of his 
origin. Now the theologian considers the nature of man 
in relation to the soul ; but not in relation to the body, 
except in so far as the body has relation to the soul. Hence 
the first object of our consideration will be the soul. And 
since Dionysius {Ang. Hier. xi.) says that three things are 
to be found in spiritual substances — essence, power, and 
operation — we shall treat first of what belongs to the 
^seo£g_QLih£ soulj secondly, of what belongs to its power ; 
thirdly, of what belongs to its operation. 

Concerning the first, two points have to be considered ; 
the first is the nature of the soul considered^ in itself; the 
second is the union of the soul with the body. Under the 
first head there are seven points of inquiry. 

(i) Whether the soul is a body ? (2) Whether the human 
soul is a subsistence ? \ (3) Whether the souls of brute 






^-fl 



\y 



Q. 75. ART. I THE " SUMM A THEOLOGICA '^ 4 

animals are subsistent? (4) Whether the soul is man, or 
is man composed of soul and body ? (5) Whether the soul 
is composed of matter and form ? (6) Whether the soul 
is incorruptible? (7) Whether' the soul is of the same 
/ species as an angel ? '^^«nc c-.. 

First Article, 
whether the soul is a body? 

We proceed thus to the First Article: — 

Objection 1. It would seem that the soul is a body. For 
the soul is the moving principle of the body. Nor does it 
move unless moved. First, because seemingly nothing can 
ny move unless it is itself moved, since nothing gives what it 
has not; for instance, what is not hot does not give heat. 
Secondly, because if there be anything that moves and is 
not moved, it miist be the cause of eternal, unchanging 
movement, as we find proved Phys. viii. 6; and this does 
not appear to be the case in the movement of an animal, 
which is caused by the soul. Therefore the soul is a mover 
moved. ' But every mover moved is a body. Therefore the 
soul is a body. 

Obj. 2. Further, all knowledge is caused by means of a 
likeness. But there can be no likeness of a body to an 
incorporeal thing. If, therefore, the soul were not a body, 
it could not have knowledge of corporeal things. 

Obj. 3. Further, between the mover and the moved 
there must be contact. But contact is only between bodies. 
Since, therefore, the soul moves the body, it seems that the 
soul must be a body. 

On the contrary, Augustine says {De Trin. vi. 6) that the 
soul is siniple in comparison ivith the body, inasmuch as it 
does not occupy space by its bulk. 

I answer that, To seek the nature of the soul, we must 
premise that the soul is defined as the first principle of life 
in those things which live : for we call living things 
animate,* and those things which have no life, inanimate. 

* I.e., having a soul. 



5 THE ESSENCE OF THE SOUL Q. 75- Art. i 

Now life is shown principally by two actions, knowledge 
and movement. The philosophers of old, not being able 
to rise above their imagination, supposed that the principle 
of these actions was something corporeal : for they asserted 
that only bodies were real things ; and that what is not 
corporeal is nothing : hence they maintained that the soul 
is something corporeal. This opinion can be proved to be 
false in many ways ; but we shall make use of only one 
proof, based on universal and certain principles, which 
shows clearly that the soul is not a body. 
- It is manifest that not every principle of vital action is 
a soul, for then the eye would be a soul, as it is a principle 
of vision ; and the same might be applied to the other 
instruments of the soul : but" it is the first principle of life, 
which we call the soul. Now, though a body may be a prin- 
ciple of life, as the heart is a principle of life in an animal, 
yet nothing corporeal can be the first principle of life. For-' 
it is clear that to be a principle of life, or to be a living / 
thing, does not belong to a body as such ; since, if that were / 
the case, every body would be a living thijigj or a-p«n€4p4^ 
of life. Therefore a body is compete'nt to be a living thing 
or even a principle of life, as such a body. Now that it is 
actually such a body, it owes to some principle which is 
called its act. Therefore the soul, which is the first prin- 
ciple of life, is not a body, but the act of a body ; thus heat, 
which is the principle of calefaction, is not a body, but an 
act of a body. 

Reply Obj. I. As everything which is in motion must be 
moved by something else, a process which cannot be pro- 
longed indefinitely, we must allow that not every mover is 
moved. For, since to be moved is to pass from potentiality 
to actuality, the mover gives what it has to the thing 
moved, inasmuch as it causes it to be in act. But, as is 
shown in Phys. viii. 6, there is a mover which is altogether 
immovable, and not moved either essentially, or accident- 
ally ; and such a mover can cause an invariable movement. 
There is, however, another kind of mover, which, though 
not moved essentially, is moved accidentally; and for this 



g. 75- Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 6 

reason it does not cause an invariable movement ; such a 
mover is the soul. There is, again, another mover, which 
is moved essentially — namely, the body.*' And because the 
philosophers of old believed that nothing existed but bodies, 
they maintained that every mover is moved; and that the 
soul is moved directlv, and is a bodv. 

Reply Obj. 2. The likeness of the thing known is not of 
necessitv actuallv in the nature of the knower; but given a 
thing which knows potentially, and afterwards knows 
actually, the likeness of the thing known must be in the 
nature of the knower, not actually, but only potentially; 
thus colour is not actually in the pupil of the eye, but onlv 
potentially. Hence it is necessary, not that the likeness 
of corporeal things should be actually in the nature of the 
soul, but that there be a potentiality in the soul for such 
a likeness. But the ancient philosophers omitted to dis- 
tinguish between actuality and potentiality ; and so they 
held that the soul must be a body in order to have know- 
ledge of a body; and that it must be composed' of the 
principles of which all bodies are formed in order to know 
all bodies. 

Reply Ohj. 3. There are two kinds of contact; of 
quantity, and of poiver. By the former a body can be 
touched only by a body ; by the latter a body can be 
touched by an incorporeal thing, which moves that body. 

Second Article. 

whether the human soul is something s ubs i stent ? 

We proceed thus to the Second Article: — 
Objection i. It would seem that the human soul is not 
something subsistent. For that which subsists is said to be 
this particular thing. Now this particular thing is said not 
of the soul, but of that which is composed of soul and body. 
Therefore the soul is not something subsistent. 

Obj. 2. Further, everything subsistent operates. But the 
soul does not operate; for, as the Philosopher says {De 
Anima i. 4), to say that the soul feels or vnderstand^ is 



7 THE ESSENCE OF THE SOUL Q. 75- Art. 2 

like saying that the soul weaves or builds. Therefore the 
soul is not subsistent. 

> Obj. 3. Further, if the soul were subsistent, it would 
have some operation apart from the body. But it has no 
operation apart from the body, not even that of under- 
standing : for the act of understanding does not take place 
without a phantasm, which cannot exist apart from the 
body. Therefore the human soul is not something sub- 
sistent. 

On the contrary, Augustine says {De Trin. x. 7) : WhO' 
ever understands that the nature of the soul is that of a 
substance and not that of a body, will see that those who 
maintain the corporeal nature of the soul, are led astray 
through associating ^vith the soul tliose things without which 
they are unable to think of any nature — i.e., imaginary 
pictures of corporeal things. Therefore the nature of the 
human intellect is not only incorporeal, but it is also a 
substance, that is, something subsistent. 

/ answer that, It must necessarily be allowed that the 
principle of intellectual operation which we call the soul, 
is a principle both incorporeal and subsistent. For it is 
clear that by means of the intellect man can have know- 
ledge of all corporeal things^ Now whatever knows certain 
things cannot have any of them in its own nature; because 
that which is in it naturally would impede the knowledge 
of anything else^ Thus we observe that a sick man's 
tongue being vitiated by a feverish and bitter humour, is 
insensible to anything sweet, and everything seems bitter 
to it. Therefore, if the intellectual principle contained the 
nature of a body it would be unable to know all bodies, 
' Now every body has its own determinate nature. There- 
fore it is impossible for the intellectual principle to be a 
body. It is likewise impossible for it to understand b) 
means of a bodily organ ; since the determinate nature of 
that organ would impede knowledge of all bodies ; as when 
a certain determinate colour is not only in the pupil of the 
eye, but also in a glass vase, the liquid in the vase seems 
to be of that same colour. 



Q. 75. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 8 

Therefore the intellectual principle which we call the mind 
or the intellect has an operation per se apart from the body. 

r Now only that which subsists can have an operation per se. 

"^ For nothing can operate but what is actual : wherefore a 
thing operates according as it is; for which reason we do 
not say that heat imparts heat, but that what is hot gives 
heat. We must conclude, therefore, that the human soul, 
which is called the intellect or the mind, is something in- 
corporeal and subsistent. 

Reply Obj. i. This particular thing can be taken in two 
senses. Firstly, for anything subsistent ; secondly, for that 
which subsists, and is complete in a specific nature.NThe 
former sense excludes the inherence of an accident or of a 
material form ; the latter excludes also the imperfection of 
the part, so that a hand can be called this particular thing 
in the first sense, but not in the second. Therefore, as the 
human soul is a part of human nature, it can indeed be 
called this particular thing, in the first sense, as being 
something subsistent ; but not rn the second, for in this 
sense, what is composed of body and soul is said to be this 
particular thing. 

Reply Obj. 2. Aristotle wrote those words as expressing 
not his own opinion, but the opinion of those who said that 
to understand is to be moved, as is clear from the context. 
Or we may reply that to operate per se belongs to what 
exists per se. But for a thing to exist per se, it suffices 
sometimes that it be not inherent, as an accident or a 
material form; even though it be part of something. 
Nevertheless, that is rightly said to subsist per se, which 
is neither inherent in the above sense, nor part of anything 
else. In this sense, the eye or the hand cannot be said to 
subsist per se ; nor can it for that reason be said to operate 
per se. Hence the operation of the parts is through each 
part attributed to the whole. For we say that man sees 
with the eye, and feels with the hand, and not in the same 
sense as when we say that what is hot gives heat by its 
heat; for heat, strictly speaking, does not give heat. We 
may therefore say that the soul understands, as the eye sees ; 



9 THE ESSENCE OF THE SOUL Q. 75- Art. 3 

but it is more correct to say that man understands through 
the soul. \, 

Reply Ohj. 3. The body is necessary for the action of 
the intellect, not as its organ of action, but on the part of 
the object ; for the phantasm is to the intellect what colour 
is to the sight. Neither does such a dependence on the 
body prove the intellect to be non-subsistent ; otherwise it 
would follow that an animal is non-subsistent, since it re- 
quires external objects of the senses in order to perform 
its act of perception. 

Third Article. 

whether the souls of brute animals are 
subsistent ? 

We proceed thus to the Third Article: — 

Objection i. It would seem that the souls of brute animals 
are subsistent. For man is of the same genus as other 
animals; and, as we have just shown (A. 2), the soul of 
man is subsistent. Therefore the souls of other animals are 
subsistent. 

Ohj. 2. Further, the relation of the sensitive faculty to 
^_^ .sensible objects is like the relation of the intellectual faculty 
to intelligible objects. But the intellect, apart from the 
body, apprehends intelligible objects. Therefore the sensi- 
tive faculty, apart from the body, perceives sensible objects. 
Therefore, since the souls of brute animals are sensitive, it 
follows that they are subsistent; just as the human intel- 
lectual soul is subsistent. 

Ohj. 3. Further, the soul of brute animals moves the 
body. But the body is not a mover, but is moved. There- 
fore the soul of brute animals has an operation apart from 
the body. 

On the contrary, Is what is written in the Book De Eccl. 
Dogm. (xvi., xvii.) : Man alone we helieve to have a sub- 
sistent soul: whereas the souls of animals are not subsistent. 

I answer that, The ancient philosophers made no dis- 
tinction between sense and intellect, and referred both to a 



Q. 75- Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " lo 

corporeal principle, as has been said (A. i). Plato, how- 
ever, drew a distinction between intellect and sense; yet 
he referred both to an incorporeal principle, maintaining 
that sensing, just as understanding, belongs to the soul 
as such. From this it follows that even the souls of brute 
animals are subsistent. But Aristotle held that of the 
operations of the soul, understanding alone is performed 
without a corporeal organ. On the other hand, sensation 
and the consequent operations of the sensitive soul are 
evidently accompanied with change in the body ; thus in 
the act of vision, the pupil of the eye is affected by a re- 
flexion of colour : and so with the other senses. Hence it 
is clear that the sensitive soul has no fer se operation of 
its own, and that every operation of the sensitive soul 
belongs to the composite. Wherefore we conclude that as 
the souls of brute animals have no per se operations they 
are not subsistent. For the operation of anything follows 
the mode of its being. 

Reply Obj. I. Although man is of the same genus as 
other animals, he is of a different species. Specific differ- 
ence is derived from the difference of form ; nor does every 
difference of form necessarily imply a diversity of genus. 

Reply Obj. 2. The relation of the sensitive faculty to the 
sensible object is in one way the same as that of the intel- 
lectual faculty to the intelligible object, in so far as each is 
in potentiality to its object. But in another way their rela- 
tions differ, inasmuch as the impression of the object on 
the sense is accompanied with change in the body; so that 
excessive strength of the sensible corrupts sense ; a thing 
that never occurs in the case of the intellect. For an 
intellect that understands the highest of intelligible objects 
is more able afterwards to understand those that are lower. 
— If, however, in the process of intellectual operation the 
body is weary, this result is accidental, inasmuch as the 
intellect requires the operation of the sensitive powers in 
the production of the phantasms. 

Reply Obj. 3. Motive power is of two kinds. One, the 
appetitive power, commands motion. The operation of 



II THE ESSENCE OF THE SOUL Q. 75- Art. 4 

this power in the sensitive soul is not apart from the body ; 
for anger, joy, and passions of a like nature are accom- 
panied by a change in the body. The other motive power 
is that which executes motion in adapting the members for 
obeying the appetite; and the act of this power does not 
consist in moving, but in being moved. Whence it is clear 
that to move is not an act of the sensitive soul without the 
body. 

Fourth Article. '^^. 

whether the soul is man? ^\^ 

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article: — 

Objection i. It would seem that the soul is man. For it 
is written (2 Cor. iv. 16) : Though our outward man is cor- 
rupted, yet the inward man is renewed day by day. But 
that which is within man is the soul. Therefore the soul 
is the inward man. 

Obj. 2. Further, the human soul is a substance. But it 
is not a universal substance. Therefore it is a particular 
substance. Therefore it is a hypostasis or a person ; and it 
can only be a human person. Therefore the soul is man ; 
for a human person is a man. 

On the contrary, Augustine (De Civ. Dei xix. 3) com- 
mends Varro as holding that man is not a mere soul, nor a 
mere body ; but both soul and body. 

I answer that, The assertion, the soul is man, can be 
taken in two senses. First, that man is a soul ; though this 
5s^articular man, Socrates, for instance, is not a soul, but 
Ccomposed of soul and body. I say this, forasmuch as 
some held that the form alone belongs to the species ; 
while matter is part of the individual, and not of the species. 
This cannot be true ; for to the nature of the species belongs 
what the definition signifies; and in natural things the 
definition does not signify the form only, but the form and 
the matter. Hence in natural things the matter is part 
of the species; not, indeed, signate matter, which is the 
principle of individuality ; but the common matter. For 
as it belongs to the notion of this particular man to be 



Q. 75- Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 12 

composed of this soul, of this flesh, and of these bones; 
so it belongs to the notion of man to be composed of 
soul, flesh, and bones; for whatever belongs in common 
to the substance of all the individuals contained under 
a given species, must belong also to the substance of the 
species. 

It may also be understood in this sense, that this soul is 

i this man ; and this could be held if it were supposed that 

\ the operation of the sensitive soul were proper to it, apart 

from the body ; because in that case all the operations 

,' which are attributed to man would belong to the soul only ; 

and whatever performs the operations proper to a thing, 

is that thing ;\vherefore that which performs the operations 

of a man is man. But it has been shown above (A. 3) that 

sensation is not the operation of the soul only. Since, 

then, sensation is an operation of man, but not proper to 

him, it is clear that man is not a soul only, but something 

composed of soul and body.— -Plato, through supposing 

that sensation was proper to the soul, could maintain man 

to be a soul making use of the body. 

Reply Ohj. i. According to the Philosopher (Ethic, ix. 
8), a thing seems to be chiefly what is principle in it; thus 
what the governor of a state does, the state is said to do. In 
this way sometimes what is principle in man is said to 
be man ; sometimes, indeed, the intellectual part which, in 
accordance with truth, is called the inward man ; and some- 
times the sensitive part with the body is called man in the 
opinion of those whose observation does not go beyond the 
senses. And this is called the outivard man. 

Reply Ohj. 2. Not every particular substance is a hypos- 
tasis or a person, but that which has the complete nature 
of its species. Hence a hand, or a foot, is not called a 
hypostasis, or a person ; nor, likewise, is the soul alone 
so called, since it is a part of the human species. 



13 THE ESSENCE OF THE SOUL g. 75- Art. 5 



Fifth Article. "«C 

whether the soul is composed of matter and xj v 

FORM? ^/j \ 

K " 
We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : — 

Objection i. It would seem that the soul is composed of 
matter and form. For potentiality is opposed to actuality. 
Now, whatsoever things are in actuality participate of the 
Eirst Act, which is God; by participation of Whom, all 
things are good, are beings, and are living things, as is 
clear from the teaching of Dionysius {Div. Nom. v.). 
Therefore whatsoever things are in potentiality participate 
of the first potentiality. But the first potentiality is primary 
matter. Therefore, since the human soul is, after a manner, 
in potentiality ; which appears from the fact that sometimes 
a man is potentially understanding ; it seems that the human 
soul must participate of primary matter, as a part of itself. 

Obj. 2. Further, wherever the properties of matter are 
found, there matter is. But the properties of matter are 
found in the soul — namely, to be a subject, and to be 
changed ; for it is subject to science, and virtue ; and it 
changes from ignorance to knowledge and from vice to 
virtue. Therefore matter is in the soul. 

Obj. 3. Further, things which have no matter, have no 
cause of their existence, as the Philosopher says 
Metaph. viii. (Did. vii. 6). But the soul has a cause of 
its existence, since it is created by God. Therefore the 
soul has matter. 

Obj. 4. Further, what has no matter, and is a form only, 
is a pure act, and is infinite. But this belongs to God 
alone. Therefore the soul has matter. 

On the contrary, Augustine (Gen. ad lit. vii. 7, 8, 9) 
proves that the soul was made neither of corporeal matter, 
nor of spiritual matter. 

/ answer that, The soul has no matter. We may consider 
this question in two ways. First, from the notion of a soul 
in general ; for it belongs to the notion of a soul to be the 



Q. 75- Art. 5 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 14 

form of a body. Now, either it is a form by virtue of itself, 
in its entirety, or by virtue of some part of itself. If by 
virtue of itself in its entirety, then it is impossible that any 
part of it should be matter, if by matter we understand 
something purely potential : for a form, as such, is an act; 
and that which is purely potential cannot be part of an act, 
since potentiality is repugnant to actuality as being opposite 
thereto. If, however, it be a form by virtue of a part of 
itself, then we call that part the soul : and that matter, 
which it actualizes first, we call the primary animate. 

Secondly, we may proceed from the specific notion of the 
human soul, inasmuch as it is intellectual. For it is dear 
that whatever is received into something is received accord- 
ing to the condition of the recipient. Now a thing is known 
in as far as its form is in the knower. But the intellectual 
soul knows a thing in its nature absolutely : for instance, it 
knows a stone absolutely as a stone ; and therefore the 
form of a stone absolutely, as to its proper formal idea, is 
in the intellectual soul. Therefore the intellectual soul 
. itself is an absolute form, and not something composed of 
l^ matter and form. For if the intellectual soul were composed 
of matter and form, the forms of things would be received 
into it as individuals, and so it would only know the indi- 
vidual : just as it happens with the sensitive powers which 
receive forms in a corporeal organ; since matter is the 
principle by which forms are individualized. It follows, 
therefore, that the intellectual soul, and every intellectual 
substance which has knowledge of forms absolutely, is 
exempt from composition of matter and form. 

Reply Ohj. i. The First Act is the universal principle of 
all acts; because It is infinite, virtually precontaining all 
things, as Dionysius says {Div. A'om. v.). Wherefore 
things participate of It not as a part of themselves, but by 
dilTusion of Its processions. Now as potentiality is recep- 
tive of act, it must be proportionate to act. But the acts 
received which proceed from the First Infinite Act, and are 
participations thereof, are diverse, so that there cannot be 
one potentiality which receives all acts, as there is one act. 



15 THE ESSENCE OF THE SOUL Q. 75- Art: 5 

from which all participated acts are derived ; for then the 
receptive potentiality would equal the active potentiality of 
the First Act. Now the receptive potentiality in the intel- 
lectual soul is other than the receptive potentiality of first 
matter, as appears from the diversity of the things received 
by each. For primary matter receives individual forms; 
whereas the intelligence receives absolute forms. Hence 
the existence of such a potentiality in the intellectual soul 
does not prove that the soul is composed of matter and 
form. 

Reply Ohj. 2. To be a subject and to be changed belong 
to matter by reason of its being in potentiality. As, 
therefore, the potentiality of the intelligence is one thing 
and the potentiality of primary matter another, so in each 
is there a different reason of subjection and change. For 
the intelligence is subject to knowledge, and is changed 
from ignorance to knowledge, by reason of its being in 
potentiality with regard to the intelligible species. 

Reply Ohj. 3. The form causes matter to be, and so does 
the agent ; wherefore the agent causes matter to be, so far 
as it actualizes it by transmuting it to the act of a form. A 
subsistent form, however, does not owe its existence to 
some formal principle, nor has it a cause transmuting it 
from potentiality to act. So after the words quoted above, 
the Philosopher concludes, that in things composed of 
matter and form there is no other cause but that which 
moves from potentiality to act; while whatsoever things 
have no matter are simply beings at once* 

Reply Ohj. 4. Everything participated is compared to 
the participator as its act. But whatever created form be 
supposed to subsist per se, must have existence by partici- 
pation ; for even life, or anything of that sort, is a par- 
ticipator of existence, as Dionysius says {Div, Nom. v.). 
Now participated existence is limited by the capacity of the 
participator; so that God alone. Who is His own existence, 

* The Leonine edition has, simpliciter sunt quod vere entia aliquid. 
The Parma edition of S. Thomas's Commentary on Aristotle has, statim 
per se titiuni qiiiddam est . , . et ens quiddam. 



Q. 75- Art. 6 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 16 

is pure act and infinite. But in intellectual substances, 
there is composition of actuality and potentiality, not, 
indeed, of matter and form, but of form and participated 
existence. Wherefore some say that they are composed of 
that whereby they are and that which they are; for 
existence itself is that by which a thing is. 

Sixth Article, 
whether the huisian soul is incorruptible? 

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article: — 

Objection i. It would seem that the human soul is cor- 
ruptible. For those things that have a like beginning and 
process seemingly have a like end. But the beginning, by 
generation, of men is like that of animals, for- they are 
made from the earth. And the process of life is alike in 
both; because all things breathe alike, and 7nan hath 
nothing more than the beast, as It is written (Eccles. iii. 19). 
Therefore, as the same text concludes, the death of man and 
beast is one, and the condition of both is equal. But the 
souls of brute animals are corruptible. Therefore, also, the 
human soul is corruptible. 

Obj. 2. Further, whatever is out of nothing can return to 
nothingness; because the end should correspond to the 
beginning. But as it is written (Wisd. ii. 2), We are born 
of nothing ; which is true, not only of the body, but also of 
the soul. Therefore, as is concluded in the same passage, 
Ajter this we shall be as if we had not been, even as to 
our soul. 

Obj. 3. Further, nothing is without its own proper opera- 
tion. But the operation proper to the soul, which is to 
understand through a phantasm, cannot be without the 
body. For the soul understands nothing without a phan- 
tasm ; and there is no phantasm without the body as the 
Philosopher says {De Anima i. i). Therefore the soul 
cannot survive the dissolution of the body. 

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv.) that 
human souls owe to Divine goodness that they are intel- 



17 THE ESSENCE OF THE SOUL Q. 7S-Art.6 

lectual, and that they have an incorruptible substantial 
life . 

I answer that, We must assert that the intellectual 
principle which we call the human soul is incorruptible. 
For a thing may be corrupted in two w^ays — per se, and 
accidentally. Now it is impossible for any substance to be 
generated or corrupted accidentally, that is, by the genera- . 
tion or corruption of something else. For generation and 
corruption belong to a thing, just as existence belongs to it, ^ V 
which is acquired by generation and lost by corruption. 
Therefore, whatever has existence per se cannot be 
generated or corrupted except per se; while things which 
do not subsist, such as accidents and material forms, 
acquire existence or lose it through the generation or 
corruption of composite things. Now it was shown above 
(AA. 2, 3) that the souls of brutes are not self-subsistent, 
whereas the human soul is ; so that the souls of brutes are 
corrupted, when their bodies are corrupted ; while the 
human soul could not be corrupted unless it were corrupted 
per se. This, indeed, is impossible, not only as regards the 
human soul, but also as regards anything subsistent that is 
a form alone. For it is clear that what belongs to a thing 
by virtue of itself is inseparable from it; but existence 
belongs to a form, which is an act, by virtue of itself. 
Wherefore matter acquires actual existence as it acquires 
the form ; while it is corrupted so far as the form is 
separated from it. But it is impossible for a form to be 
separated from itself; and therefore it is impossible for a 
subsistent form to cease to exist. 

Granted even that the soul is composed of matter and 
form, as some pretend, we should nevertheless have to 
maintain that it is incorruptible. For corruption is found 
only where there is contrariety ; since generation and cor- 
ruption are from contraries and into contraries. Wherefore 
the heavenly bodies, since they have no matter subject to 
contrariety, are incorruptible. Now there can be no con- 
trariety in the intellectual soul ; for it receives according to 

the manner of its existence, and those things which it 
1. 4 2 



Q. 75. Aur. 6 THE " SUMM A THEOLOGICA " .18 

receives are without contrariety ; for the notions even of 
contraries are not themselves contrary, since contraries 
belong to the same knowledge. Therefore it is impossible 
for the intellectual soul to be corruptible. Moreover we 
may take a sign of this from the fact that everything 
naturally aspires to existence after its own manner. Now, 
in things that have knowledge, desire ensues upon know- 
ledge. The senses indeed do not know existence, except 
under the conditions of here and now, whereas the intellect 
apprehends existence absolutely, and for all time; so that 
everything that has an intellect naturally desires always to 
exist. But a natural desire cannot be in vain. Therefore 
every intellectual substance is incorruptible. 

Reply Obj. i. Solomon reasons thus in the person of 
the foolish, as expressed in the words of Wisd. ii, There- 
fore the saying that man and animals have a like beginning 
in generation is true of the body ; for all animals alike are 
made of earth. But it is not true of the soul. For the souls 
of brutes are produced by some power of the body ; whereas 
the human soul is produced by God. To signify this, it is 
written as to other animals : Let the earth bring forth the 
living soul (Gen. i. 24) : while of man it is written (ibid. 
ii. 7) that He breathed into his face the breath of life. And 
so in the last chapter of Ecclesiastes (xii. 7) it is concluded : 
(Before) the dust return- into its earth from ivhence it was; 
and the spirit return to God Who gave it. Again the 
process of life is alike as to the body, concerning which it 
is written (Eccles. iii. 19) : All things breathe alike, and 
(Wisd. ii. 2), The breath in our nostrils is smoke. But the 
process is not alike of the soul ; for man is intelligent, 
whereas animals are not. Hence it is false to say : Man 
has nothing more than beasts. Thus death comes to both 
alike as to the body, but not as to the soul. 

Reply Obj. 2. As a thing can be created by reason, not 
of a passive potentiality, but only of the active potentiality 
of the Creator, Who can produce something out of nothing, 
so when we say that a thing can be reduced to nothing, we 
do not imply in the creature a potentiality to non- 



19 



THE ESSENCE OF THE SOUL Q. 75- Art. 7 



existence, but in the Creator the power of ceasing to sus- 
tain existence. But a thing is said to be corruptible because 
there is in it a potentiality to non-existence. 

Reply Obj. 3. To understand through a phantasm is the 
proper operation of the soul by virtue of its union with the 
body. After separation from the body it will have another 
mode of understanding, similar to other substances separated 
from bodies, as will appear later on (Q. LXXXIX., A. i). 



Seventh Article. 

WHETHER the SOUL IS OF THE SAME SPECIES AS AN 

ANGEL ? 

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article: — 

Objection i. It would seem that the soul is of the same 
species as an angel. For each thing is ordained to its 
proper end by the nature of its species, whence is derived 
its inclination for that end. But the end of the soul is the 
same as that of an angel — namely, eternal happiness. 
Therefore they are of the same species. 

Ob]. 2. Further, the ultimate specific difference is the 
noblest, because it completes the nature of the species. 
But there is nothing nobler either in an angel or in the soul 
than their intellectual nature. Therefore the soul and the 
angel agree in the ultimate specific difference : therefore 
they belong to the same species. 

Obj. 3. Further, it seems that the soul does not differ 
from an angel except in its union with the body. But as 
the body is outside the essence of the soul, it seems that it 
does not belong to its species. Therefore the soul and an 
angel are of the same species. 

On the contrary, Things which have different natural 
operations are of different species. But the natural opera- 
tions of the soul and of an angel are different ; since, as 
Dionysius says {Div. Nom. vii.). Angelic minds have 
simple and blessed intelligence, not gathering their know- 
ledge of Divine things from visible things. Subsequently 



Q. 75- Art. 7 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 20 

he says the contrary to this of the soul. Therefore the soul 
and an angel are not of the same species. 

/ ansiver thai, Origen (Peri Archon iii. 5) held that 
human souls and angels are all of the same species; and 
this because he supposed that in these substances the 
difference of degree was accidental, as resulting from their 
free-will : as we have seen above (Q. XLVII., A. 2). But 
this cannot be; for in incorporeal substances there cannot 
be diversity of number without diversity of species and 
inequality of nature ; because, as they are not composed of 
matter and form, but are subsistent forms, it is clear that 
there is necessarily among them a diversity in species. 
For a separate form cannot be understood otherwise than 
as one of a single species ; thus, supposing a separate 
whiteness to exist, it could only be one ; forasmuch as one 
whiteness does not differ from another except as in this or 
that subject. But diversity of species is always accompanied 
with a diversity of nature ; thus in species of colours one is 
more perfect than another ; and the same applies to other 
species, because differences which divide a genus are 
contrary to one another. Contraries, however, are com- 
pared to one another as the perfect to the imperfect, since 
the principle of contrariety is habit, and privation thereof, 
as is written, Metaph. x. (Did. ix. 4). The same would 
follow if the aforesaid substances were composed of matter 
and form. For if the matter of one be distinct from the 
matter of another, it follows that either the form is the 
principle of the distinction of matter — that is to say, that 
the matter is distinct on account of its relation to divers 
forms ;' and even then there would result a difference of 
species and inequality of nature : or else the matter is the 
principle of the distinction of forms. But one matter 
cannot be distinct from another, except by a distinction of 
quantity, which has no place in these incorporeal substances, 
such as an angel and the soul. So that it is not possible 
for the angel and the soul to be of the same species. How 
it is that there can be many souls of one species will be 
explained later (Q. LXX\T., A. 2, ad i). 



21 THE ESSENCE OF THE SOUL Q. 75- Art. 7 

Reply Obj. i. This argument proceeds from the proxi- 
mate and natural end. Eternal happiness is the ultimate 
and supernatural end. 

Reply Obj. 2. The ultimate specific difference is the 
noblest because it is the most determinate, in the same way 
as actuality is nobler than potentiality. Thus, however, 
the intellectual faculty is not the noblest, because it is in- 
determinate and common to many degrees of intellectuality ; 
as the sensible faculty is common to many degrees in the 
sensible nature. Hence, as all sensible things are not of 
one species, so neither are all intellectual things of one 
species. 

Reply Obj. 3. The body is not of the essence of the soul ; 
but the soul by the nature of its essence can be united to 
the body, so that, properly speaking, not the soul alone, 
but the composite, is the species. And the very fact that 
the soul in a certain way requires the body for its operation, 
proves that the soul is endowed with a grade of intellectu- 
ality inferior to that of an angel, who is not united to a 
bodv. 



QUESTION LXXVI. 

OF THE UNION OF BODY AND SOUL. 
{In Eisht Articles.) 

We now consider the union of the soul with the body; 
and concerning this there are eight points for inquiry : 
(i) Whether the intellectual principle is united to the body 
as its form ? (2) Whether the intellectual principle is 
multiplied numerically according to the number of bodies; 
or is there one intelligence for all men ? (3) Whether in the 
body the form of which is an intellectual principle, there is 
some other soul ? (4) Whether in the body there is any 
other substantial form ? (5) Of the qualities required in 
the body of which the intellectual principle is the form ? 
(6) Whether it be united to such a body by means of 
another body ? (7) Whether by means of an accident ? 
(8) Whether the soul is wholly in each part of the body ? 

First Article. 

whether the intellectual principle is united to the 

body as its form ? 

We proceed thus to the First Article: — 
Objection I. It seems that the intellectual principle is not 
united to the body as its form. For the Philosopher says 
{De Anima iii. 4) that the intellect is separate, and that it is 
not the act of any body. Therefore it is not united to the 
body as its form. 

Qi,j,'j. Further, every form is determined according to 
the nature of i "^ matter of which it is the form; otherwise 
no nroportion.vould be required between matter and form. 
Therefore if-'ie intellect were united to the body as its 



23 UNION OF BODY AND SOUL Q. 6. Art. i 

form, since every body has a determinate nature, it would 
follow that the intellect has a determinate nature; and thus, 
it would not be capable of knowing all things, as is clear 
from what has been said (Q. LXXV., A. 2) ; which is con- 
trary to the nature of the intellect. Therefore the intellect 
is not united to the body as its form. 

Obj. 3. Further, whatever receptive power is an act of a 
body, receives a form materially and individually; for what 
is received must be received according to the condition of 
the receiver. But the form of the thing understood is not 
received into the intellect materially and individually, but 
rather immaterially and universally : otherwise the intellect 
would not be capable of the knowledge of immaterial and 
universal objects, but only of individuals, like the senses. 
Therefore the intellect is not united to the body as its form. 

Obj. 4. Further, power and action have the same sub- 
ject; for the same subject is what can, and does, act. But 
the intellectual action is not the action of a body, as appears 
from above (Q. LXXV., A. 2). Therefore neither is the 
intellectual faculty a power of the body. But virtue or 
power cannot be more abstract or more simple than the 
essence from which the faculty or power is derived. There- 
fore neither is the substance of the intellect the form of 
a body. 

Obj. 5. Further, whatever has per se existence is not 
united to the body as its form; because a form is that by 
which a thing exists : so that the very existence of a form 
does not belong to the form by itself. But the intellectual 
principle has per se existence and is subsistent, as was said 
above (Q. LXXV., A. 2). Therefore it is not united to the 
body as its form. 

Obj. 6. Further, whatever exists in a thing by reason of 
its nature exists in it always. But to be united to matter 
belongs to the form by reason of its nature; because form 
is the act of matter, not by any accidental quality, but by 
its own essence ; otherwise matter and form would not make 
a thing substantially one, but only accidentally one. There- 
fore a form cannot be without its own proper matter. But 



Q. 76. Art. I THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 24 

the intellectual principle, since it is incorruptible, as was 
shown above (Q. LXXV., A. 6), remains separate from the 
body, after the dissolution of the body. Therefore the 
intellectual principle is not united to the body as its form. 
v/ On the contrary, According to the Philosopher, Metaph. 

\r'Z- viii. (Did. vii. 2), difference is derived from the form. But 
the difference which constitutes man is rational, which is 
applied to man on account of his intellectual principle. 
Therefore the intellectual principle is the form of man. 

I answer that, We must assert that the intellect which 

is the principle of intellectual operation is the form of the 

i^ human body.( For that whereby primarily anything acts is 

y^ a form of the thing to which the act is to be attributed : for 

\Jl instance, that whereby a body is primarily healed is health, 

i^ ^^ and that whereby the soul knows primarily is knowledge ; 

%_, \ hence health is a form of the body, and knowledge is a form 

"i of the soul. The reason is because nothing acts except so 

far as it is in act ; wherefore a thing acts by that whereby it 

, is in act. Now it is clear that the first thing by which the 

body lives is the soul. And as life appears through various 

^ operations in different degrees of living things, that whereby 

\^ we primarily perform each of all these vital actions is the 

. 'cr soul. For the soul is the primary principle of our nourish- 

^ ment, sensation, and local movement; and likewise of our 

'^^ understanding. Therefore this principle by which we 

•i primarily understand, whether it be called the intellect or 

the intellectual soul, is the form of the body. This is the 

demonstration used by Aristotle {De Anima ii. 2). 

But if anyone say that the intellectual soul is not the 

^^ form of the body he must first explain how it is that this 

'^ action of understanding is the action of this particular man ; 

for each one is conscious that it is himself who understands. 

Now an action may be attributed to anyone in three ways, 

' as is clear from the Philosopher (Phys. v. i) ; for a thing 

is said to move or act, either by virtue of its whole self, 

for instance, as a physician heals ; or by virtue of a part, 

as a man sees by his eye; or through an accidental quality, 

as when we say that something that is white builds, because 



25 UNION OF BODY AND SOUL Q. 76.ART. i 

it is accidental to the builder to be white. So when we say 
that Socrates or Plato understands, it is clear that this is 
not attributed to him accidentally ; since it is ascribed to 
him as man, which is predicated of him essentially. We 
must therefore say either that Socrates understands by virtue 
of his whole self, as Plato maintained, holding that man is 
an intellectual soul ; or that intelligence is a part of Socrates. 
The first cannot stand, as was shown above (Q. LXXV., 
A. 4), for this reason, that it is one and the same man who 
is conscious both that he understands, and that he senses. 
But one cannot sense without a body : therefore the body 
must be some part of man. It follows therefore that the 
intellect by which Socrates understands is a part of Socrates, 
so that in some way it is united to the body of Socrates. 

The Commentator held that this union is through the in- 
telligible species, as having a double subject, in the possible 
intellect, and in the phantasms which are in the corporeal 
organs. Thus through the intelligible species the possible 
intellect is linked to the body of this or that particular man. 
But this link or union does not sufficiently explain the fact, 
that the act of the intellect is the act of Socrates. This 
can be clearly seen from comparison with the sensitive 
faculty, from which Aristotle proceeds to consider things 
relating to the intellect. For the relation of phantasms to 
the intellect is like the relation of colours to the sense of 
sight, as he says De Anima iii. 5, 7. Therefore, as the 
species of colours are in the sight, so are the species of phan- 
tasms in the possible intellect. Now it is clear that because 
the colours, the images of which are in the sight, are on a 
wall, the action of seeing is not attributed to the wall : for 
we do not say that the wall sees, but rather that it is seen. 
Therefore, from the fact that the species of phantasms are 
in the possible intellect, it does not follow that Socrates, in 
whom are the phantasms, understands, but that he or his 
phantasms are understood. 

Some, however, tried to maintain that the intellect is 



united to the body as its motor; and hence that the in- 
tellect and body form one thing so that the act of the 



Q. 76. Art. I THE *' SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 26 

intellect could be attributed to the whole. This is, however, 
absurd for many reasons. First, because the intellect does 
not move the body except through the appetite, the move- 
ment of which presupposes the operation of the intellect. 
The reason therefore why Socrates understands is not 
because he is moved by his intellect, but rather, contrari- 
wise, he is moved by his intellect because he understands. 
Secondly, because, since Socrates is an individual in a 
nature of one essence composed of matter and form, if the 
intellect be not the form, it follows that it must be outside 
the essence, and then the intellect is to the whole Socrates 
as a motor to the thing moved. Whereas the act of intellect 
remains in the agent, and does not pass into something else, 
as does the action of heating. Therefore the action of 
understanding cannot be attributed to vSocrates -for the 
reason that he is moved by his intellect. Thirdly, because 
the action of a motor is never attributed to the thing moved, 
except as to an instrument ; as the action of a carpenter to 
a saw. Therefore if understanding is attributed to Socrates, 
as the action of what moves him, it follows that it is at- 
tributed to him as to an instrument. This is contrary to the 
teaching of the Philosopher, who holds that understanding 
is not possible through a corporeal instrument {De Anima 
iii. 4). Fourthly, because, although the action of a part be 
attributed to the whole, as the action of the eye is attributed 
to a man ; yet it is never attributed to another part, except 
perhaps indirectly; for we do not say that the hand sees 
because the eye sees. Therefore if the intellect and Socrates 
are united in the above manner, the action of the intellect 
cannot be attributed to Socrates. If, however, Socrates be 
a whole composed of a union of the intellect with whatever 
else belongs to Socrates, and still the intellect be united to 
those other things only as a motor, it follows that Socrates 
is not one absolutely, and consequently neither a being 
absolutely, for a thing is a being according as it is one. 

There remains, therefore, no other explanation than that 
given by Aristotle — namely, that this particular man under- 
stands, because the intellectual principle is his form. Thus 



27 UNION OF BODY AND SOUL Q.76. Art. i 

from the very operation of the intellect it is made clear that 
the intellectual principle is united to the body as its form, 
i The same can be clearly shown from the nature of the 
*human species. 1^'or the nature of each thing- is shown by 
its operation. Now the proper operation of man as man 
is to understand; because he thereby surpasses all other 
animals. Whence Aristotle concludes (Ethic, x. 7) that the 
ultimate happiness of man must consist in this operation as 
properly belonging to him. Man must therefore derive his 
species from that which is the principle of this operation. 
But the species of anything is derived from its form. It 
follows therefore that the intellectual principle is the proper 
form of man. 

But we must observe that the nobler a form is, the more 
it rises above corporeal matter, the less it is merged in 
matter, and the more it excels matter by its power and its 
operation ; hence we find that the form of a mixed body has 
another operation not caused by its elemental qualities. ""^ 
And the higher we advance in the nobility of forms, the '- 
more we find that the power of the form excels the elemen- 
tary matter ; as the vegetative soul excels the form of the 
metal, and the sensitive soul excels the vegetative soul. Now 
the human soul is the highest and noblest of forms. Where- 
fore it excels corporeal matter in its power by the fact that : 
it has an operation and a power in which corporeal matter , " 
has no share whatever. This power is called the intellect. ) 

It is well to remark that if anyone holds that the soul is 
composed of matter and form, it would follow that in no 
way could the soul be the form of the body. For since the 
form is an act, and matter is only in potentiality, that which 
is composed of matter and form cannot be the form of 
another by virtue of itself as a whole. But if it is a form by 
virtue of some part of itself, then that part which is the form 
we call the soul, and that of which it is the form we call the 
primary animate, as was said above (Q. LXXV., A. 5). 

Reply Ohj. i. As the Philosopher says (Phys. ii. 2), 
the ultimate natural form to which the consideration of the 
natural philosopher is directed is indeed separate; yet it 



Q. 76. Art. I THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 28 

exists in matter. He proves this from the fact that man 
and the sun generate man jrom matter. It is separate 
indeed according to its intellectual power, because the 
intellectual power does not belong to a corporeal organ, as 
the power of seeing is the act of the eye; for understanding 
is an act which cannot be performed by a corporeal organ, 
like the act of seeing. But it exists in matter so far as 
the soul itself, to which this powder belongs, is the form of 
the body, and the term of human generation. And so the 
Philosopher says (De Anima iii.) that the intellect is 
separate, because it is not the faculty of a corporeal organ. 

From this it is clear how to answer the Second and Third 
objections : since, in order that man may be able to under- 
stand all things by means of his intellect, and that his 
intellect may understand immaterial things and universals, 
it is sufficient that the intellectual power be not the act ot 
the body. 

Reply Obj. 4. The human soul, by reason of its perfec- 
tion, is not a form merged in matter, or entirely embraced 
by matter. Therefore there is nothing to prevent some 
power thereof not being the act of the body, although the 
soul is essentially the form of the body. 

Reply Obj. 5. The soul communicates that existence in 
which it subsists to the corporeal matter, out of which and 
the intellectual soul there results unity of existence; so that 
the existence of the whole composite is also the existence 
of the soul. This is not the case with other non-subsistent 
forms. For this reason the human soul retains its own 
existence after the dissolution of the body ; whereas it is 
not so with other forms. 

Reply Obj. 6. To be united to the body belongs to the 
soul by reason of itself, as it belongs to a light body by 
reason of itself to be raised up. And as a light body 
remains light, when removed from its proper place, retain- 
ing meanwhile an aptitude and an inclination for its proper 
place; so the human soul retains its proper existence when 
separated from the body, having an aptitude and a natural 
inclination to be united to the body. 



29 UNION OF BODY AND SOUL Q. 76. Art. 2 



Second Article. 

whether the intellectual principle is multiplied 
according to the number of bodies? 

We proceed thus to the Second Article: — 

Objection i. It would seem that the intellectual principle 
is not multiplied according to the number of bodies, but 
that there is one intellect in all men. For an immaterial 
substance is not multiplied in number within one species. 
But the human soul is an immaterial substance; since it is 
not composed of matter and form, as was shown above 
(Q. LXXV., A. 5). Therefore there are not many human 
souls in one species. But all men are of one species. 
Therefore there is but one intellect in all men. 

Ohj. 2. Further, when the cause is removed, the effect is 
also removed. Therefore, if human souls were multiplied 
according to the number of bodies, it follows that the bodies 
being removed, the number of souls would not remain ; 
but from all the souls there would be but a single remainder. 
This is heretical ; for it would do away with the distinction 
of rewards and punishments. 

Obj. 3. Further, if my intellect is distinct from your 
intellect, my intellect is an individual, and so is yours; 
for individuals are things which differ in number but 
agree in one species. Now whatever is received into any- 
thing must be received according to the condition of the 
receiver. Therefore the species of things would be received 
individually into my intellect, and also into yours : which 
is contrary to the nature of the intellect which knows 
universals. 

Obj. 4. Further, the thing understood is in the intellect 
which understands. If, therefore, my intellect is distinct 
from yours, what is understood by me must be distinct 
from what is understood by you ; and consequently it will 
be reckoned as something individual, and be only potenti- 
ally something understood; so that the common intention 
will have to be abstracted from both ; since from things 



g. 7.6. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 30 

diverse something intelligible common to them may be 
abstracted. But this is contrary to the nature of the intel- 
lect; for then the intellect would seem not to be distinct 
from the imagination. It seems, therefore, to follow that 
there is one intellect in all men. 

Obj. 5. Further, when the disciple receives knowledge 
from the master, it cannot be said that the master's know- 
ledge begets knowledge in tiie disciple, because then also 
knowledge would be an active form, such as heat is, which 
is clearly false. It seems, therefore, that the same indi- 
vidual knowledge which is in the master is communicated 
to the disciple ; which cannot be, unless there is one intellect 
in both. Seemingly, therefore, the intellect of the disciple 
and master is but one; and, consequently, the same applies 
to all men. 

Obj. 6. Further, Augustine (De Quant. Animce xxxii.) 
says : If I tvere to say that there are many human souls, I 
should laugh at myself. But- the soul seems to be one 
chiefly on account of the intellect. Therefore there is one 
intellect of all men. 

On the contrary, The Philosopher says {Phys. ii. 3) that 
the relation of universal causes to universals is like the 
relation of particular causes to individuals. But it is im- 
possible that a soul, one in species, should belong to 
animals of different species. Therefore it is impossible that 
one individual intellectual soul should belong to several 
individuals. 

/ answer that, It is absolutely impossible for one intellect 
to belong to all men. This is clear if, as Plato maintained, 
man is the intellect itself. For it would follow that Socrates 
and Plato are one man ; and that they are not distinct from 
each other, except by something outside the essence of 
each. The distinction between Socrates and Plato would 
be no other than that of one man with a tunic and another 
with a cloak ; which is quite absurd. 

It is likewise clear that this is impossible if, according to 
the opinion of Aristotle (De Anima ii. 2), it is supposed 
that the intellect is a part or a power of the soul which is 



o 



I UNION OF BODY AND SOUL Q. 76. Art. 2 



the form of man. For it is impossible for many distinct 
individuals to have one form, as it is impossible for them to 
have one existence, for the form is the principle of existence. 

Again, this is clearly impossible, whatever one may hold 
as to the manner of the union of the intellect to this or that 
man. For it is manifest that, supposing there is one prin- 
cipal agent, and two instruments, we can say that there is 
one agent absolutely, but several actions; as when one man 
touches several things with his two hands, there will be one 
who touches, but two contacts. If, on the contrary, we 
suppose one instrument and several principal agents, we 
might say that there are several agents, but one act ; for 
example, if there be many drawing a ship by means of a 
rope; there will be many drawing, but one pull. If, how- 
ever, there is one principal agent, and one instrument, we 
say that there is one agent and one action, as when the 
smith strikes with one hammer, there is one striker and one 
stroke. Now it is clear that no matter how the intellect is 
united or coupled to this or that man, the intellect has the 
precedence of all the other things which appertain to man ; 
for the sensitive powers obey the intellect, and are at its 
service. Therefore, if we suppose two men to have several 
intellects and one sense, — for instance, if two men had one 
eye, — there would be several seers, but one sight. But if 
there is one intellect, no matter how diverse may be all 
those things of which the intellect makes use as instru- 
ments, in no way is it possible to say that Socrates and 
Plato are otherwise than one understanding man. And if 
to this we add that to understand, which is the act of the 
intellect, is not affected by any organ other than the intel- 
lect itself; it will further follow that there is but one agent 
and one action : that is to say that all men are but one 
" understander," and have but one act of understanding-, 
in regard, that is, of one intelligible object. 

However, it would be possible to distinguish my intel- 
lectual action from yours by the distinction of the phan- 
tasms — that is to say, were there one phantasm of a stone 
in me, and another in you — if the phantasm itself, as it is 



g. 76. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 32 

one thing in me and another in you, were a form of the 
possible intellect ; since the same agent according to divers 
forms produces divers actions ; as, according to divers forms 
of things with regard to the same eye, there are divers 
visions. But the phantasm itself is not a form of the 
possible intellect ; it is the intelligible species abstracted from 
the phantasm that is a form. ^Now in one intellect, from 
different phantasms of the same species, only one intel- 
ligible species is abstracted; as appears in one man, in 
whom there may be different phantasms of a stone; yet 
from all of them only one intelligible species of a stone is 
abstracted; by which the intellect of that one man, by one 
operation, understands the nature of a stone, notwith- 
standing the diversity of phantasms. Therefore, if there 
were one intellect for all men, the diversity of phantasms 
which are in this one and that one would not cause a 
diversity of intellectual operation in this man and that man. 
It follows, therefore, that it is altogether impossible and un- 
reasonable to maintain that there exists one intellect for all 
men. 

Reply Ohj. i. Although the intellectual soul, like an 
angel, has no matter from which it is produced, yet it is the 
form of a certain matter; in which it is unlike an angel. 
Therefore, according to the division of matter, there are 
many souls of one species ; while it is quite impossible for 
many angels to be of one species. 

Reply Ohj. 2. Everything has unity in the same way that 
it has being; consequently we must judge of the multi- 
plicity of a thing as we judge of its being. Now it is 
clear that the intellectual soul, by virtue of its very being, 
is united to the body as its form ; yet, after the dissolution 
of the body, the intellectual soul retains its own being. 
In like manner the multiplicity of souls is in proportion to 
the multiplicity of bodies ; yet, after the dissolution of the 
bodies, the souls retain their multiplied being. 

Reply Ohj. 3. Individuality of the intelligent being, or 
of the species whereby it understands, does not exclude the 
understanding of universals; otherwise, since separate in- 



33 UNION OF BODY AND SOUL Q. 76. Art. 2 

tellects are subsistent substances, and consequently indi- 
vidual, they could not understand universals. But the 
materiality of the knower, and of the species whereby it 
knows, impedes the knowledge of the universal. For as 
every action is according to the mode of the form by which 
the agent acts, as heating is according to the mode of 
the heat; so knowledge is according to the mode of the 
species by which the knower knows. Now it is clear that 
common nature becomes distinct and multiplied by reason 
of the individuating principles which come from the 
matter. Therefore if the form, which is the means of 
knowledge, is material — that is, not abstracted from 
material conditions — its likeness to the nature of a species 
or genus will be according to the distinction and multiplica- 
tion of that nature by means of individuating principles; so 
that knowledge of the nature of a thing in general will be 
impossible. But if the species be abstracted from the 
conditions of individual matter, there will be a likeness of 
the nature without those things which make it distinct and 
multiplied; thus there will be knowledge of the universal. 
Nor does it matter, as to this particular point, whether 
there be one intellect or many ; because, even if there were 
but one, it would necessarily be an individual intellect, and 
the species whereby it understands, an individual species. 

Reply Obj. 4. Whether the intellect be one or many, 
what is understood is one; for what is understood is in the 
intellect, not according to its own nature, but according to 
its likeness ; for the stone is not in the soul, but its likeness 
is, as is said De Anima iii. 8. Yet it is the stone which is 
understood, not the likeness of the stone ; except by a 
reflection of the intellect on itself : otherwise, the objects 
of sciences would not be things, but only intelligible 
species. Now it happens that different things, according to 
different forms, are likened to the same thing. And since 
knowledge is begotten according to the assimilation of the 
knower to the thing known, it follows that the same thing 
may happen to be known by several knowers ; as is ap- 
parent in regard to the senses; for several see the same 

1-4 3 



Q.76.ART.3 THE "SUAIMA THEOLOGICA " 34 

colour, according to different likenesses. In the same way 
several intellects understand one object understood. But 
there is this difference, according to the opinion of Aristotle, 
between the sense and the intelligence — that a thing is 
perceived by the sense according to the disposition which 
it has outside the soul — that is, in its individuality ; whereas 
the nature of the thing understood is indeed outside the soul, 
but the mode according to which it exists outside the soul 
is not the mode according to which it is understood. For 
the common nature is understood as apart from the indi- 
viduating principles; whereas such is not its mode of 
existence outside the soul. But, according to the opinion 
of Plato, the thing understood exists outside the soul in the 
same conditions as those under which it is understood; 
for he supposed that the natures of things exist separate 
from matter. 

Reply Obj. 5. One knowledge exists in the disciple and 
another in the master. How it is caused will be shown 
later on (Q. CXVH., A. i). 

Reply Obj. 6. Augustine denies a plurality of souls, that 
would involve a plurality of species. 

Third Article. 

whether besides the intellectual soul there are in 
man other souls essentially different from one 

ANOTHER ? 

We proceed thus to the Third Article: — 
Objection i. It would seem that besides the intellectual 
soul there are in man other souls essentially different from 
one another, such as the sensitive soul and the nutritive 
soul. For corruptible and incorruptible are not of the same 
substance. But the intellectual soul is incorruptible; 
whereas the other souls, as the sensitive and the nutritive, 
are corruptible, as was shown above (Q. LXXV., A. 6). 
Therefore in man the essence of the intellectual soul, the 
sensitive soul, and the nutritive soul, cannot be the same. 
Obj. 2. Further, if it be said that the sensitive soul in 



35 UNION OF BODY AND SOUL Q- 76. Art. 3 

man is incorruptible; on the contrary, corruptible and in- 
corruptible differ generically, says the Philosopher, 
Metaph. x. (Did. ix. 10). But the sensitive soul in the 
horse, the lion, and other brute animals, is corruptible. 
If, therefore, in man it be incorruptible, the sensitive soul 
in man and brute animals will not be of the same genus. 
Now, an animal is so called from its having a sensitive 
soul ; and, therefore, animal will not be one genus common 
to man and other animals, which is absurd. 

Obj. 3. Further, the Philosopher says {De Gener. 
Animal, ii. 3) that the embryo is an animal before it is a 
man. But this would be impossible if the essence of the 
sensitive soul were the same as that of the intellectual soul ; 
for an animal is such by its sensitive soul, while a man is a 
man by the intellectual soul. Therefore in man the essence 
of the sensitive soul is not the same as the essence of the 
intellectual soul. 

Obj. 4. Further, the Philosopher says, Metaph. viii. 
(Did. vii. 2), that the genus is taken from the matter, and 
difference from the form. But rational, which is the differ- 
ence constituting man, is taken from the intellectual soul; 
while he is called animal by reason of his having a body 
animated by a sensitive soul. Therefore the intellectual 
soul may be compared to the body animated by a sensitive 
soul, as form to matter. Therefore in man the intel- 
lectual soul is not essentially the same as the sensitive soul, 
but presupposes it as a material subject. 

On the contrary, It is said in the- Book De Ecclesiasticis 
Dogniatibus xv. : Nor do we say that there are two souls in 
one man, as James and other Syrians write ; one, animal, by 
which the body is animated, and which is mingled with the 
blood; the other, spiritual, which obeys the reason; but we 
say that it is one and the same soul in man, that both gives 
life to the body by being united to it, and orders itself by its 
own reasoning. 

I answer that, Plato held that there were several souls in 
one body, distinct even as to organs, to which souls he 
referred the different vital actions, saying that the nutri- 



g. 76. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 36 

tive power is in the liver, the concupiscible in the heart, 
and the power of knowledge in the brain. Which opinion 
is rejected by Aristotle {De A7iima ii. 2), with regard to 
those parts of the soul which use corporeal organs ; for this 
reason, that in those animals which continue to live when 
they have been divided, in each part are observed the opera- 
tions of the soul, as sense and appetite. Now this would 
not be the case if the various principles of the soul's opera- 
tions were essentially different, and distributed in the 
various parts of the body. ^But with regard to the intel- 
lectual part, he seems to leave it in doubt whether it be 
only logically distinct from the other parts of the soul, or 
also locally. \ 

The opinion of Plato might be maintained if, as he held, 
the soul were supposed to be united to the body, not as its 
form, but as its motor. For it involves nothing unreason- 
able that the same movable thing be moved by several 
motors; and still less if it "be moved according to its 
various parts, /ii we suppose, however, that the soul is 
united to the body as its form, it is quite impossible for 
several essentially different souls to be in one bodyi This 
can be made clear by three reasons. 

In the first place, an animal would not be absolutely one, 
in which there were several souls. For nothing is absolutely 
one except by one form, by which a thing has existence : 
because a thing has from the same source both existence 
and unity; and therefore things which are denominated by 
various forms are not absolutely one; as, for instance, 
a white man. If, therefore, man were living by one form, 
the vegetative soul, and atiimal by another form, the sensi- 
tive soul, and man by another form, the intellectual soul, it 
would follow that rnan is not absolutely one. Thus Aristotle 
argues, Metaph. viii. (Did. vii. 6), against Plato, that if the 
idea of an animal is distinct from the idea of a biped, then 
a biped animal is not absolutely one. For this reason, 
against those who hold that there are several souls in the 
body, he asks {De Anima i. 5), what contains them? — that 
is, what makes them one? It cannot be said that they are 



37 UNION OF BODY AND SOUL Q. 76. Art. 3 

united by the one body ; because rather does the soul 
contain the body and make it one, than the reverse. 

Secondly, this is proved to be impossible by the manner 
in which one thing is predicated of another. Those things 
which are derived from various forms are predicated of one 
another, either accidentally, (if the forms are not ordered 
one to another, as when we say that something white is 
sweet), or essentially, in the second manner of essential 
predication, (if the forms are ordered one to another, the 
subject belonging to the definition of the predicate ; as a 
surface is presupposed to colour ; so that if we say that a 
body with a surface is coloured, we have the second manner 
of essential predication). Therefore, if we have one form 
by which a thing is an animal, and another form by which 
it is a man, it follows either that one of these two things 
could not be predicated of the other, except accidentally, 
supposing these two forms not to be ordered to one another, 
— or that one would be predicated of the other according 
to the second manner of essential predication, if one soul 
be presupposed to the other. But both of these conse- 
quences are clearly false : because animal is predicated of 
man essentially and not accidentally ; and man is not part 
of the definition of an animal, but the other way about. 
Therefore of necessity by the same form a thing is animal 
and man ; otherwise man would not really be the thing 
which is an animal, so that animal can be essentially 
predicated of man. 

Thirdly, this is shown to be impossible by the fact that 
when one operation of the soul is intense it impedes 
another, which could never be the case unless the principle 
of action were essentially one. 

We must therefore conclude that in man the sensitive 
soul, the intellectual soul, and the nutritive soul are 
numerically one soul. This can easily be explained, if we 
consider the differences of species and forms. For we 
observe that the species and forms of things differ from one 
another, as the perfect and the imperfect; as in the order of 
things, the animate are more perfect than the inanimate. 



Q. 76. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 38 

and animals more perfect than plants, and man than brute 
animals; and in each of these genera there are various 
degrees. For this reason Aristotle, Melaph. viii. (Did. 
vii. 3), compares the species of things to numbers, which 
differ in species by the addition or subtraction of unity. 
And (De Anima ii. 3) he compares the various souls to the 
species of figures, one of which contains another; as a 
pentagon contains and exceeds a tetragon. Thus the intel- 
lectual soul contains virtually whatever belongs to the sensi- 
tive soul of brute animals, and to the nutritive soul of 
plants. Therefore, as a surface which is of a pentagonal 
shape, is not tetragonal by one shape, and pentagonal by 
another — since a tetragonal shape would be superfluous 
as contained in the pentagonal — so neither is Socrates a 
man by one soul, and an animal by another; but by one 
and the same soul he is both animal and man. 

Reply Ohj. i. The sensitive soul is incorruptible, not by 
reason of its being sensitive, but by reason of its being 
intellectual. When, therefore, a soul is sensitive only, it 
is corruptible; but when with sensibility it has also intel- 
lectuality, it is incorruptible. For although sensibility does 
not give incorruptibility, yet it cannot deprive intellectu- 
ality of its incorruptibility. 

Reply Ohj. 2. Not forms, but composites, are classified 
either generically or specifically. Now man is corruptible 
like other animals. And so the difference of corruptible 
and incorruptible which is on the part of the forms does 
not involve a generic difference between man and the other 
animals. 

Reply Ohj. 3. The embryo has first of all a soul which is 
merely sensitive, and when this is removed, it is supplanted 
by a more perfect soul, which is both sensitive and intel- 
lectual : as will be shown farther on (Q. CXVIII., A. 2, 
ad 2). 

Reply Ohj. 4. We must not consider the diversity of 
natural things as proceeding from the various logical 
notions or intentions, which flow from our manner of 
understanding, because reason can apprehend one and the 



39 UNION OF BODY AND SOUL Q.76.ART.4 

same thing in various ways. Therefore since, as we have 
said, the intellectual soul contains virtually what belongs 
to the sensitive soul, and something more, reason can 
consider separately what belongs to the power of the sensi- 
tive soul, as something imperfect and material. And be- 
cause it observes that this is something common to man 
and to other animals, it forms thence the notion of the 
genus: while that wherein the intellectual soul exceeds the 
sensitive soul, it takes as formal and perfecting; and thence 
it gathers the difference of man. 



Fourth Article. 

whether in man there is another form besides 
the intellectual soul ? 

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : — 

Objection i. It would seem that in man there is another 
form besides the intellectual soul. For the Philosopher 
says (De Anivia ii. i), that the soul is the act of a physical 
body which has life potentially. Therefore the soul is to 
the body as a form to matter. But the body has a sub- 
stantial form by which it is a body. Therefore some other 
substantial form in the body precedes the soul. 

Obj. 2. Further, man moves himself as every animal 
does. Now everything that moves itself is divided into 
two parts, of which one moves, and the other is moved, as 
the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii. 5). But the part which 
moves is the soul. Therefore the other part must be such 
that it can be moved. But primary matter cannot be 
moved {ibid. v. i), since it is a being only potentially; 
indeed everything that is moved is a body. Therefore in 
.man and in every animal there must be another substantial 
form, by which the body is constituted. 

Obj. 3. Further, the order of forms depends on their 
relation to primary matter; for before and after apply by 
comparison to some beginning. Therefore if there were 
not in man some other substantial form besides the rational 
soul, and if this were to inhere immediately to primary 



g. 76. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 40 

matter ; it would follow that it ranks among the most 
imperfect forms which inhere to matter immediately. 

Obj. 4. Further, the human body is a mixed body. Now 
mingling does not result from matter alone; for then we 
should have mere corruption. Therefore the forms of the 
elements must remain in a mixed body; and these are 
substantial forms. Therefore in the human body there are 
other substantial forms besides the intellectual soul. 

On the contrary, Of one thing there is but one sub- 
stantial being. But the substantial form gives substantial 
being. Therefore of one thing there is but one substantial 
form. But the soul is the substantial form of man. There- 
fore it is impossible for there to be in man another sub- 
stantial form besides the intellectual soul. 

I answer that, If we suppose that the intellectual soul is 
not united to the body as its form, but only as I'ts motor, as 
the Platonists maintain, it would necessarily follow that in 
man there is another substantial form, by which the body 
is established in its being as movable by the soul. If, 
however, the intellectual soul be united to the body as its 
substantial form, as we have said above (A. 1), it is 
impossible for another substantial form besides the intel- 
lectual soul to be found in man. 

In order to make this evident, we must consider that the 
substantial form differs from the accidental form in this, 
that the accidental form does not make a thing to be 
simply, but to be such, as heat does not make a thing to 
be simply, but only to be hot. Therefore by the coming of 
the accidental form a thing is not said to be made or 
generated simply, but to be made such, or to be in some 
particular condition ; and in like manner, when an acci- 
dental form is removed, a thing is said to be corrupted, 
not simply, but relatively. Now the substantial form gives 
being simply ; therefore by its coming a thing is said to be 
generated simply ; and by its removal to be corrupted 
simply. For this reason, the old natural philosophers, 
who held that primary matter was some actual being — for 
instance, fire or air, or something of that sort — maintained 



41 UNION OF BODY AND SOUL Q. 76. Art. 4 

that nothing is generated simply, or corrupted simply ; and 
stated that every becoming is nothing hut an alteration, as 
we read Phys. i. 4. Therefore, if besides the intellectual 
soul there pre-existed in matter another substantial form by 
which the subject of the soul were made an actual being, it 
would follow that the soul does not give being simply ; and 
consequently that it is not the substantial form : and so at 
the advent of the soul there would not be simple generation ; 
nor at its removal simple corruption, all of which is clearly 
false. 

Whence we must conclude, that there is no other sub- 
stantial form in man besides the intellectual soul ; and that 
the soul, as it virtually contains the sensitive and nutritive 
souls, so does it virtually contain all inferior forms, and 
itself alone does whatever the imperfect forms do in other 
things. The same is to be said of the sensitive soul in 
brute animals, and of the nutritive soul in plants, and 
universally of all more perfect forms with regard to the 
imperfect. 

Reply Ohj. i. Aristotle does not say that the soul is the 
act of a body only, but the act of a physical organic body 
which has life potentially ; and that this potentiality does 
not reject the soul. Whence it is clear that when the soul 
is called the act, the soul itself is included ; as when we say 
that heat is the act of what is hot, and light of what is 
lucid; not as though lucid and light were two separate 
things, but because a thing is made lucid by the light. In 
like manner, the soul is said to be the act of a body, etc., 
because by the soul it is a body, and is organic, and has 
life potentially. Yet the first act is said to be in potentiality 
to the second act, which is operation ; for such a potentiality 
does not reject — that is, does not exclude — the soul. 

Reply Obj. 2. The soul does not move the body by its 
essence, as the form of the body, but by the motive power, 
the act of which presupposes the body to be already 
actualized by the soul : so that the soul by its motive power 
is the part which moves; and the animate body is the part 
moved. 



Q. 76. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 42 

Reply Obj. 3. We observe in matter various degrees of 
perfection, as existence, living, sensing, and understand- 
ing. Now what is added is always more perfect. There- 
fore that form which gives matter only the first degree of 
perfection is the most imperfect; while that form whicii 
gives the first, second, and third degree, and so on, is the 
most perfect : and yet it inheres to matter immediately. 

Reply Obj. 4. Avicenna held that the substantial forms 
of the elements remain entire in the mixed body; and that 
the mixture is made by the contrary qualities of the 
elements being reduced to an average. But this is im- 
possible, because the various forms of the elements must 
necessarily be in various parts of matter; for the distinction 
of which we must suppose dimensions, without which 
matter cannot be divisible. Now matter subject to dimen- 
sion is not to be found except in a body. But various 
bodies cannot be in the same place. Whence it follows 
that elements in the mixed body would be distinct as 10 
situation. And then there would not be a real mixture 
which is in respect of the whole ; but only a mixture 
apparent to sense, by the juxtaposition of particles. 

Averrocs maintained that the forms of elements, by 
reason of their imperfection, are a medium between acci- 
dental and substantial forms, and so can be more or less; 
and therefore in the mixture they are modified and reduced 
to an average, so that one form emerges from them. But 
this is even still more impossible. For the substantia] 
being of each thing consists in something indivisible, and 
every addition and subtraction varies the species, as in 
numbers, as stated in Metaph. viii. (Did. vii. 3); and 
consequently it is impossible for any substantial form to 
receive rnore or less. Nor is it less impossible for anything 
to be a medium between substance and accident. 

Therefore we must say, in accordance with the Philoso- 
pher {De Gener. i. 10), that the forms of the elements 
remain in the mixed body, not actually but virtually. For 
the proper qualities of the elements remain, though modi- 
fied; and in them is the power of the elementary forms. 



43 UNION OF BODY AND SOUL Q. 76. Art. s 

This quality of the mixture is the proper disposition for 
the substantial form of the mixed body ; for instance, the 
form of a stone, or of any sort of soul. 



Fifth Article. 

whether the intellectual soul is properly 
united to such a body? 

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article: — 

Objection i. It would seem that the intellectual soul is 
improperly united to such a body. For matter must be 
proportionate to the form. But the intellectual soul is 
incorruptible. Therefore it is not properly united to a 
corruptible body. 

Obj. 2. Further, the intellectual soul is a perfectly im- 
material form ; a proof whereof is its operation in which 
corporeal matter does not share. But the more subtle is the 
body, the less has it of matter. Therefore the soul should 
be united to a most subtle body, to fire, for instance, and 
not to a mixed body, still less to a terrestrial body. 

Obj. 3. Further, since the form is the principle of the 
species, one form cannot produce a variety of species. But 
the intellectual soul is one form. Therefore, it should not 
be united to a body which is composed of parts belonging 
to various species. 

Obj. 4. Further, what is susceptible of a more perfect 
form should itself be more perfect. But the intellectual 
soul is the most perfect of souls. Therefore since the 
bodies of other animals are naturally provided with a 
covering, for instance, with hair instead of clothes, and 
hoofs instead of shoes; and are, moreover, naturally pro- 
vided with arms, as claws, teeth, and horns ; it seems that 
the intellectual soul should not have been united to a body 
which is imperfect as being deprived of the above means 
of protection. 

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima ii. i), 
that the soul is the act of a physical organic body having 
life potentially. 



Q. 76. Art. 5 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 44 

/ answer that, Since the form is not for the matter, but 
rather the matter for the form, we must gather from the 
form the reason why the matter is such as it is ; and not 
conversely. Now the intellectual soul, as we have seen 
above (Q. LV., A. 2) in the order of nature, holds the 
lowest place among intellectual substances; inasmuch as it 
is not naturally gifted with the knowledge of truth, as the 
angels are; but has to gather knowledge from individual 
things by way of the senses, as Dionysius says {Div. 
Nom. vii.). But nature never fails in necessary things : 
therefore the intellectual soul had to be endowed not only 
with the power of understanding, but also with the power 
of feeling. Now the action of the senses is not performed 
without a corporeal instrument. Therefore it behoved the 
intellectual soul to be united to a body fitted to be a con- 
venient organ of sense. 

Now all the other senses are based on the sense of touch. 
But the organ of touch requires to be a medium between 
contraries, such as hot and cold, wet and dry, and the like, 
of which the sense of touch has the perception ; thus it is in 
potentiality with regard to contraries, and is able to perceive 
them. Therefore the more the organ of touch is reduced to 
an equable complexion, the more sensitive will be the touch. 
But the intellectual soul has the power of sense in all its 
completeness; because what belongs to the inferior nature 
pre-exists more perfectly in the superior, as Dionysius says 
{Div. Nom. v.). Therefore the body to which the intel- 
lectual soul is united should be a mixed body, above others 
reduced to the most equable complexion. For this reason 
among animals, man has the best sense of touch. And 
among men, those who have the best sense of touch have 
the best intelligence. A sign of which is that we observe 
those who are refined in body are well endowed in mind, as 
stated in De Anima ii. 9. 

Reply Obj. i. Perhaps someone might attempt to answer 
this by saying that before sin the human body was incor- 
ruptible. This answer does not seem sufficient; because 
before sin the human body was immortal not by nature, 



45 UNION OF BODY AND SOUL Q. 76. Art. 5 

but by a gift of Divine grace; otherwise its immortality 
would not be forfeited through sin, as neither was the 
immortality of the devil. 

Therefore we answer otherwise by observing that in 
matter two conditions are to be found ; one which is chosen 
in order that the matter be suitable to the form ; the other 
which follows by force of the first disposition. The artisan, 
tor instance, for the form of the saw chooses iron adapted 
tor cutting through hard material; but that the teeth of the 
saw may become blunt and rusted, follows by force of the 
matter itself. So the intellectual soul requires a body of 
equable complexion, which, however, is corruptible by 
force of its matter. If, however, it be said that God could 
avoid this, we answer that in the formation of natural 
things we do not consider what God might do ; but what is 
suitable to the nature of things, as Augustine says {Gen. ad 
lit. ii. i). God, however, provided in this case by applying 
a remedy against death in the gift of grace. 

Reply Obj. 2. A body is not necessary to the intellectual 
soul by reason of its intellectual operation considered as 
such ; but on account of the sensitive power, which requires 
an organ of equable temperament. Therefore the intel- 
lectual soul had to be united to such a body, and not to a 
simple element, or to a mixed body, in which fire was in 
excess ; because otherwise there could not be an equability 
of temperament. And this body of an equable temperament 
has a dignity of its own by reason of its being remote from 
contraries, thereby resembling in a way a heavenly body. 

Reply Obj. 3. The parts of an animal, for instance, the 
eye, hand, flesh, and bones, and so forth, do not make the 
species ; but the whole does, and therefore, properly speak- 
ing, we cannot say that these are of dififerent species, but 
that they are of various dispositions. This is suitable to 
the intellectual soul, which, although it be one in its 
essence, yet on account of its perfection, is manifold in 
power : and therefore, for its various operations it requires 
various dispositions in the parts of the body to which it is 
united. For this reason we observe that there is a greater 



0.76. Art. 6 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA '* 46 

variety of parts in perfect than in imperfect animals; and 
in these a greater variety than in plants. 

Reply Obj. 4. The intellectual soul as comprehending 
universals, has a power extending to the infinite; therefore 
it cannot be limited by nature to certain fixed natural 
notions, or even to certain fixed means whether of defence 
or of clothing, as is the case with other animals, the souls 
of which are endowed with knowledge and power in regard 
to fixed particular things. Instead of all these, man has by 
nature his reason and his hands, which are the organs of 
organs (De Anima iii.), since by their means man can make 
for himself instruments of an infinite variety, and for any 
number of purposes. 

Sixth Article. 

whether the intellectual soul is united to the body 
through the medium of accidental dispositions ? 

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article: — 

Objection i. It would seem that the intellectual soul is 
united to the body through the medium of accidental dis- 
positions. For every form exists in its proper disposed 
matter. But dispositions to a form are accidents. There- 
fore we must presuppose accidents to be in matter before the 
substantial form ; and therefore before the soul, since the 
soul is a substantial form. •, 

Obj. 2. F"urther, various forms of one species require 
various parts of matter. But various parts of matter are 
unintelligible without division in measurable quantities. 
Therefore we must suppose dimensions in matter before the 
substantial forms, which are many belonging to one species. 

Obj. 3. Further, what is spiritual is connected with what 
is corporeal by virtual contact. But the virtue of the soul 
is its power. Therefore it seems that the soul is united to 
the body by means of a power, which is an accident. 

On the contrary, Accident is posterior to substance, both 
in the order of time and in the order of reason, as the 
Philosopher says, Metaph. vii. (Did. vi. 1). Therefore it 



47 UNION OF BODY AND SOUL Q. 76. Art. 6 

is unintelligible that any accidental form exist in matter 
before the soul, which is the substantial form. 

I answer that, If the soul were united to the body, merely 
as a motor, there would be nothing to prevent the existence 
of certain dispositions mediating between the soul and the 
body ; on the contrary, they would be necessary, for on 
the part of the soul would be required the power to move 
the body ; and on the part of the body, a certain aptitude 
to be moved by the soul. 

If, however, the intellectual soul is united to the body as 
the substantial form, as we have already said above (A. i), 
it is impossible for any accidental disposition to come 
between the body and the soul, or between any substantial 
form whatever and its matter. The reason is because since 
matter is in potentiality to all manner of acts in a certain 
order, what is absolutely first among the acts must be 
understood as being first in matter. Now the first among 
all acts is existence. Therefore, it is impossible for matter 
to be apprehended as hot, or as having quantity, before it 
is actual. But matter has actual existence by the substantial 
form, which makes it to exist absolutely, as we have said 
above (A. 4). Wherefore it is impossible for any accidental 
dispositions to pre-exist in matter before the substantial 
form, and consequently before the soul. 

Feply Obj. i. As appears from what has been already 
said (A. 4), the more perfect form virtually contains what- 
ever belongs to the inferior forms; therefore while remain- 
ing one and the same, it perfects matter according to the 
various degrees of perfection. For the same essential form 
makes man an actual being, a body, a living being, an 
animal, and a man. Now it is clear that to every genus 
follow its own proper accidents. Therefore as matter is 
apprehended as perfected in its existence, before it is 
understood as corporeal, and so on ; so those accidents 
which belong to existence are understood to exist before 
corporeity; and thus dispositions are understood in matter 
before the form, not as regards all its effects, but as regards 
the subsequent effect. 



Q. 76. Art. 7 THE " SUM MA THEOLOGICA " 48 

Reply Obj. 2. Dimensions of quantity are accidents 
consequent to the corporeity which belongs to the whole 
matter. Wherefore matter, once understood as corporeal 
and measurable, can be understood as distinct in its various 
parts, and as receptive of different forms according to the 
further degrees of perfection. For although it is essentially 
the same form which gives matter the various degrees of 
perfection, as we have said {ad i), yet it is considered as 
different when brought under the observation of reason. 

Reply Obj. 3. A spiritual substance which is united to a 
body as its motor only, is united thereto by power or virtue. 
But the intellectual soul is united by its very being to the 
body as a form ; and yet it guides and moves the body by 
its power and virtue. 

Seventh Article. 

whether the soul is united to the anim.-u- body 
by means of a body ? 

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article: — 

Objection i. It seems that the soul is united to the 
animal body by means of a body. For Augustine says 
{Gen. ad lit. vii. 19), that the soul administers the body by 
light, that is, by fire, and by air, which are most akin to a 
spirit. But fire and air are bodies. Therefore the soul is 
united to the human body by means of a body. 

Obj. 2. Further, a link between two things seems to be 
that thing: the removal of which involves the cessation of 
their union. But when breathing ceases, the soul is 
separated from the body. Therefore the breath, which is 
a subtle body, is the means of union between soul and 
body. 

Obj. 3. Further, things which are very distant from one 
another, are not united except by something between them. 
But the intellectual soul is very distant from the body, both 
because it is incorporeal, and because it is incorruptible. 
Therefore it seems to be united to the body by means of 
an incorruptible body, and such would be some heavenly 



49 UNION OF BODY AND SOUL Q. 76. Art. 7 

light, which would harmonize the elements, and unite 
them together. 

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima ii. 1) : 
We need not ask if the soul and body are one, as neither 
do ive ask if wax and its shape are one. But the shape is 
united to the wax without a body intervening. Therefore 
also the soul is thus united to the body. 

/ answer that, If the soul, according to the Platonists, 
were united to the body merely as a motor, it would be 
right to say that some other bodies must intervene between 
the soul and body of man, or any animal whatever; for a 
motor naturally moves what is distant from it by means of 
something nearer. 

If, however, the soul is united to the body as its form, as 
we have said above (A. i), it is impossible for it to be 
united by means of another body. The reason of this is 
that a thing is one, according as it is a being. Now the 
form, through itself, makes a thing to be actual since it is 
itself essentially an act ; nor does it give existence by means 
of something else. Wherefore the unity of a thing com- 
posed of matter and form, is by virtue of the form itself, 
which by reason of its very nature is united to matter as its 
act. Nor is there any other cause of union except the 
agent, which causes matter to be in act, as the Philosopher 
says, Metaph. viii. (Did. vii. 6). 

From this it is clear how false are the opinions of those 
who maintained the existence of some mediate bodies- 
between the soul and body of man. Of these certain 
Platonists said that the intellectual soul has an incor- 
ruptible body naturally united to it, from which it is 
never separated, and by means of which it is united to the 
corruptible body of man. Others said that the soul is 
united to the body by means of a corporeal spirit. Others 
said it is united to the body by means of light, which, they 
say, is a body and of the nature of the fifth essence; so that 
the vegetative soul would be united to the body by means 
of the light of the sidereal heaven ; the sensible soul, by 
means of the light of the crystal heaven ; and the intellectual 



Q. 76. Art. 8 THE " SUM MA THEOLOGICA " 50 

soul by means of the light of the empyrean heaven. Now 
all this is fictitious and ridiculous : for light is not a body; 
and the fiftli essence does not enter materially into the 
composition of a mixed body (since it is unchangeable), 
but only virtually : and lastly, because the soul is imme- 
diately united to the body as the form to matter. 

Reply Obj. i. Augustine speaks there of the soul as it 
moves the body; whence he uses the word administration. 
It is true that it moves the grosser parts of the body by the 
more subtle parts. And the first instrument of the motive 
power is a kind of spirit, as the Philosopher says in De 
causa 77iotus animalium {De mot. animal, x.). 

Reply Obj. 2. The union of soul and body ceases at the 
cessation of breath, not because this is the means of union, 
but because of the removal of that disposition by which 
the body is disposed for such a union. Nevertheless the 
breath is a means of moving, as the first instrument of 
motion. 

Reply Obj. 3. The soul is indeed very distant from the 
body, if we consider the condition of each separately : so 
that if each had a separate existence, many means of con- 
nection would have to intervene. But inasmuch as the soul 
is the form of the body, it has not an existence apart from 
the existence of the body, but by its own existence is united 
to the body immediately. This is the case with every form 
which, if considered as an act, is very distant from matter, 
which is a being only in potentiality. 



Eighth Article, 
.whether the whole soul is in each part of the 

BODY ? 

iWe proceed thus to the Eighth Article: — 

Objection i. It would seem that the whole soul is not in 
each part of the body ; for the Philosopher says in De causa 
motus animalium (De mot. aiiimal. x.) : It is not necessary 
for the soul to be in each part of the body ; it suffices that it 



51 UNION OF BODY AND SOUL Q. 76 Art. 8 

be in some principle of the body causing the other parts to 
live, for each part has a natural movement of its own. 

Obj. 2. Further, the soul is in the body of which it is the 
act. But it is the act of an organic body. Therefore it 
exists only in an organic body. But each part of the 
human body is not an organic body. Therefore the whole 
soul is not in each part. 

Obj. 3. Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima ii. i) 
that the relation of a part of the soul to a part of the body, 
such as the sight to the pupil of the eye, is the same as the 
relation of the soul to the whole body of an animal. If, 
therefore, the whole soul is in each part of the body, it 
follows that each part of the body is an animal. 

Obj. 4. Further, all the powers of the soul are rooted in 
the essence of the soul. If, therefore, the whole soul be in 
each part of the body, it follows that all the powers of the 
soul are in each part of the body ; thus the sight will be in 
the ear, and hearing in the eye, and this is absurd. 

Obj. 5. Further, if the whole soul is in each part of the 
body, each part of the body is immediately dependent on 
the soul. Thus one part would not depend on another; nor 
would one part be nobler than another; which is clearly 
untrue. Therefore the soul is not in each part of the body. 

On the contrary, Augustine says {De Trin. vi. 6), that in 
each body the whole soul is in the whole body, and in each 
part is entire. 

I answer that, As we have said, if the soul were united to 
the body merely as its motor, we might say that it is not in 
each part of the body, but only in one part through which 
it would move the others. But since the soul is united to 
the body as its form, it must necessarily be in the whole 
body, and in each part thereof. For it is not an accidental 
form, but the substantial form of the body. Now the 
substantial form perfects not only the whole, but each part 
of the whole. For since a whole consists of parts, a form 
of the whole which does not give existence to each of the 
parts of the body, is a form consisting in composition and 
order, such as the form of a house; and such a form is 



g. 76. Art. 8 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 52 

accidental. But the soul is a substantial form; and there- 
fore it must be the form and the act, not only of the whole, 
but also of each part. Therefore, on the withdrawal of the 
soul, as we do not speak of an animal or a man unless 
equivocally, as we speak of a painted animal or a stone 
animal ; so is it with the hand, the eye, the flesh and bones, 
as the Philosopher says {De Anima ii. 1). A proof of 
which is, that on the withdrawal of the soul, no part of the 
body retains its proper action ; although that which retains 
its species, retains the action of the species. But act is in 
that which it actuates : wherefore the soul must be in the 
whole body, and in each part thereof. 

That it is entire in each part thereof, may be concluded 
from this, that since a whole is that which is divided into 
parts, there are three kinds of totality, corresponding to 
three kinds of division. There is a whole which is divided 
into parts of quantity, as a wTiole line, or a whole body. 
-^There is also a whole which is divided into logical and 
essential parts : as a thing defined is divided into the parts 
of a definition, /and a composite into matter and form. 
There is, further, a third kind of whole which is potential, 
divided into virtual parts. The first kind of totality does 
not apply to forms, except perhaps accidentally ; and then 
only to those forms, which have an indifferent relationship 
to a quantitative whole and its parts; as whiteness, as far 
as its essence is concerned, is equally disposed to be in the 
whole surface, and in each part of the surface; and, there- 
fore, the surface being divided, the whiteness is accidentally 
divided. But a form which requires variety in the parts, 
such as a soul, and specially the soul of perfect animals, is 
not equally related to the whole and the parts : hence it is 
not divided accidentally when the whole is divided So 
therefore quantitative totality cannot be attributed to the 
soul, either essentially or accidentally. But the second 
kind of totality, which depends on logical and essential 
perfection, properly and essentially belongs to forms : and 
likewise the virtual totality, because a form is the principle 
of operation. 



53 UNION OF BODY AND SOUL Q. 76. Art. 

Therefore if it be asked whether the whole whiteness is 
in the whole surface and in each part thereof, it is necessary 
to distinguish. If we mean quantitative totality which 
whiteness has accidentally, then the whole whiteness is not 
in each part of the surface. The same is to be said of 
totality of power : since the whiteness which is in the whole 
surface moves the sight more than the whiteness which is 
in a small part thereof. But if we mean totality of species 
and essence, then the whole whiteness is in each part of a 
surface. 

Since, however, the soul has not quantitative totality, 
neither essentially, nor accidentally, as we have seen ; it is 
enough to say that the whole soul is in each part of the 
body, by totality of perfection and of essence, but not by 
totality of power. For it is not in each part of the body, 
with regard to each of its powers; but with regard to sight, 
it is in the eye; and with regard to hearing, it is in the ear; 
and so forth. We must observe, however, that since the 
soul requires variety of parts, its relation to the whole is 
not the same as its relation to the parts ; for to the whole it 
is compared primarily and essentially, as to its proper and 
proportionate perfectible ; but to the parts, secondarily, 
inasmuch as they are ordained to the whole. 

Reply Obj. i. The Philosopher is speaking there of the 
motive power of the soul. 

Reply Obj. 2. The soul is the act of an organic body, as 
of its primary and proportionate perfectible. 

Reply Obj. 3. An animal is that which is composed of a 
soul and a whole body, which is the soul's primary and 
proportionate perfectible. Thus the soul is not in a part. 
Whence it does not follow that a part of an animal is an 
animal. 

Reply Obj. 4. Some of the powers of the soul are in it 
according as it exceeds the entire capacity of the bodv, 
namely, the intellect and the will; whence these powers 
are not said to be in any part of the body. Other powers 
are common to the soul and body ; wherefore each of these 
powers need not be wherever the soul is, but only in that 



Q. 76. Art. 8 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 54 

part of the body, which is adapted to the operation of such 
a power. 

Reply Obj. 5. One part of the body is said to be nobler 
than another, on account of the various powers, of which 
the parts of the body are the organs. For that part which 
is the organ of a nobler power, is a nobler part of the 
body : as also is that part which serves the same power in 
a nobler manner. 



QUESTION LXXVn. 

OF THOSE THINGS WHICH BELONG TO THE POWERS OF 
THE SOUL IN GENERAL. 

(/;; Eight Articles.) 

We proceed to consider those things which belong to the 
powers of the soul ; first, in general, secondly, in par- 
ticular. Under the first head there are eight points of 
inquiry : (i) Whether the essence of the soul is its power? 

(2) Whether there is one power of the soul, or several ? 

(3) How the powers of the soul are distinguished from one 
another ? (4) Of the order of the powers, one to another. 
(5) Whether the powers of the soul are in it as in their 
subject ? (6) Whether the powers flow from the essence of 
the soul ? (7) Whether one power rises from another ? 
(8) Whether all the powers of the soul remain in the soul 
after death ? 

First Article, 
whether the essence of the soul is its power ? 

We proceed thus to the First Article: — 

Objection i. It would seem that the essence of the soul is 
its power. For Augustine says {De Trin. ix. 4), that mind, 
knowledge, and love are in the soul substantially, or, which 
is the same thing, essentially : and {ibid. ^. 11), that memory, 
understanding , and will are one life, one mind, one essence. 

Obj. 2. Further, the soul is nobler than primary matter. 
But primary matter is its own potentiality. Much more 
therefore is the soul its own power. 

Obj, 3. Further, the substantial form is simpler than the 
accidental form; a sign of which is that the substantial 

55 



Q. 77. Art. I THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA" 56 

form is not intensified or relaxed, but is indivisible. But 
the accidental form is its own power. Much more therefore 
is that substantial form which is the soul. 

Obj. 4. Further, we sense by the sensitive power and we 
understand by the intellectual power. But that by which 
we first sense and understand is the soul, according to the 
Philosopher {De Anima ii. 2). Therefore the soul is its 
own power. 

Obj. 5. Further, whatever does not belong to the essence 
is an accident. Therefore if the power of the soul is some- 
thing else beside the essence thereof, it is an accident, 
which is contrary to Augustine, who says that the foregoing 
{see Obj. i) are not in the soul as in a subject, as colour or 
shape, or any other quality, or quantity, are in a body ; for 
whatever is so, does not exceed the subject in which it is: 
whereas the mind can love and know other things {De 
Trin. ix. 4). 

Obj. 6. Further, a simple form cannot be a subject. But 
the soul is a simple form ; since it is not composed of matter 
and form, as we have said above (Q. LXXV., A. 5). There- 
fore the power of the soul cannot be in it as in a subject. 

Obj. 7. Further, an accident is not the principle of a 
substantial difference. But sensitive and rational are sub- 
stantial dijferences ; and they are taken from sense and 
reason, which are powers of the soul. Therefore the 
powers of the soul are not accidents ; and so it would seem 
that the power of the soul is its own essence. 

On the contrary, Dionysius {Gael. Hier. xi.) says that 
heavenly spirits are divided into essence, power, and opera- 
tion. Much more, then, in the soul is the essence distinct 
from the virtue or power. 

I answer that, It is impossible to admit that the power 

of the soul is its essence, although some have maintained it. 

For the present purpose this may be proved in two ways. 

First, because, since power and act divide being and every 

Kind »f beinp- we must refer a power and its act to the 

same genus, j^.'^-vefore, if the act be not in the genus of 

substance, the n '^^^ directed to that act cannot be in the 



57 POWERS OF THE SOUL Q. 77. Art. i 

genus of substance. Now the operation of the soul is not in 
the genus of substance ; for this belongs to God alone, 
whose operation is His own substance. Wherefore the 
Divine power which is the principle of His operation is 
the Divine Essence itself. This cannot be true either of the 
soul, or of any creature ; as we have said above when speak- 
ing of the angels (Q. LIV., A. 3). Secondly, this may be 
also shown to be impossible in the soul. For the soul by 
its very essence is an act. Therefore if the very essence of 
the soul were the immediate principle of operation, whatever 
has a soul would always have actual vital actions, as that 
which has a soul is always an actually living thing. For 
as a form the soul is not an act ordained to a further act, 
but the ultimate term of generation. Wherefore, for it to 
be in potentiality to another act, does not belong to it 
according to its essence, as a form, but according to its 
power. So the soul itself, as the subject of its power, is 
called the first act, with a further relation to the second act. 
Now we observe that what has a soul is not always actual 
with respect to its vital operations ; whence also it is said in 
the definition of the soul, that it is the act of a body having 
life potentially ; which potentiality, however, does not ex- 
clude the soul. Therefore it follows that the essence of the 
soul is not its power. For nothing is in potentiality by 
reason of an act, as act. 

Reply Obj. i. Augustine is speaking of the mind as it 
knows and loves itself. Thus knowledge and love as 
referred to the soul as known and loved, are substantially 
or essentially in the soul, for the very substance or essence 
of the soul is known and loved. In the same way are we to 
understand what he says in the other passage, that those 
things are one life, one mind, one essence. Or, as some 
say, this passage is true in the sense in which the potential 
whole is predicated of its parts, being midway between the 
universal whole, and the integral whole. For the universal 
whole is in each part according to its entire essence and 
power; as animal in a man and in a horse; and therefore it 
is properly predicated of each part. But the integral whole 



Q. 77. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 58 

is not in each part, neither according to its whole essence, 
nor according to its whole power. Therefore in no way 
can it be predicated of each part; yet in a way it is predi- 
cated, though improperly, of all the parts together ; as if we 
were to say that the wall, roof, and foundations are a house. 
But the potential whole is in each part according to its 
whole essence, not, however, according to its whole power. 
Therefore in a way it can be predicated of each part, but not 
so properly as the universal whole. In this sense, Augustine 
says that the memory, understanding, and will are the one 
essence of the soul. 

Reply Obj. 2. The act to which primary matter is in 
potentiality is the substantial form. Therefore the potenti- 
ality of matter is nothing else but its essence. 

Reply Obj. 3. Action belongs to the composite, as does 
existence; for to act belongs to what exists. Now the 
composite has substantial existence through the substantial 
form ; and it operates by the power which results from the 
substantial form. Hence an active accidental form is to 
the substantial form of the agent (for instance, heat com- 
pared to the form of fire) as the power of the soul is to the 
soul. 

Reply Obj. 4. That the accidental form is a principle of 
action is due to the substantial form. Therefore the sub- 
stantial form is the first principle of action ; but not the 
proximate principle. In this sense the Philosopher says 
that the soul is that whereby we uiiderstand and sense. 

Reply Obj. 5. If we take accident as meaning what is 
divided against substance, then there can be no medium 
between substance and accident ; because they are divided 
by affirmation and negation, that is, according to existence 
in a subject, and non-existence in a subject. In this sense, 
as the power of the soul is not its essence, it must be an 
accident ; and it belongs to the second species of accident, 
that of quality. But if we take accident as one of the five 
universals, in this sense there is a medium between sub- 
stance and accident. For the substance is all that belongs 
to the essence of a thing ; whereas whatever is beyond the 



59 



POWERS OF THE SOUL Q. 77- Art. 2 



essence of a thing cannot be called accident in this sense; 
but only what is not caused by the essential principle of the 
species. For the proper does not belong to the essence of 
a thing, but is caused by the essential principles of the 
species ; wherefore it is a medium between the essence and 
accident thus understood. In this sense the powers of the 
soul may be said to be a medium between substance and 
accident, as being natural properties of the soul. When 
Augustine says that knowledge and love are not in the soul 
as accidents in a subject, this must be understood in the 
sense given above, inasmuch as they are compared to the 
soul, not as loving and knowing, but as loved and known. 
His argument proceeds in this sense ; for if love were in the 
soul loved as in a subject, it would follow that an accident 
transcends its subject, since even other things are loved 
through the soul. 

Reply Obj. 6. Although the soul is not composed of 
matter and form, yet it has an admixture of potentiality, as 
we have said above (Q. LXXV., A. 5, ad 4); and for this 
reason it can be the subject of an accident. The statement 
quoted is verified in God, Who is the Pure Act; in treating 
of which subject Boethius employs that phrase {De Trin. i.). 

Reply Obj. 7. Rational and sensitive, as differences, are 
not taken from the powers of sense and reason, but from 
the sensitive and rational soul itself. But because sub- 
stantial forms, which in themselves are unknown to us, are 
known by their accidents ; nothing prevents us from some- 
times substituting accidents for substantial differences. 

Second Article. 

whether there are several powers of the soul? 

We proceed thus to the Second Article: — 

Objection i. It would seem that there are not several 

powers of the soul. For the intellectual soul approaches 

nearest to the likeness of God. But in God there is one 

simple power : and therefore also in the intellectual soul. 

Obj. 2. Further, the higher a power is, the more unified 



Q. 77. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 60 

it is. But the intellectual soul excels all other forms in 
power. Therefore above all others it has one virtue or 
power. 

Obj. 3. Further, to operate belongs to what is in act. 
But by the one essence of the soul, man has actual existence 
in the different degrees of perfection, as we have seen above 
(Q. LXXVI., AA. 3, 4). Therefore by the one power of the 
soul he performs operations of various degrees. 

On the contrary, The Philosopher places several powers 
in the soul (De Anima ii. 2, 3). 

1 ansiver that, Of necessity we must place several powers 
in the soul. To make this evident, we observe that, as the 
Philosopher says {De Coelo ii. 12), the lowest order of things 
cannot acquire perfect goodness, but they acquire a certain 
imperfect goodness, by few movements ; and those which 
belong to a higher order acquire perfect goodness by many 
movements; and those yet higher acquire perfect goodness 
by few movements; and the highest perfection is found in 
those things which acquire perfect goodness without any 
movement whatever. Thus he is least of all disposed to 
health, who can only acquire imperfect health by means of 
a few remedies ; better disposed is he who can acquire perfect 
health by means of many remedies ; and better still, he who 
can by few remedies ; best of all is he who has perfect health 
without any remedies. We conclude, therefore, that things 
which are below man acquire a certain limited goodness; 
and so they have a few determinate operations and powers. 
But man can acquire universal and perfect goodness, 
because he can acquire beatitude. Yet he is in the last 
degree, according to his nature, of those to whom beatitude 
is possible; therefore the human soul requires many and 
various operations and powers. But to angels a smaller 
variety of powers is sufficient. In God there is no power or 
action beyond His own Essence. 

There is yet another reason why the human soul abounds 
in a variety of powers ; — because it is on the confines of 
spiritual and corporeal creatures; and therefore the powers 
of both meet together in the soul. 



6i POWERS OF THE SOUL Q. 77- Art. 3 

Reply Obj. i. The intellectual soul approaches to the 
Divine likeness, more than inferior creatures, in being able 
to acquire perfect goodness ; although by many and various 
means; and in this it falls short of more perfect creatures. 

Reply Obj. 2. A unified power is superior if it extends to 
equal things : but a multiform power is superior to it, if it 
is over many things. 

Reply Obj. 3. One thing has one substantial existence, 
but may have several operations. So there is one essence 
of the soul, with several powers. 



Third Article. 

"whether the powers are distinguished by their 

acts and objects ? 

We proceed thus to the Third Article: — 

Objection i. It would seem that the powers of the soul 
are not distinguished by acts and objects. For nothing is 
determined to its species by what is subsequent and ex- 
trinsic to it. But the act is subsequent to the power; and 
the object is extrinsic to it. Therefore the soul's powers are 
not specifically distinct by acts and objects, 

Obj. 2. Further, contraries are what differ most from 
each other. Therefore if the powers are distinguished by 
their objects, it follows that the same power could not have 
contrary objects. This is clearly false in almost all the 
powers ; for the power of vision extends to white and black, 
and the power of taste to sweet and bitter. 

Obj. 3. Further, if the cause be removed, the effect" is 
removed. Hence if the difference of powers came from the 
difference of objects, the same object would not come under 
different powers. This is clearly false; for the same thing 
is known by the cognitive power, and desired by the 
appetitive. 

Obj. 4. Further, that which of itself is the cause of any- 
thing, is the cause thereof, wherever it is. But various 
objects which belong to various powers, belong also to 



Q.77-ART.3 THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 62 

some one power; as sound and colour belong- to sight and 
hearing, which are dififerent powers, yet they come under 
the one power of common sense. Therefore the powers are 
not distinguished according to the difference of their objects. 

On the contrary. Things that are subsequent are distin- 
guished by what precedes. But the Philosopher says {De 
Anima ii. 4) that acts and operations precede the powers 
according to the reason; and these again are preceded by 
their opposites, that is their objects. Therefore the powers 
are distinguished according to their acts and objects. 

/ ansiver that, A power as such is directed to an act. 
Wherefore we seek to know the nature of a power from the 
act to which it is directed, and consequently the nature of 
a power is diversified, as the nature of the act is diversified. 
Now the nature of an act is diversified according to the 
various natures of the objects. For every act is either of an 
active power or of a passive power. Now, the object is to 
the act of a passive power, as the principle and moving 
cause : for colour is the principle of vision, inasmuch as it 
moves the sight. On the other hand, to the act of an active 
power the object is a term and end ; as the object of the 
power of growth is perfect quantity, which is the end of 
growth. Now, from these two things an act receives its 
species, namely, from its principle, or from its end or term ; 
for the act of heating differs from the act of cooling, in this, 
that the former proceeds from something hot, which is the 
active principle, to heat; the latter from something cold, 
which is the active principle, to cold. Therefore the powers 
are of necessity distinguished by their acts and objects. 

Nevertheless, we must observe that things which are 
accidental do not change the species. For since to be 
coloured is accidental to an animal, its species is not 
changed by a difference of colour, but by a difference in 
that which belongs to the nature of an animal, that is to 
say, bv a difference in the sensitive soul, which is some- 
times rational, and sometimes otherwise. Hence rational 
and irrational are differences dividing animal, constituting 
its various species. In like manner, therefore, not any 



63 POWERS OF THE SOUL Q. 77- Art. 3 

variety of objects diversifies the powers of the soul, but a 
difference in that to which the power of its very nature is 
directed. Thus the senses of their very nature are directed 
to the passive quaHty which of itself is divided into colour, 
sound, and the like, and therefore there is one sensitive 
power with regard to colour, namely, sight, and another 
with regard to sound, namely, hearing. But it is accidental 
to a passive quality, for instance, to something coloured, to 
be a musician or a grammarian, great or small, a man or 
a stone. Therefore by reason of such differences the powers 
of the soul are not distinct. 

Reply Obj. i. Act, though subsequent in existence to 
power, is, nevertheless, prior to it in intention and logically ; 
as the end is with regard to the agent. And the object, 
although extrinsic, is, nevertheless, the principle or end of 
the action ; and those conditions which are intrinsic to a 
thing, are proportionate to its principle and end. 

Reply Obj. 2. If any power were to have one of two 
contraries as such for its object, the other contrary would 
belong to another power. But the power of the soul does 
not regard the nature of the contrary as such, but rather 
the common aspect of both contraries ; as sight does not 
regard white as such, but as colour. This is because of 
two contraries one, in a manner, includes the idea of the 
other, since they are to one another as perfect and im- 
perfect. 

Reply Obj. 3. Nothing prevents things which coincide 
in subject, from being considered under different aspects; 
therefore they can belong to various powers of the soul. 

Reply Obj. 4. The higher power of itself regards a more 
universal formality of the object than the lower power ; 
because the higher a power is, to a greater number of 
things does it extend. Therefore many things are com- 
bined in the one formality of the object, which the higher 
power considers of itself ; while they differ in the formalities 
regarded by the lower powers of themselves. Thus it is that 
various objects belong to various lower powers; which 
objects, however, are subject to one higher power. 



g. 77. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 64 



Fourth Article, 
whether among the powers of the soul there is 

ORDER ? 

We proceed thus to the Fourth 'Article: — 

Objection 1. It would seem that there is no order among 
the powers of the soul. For in those things which come 
under one division, there is no before and after, but all are 
naturally simultaneous. But the powers of the soul are 
contradistinguished from one another. Therefore there is 
no order among them. 

Obj. 2. Further, the powers of the soul are referred to 
their objects, and to the soul itself. On the part of the soul, 
there is not order among them, because the soul is one. 
In like manner the objects are various and dissimilar, as 
colour and sound. Therefore there is no order among the 
powers of the soul. 

Obj. 3. Further, where there is order among powers, we 
find that the operation of one depends on the operation of 
another. But the action of one power of the soul does not 
depend on that of another; for sight can act independently 
of hearing, and conversely. Therefore there is no order 
among the powers of the soul. 

On the contrary, The Philosopher {De Anima ii. 3) com- 
pares the parts or powers of the soul to figures. But figures 
have an order among themselves. Therefore also the powers 
of the soul have order. 

I answer that, Since the soul is one, and the powers are 
many ; and since a number of things that proceed from 
one must proceed in a certain order ; there must be some 
order among the powers of the soul. Accordingly we may 
observe a triple order among them, two of which correspond 
to the dependence of one power on another; while the third 
is taken from the order of the objects. Now the dependence 
of one power on another can be taken in two ways ; accord- 
ing to the order of nature, forasmuch as perfect things are 
by their nature prior to imperfect things; and according to 



65 POWERS OF THE SOUL Q. 77. Art. 4 

the order of generation and time; forasmuch as from being 
imperfect, a thing comes to be perfect. Thus, according to 
the first kind of order among the powers, the intellectual 
powers are prior to the sensitive powers; wherefore they 
direct them and command them. Likewise the sensitive 
powers are prior in this order to the powers of the nutritive 
soul. 

In the second kind of order, it is the other way about. 
For the powers of the nutritive soul are prior by way of 
generation to the powers of the sensitive soul ; for which, 
therefore, they prepare the body. The same is to be said 
of the sensitive powers with regard to the intellectual. 
But in the third kind of order, certain sensitive powers 
are ordered among themselves, namely, sight, hearing, and 
smelling. For the visible naturally comes first; since it is 
common to higher and lower bodies. But sound is audible 
in the air, which is naturally prior to the mingling of 
elements, of which smell is the result. 

Reply Obj. i. The species of a given genus are to one 
another as before and after, like numbers and figures, if 
considered in their nature; although they may be said to 
be simultaneous, according as they receive the predication 
of the common genus. 

Reply Obj. 2. This order among the powers of the soul 
is both on the part of the soul (which, though it be one 
according to its essence, has a certain aptitude to various 
acts in a certain order) and on the part of the objects, and 
furthermore on the part of the acts, as we have said above. 

Reply Obj. 3. This argument is verified as regards those 
powers among which order of the third kind exists. Those 
powers among which the two other kinds of order exist 
are such that the action of one depends on another. 



I- 4 



Q. 77- Art. 5 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA" 66 



Fifth Article. 

whether all the powers of the soul are in the 
soul as their subject? 

\We proceed thus to the Fifth Article: — 

Objection i. It would seem that all the powers of the soul 
are in the soul as their subject. For as the powers of the 
body are to the body ; so are the powers of the soul to the 
soul. But the body is the subject of the corporeal powers. 
Therefore the soul is the subject of the powers of the soul. 

Ohj. 2. Further, the operations of the powers of the soul 
are attributed to the body by reason of the soul ; because, as 
the Philosopher says (De Anima ii. 2), The soul'is that by 
which ive sense^and understand primarily. But the natural 
principles of the operations of the soul are the powers. 
Therefore the powers are primarily in the soul. 

Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says {Gen. ad lit. xii. 7, 24) 
that the soul senses certain things, not through the body, 
in fact, without the body, as fear and suchlike; and some 
things through the body. But if the sensitive powers were 
not in the soul alone as their subject, the soul could not 
sense anything without the body. Therefore the soul is the 
subject of the sensitive powers ; and for a similar reason, of 
all the other powers. 

On the contrary, The Philosopher says {De Somno et 
Vigilia i.) that sensation belongs neither to the soul, nor to 
the body, but to the composite. Therefore the sensitive 
power is in the composite as its subject. Therefore the soul 
alone is not the subject of all the powers. 

I answer that. The subject of operative power is that which 
is able to operate, for every accident denominates its proper 
subject. Now the same is that which is able to operate, and 
that which does operate. Wherefore the subject of power is 
of necessity the subject of operation, as again the Philoso- 
pher says in the beginning of De Somno et Vigilia. Now, 
it is clear from what we have said above (Q. LXXV., 
AA. 2, 3; O. LXXVI., A. I, ad i), that some operations of 



67 POWERS OF THE SOUL Q. 77. art. 5 

the soul are performed without a corporeal organ, as under- 
standing and will. Hence the powers of these operations are 
in the soul as their subject. But some operations of the 
soul are performed by means of corporeal organs ; as sight 
by the eye, and hearing by the ear. And so it is with all 
the other operations of the nutritive and sensitive parts. 
Therefore the powers which are the principles of these 
operations have their subject in the composite, and not in 
the soul alone. 

Reply Obj. i. All the powers are said to belong to the 
soul, not as their subject, but as their principle; because 
it is by the soul that the composite has the power to perform 
such operations. 

Reply Obj. 2. All such powers are primarily in the soul, 
as compared to the composite; not as in their subject, but 
as in their principle. 

Reply Obj. 3. Plato's opinion was that sensation is an 
operation proper to the soul, just as understanding is. 
Now in many things relating to Philosophy Augustine makes 
use of the opinions of Plato, not asserting them as true, 
but relating them. However, as far as the present question 
is concerned, when it is said that the soul senses some 
things with the body, and some without the body, this can 
be taken in two ways. Firstly, the words with the body or 
without the body may determine the act of sense in its mode 
of proceeding from the sentient. Thus the soul senses 
nothing without the body, because the action of sensation 
cannot proceed from the soul except by a corporeal organ. 
Secondly, they may be understood as determining the act 
of sense on the part of the object sensed. Thus the soul 
senses some things with the body, that is, things existing 
in the body, as when it feels a wound or something of that 
sort; while it senses some things without the body, that is, 
which do not exist in the body, but only in the apprehen- 
sion of the soul, as when it feels sad or joyful on hearing 
something. 



Q.77.ART.6 THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 68 



Sixth Article, 
whether the powers of the soul flow from its 

ESSENCE ? 

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article: — 

Objection i. It would seem that the powers of the soul do 
not flow from its essence. For different things do not pro- 
ceed from one simple thing. But the essence of the soul is 
one and simple. Since, therefore, the powers of the soul are 
many and various, they cannot proceed from its essence. 

Obj. 2. Further, that from which a thing proceeds is its 
cause. But the essence of the soul cannot be said to be 
the cause of the powers ; as is clear if one considers the 
different kinds of causes. Therefore the powers of the soul 
do not flow from its essence.- 

Obj. 3. Further, emanation involves some sort of move- 
ment. But nothing is moved by itself, as the Philosopher 
proves (Phys. vii. 1,2); except, perhaps, by reason of a part 
of itself, as an animal is said to be moved by itself, because 
one part thereof moves and another is moved. Neither is 
the soul moved, as the Philosopher proves {De Atiima i. 4). 
Therefore the soul does not produce its powers within itself. 

On the contrary, The powers of the soul are its natural 
properties. But the subject is the cause of its proper 
accidents ; whence also it is included in the definition of 
accident, as is clear from Metaph. vii. (Did. vi. 4). There- 
fore the powers of the soul proceed from its essence as their 
cause. 

/ answer that, The substantial and the accidental form 
partly agree and partly differ. They agree in this, that 
each is an act ; and that by each of them something is 
after a manner actual. They differ, however, in two re- 
spects. First, because the substantial form makes a thing 
to exist absolutely, and its subject is something purely 
potential. But the accidental form does not make a thing 
to exist absolutely ; but to be such, or so great, or in some 
particular condition ; for its subject is an actual being. 



69 POWERS OF THE SOUL Q. 77- Art. 6 

Hence it is clear that actuality is observed in the substantial 
form prior to its being observed in the subject : and since 
that which is first in a genus is the cause in that genus, 
the substantial form causes existence in its subject. On 
the other hand, actuality is observed in the subject of the 
accidental form prior to its being observed in the acci- 
dental form ; wherefore the actuality of the accidental form 
is caused by the actuality of the subject. So the subject, 
forasmuch as it is in potentiality, is receptive of the 
accidental form : but forasmuch as it is in act, it produces 
it. This I say of the proper and per se accident; for with 
regard to the extraneous accident, the subject is receptive 
only, the accident being caused by an extrinsic agent. 
Secondly, substantial and accidental forms differ, because, 
since that which is the less principal exists for the sake of 
that which is the more principal, matter therefore exists on 
account of the substantial form ; while on the contrary, the 
accidental form exists on account of the completeness of the 
subject. 

Now it is clear, from what has been said (A. 5), that 
either the subject of the soul's powers is the soul itself 
alone, which can be the subject of an accident, forasmuch 
as it has something of potentiality, as we have said above 
(A. I, ad 6); or else this subject is the composite. Now 
the composite is actual by the soul. Whence it is clear 
that all the powers of the soul, whether their subject be the 
soul alone, or the composite, flow from the essence of the 
soul, as from their principle; because it has already been 
said that the accident is caused by the subject according as 
it is actual, and is received into it according as it is in 
potentiality. 

Reply Ohj. i. From one simple thing many things may 
proceed naturally, in a certain order; or again if there be 
diversity of recipients. Thus, from the one essence of the 
soul many and various powers proceed ; both because order 
exists among these powers; and also by reason of the 
diversity of the corporeal organs. 

Reply Ohj. 2. The subject is both the final cause, and in 



Q. 77. ART. 7 THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 70 

a way the active cause, of its proper accident. It is also as 
it were the material cause, inasmuch as it is receptive of 
the accident. From this we may gather that the essence of 
the soul is the cause of all its powers, as their end, and as 
their active principle; and of some as receptive thereof. 

Reply Obj. 3. The emanation of proper accidents from 
their subject is not by way of transmutation, but by a 
certain natural resultance ; thus one thing results naturally 
from another, as colour from light. 

Seventh Article. 

WHETHER ONE POWER OF THE SOUL ARISES FROM ANOTHER? 

[We proceed thus to the Seventh Article : — 
Objection i. It would seem that one power of the soul 
does not arise from another. For if several things arise 
together, one of them does not arise from another. But all 
the powers of the soul are created at the same time with the 
soul. Therefore one of them does not arise from another. 

Obj. 2. Further, the power of the soul arises from the 
soul as an accident from the subject. But one power of the 
soul cannot be the subject of another; because nothing is 
the accident of an accident. Therefore one power does not 
arise from another. 

Obj. 3. Further, one opposite does not arise from the 
other opposite; but everything arises from that which is 
like it in species. Now the powers of the soul are oppositely 
divided, as various species. Therefore one of them does not 
proceed from another. 

On the contrary, Powers are known by their actions. But 
the action of one power is caused by the action of another 
power, as the action of the imagination by the action of the 
senses. Therefore one power of the soul is caused by another. 
I answer that, In those things which proceed from one 
according to a natural order, as the first is the cause of all, 
so that which is nearer to the first is, in a way, cause of 
those which are more remote. Now it has been shown above 
(A. 4) that among the powers of the soul there are several 



71 



POWERS OF THE SOUL Q. 77- Art. 7 



kinds of order. Therefore one power of the soul proceeds 
from the essence of the soul by the medium of another. 
But since the essence of the soul is compared to the powers 
both as a principle active and final, and as a receptive 
principle, either separately by itself, or together with the 
body; and since the agent and the end are more perfect, 
while the receptive principle, as such, is less perfect; it 
follows that those powers of the soul which precede the 
others, in the order of perfection and nature, are the prin- 
ciples of the others, after the manner of the end and active 
principle. For we see that the senses are for the sake of 
the intelligence, and not the other way about. The senses, 
moreover, are a certain imperfect participation of the in- 
telligence ; wherefore, according to their natural origin, 
they proceed from the intelligence as the imperfect from 
the perfect. But considered as receptive principles, the 
more imperfect powers are principles with regard to the 
others; thus the soul, according as it has the sensitive 
power, is considered as the subject, and as something 
material with regard to the intelligence. On this account, 
the more imperfect powers precede the others in the order 
of generation, for the animal is generated before the man. 

Reply Obj. i. As the power of the soul flows from the 
essence, not by a transmutation, but bv a certain natural 
resultance, and is simultaneous with the soul, so is it the 
case with one power as regards another. 

Reply Obj. 2, An accident cannot of itself be the subject 
of an accident ; but one accident is received prior to another 
into substance, as quantity prior to quality. In this 
sense one accident is said to be the subject of another; as 
surface is of colour, inasmuch as substance receives an 
accident through the means of another. The same thing 
may be said of the powers of the soul. 

Reply Obj. 3. The powers of the soul are opposed to one 
another, as perfect and imperfect; as also are the species 
of numbers and figures. But this opposition does not 
prevent the origin of one from another, because imperfect 
things naturally proceed from perfect things. 



g. 77- Art. 8 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 72 



Eighth Article. 

WHETHER ALL THE POWERS REMAIN IN THE SOUL WHEN 
SEPARATED FROM THE BODY? 

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article:— 
Objection i. It would seem that all the powers of the 
soul remain in the soul separated from the body. For 
we read in the book De Spiritu et Anima that the soul 
withdraws from the body, taking with itself sense and 
i7nagination, reason and intelligence, concupiscibility and 

irascibility. 

Obj. 2. Further, the powers of the soul are its natural 
properties. But properties are always in that to which they 
belong; and are never separated from it. Therefore the 
powers of the soul are in it even after death. 

Obj. 3. Further, the powers even of the sensitive soul are 
not weakened when the body becomes weak ; because, as 
the Philosopher says {De Anima i. 4), Jf an old man were 
given the eye of a young man, he would see even as well as 
a young man. But weakness is the road to corruption. 
Therefore the powers of the soul are not corrupted when 
the body is corrupted, but remain in the separated soul. 

Obj. 4. Further, memory is a power of the sensitive soul, 
as the Philosopher proves {De Memor. et Remin. i.). But 
memory remains in the separated soul ; for it was said to 
the rich glutton whose soul was in hell : Remember that thou 
didst receive good things during thy lifetime (Luke xvi. 25). 
Therefore memory remains in the separated soul ; and con- 
sequently the other powers of the sensitive part. 

Obj 5 Further, joy and sorrow are in the concupiscible 
part, which is a power of the sensitive soul. But it is clear 
that separate souls grieve or rejoice at the pains or rewards 
which they receive. Therefore the concupiscible power 
remains in the separate soul. 

Obj 6. Further, Augustine says {Gen. ad lit. xii. 32) 
that, as the soul, when the body lies senseless, yet not quite 
dead, sees some things by imaginary vision ; so also when 



73 



POWERS OF THE SOUL Q. 77- Art. 8 



by death the soul is quite separate from the body. But 
the imagination is a power of the sensitive part. There- 
fore the power of the sensitive part remains in the separate 
soul; and consequently all the other powers. 

On the contrary, It is said {De Eccl. Dogm. xix.) that of 
two substances only does man consist; the soul with its 
reason, and the body with its senses. Therefore the body 
being dead, the sensitive powers do not remain. 

I answer that, As we have said already (AA. 5, 6, 7), all 
the powers of the soul belong to the soul alone as their 
principle. But some powers belong to the soul alone as 
their subject ; as the intelligence and the will. These powers 
must remain in the soul, after the destruction of the body. 
But other powers are subjected in the composite ; as all the 
powers of the sensitive and nutritive parts. Now accidents 
cannot remain after the destruction of the subject. Where- 
fore, the composite being destroyed, such powers do not 
remain actually ; but they remain virtually in the soul, as 
in their principle or root. 

So it is false that, as some say, these powers remain in 
the soul even after the corruption of the body. It is much 
more false that, as they say also, the acts of these powers 
remain in the separate soul; because these powers have no 
act apart from the corporeal organ. 

Reply Obf. i. That book has no authority, and so what 
is there written can be despised with the same facility as it 
was said ; although we may say that the soul takes with 
itself these powers, not actually but virtually. 

Reply Obj. 2. These powers, which we say do not 
actually remain in the separate soul, are not the properties 
of the soul alone, but of the composite. 

Reply Obj. 3. These powers are said not to be weakened 
when the body becomes weak, because the soul remains 
unchangeable, and is the virtual principle of these powers. 

Reply Obj. 4. The recollection spoken of there is to be 
taken in the same way as Augustine (De Trin. x. 11; 
xiv. 7) places memory in the mind; not as a part of the 
sensitive soul. 



Q. 77- Art. 8 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA" 74 

Reply Obj. 5. In the separate soul, sorrow and joy are 
not in the sensitive, but in the intellectual appetite, as in 
the angels. 

Reply Obj. 6. Augustine in that passage is speaking as 
inquiring, not as asserting. Wherefore he retracted some 
things which he had said there {Retract, ii. 24). 



/ 



QUESTION LXXVIII. 

OF THE SPECIFIC POWERS OF THE SOUL. 
{In Four Ar licks.) 

We next treat of the powers of the soul specifically. The 
theologian, however, has only to inquire specifically con- 
cerning the intellectual and appetitive powers, in which the 
virtues reside. And since the knowledge of these powers 
depends to a certain extent on the other powers, our 
consideration of the powers of the soul taken specifically 
will be divided into three parts : first, we shall consider 
those powers which are a preamble to the intellect; 
secondly, the intellectual powers; thirdly, the appetitive 
powers. 

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry : 
(i) Thepowers of the soul considered generally. (2) The 
various species of the vegetative part. (3) The exterior 
senses. (4) The interior senses. 

First Article. 

whether there are to be distinguished five genera 
of powers in the soul? 

We proceed thus to the First Article: — 

Objection i. It would seem that there are not to be dis- 
tinguished five genera of powers in the soul — namely, 
vegetative, sensitive, appetitive, locomotive, and intel- 
lectual. For the powers of the soul are called its parts. 
But only three parts of the soul are commonly assigned — 
namely, the vegetative soul, the sensitive soul, and the 
rational soul. Therefore there are only three genera of 
powers in the soul, and not five. 

Obj. 2. Further, the powers of the soul are the principles 

75 



Q. 78. Art. I THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA" 76 

of its vital operations. Now, in four ways is a thing said 
to live. For the Philosopher says {De Anima ii. 2) : In 
several ways a thing is said to live, and even if only one of 
these is present, the thing is said to live; as intellect and 
sense, local movement and rest, and lastly, movement of 
decrease and increase due to nourishment. Therefore there 
are only four genera of powers of the soul, as the appetitive 
is excluded. 

Obj. 3. Further, a special kind of soul ought not to be 
assigned as regards what is common to all the powers. 
Now desire is common to each power of the soul. For 
sight desires an appropriate visible object; whence we read 
(Ecclus. xl. 22) : The eye desireth favour and beauty, but 
more than these green sown fields. In the same way every 
other power desires its appropriate object. Therefore the 
appetitive power should not be made a special genus of the 
powers of the soul. 

Obj. 4. Further, the moving principle in animals is sense, 
intellect, or appetite, as the Philosopher says (De Anima 
iii. 10). Therefore the motive power should not be added 
to the above as a special genus of soul. 

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima ii. 3), 
The powers are the vegetative, the sensitive, the appetitive, 
the locomotive, and the intellectual. 

I answer that, There are five genera of powers of the soul, 
as above numbered. Of these, three are called souls, and 
four are called modes of living. The reason of this diversity 
lies in the various souls being distinguished accordingly as 
the operation of the soul transcends the operation of the 
corporeal nature in various ways ; for the whole corporeal 
nature is subject to the soul, and is related to it as its 
matter and instrument. There exists, therefore, an opera- 
tion of the soul which so far exceeds the corporeal nature 
that it is not even performed by any corporeal organ ; and 
such is the operation of the rational soul. Below this, 
there is another operation of the soul, which is indeed per- 
formed through a corporeal organ, but not through a 
corporeal quality, and this is the operation of the sensitive 



77 THE SOUL'S SPECIFIC POWERS Q. 78. Art. i 

soul; for though hot and cold, wet and dry, and other such 
corporeal qualities are required for the work of the senses, 
yet they are not required in such a way that the operation 
of the senses takes place by virtue of such qualities ; but 
only for the proper disposition of the organ. The lowest 
of the operations of the soul is that which is performed by 
a corporeal organ, and by virtue of a corporeal quality. 
Yet this transcends the operation of the corporeal nature ; 
because the movements of bodies are caused by an extrinsic 
principle, while these operations are from an intrinsic 
principle; for this is common to all the operations of the 
soul, since every animate thing, in some way, moves itself. 
Such is the operation of the vegetative soul; for digestion, 
and what follows, is caused instrumentally by the action of 
heat, as the Philosopher says {De Anima ii. 4). 

Now the powers of the soul are distinguished generically 
by their objects. For the higher a power is, the more uni- 
versal is the object to which it extends, as we have said 
above (Q. LXXVII., A. 3, ad 4). But the object of the 
soul's operation may be considered in a triple order. For 
in the soul there is a power the object of which is only the 
body that is united to that soul ; the powers of this genus 
are called vegetative, for the vegetative power acts only on 
the body to which the soul is united. There is another 
genus in the powers of the soul, which genus regards a 
more universal object — namely, every sensible body, not 
only the body to which the soul is united. And there is yet 
another genus in the powers of the soul, which genus 
regards a still more universal object — namely, not only the 
sensible body, but all being in universal. Wherefore it is 
evident that the latter two genera of the soul's powers have 
an operation in regard not merely to that which is united 
to them, but also to something extrinsic. Now, since what- 
ever operates must in some way be united to the object 
about which it operates, it follows of necessity that this 
something extrinsic, which is the object of the soul's opera- 
tion, must be related to the soul in a twofold manner. First, 
inasmuch as this something extrinsic has a natural aptitude 



Q. 78. Art. I THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA" 78 

to be united to the soul, and to be by its likeness in the 
soul. In this way there are two kinds of powers — namely, 
the sensitive in regard to the less common object — the 
sensible body ; and the intellectual, in regard to the most 
common object — universal being. Secondly, forasmuch as 
the soul itself has an inclination and tendency to the some- 
thing extrinsic. And in this way there are again two kinds 
of powers in the soul : one — the appetitive — in respect of 
which the soul is referred to something extrinsic as to 
an end, which is first in the intention ; the other — the loco- 
motive power — in respect of which the soul is referred to 
something extrinsic as to the term of its operation and 
movement; for every animal is moved for the purpose of 
realizing its desires and intentions. 

The modes of living are distinguished according to the 
degrees of living things. There are some living things in 
which there exists only vegetative power, as the plants. 
There are others in which with the vegetative there exists 
also the sensitive, but not the locomotive power; such are 
immovable animals, as shellfish. There are others which 
besides this have locomotive powers, as perfect animals, 
which require many things for their life, and consequently 
movement to seek necessaries of life from a distance. And 
there are some living things which with these have intel- 
lectual power — namely, men. But the appetitive power does 
not constitute a degree of living things; because wherever 
there is sense there is also appetite {De Anima ii. 3). 

Thus the first two objections are hereby solved. 

Reply Obj. 3. The natural appetite is that inclination 
which each thing has, of its own nature, for something; 
wherefore by its natural appetite each power desires some- 
thing suitable to itself. But the animal appetite results 
from the form apprehended; this sort of appetite requires 
a special power of the soul — mere apprehension does not 
suffice. For a thing is desired as it exists in its own nature, 
whereas in the apprehensive power it exists not according 
to its own nature, but according to its likeness. Whence 
it is clear that sight desires naturally a visible object for the 



79 THE SOUL'S SPECIFIC POWERS Q. 78. Art. 

purpose of its act only — namely, for the purpose of seeing ; 
but the animal by the appetitive power desires the thing 
seen, not merely for the purpose of seeing it, but also for 
other purposes. But if the soul did not require things 
perceived by the senses, except on account of the actions 
of the senses, that is, for the purpose of sensing them ; there 
would be no need for a special genus of appetitive powers, 
since the natural appetite of the powers would suffice. 

Reply Ohj. 4. Although sense and appetite are prin- 
ciples of movement in perfect animals, yet sense and 
appetite, as such, are not sufficient to cause movement, 
unless another power be added to them ; for immovable 
animals have sense and appetite, and yet they have not the 
power of motion. Now this motive power is not only in the 
appetite and sense as commanding the movement, but also 
in the parts of the body, to make them obey the appetite 
of the soul which moves them. Of this we have a sign in 
the fact that when the members are deprived of their natural 
disposition, they do not move in obedience to the appetite. 

Second Article. 

whether the parts of the vegetative soul are fittingly 
described as the nutritive, augmentative, and 
generative? 

We proceed thus to the Second Article: — 
Objection i. It would seem that the parts of the vegeta- 
tive soul are not fittingly described — namely, the nutritive, 
augmentative, and generative. For these are called statural 
forces. But the powers of the soul are above the natural 
forces. Therefore we should not class the above forces as 
powers of the soul. 

Obj. 2. Further, we should not assign a particular power 
of the soul to that which is common to living and non- 
living things. But generation is common to all things that 
can be generated and corrupted, whether living or not 
living. Therefore the generative force should not be 
classed as a power of the soul. 



Q. 78. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA" 80 

Obj. 3. Further, the soul is more powerful than the body. 
But the body by the same force gives species and quantity ; 
much more, therefore, does the soul. Therefore the aug- 
mentative power of the soul is not distinct from the genera- 
tive power. 

Obj. 4. Further, everything is preserved in being by 
that whereby it exists. But the generative power is that 
whereby a living things exists. Therefore by the same 
power the living thing is preserved. Now the nutritive 
force is directed to the preservation of the living thing 
{De Anima ii. 4), being a power which is capable of pre- 
serving whatever receives it. Therefore we should not 
distinguish the nutritive power from the generative. 

On the contrary, The Philosopher says {De Anima ii. 
2, 4) that the operations of this soul are generation, the 
use of food, and (c/. ibid. iii. 9) growth. 

I answer that, The vegetative part has three powers. 
For the vegetative part, as we have said (A. i), has for its 
object the body itself, living by the soul ; for which body 
a triple operation of the soul is required. One is whereby 
it acquires existence, and to this is directed the generative 
power. Another is whereby the living body acquires its 
due quantity; to this is directed the augynejitative power. 
Another is whereby the body of a living thing is preserved 
in its existence and in its due quantity ; to this is directed 
the nutritive power. 

We must, however, observe a difference among these 
powers. The nutritive and the augmentative have their 
effect where they exist, since the body itself united to the 
soul grows and is preserved by the augmentative and 
nutritive powers which exist in one and the same soul. 
But the generative power has its effect, not in one and the 
same body but in another; for a thing cannot generate 
itself. Therefore the generative power, in a way, ap- 
proaches to the dignity of the sensitive soul, which has an 
operation extending to extrinsic things, although in a more 
excellent and more universal manner; for that which is 
highest in an inferior nature approaches to that which is 



8i THE SOUL'S SPECIFIC POWERS Q.78.ARi.2 

lowest in the higher nature, as is made clear by Dionysius 
{Div. Nom. vii.). Therefore, of these three powers, the 
generative has the greater finality, nobility, and perfection, 
as the Philosopher says {De Anima ii. 4), for it belongs to 
a thing which is already perfect to produce another like 
unto itself. And the generative power is served by the 
augmentative and nutritive powers; and the augmentative 
power by the nutritive. 

Reply Obj. i. Such forces are called natural, both be- 
cause they produce an effect like that of nature, which 
also gives existence, quantity, and preservation (although 
the above forces accomplish these things in a more perfect 
way) ; and because those forces perform their actions 
instrumentally, through the active and passive qualities, 
which are the principles of natural actions. 

Reply Obj. 2. Generation of inanimate things is entirely 
from an extrinsic source; whereas the generation of living 
things is in a higher way, through something in the living 
thing itself, which is the semen containing the principle 
productive of the body. Therefore there must be in the 
living thing a power that prepares this semen; and this is 
the generative power. 

Reply Obj. 3. Since the generation of living things is 
from a semen, it is necessary that in the beginning an 
animal of small size be generated. For this reason it must 
have a power in the soul, whereby it is brought to its 
appropriate size. But the inanimate body is generated 
from determinate matter by an extrinsic agent ; therefore it 
receives at once its nature and its quantity, according to 
the condition of the matter. 

Reply Obj. 4. As we have said above (A. i), the opera- 
tion of the vegetative principle is performed by means of 
heat, the property of which is to consume humidity. There- 
fore, in order to restore the humidity thus lost, the nutri- 
tive povv'er is required, whereby the food is changed into 
the substance of the body. This is also necessary for the 
action of the augmentative and generative powers. 



I. 4 



Q. 78. Apt. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 82 



Third Article. 

whether the five exterior senses are properly 

distinguished ? 

We proceed thus to the Third Article: — 

Objection i. It would seem inaccurate to distinguish five 
exterior senses. For sense can know accidents. But there 
are many kinds of accidents. Therefore, as powers are 
distinguished by their objects, it seems that the senses 
are muUipHed according to the number of the kinds of 
accidents. 

Obj. 2. Further, magnitude and shape, and other things 
which are called common sensibles, are not' sensibles by 
accident, but are contradistinguished from them by the 
Philosopher {De Aniina ii. 6). Now the diversity of 
objects, as such, diversifies the powers. Since, therefore, 
magnitude and shape are further from colour than sound is, 
it seems that there is much more need for another sensitive 
power that can grasp magnitude or shape than for that 
which grasps colour or sound. 

Obj. 3. Further, one sense regards one contrariety; as 
sight regards white and black. But the sense of touch 
grasps several contrarieties; such as hot or cold, damp or 
dry, and suchlike. Therefore it is not a single sense but 
several. Therefore there are more than five senses. 

Obj. 4. Further, a species is not divided against its 
genus. But taste is a kind of touch. Therefore it should 
hot be classed as a distinct sense from touch. 

On the contrary, The Philosopher says {De Anima iii. i) : 
There is no other besides the five senses. 

I answer that. The reason of the distinction and number 
of the senses has been assigned by some to the organs in 
which one or other of the elements preponderate, as water, 
air, or the like. By others it has been assigned to the 
medium, which is either in conjunction or extrinsic, and is 
either water or air, or suchlike. Others have ascribed it 
to the various natures of the sensible qualities, according 



83 THE SOUL'S SPECIFIC POWERS Q. 78. Art. 3 

as such quality belongs to a simple body or results from 
complexity. But none of these explanations is apt. For 
the powers are not for the organs, but the organs for 
the powers; wherefore there are not various powers for 
the reason that there are various organs ; on the contrary, 
for this has nature provided a variety of organs, that they 
might be adapted to various powers. In the same way 
nature provided various mediums for the various senses, 
according to the convenience of the acts of the powers. 
And to be cognizant of the natures of sensible qualities 
does not pertain to the senses, but to the intellect. 

The reason of the number and distinction of the exterior 
senses must therefore be ascribed to that which belongs to 
the senses properly and fer se. Now, sense is a passive 
power, and is naturally immuted by the exterior sensible. 
Wherefore the exterior cause of such immutation is what 
is per se perceived by the sense, and according to the 
diversity of that exterior cause are the sensitive powers 
diversified. 

Novv, immutation is of two kinds, one natural, the other 
spiritual. Natural immutation takes place by the form of 
the immuter being received, according to its natural exist- 
ence, into the thing immuted, as heat is received into the 
thing heated. Whereas spiritual immutation takes place 
by the form of the immuter being received, according to a 
spiritual mode of existence, into the thing immuted, as the 
form of colour is received into the pupil which does not 
thereby become coloured. Now, for the operation of the 
senses, a spiritual immutation is required, whereby an 
intention of the sensible form is effected in the sensile 
organ. Otherwise, if a natural immutation alone sufficed 
for the sense's action, all natural bodies would feel when 
they undergo alteration. 

But in some senses we find spiritual immutation only, as 
in sight: while in others we find not only a spiritual but 
also a natural immutation ; either on the part of the object 
only, or likewise on the part of the organ. On the part of 
the object we find natural immutation, as to place, in sound 



0.78.ART.3 THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 84 

which is the object of hearing ; for sound is caused by per- 
cussion and commotion of the air : and we find natural 
immutation by alteration, in odour which is the object of 
smelling; for in order to exhale an odour, a body must be 
in a measure affected by heat. On the part of the organ, 
natural immutation takes place in touch and taste; for the 
hand that touches something hot becomes hot, while the 
tongue is moistened by the humidity of the flavoured 
morsel. But the organs of smelling and hearing are not 
affected in their respective operations by any natural im- 
mutation unless indirectly. 

Now, the sight, which is without natural immutation 
either in its organ or in its object, is the most spiritual, 
the most perfect, and the most universal of all the senses. 
After this comes the hearing and then the smell, which 
require a natural immutation on the part of the object ; 
while local motion is more perfect than, and naturally prior 
to, the motion of alteration, as the Philosopher proves 
{Phys. viii. 7). Touch and taste are the most material of 
all : of the distinction of which we shall speak later on 
{ad 3, 4). Hence it is that the three other senses are not 
exercised through a medium united to them, to obviate any 
natural immutation in their organ; as happens as regards 
these two senses. 

Reply Obj. i. Not every accident has in itself a power 
of immutation, but only qualities of the third species, 
which are the principles of alteration : therefore only 
suchlike qualities are the objects of the senses ; because 
the senses are affected by the same things whereby in- 
animate bodies are affected, as stated in Phys. vii. 2. 

Reply Obj. 2. Size, shape, and the like, which are called 
common sensibles, are midway between accidental sen- 
sibles and proper sensibles, which are the objects of the 
senses. For the proper sensibles first, and of their very 
nature, affect the senses ; since they are qualities that cause 
alteration. But the common sensibles are all reducible to 
quantity. As to size and number, it is clear that they are 
species of quantity. Shape is a quality about quantity, 



?5 THE SOUL'S SPECIFIC POWERS Q. 78. Art. 3 

since the notion of shape consists in fixing the bounds of 
magnitude. Movement and rest are sensed according as 
the subject is affected in one or more ways in the magni- 
tude of the subject or of its local distance, as in the move- 
ment of growth or of locomotion, or again, according as it 
is affected in some sensible qualities, as in the movement 
of alteration ; and thus to sense movement and rest is, in a 
way, to sense one thing and many. Now quantity is the 
proximate subject of the qualities that cause alteration, 
as surface is of colour. Therefore the common sensibles 
do not move the senses first and of their own nature, but 
by reason of the sensible quality ; as the surface by reason 
of colour. Yet they are not accidental sensibles, for they 
produce a certain variety in the immutation of the senses. 
For sense is immuted differently by a large and by a small 
surface : since whiteness itself is said to be great or small, 
and therefore is divided according to its proper subject. 

Reply Obj. 3. As the Philosopher seems to say {De 
Anima ii. 11), the sense of touch is generically one, but is 
divided into several specific senses, and for this reason it 
extends to various contrarieties; which senses, however, 
are not separate from one another in their organ, but are 
spread throughout the whole body, so that their distinction 
is not evident. But taste, which perceives the sweet and 
the bitter, accompanies touch in the tongue, but not in the 
whole body; so it is easily distinguished from touch. We 
might also say that all those contrarieties agree, each in 
some proximate genus, and all in a common genus, which 
is the common and formal object of touch. Such common 
genus is, however, unnamed, just as the proximate genus 
of hot and cold is unnamed. 

Reply Ohj. 4. The sense of taste, according to a saying 
of the Philosopher {De Anima ii. 9), is a kind of touch 
existing in the tongue only. It is not distinct from touch 
in general, but only from the species of touch distributed in 
the body. But if touch is one sense only, on account of the 
common formality of its object : we must say that taste is 
distinguished from touch by reason of a different formality 



Q 78. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 86 

of immutation. For touch involves a natural, and not only 
a spiritual, immutation in its organ, by reason of the 
quality which is its proper object. But the organ of taste 
is not necessarily immuted by a natural immutation by 
reason of the quality which is its proper object, so that the 
tongue itself becomes sweet or bitter : but by reason of a 
quality which is a preamble to, and on which is based, the 
flavour, which quality is moisture, the object of touch. 

Fourth Article. 

whether the interior senses are suitably 
distinguished ? 

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article: — 

Objection i. It would seem that the interior senses are 
not suitably distinguished. For the common is not divided 
against the proper. Therefore the common sense should 
not be numbered among the interior sensitive powers, in 
addition to the proper exterior senses. 

Obj. 2. Further, there is no need to assign an interior 
power of apprehension when the proper and exterior sense 
suffices. But the proper and exterior senses suffice for us 
to judge of sensible things; for each sense judges of its 
proper object. In like manner they seem to suffice for the 
perception of their own actions; for since the action of the 
sense is, in a way, between the power and its object, it 
seems that sight must be much more able to perceive its 
own vision, as being nearer to it, than the colour; and in 
like manner with the other senses. Therefore for this 
there is no need to assign an interior power, called the 
common sense. 

Obj. 3. Further, according to the Philosopher(De Memor. 
et Remin. i.), the imagination and the memory are passions 
of the first sensitive. But passion is not divided against 
its subject. Therefore memory and imagination should 
not be assigned as powers distinct from the senses. 

Obj. 4. Further, the intellect depends on the senses less 
than any power of the sensitive part. But the intellect 



8; THE SOUL'S SPECIFIC POWERS Q. 78. Art. 4 

knows nothing but what it receives from the senses ; whence 
we read {Poster, i. 8), that those ivho lack one sense lack 
one kind of knoivledge. Therefore much less should we 
assign to the sensitive part a power, which they call the 
estimative power, for the perception of intentions which the 
sense does not perceive. 

Obj. 5. Further, the action of the cogitative power, 
which consists in comparing, adding, and dividing, and 
the action of the reminiscence, which consists in the use of 
a kind of syllogism for the sake of inquiry, is not less 
distant from the actions of the estimative and memorative 
powers, than the action of the estimative is from the action 
of the imagination. Therefore either we must add the 
cogitative and reminiscitive to the estimative and memora- 
tive powers, or the estimative and memorative powers 
should not be made distinct from the imagination. 

Obj. 6. Further, Augustine {Gen. ad lit. xii. 6, 7, 24) 
describes three kinds of vision ; namely, corporeal, which 
is an action of the sense; spiritual, which is an action of 
the imagination or phantasy ; and intellectual, which is an 
action of the intellect. Therefore there is no interior power 
between the sense and intellect, besides the imagination. 

On the contrary, Avicenna {De Anima iv. i) assigns five 
interior sensitive powers ; namely, common sense, phantasy, 
imagination, and the estimative and memorative powers. 

I answer that, As nature does not fail in necessary things, 
there must needs be as many actions of the sensitive soul 
as may suffice for the life of a perfect animal. If any of 
these actions cannot be reduced to the same one principle, 
they must be assigned to diverse powers; since a power 
of the soul is nothing else than the proximate principle of 
the soul's operation. 

Now we must observe that for the life of a perfect animal, 
the animal should apprehend a thing not only at the actual 
tim.e of sensation, but also when it is absent. Otherwise, 
since animal motion and action follow apprehension, an 
animal would not be moved to seek something absent : 
the contrary of which we may observe specially in perfect 



Q. 78. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 88 

animals, which are moved by progression, for they are 
moved towards something apprehended and absent. There- 
fore an animal through the sensitive soul must not only 
receive the species of sensible things, when it is actually 
affected by them, but it must also retain and preserve them. 
Now to receive and retain are, in corporeal things, reduced 
to diverse principles; for moist things are apt to receive, 
but retain with difficulty, while it is the reverse with dry 
things. Wherefore, since the sensitive power is the act 
of a corporeal organ, it follows that the power which 
receives the species of sensible things must be distinct from 
the power which preserves them. 

Again we must observe that if an animal were moved by 
pleasing and disagreeable things only as affecting the sense, 
there would be no need to suppose that an animal has a 
power besides the apprehension of those forms which the 
senses perceive, and in which the animal takes pleasure, or 
from which it shrinks with horror. But the animal needs 
to seek or to avoid certain things, not only because they are 
pleasing or otherwise to the senses, but also on account of 
other advantages and uses, or disadvantages : just as the 
sheep runs away when it sees a wolf, not on account of its 
colour or shape, but as a natural enemy : and again a bird 
gathers together straws, not because they are pleasant to 
the sense, but because they are useful for building its nest. 
Animals, therefore, need to perceive such intentions, which 
the exterior sense does not perceive. And some distinct 
principle is necessary for this ; since the perception of 
sensible forms comes by an immutation caused by the 
sensible, which is not the case with the perception of those 
intentions. 

Thus, therefore, for the reception of sensible forms, the 
proper sense and the common sense are appointed, and of 
their distinction we shall speak farther on {ad i, 2). But 
for the retention and preservation of these forms, the 
phantasy or imagination is appointed; which are the same, 
for phantasy or imagination is as it were a storehouse of 
forms received through the senses. Furthermore, for the 



89 THE SOUL'S SPECIFIC POWERS Q. 78. Art. 4 

apprehension of intentions which are not received through 
the senses, the estimative power is appointed : and for the 
preservation thereof, the memorative power, which is a 
storehouse of such-like intentions. A sign of which we 
have in the fact that the principle of memory in animals is 
found in some such intention, for instance, that something 
is harmful or otherwise. And the very formality of the 
past, which memory observes, is to be reckoned among 
these intentions. 

Now, we must observe that as to sensible forms there is 
no difference between man and other animals ; for they are 
similarly immuted by the extrinsic sensible. But there is 
a difference as to the above intentions : for other animals 
perceive these intentions only by some natural instinct, 
while man perceives them by means of collation of ideas. 
Therefore the power which in other animals is called the 
natural estimative, in man is called the cogitative, which 
by some sort of collation discovers these intentions. Where- 
fore it is also called the particular reason, to which medical 
men assign a certain particular organ, namely, the middle 
part of the head : for it compares individual intentions, just 
as the intellectual reason compares universal intentions. 
As to the memorative power, man has not only memory, as 
other animals have in the sudden recollection of the past; 
but also reminiscence by syllogistically, as it were, seeking 
for a recollection of the past by the application of individual 
intentions. Avicenna, however, assigns between the esti- 
mative and the imaginative, a fifth power, which combines 
and divides imaginary forms : as when from the imaginary 
form of gold, and the imaginary form of a mountain, we 
compose the one form of a golden mountain, which we 
have never seen. But this operation is not to be found in 
animals other than man, in whom the imaginative power 
suffices thereto. To man also does Averroes attribute this 
action in his book De sensu et sensibilibus (viii.). So there 
is no need to assign more than four interior powers of the 
sensitive part — namely, the common sense, the imagination, 
and the estimative and memorative powers. 



Q. 78. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA TFIEOLOGICA " 90 

Reply Obj. I. The interior sense is called common not 
by predication, as if it were a genus ; but as the common 
root and principle of the exterior senses. 

Reply Obj. 2. The proper sense judges of the proper 
sensible by discerning it from other things which come 
under the same sense ; for instance, by discerning white 
from black or green. But neither sight nor taste can 
discern white from sweet : because what discerns between 
two things must know both. Wherefore the discerning 
judgment must be assigned to the common sense ; to which, 
as to a common term, all apprehensions of the senses must 
be referred : and by which, again, all the intentions of the 
senses are perceived; as when someone sees that he sees. 
For this cannot be done by the proper sense, which only 
knows the form of the sensible by which it is immuted, in 
which immutation the action of sight is completed, and 
from which immutation follows another in the common 
sense which perceives the act of vision. 

Reply Obj. 3. As one power arises from the soul by 
means of another, as we have seen above (Q. LXXVII., 
A. 7), so also the soul is the subject of one power through 
another. In this way the imagination and the memory are 
called passions of the first sensitive. 

Reply Obj. 4. Although the operation of the intellect 
has its origin in the senses : yet, in the thing apprehended 
through the senses, the intellect knows many things which 
the senses cannot perceive. In like manner does the esti- 
mative power, though in a less perfect manner. 

Reply Obj. 5. The cogitative and memorative powers in 
man owe their excellence not to that which is proper to the 
sensitive part; but to a certain affinity and proximity to 
the universal reason, which, so to speak, overflows into 
them. Therefore they are not distinct powers, but the 
same, yet more perfect than in other animals. 

Reply Obj. 6. Augustine calls that vision spiritual which 
is effected by the images of bodies in the absence of bodies. 
Whence it is clear that it is common to all interior appre- 
hensions. 



QUESTION LXXIX. 

OF THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS. 
(In Thirteen Articles.) 

The next question concerns the intellectual powers, under 
which head there are thirteen points of inquiry : (i) Whether 
the intellect is a power of the soul, or its essence ? (2) If it 
be a power, whether it is a passive power? (3) If it is 
a passive power, whether there is an active intellect ? 
(4) Whether it is something in the soul ? (5) Whether 
the active intellect is one in all? (6) Whether memory is 
in the intellect? (7) Whether the memory be distinct from 
the intellect ? (8) Whether the reason is a distinct power 
from the intellect ? (9) Whether the superior and inferior 
reason are distinct powers? (10) Whether the intelligence 
is distinct from the intellect ? (11) Whether the speculative 
and practical intellect are distinct powers? (12) Whether 
synderesis is a power of the intellectual part? (13) Whether 
the conscience is a power of the intellectual part ? 

First Article, 
whether the intellect is a power of the soul? 

We proceed thus to the First Article: — 

Objection i. It would seem that the intellect is not a 
power of the soul, but the essence of the soul. For the 
intellect seems to be the same as the mind. Now the mind 
is not a power of the soul, but the essence : for Augustine 
says (De Trin. ix. 2) : Mind and spirit are not relative 
things, but denominate the essence. Therefore the intellect 
is the essence of the soul. 

Obj. 2. Further, different genera of the soul's powers are 
not united in some one power, but only in the essence of the 

91 



Q. 79- Art. I THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 92 

soul. Now the appetitive and the intellectual are different 
genera of the soul's powers as the Philosopher says {De 
Anima ii. 3), but they are united in the mind, for Augustine 
{De Trin. x. 11) places the intelligence and will in the mind. 
Therefore the mind and intellect of man is the very essence 
of the soul and not a power thereof. 

Obj. 3. Further, according to Gregory, in a homily for 
the Ascension (xxix. in Ev.), man understands with the 
angels. But angels are called minds and intellects. There- 
fore the mind and intellect of man are not a power of the 
soul, but the soul itself. 

Ohj . 4. Further, a substance is intellectual by the fact 
that it is immaterial. But the soul is immaterial through 
its essence. Therefore it seems that the soul must be 
intellectual through its essence. 

On the contrary, The Philosopher assigns the intellectual 
faculty as a power of the soul {De Anima ii. 3). 

/ answer that, In accordance with what has been already 
shown (Q. LIV., A. 3; Q. LXXVII., A. i) it is necessary 
to say that the intellect is a power of the soul, and not the 
very essence of the soul. For then alone the essence of that 
which operates is the immediate principle of operation, 
when operation itself is its being : for as power is to 
operation as its act, so is the essence to being. But in God 
alone His action of understanding is His very Being. 
Wherefore in God alone is His intellect His essence : while 
in other intellectual creatures, the intellect is a power. 

Reply Ohj. i. Sense is sometimes taken for the power, 
and sometimes for the sensitive soul ; for the sensitive soul 
takes its name from its chief power, which is sense. And 
in like manner the intellectual soul is sometimes called 
intellect, as from its chief power; and thus we read {De 
Anima i. 4), that the intellect is a substance. And in this 
sense also Augustine says that the mind is spirit and 
essence {De Trin. ix. 2 ; xiv. 16). 

Reply Obj. 2. The appetitive and intellectual powers are 
different genera of powers in the soul, by reason of the 
different formalities of their objects. But the appetitive 



93 THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS Q. 79- Art. 2 

power agrees partly with the intellectual power and partly 
with the sensitive in its mode of operation either through 
a corporeal organ or without it : for appetite follows appre- 
hension. And in this way Augustine puts the will in the 
mind; and the Philosopher, in the reason {De Anima iii. 9). 

Reply Ohj. 3. In the angels there is no other power 
besides the intellect, and the will, which follows the intellect. 
And for this reason an angel is called a mind or an intellect; 
because his whole power consists in this. But the soul has 
many other powers, such as the sensitive and nutritive 
powers, and therefore the comparison fails. 

Reply Obj. 4. The immateriality of the created intelligent 
substance is not its intellect; but through its immateriality 
it has the power of intelligence. Wherefore it follows not 
that the intellect is the substance of the soul, but that it is 
its virtue and power. 

Second Article, 
whether the intellect is a passive power? 

We proceed thus to the Second Article: — 

Objection i. It would seem that the intellect is not a 
passive power. For everything is passive by its matter, 
and acts by its form. But the intellectual power results 
from the immateriality of the intelligent substance. There- 
fore it seems that the intellect is not a passive power. 

Obj. 2. Further, the intellectual power is incorruptible, 
as we have said above (Q. LXXIX., A. 6). But if the 
intellect is passive, it is corruptible (De Anima iii. 5). 
Therefore the intellectual power is not passive. 

Obj. 3. Further, the agent is nobler than the patient, as 
Augustine {Gen. ad lit. xii. 16) and Aristotle {De Anima, I.e.) 
say. But all the powers of the vegetative part are active; 
yet they are the lowest among the powers of the soul. Much 
more, therefore, all the intellectual powers, which are the 
highest, are active. 

On the contrary. The Philosopher says {De Anima iii. 4) 
that to understand is in a way to be passive. 



Q. 79. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 94 

/ answer that, To be passive may be taken in three ways, 
firstly, in its most strict sense, when from a thing is taken 
something which belongs to it by virtue either of its nature, 
or of its proper inclination : as when water loses coolness by 
heating, and as when a man becomes ill or sad. Secondly, 
less strictly, a thing is said to be passive, when something, 
whether suitable or unsuitable, is taken away from it. And 
in this way not only he who is ill is said to be passive, but 
also he who is healed ; not only he that is sad, but also he 
that is joyful; or whatever way he be altered or moved. 
Thirdly, in a wide sense a thing is said to be passive, from 
the very fact that what is in potentiality to something 
receives that to which it was in potentiality, without being 
deprived of anything. And accordingly, whatever passes 
from potentiality to act, may be said to be passive, even 
when it is perfected. And thus with us to understand is to 
be passive. This is clear from the following reason. For 
the intellect, as we have seen above (Q. LXXVIII., A. i), 
has an operation extending to universal being. We may 
therefore see whether the intellect be in act or potentiality 
by observing first of all the nature of the relation of the 
intellect to universal being. For we find an intellect whose 
relation to universal being is that of the act of all being : 
and such is the Divine intellect, which is the Essence of 
God, in which originally and virtually, all being pre-exists 
as in its first cause. And therefore the Divine intellect is 
not in potentiality, but is pure act. But no created intellect 
can be an act in relation to the whole universal being; 
otherwise it would needs be an infinite being. Wherefore 
every created intellect is not the act of all things intelligible, 
by reason of its very existence; but is compared to these 
intelligible things as a potentiality to act. 

Now, potentiality has a double relation to act. There is 
a potentiality which is always perfected by its act : as the 
matter of the heavenly bodies (Q. LVIII., A. i). And there 
is another potentiality which is not always in act, but 
proceeds from potentiality to act; as we observe in things 
that are corrupted and generated. Wherefore the angelic 



95 THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS Q. 79- Art..^ 

intellect is always in act as regards those things which it 
can understand, by reason of its proximity to the first 
intellect, which is pure act, as we have said above. But 
the human intellect, which is the lowest in the order of 
intelligence and most remote from the perfection of the 
Divine intellect, is in potentiality with regard to things 
intelligible, and is at first like a clean tablet on ivhich 
nothing is written, as the Philosopher says {De Anima iii. 4). 
This is made clear from the fact, that at first we are only in 
potentiality to understand, and afterwards we are made to 
understand actually. And so it is evident that with us to 
understand is in a way to be passive; taking passion in the 
third sense. And consequently the intellect is a passive 
power. 

Obj. I. This objection is verified of passion in the first 
and second senses, which belong to primary matter. But 
in the third sense passion is in anything which is reduced 
from potentiality to act. 

Obj. 2. Passive intellect is the name given by some to 
the sensitive appetite, in which are the passions of the soul ; 
which appetite is also called rational by participation, 
because it obeys the reason (Ethic, i. 13). Others give the 
name of passive intellect to the cogitative power, which is 
called the particular reason. And in each case passive may 
be taken in the two first senses ; forasmuch as this so-called 
intellect is the act of a corporeal organ. But the intellect 
which is in potentiality to things intelligible, and which for 
this reason Aristotle calls the possible intellect (De Anima 
iii. 4) is not passive except in the third sense : for it is not 
an act of a corporeal organ. Hence it is incorruptible. 

Reply Obj. 3. The agent is nobler than the patient, if 
the action and the passion are referred to the same thing : 
but not always, if they refer to different things. Now the 
intellect is a passive power in regard to the whole universal 
being : while the vegetative power is active in regard to 
some particular thing, namely, the body as united to the 
soul. Wherefore nothing prevents such a passive force 
being nobler than such an active one. 



Q. 79- Art. 3 THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA" 96 



Third Article, 
whether there is an active intellect? 

We proceed thus to the Third Article:— 
Objection 1 . It would seem that there is no active intellect. 
For as the senses are to things sensible, so is our intellect to 
things intelligible. But because sense is in potentiality to 
things sensible, the sense is not said to be active, but only 
passive. Therefore, since our intellect is in potentiality to 
things intelligible, it seems that we cannot say that the 
intellect is active, but only that it is passive. 

Obj. 2. Further, if we say that also in the senses there is 
something active, such as light : on the contrary, light is 
required for sight, inasmuch as it makes the medium to be 
actually luminous; for colour of its own nature moves the 
luminous medium. But in the operation of the intellect 
there is no appointed medium that has to be brought into 
act. Therefore there is no necessity for an active intellect. 
Obj. 3. Further, the likeness of the agent is received into 
the patient according to the nature of the patient. But the 
passive intellect is an immaterial power. Therefore its 
immaterial nature suffices for forms to be received into it 
immaterially. Now a form is intelligible in act from the 
very fact that it is immaterial. Therefore there is no need 
for an active intellect to make the species actually in- 
telligible. 

On the contrary, The Philosopher says {De 'Anima iii. 5), 
As in every nature, so in the soul is there something by 
which it becomes all things, and something by which it 
makes all things. Therefore we must admit an active 
intellect. 

/ answer that, According to the opinion of Plato, there is 
no need for an active intellect in order to make things 
actually intelligible; but perhaps in order to provide intel- 
lectual light to the intellect, as will be explained farther on 
(A. 4). For Plato supposed that the forms of natural things 
subsisted apart from matter, and consequently that they are 



97 



THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS Q. 79- Art. 3 



intelligible : since a thing is actually intelligible from the 
very fact that it is immaterial. And he called such forms 
species or ideas ; from a participation of which, he said that 
even corporeal matter was formed, in order that individuals 
might be naturally established in their proper genera and 
species : and that our intellect was formed by such partici- 
pation in order to have knowledge of the genera and species 
of things. But since Aristotle did not allow that forms of 
natural things exist apart from matter, and as forms exist- 
ing in matter are not actually intelligible ; it follows that 
the natures or forms of the sensible things which we under- 
stand are not actually intelligible. Now nothing is reduced 
from potentiality to act except by something in act; as the 
senses are made actual by what is actually sensible. We 
must therefore assign on the part of the intellect some 
power to make things actually intelligible, by the abstrac- 
tion of the species from material conditions. And such is 
the necessity for an active intellect. 

Reply Obj, i. Sensible things are found in act outside 
the soul; and hence there is no need for an active sense. 
Wherefore it is clear that in the nutritive part all the powers 
are active, whereas in the sensitive part all are passive : but 
in the intellectual part, there is something active and some- 
thing passive. 

Reply Obj. 2. There are two opinions as to the effect of 
light. For some say that light is required for sight, in order 
to make colours actually visible. And according to this the 
active intellect is required for understanding, in like manner 
and for the same reason as light is required for seeing. 
But in the opinion of others, light is required for sight; not 
for the colours to become actually visible ; but in order that 
the medium may become actually luminous, as the Com- 
mentator says on De Anima ii. And according to this, 
Aristotle's comparison of the active intellect to light is 
verified in this, that as it is required for understanding, so 
is light required for seeing; but not for the same reason. 

Reply Obj. 3. If the agent pre-exist, it may well happen 
that its likeness is received variously into various things, on 

I. 4 7 



Q. 79. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 98 

account of their dispositions. But if the agent does not pre- 
exist, the disposition of the recipient has nothing to do with 
the matter. Now the intelligible in act is not something 
existing in nature ; if we consider the nature of things 
sensible, which do not subsist apart from matter. And 
therefore in order to understand them, the immaterial 
nature of the passive intellect would not suffice but for the 
presence of the active intellect, which makes things actually 
intelligible by way of abstraction. 



Fourth Article, 
whether the active intellect is something in 

THE SOUL? 

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article: — 

Objection i. It would seem that the active intellect is not 
something in the soul. For the effect of the active intellect 
is to give light for the purpose of understanding. But this 
is done by something higher than the soul : according to 
Jo. i. 9, He was the true light that enlighteneth every man 
coming into this world. Therefore the active intellect is 
not something in the soul. 

Obj. 2. Further, the Philosopher {De Anima iii. 5) says 
of the active intellect, that it does not sometimes understand 
and sometimes not understand. But our soul does not 
always understand : sometimes it understands, and some- 
times it does not understand. Therefore the active intellect 
is not something in our soul. 

Obj. 3. Further, agent and patient suffice for action. If, 
therefore, the passive intellect, which is a passive power, is 
something belonging to the soul ; and also the active intel- 
lect, which is an active power : it follows that man would 
always be able to understand when he wished, which is 
clearly false. Therefore the active intellect is not some- 
thing in our soul. 

Obj. 4. Further, the Philosopher (De Anima iii. 5) says 
that the active intellect is a substance in actual being. But 
nothing can be in potentiality and in act with regard to the 



99 THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS Q. 79- art. 4 

same thing. If, therefore, the passive intellect, which is in 
potentiality to all things intelligible, is something in the 
soul, it seems impossible for the active intellect to be also 
something in our soul. 

Obj. 5. Further, if the active intellect is something in the 
soul, it must be a power. For it is neither a passion nor 
a habit; since habits and passions are not in the nature of 
agents in regard to the passivity of the soul ; but rather 
passion is the very action of the passive power; while habit 
is something which results from acts. But every power 
flows from the essence of the soul. It would therefore 
follow that the active intellect flows from the essence of the 
soul. And thus it would not be in the soul by way of 
participation from some higher intellect : which is unfitting. 
Therefore the active intellect is not something in our soul. 

On the contrary, The Philosopher says {De Anima 
iii., I.e.), that it is necessary for these differences, namely, 
the passive and active intellect, to be in the soul. 

I ansiver that, The active intellect, of which the Philoso- 
pher speaks, is something in the soul. In order to make 
this evident, we must observe that above the intellectual 
soul of man we must needs suppose a superior intellect, 
from which the soul acquires the power of understanding. 
For what is such by participation, and what is mobile, and 
what is imperfect always requires the pre-existence of some- 
thing essentially such, immovable and perfect. Now the 
human soul is called intellectual by reason of a participation 
in intellectual power; a sign of which is, that it is not wholly 
intellectual but only in part. Moreover it reaches to the 
understanding of truth by arguing, with a certain amount 
of reasoning and movement. Again it has an imperfect 
understanding; both because it does not understand every- 
thing, and because, in those things which it does under- 
stand, it passes from potentiality to act. Therefore there 
must needs be some higher intellect, by which the soul is 
helped to understand. 

Wherefore some held that this intellect, substantially 
separate, is the active intellect, which by lighting up the 



g.79. Art. 4 THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA " loo 

phantasms as it were, makes them to be actually intelligible. 
But, even supposing the existence of such a separate active 
intellect, it would still be necessary to assign to the human 
soul some power participating in that superior intellect, by 
which power the human soul makes things actually intel- 
ligible. Just as in other perfect natural things, besides the 
universal active causes, each one is endowed with its proper 
powers derived from those universal causes : for the sun 
alone does not generate man ; but in man is the power of 
begetting man : and in like manner with other perfect 
animals. Now among these lower things nothing is more 
perfect than the human soul. Wherefore we must say that 
in the soul is some power derived from a higher intellect, 
whereby it is able to light up the phantasms. And we 
know this by experience, since we perceive that we abstract 
universal forms from their particular conditions, which is to 
make them actually intelligible. Now no action belongs to 
anything except through som.e principle formally inherent 
therein ; as we have said above of the passive intellect 
(Q. LXXVI., A. i). Therefore the power which is the 
principle of this action must be something in the soul. 
For this reason Aristotle {De Anima iii. 5) compared the 
active intellect to light, which is something received into 
the air : while Plato compared the separate intellect im- 
pressing the soul to the sun, as Themistius says in his 
commentary on De Anima iii. But the separate intellect, 
according to the teaching of our faith, is God Himself, 
Who is the soul's Creator, and only beatitude; as will be 
shown later on (Q. XC., A. 3; I.-H., Q. HI., A. 7). 
Wherefore the human soul derives its intellectual light 
from Him, according to Ps. iv. 7, The light of Thy 
countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us. 

Reply Obj. i. That true light enlightens as a universal 
cause, from which the human soul derives a particular 
power, as we have explained. 

Reply Obj. 2. The Philosopher says those words not of 
the active intellect, but of the intellect in act : of which he 
had already said : Knowledge in act is the same as the 



loi THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS Q. 79- Art. 4 

thing. Or, if we refer those words to the active intellect, 
then they are said because it is not owing to the active 
intellect that sometimes we do, and sometimes we do not 
understand, but to the intellect which is in potentiality. 

Reply Obj. 3. If the relation of the active intellect to the 
passive intellect were that of the active object to a power, 
as, for instance, of the visible in act to the sight ; it would 
follow that we could understand all things instantly, since 
the active intellect is that which makes all things (in act). 
But now the active intellect is not an object, rather is it 
that whereby the objects are made to be in act : for which, 
besides the presence of the active intellect, we require the 
presence of phantasms, the good disposition of the sensitive 
powers, and practice in this sort of operation : since through 
one thing understood, other things come to be understood, 
as from terms are made propositions, and from first prin- 
ciples, conclusions. From this point of view it matters not 
whether the active intellect is something belonging to the 
soul, or something separate from the soul. 

Reply Obj. 4. The intellectual soul is indeed actually 
immaterial, but it is in potentiality to determinate species. 
On the contrary, phantasms are actual images of certain 
species, but are immaterial in potentiality. Wherefore 
nothing prevents one and the same soul, inasmuch as it is 
actually immaterial, having one power by which it makes 
things actually immaterial, by abstraction from the con- 
ditions of individual matter : which power is called the 
active intellect; and another power, receptive of such species, 
which is called the passive intellect by reason of its being in 
potentiality to such species. 

Reply Obj. 5. Since the essence of the soul is immaterial, 
created by the supreme intellect, nothing prevents that 
power which it derives from the supreme intellect, and 
whereby it abstracts from matter, flowing from the essence 
of the soul, in the same way as its other powers. 



Q. 79. Art. 5 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 102 

Fifth Article, 
whether the active intellect is one in all? 

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article: — 

Objection i. It would seem that there is one active in- 
tellect in all. For what is separate from the body is not 
multiplied according to the number of bodies. But the 
active intellect is separate, as the Philosopher says {De 
Anima iii. 5). Therefore it is not multiplied in the many 
human bodies, but is one for all men. 

Obj. 2. Further, the active intellect is the cause of the 
universal, which is one in many. But that which is the 
cause of unity is still more itself one. Therefore the active 
intellect is the same in all. 

Obj. 3. Further, all men agree in the first intellectual 
concepts. But to these they assent by the active intellect. 
Therefore all agree in one active intellect. 

On the contrary, The Philosopher says {De Anima iii., 
I.e.) that the active intellect is as a light. But light is not 
the same in the various things enlightened. Tlierefore the 
same active intellect is not in various men. 

/ answer that, The truth about this question depends on 
what we have already said (A. 4). For if the active in- 
tellect were not something belonging to the soul, but were 
some separate substance, there would be one active intellect 
for all men. And this is what they mean who hold that 
there is one active intellect for all. But if the active in- 
tellect is something belonging to the soul, as one of its 
powers, we are bound to say that there are as many active 
intellects as there are souls, which are multiplied according 
to the number of men, as we have said above (Q. LXXVI., 
A. 2). For it is impossible that one same power belong to 
various substances. 

Reply Obj. i. The Philosopher proves that the active 
intellect is separate, by the fact that the passive intellect 
is separate : because, as he says (lac. cit.), the agent is more 
noble than the patient. Now the passive intellect is said to 



103 THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS Q. 79- Art. 6 

be separate, because it is not the act of any corporeal organ. 
And in the same sense the active intellect is also called 
separate; but not as a separate substance. 

Reply Obj. 2. The active intellect is the cause of the 
universal, by abstracting it from matter. But for this 
purpose it need not be the same intellect in all intelligent 
beings; but it must be one in its relationship to all those 
things from which it abstracts the universal, with respect 
to which things the universal is one. And this befits the 
active intellect inasmuch as it is immaterial. 

Reply Obj. 3. All things which are of one species enjoy 
in common the action which accompanies the nature of the 
species, and consequently the power which is the principle 
of such action ; but not so as that power be identical in all. 
Now to know the first intelligible principles is the action 
belonging to the human species. Wherefore all men enjov 
in common the power which is the principle of this action : 
and this power is the active intellect. But there is no need 
for it to be identical in all. Yet it must be derived by all 
from one principle. And thus the possession by all men in 
common of the first principles proves the unity of the 
separate intellect, which Plato compares to the sun; but 
not the unity of the active intellect, which Aristotle com- 
pares to light. 

Sixth Article. 

whether memory is in the intellectual part 
of the soul? 

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article : — 

Objection i. It would seem that memory is not in the 
intellectual part of the soul. For Augustine says {De Trin. 
xii. 2, 3, 8) that to the higher part of the soul belong those 
things which are not common to man and beast. But 
memory is common to man and beast, for he says {ibid. 2) 
that beasts can sense corporeal things through the senses of 
the body, and commit them to memory. Therefore memory 
does not belong to the intellectual part of the soul. 



Q.79. Art. 6 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 104 

Obj. 2. Further, memory is of the past. But the past is 
said of something with regard to a fixed time. Memory, 
therefore, knows a thing under a condition of a fixed time; 
which involves knowledge under the conditions of here and 
now. But this is not the province of the intellect, but of 
the sense. Therefore memory is not in the intellectual part, 
but only in the sensitive part. 

Obj. 3. Further, in the memory are preserved the species 
of those things of which we are not actually thinking. But 
this cannot happen in the intellect, because the intellect is 
reduced to act by the fact that the intelligible species are 
received into it. Now the intellect in act implies under- 
standing in act; and therefore the intellect actually under- 
stands all things of which it has the species. Therefore the 
memory is not in the intellectual part. 

On the contrary, Augustine says {De Trin. x. 11) that 
memory, understanding, and will are one mind. 

I answer that, Since it is of the nature of the memory to 
preserve the species of those things which are not actually 
apprehended, we must first of all consider whether the 
intelligible species can thus be preserved in the intellect : 
because Avicenna held that this was impossible. For he 
admitted that this could happen in the sensitive part, as to 
some powers, inasmuch as they are acts of corporeal organs, 
in which certain species may be preserved apart from actual 
apprehension. But in -the intellect, which has no corporeal 
organ, nothing but what is intelligible exists. Wherefore 
every thing of which the likeness exists in the intellect must 
be actually understood. Thus, therefore, according to him, 
as soon as we cease to understand something actually, the 
species of that thing ceases to be in our intellect, and if we 
wish to understand that thing anew, we must turn to the 
active intellect, which he held to be a separate substance, 
in order that the intelligible species may thence flow again 
into our passive intellect. And from the practice and habit 
of turning to the active intellect there is formed, according 
to him, a certain aptitude in the passive intellect for turning 
to the active intellect ; which aptitude he calls the habit 



105 THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS Q. 79- Art. 6 

of knowledge. According, therefore, to this supposition, 
nothing is preserved in the intellectual part that is not 
actually understood : wherefore it would not be possible 
to admit memory in the intellectual part. 

But this opinion is clearly opposed to the teaching of 
Aristotle. For he says (De Anima iii. 4) that, when the 
passive intellect is identified with each thing as knowing it, 
it is said to be in act, and that this happens when it can 
operate of itself. And, even then, it is in potentiality, but 
not in the same way as before learfiing and discovering. 
Now, the passive intellect is said to be each thing, inasmuch 
as it receives the intelligible species of each thing. To the 
fact, therefore, that it receives the species of intelligible 
things it owes its being able to operate when it wills, but 
not so that it be always operating : for even then is it in 
potentiality in a certain sense, though otherwise than before 
the act of understanding — namely, in the sense that who- 
ever has habitual knowledge is in potentiality to actual 
consideration. 

The foregoing opinion is also opposed to reason. For 
what is received into something is received according to 
the conditions of the recipient. But the intellect is of a 
more stable nature, and is more immovable than corporeal 
matter. If, therefore, corporeal matter holds the forms 
which it receives, not only while it actually does something 
through them, but also after ceasing to act through them, 
much more cogent reason is there for the intellect to receive 
the species unchangeably and lastingly, whether it receive 
them from things sensible, or derive them from some 
superior intellect. Thus, therefore, if we take memory only 
for the power of retaining species, we must say that it is in 
the intellectual part. But if in the notion of memory we 
include its object as something past, then the memory is 
not in the intellectual, but only in the sensitive part, which 
apprehends individual things. For past, as past, since it 
signifies being under a condition of fixed time, is something 
individual. 

Reply Obj. I. Memory, if considered as retentive of 



Q. 79. Art. 6 THE " SUALMA THEOLOGICA " 106 

species, is not common to us and other animals. For species 
are not retained in the sensitive part of the soul only, but 
rather in the body and soul united : since the memorative 
power is the act of some organ. But the intellect in itself 
is retentive of species, without the association of any cor- 
poreal organ. Wherefore the Philosopher says {De Anima 
iii. 4) that the soul is the seat of the species, not the whole 
soul, but the intellect. 

Reply Obj. 2. The condition of past may be referred to 
two things — namely, to the object which is known, and to 
the act of knowledge. These tw^o are found together in the 
sensitive part, which apprehends something from the fact 
of its being immutcd by a present sensible : wherefore at 
the same time an animal remembers to have sensed before 
in the past, and to have sensed some past sensible thing. 
But as concerns the intellectual part, the past is accidental, 
and is not in itself a part of the object of the intellect. For 
the intellect understands man, as man : and to man, as man, 
it is accidental that he exist in the present, past, or future. 
But on the part of the act, the condition of past, even as 
such, may be understood to be in the intellect, as well as 
in the senses. Because our soul's act of understanding is 
an individual act, existing in this or that time, inasmuch 
as a man is said to understand now, or yesterday, or to- 
morrow. And this is not incompatible with the intellectual 
nature : for such an act of understanding, though something 
individual, is yet an immaterial act, as we have said above 
of the intellect (Q. LXXVI., A. i); and therefore, as the 
intellect understands itself, though it be itself an individual 
intellect, so also it understands its act of understanding, 
which is an individual act, in the past, present, or future. 
In this way, then, the notion of memory, in as far as it 
regards past events, is preserved in the intellect, forasmuch 
as it understands that it previously understood : but not in 
the sense that it understands the past as something here 
and noiv. 

Reply Obj. 3. The intelligible species is sometimes in the 
intellect only in potentiality, and then the intellect is said 



I07 THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS Q. 79. Art. 7 

to be in potentiality. Sometimes the intelligible species is 
in the intellect as regards the ultimate completion of the 
act, and then it understands in act. And sometimes the 
intelligible species is in a middle state, between potentiality 
and act : and then we have habitual knowledge. In this 
way the intellect retains the species, even when it does not 
understand in act. 



Seventh Article. 

whether the intellectual memory is a power distinct 

from the intellect? 

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article: — 

Objection i. It would seem that the intellectual memory 
is distinct from the intellect. For Augustine {De Trin. 
X. 1 1) assigns to the soul memory, understanding, and will. 
But it is clear that the memory is. a distinct power from the 
will. Therefore it is also distinct from the intellect. 

Obj. 2. Further, the reason of distinction among the 
powers in the sensitive part is the same as in the intellectual 
part. But memory in the sensitive part is distinct from 
sense, as we have said (Q. LXXVIIL, A. 4). Therefore 
memory in the intellectual part is distinct from the 
intellect. 

Obj. 3. Further, according to Augustine {De Trin. x. 11 ; 
xi. 7), memory, understanding, and will are equal to one 
another, and one flows from the other. But this could not 
be if memory and intellect were the same power. Therefore 
they are not the same power. 

On the contrary, From its nature the memorv is the 
treasury or storehouse of species. But the Philosopher 
{De Anima iii.) attributes this to the intellect, as we have 
said (A. 6 ad i). Therefore the memory is not another 
power from the intellect. 

/ answer that, As has been said above (Q. LXXVII., 
A. 3), the powers of the soul are distinguished by the 
different formal aspects of their objects : since each power 
is defincj in revrence to that thing to which it is directed 



Q.79.ART.7 THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA" io8 

and which is its object. It has also been said above 
(Q. LIX., A. 4) that if any power by its nature be directed 
to an object according to the common ratio of the object, 
that power will not be differentiated according to the indi- 
vidual differences of that object : just as the power of sight, 
which regards its object under the common ratio of colour, 
is not differentiated by differences of black and white. Now, 
the intellect regards its object under the common ratio of 
being : since the passive intellect is that in which all are in 
potentiality. Wherefore the passive intellect is not dif- 
ferentiated by any difference of being. Nevertheless there 
is a distinction between the power of the active intellect 
and of the passive intellect : because as regards the same 
object, the active power which makes the object to be in 
act must be distinct from the passive power, which is moved 
by the object existing in act. Thus the active power is 
compared to its object as a being in act is to a being in 
potentiality ; whereas the passive power, on the contrary, 
is compared to its object as a being in potentiality is to a 
being in act. Therefore there can be no other difference of 
powers in the intellect, but that of passive and active. 
Wherefore it is clear that memory is not a distinct power 
from the intellect : for it belongs to the nature of a passive 
power to retain as well as to receive. 

Reply Obj. I. Although it is said (3 Sent., D. i.) that 
memory, intellect, and will are three powers, this is not in 
accordance with the meaning of Augustine, who says ex- 
pressly (De Trin. xiv.) that if we take memory, intelligence, 
and will as always present in the soul, whether we actually 
attend to them or not, they seem to pertain to the memory 
only. And by intelligence I mean that by which we under- 
stand when actually thinking ; and by will I mean that love 
or affection which unites the child and its parent. Where- 
fore it is clear that Augustine does not take the above three 
for three powers ; but by memory he understands the soul's 
habit of retention ; by intelligence, the act of the intellect ; 
and by will, the act of the will. 

Reply Obj. 2. Past and present may differentiate the 



I09 THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS Q. 79- Art. 8 

sensitive powers, but not the intellectual powers, for the 
reason given above. 

Reply Obj. 3. Intelligence arises from memory, as act 
from habit ; and in this way it is equal to it, but not as a 
power to a power. 

Eighth Article. 

whether the reason is distinct from the 

intellect ? 

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article: — 

Objection i. It would seem that the reason is a distinct 
power from the intellect. For it is stated in De Spiritu 
et Anima that when we wish to rise from lower things to 
higher, first the sense comes to our aid, then imagination, 
then reason, then the intellect. Therefore the reason is 
distinct from the intellect, as imagination is from sense. 

Obj. 2. Further, Boethius says {De Consol. iv. 6), that 
intellect is compared to reason, as eternity to time. But it 
does not belong to the same power to be in eternity and 
to be in time. Therefore reason and intellect are not the 
same power. 

Obj. 3. Further, man has intellect in common with the 
angels, and sense in common with the brutes. But reason, 
which is proper to man, whence he is called a rational 
animal, is a power distinct from sense. Therefore is it 
equally true to say that it is distinct from the intellect, 
which properly belongs to the angel : whence they are 
called intellectual. 

On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iii. 20) that 
that in which man excels irrational animals is reason, or 
mind, or intelligence, or whatever appropriate name we like 
to give it. Therefore reason, intellect, and mind are one 
power. 

/ answer that, Reason and intellect in man cannot be 
distinct powers. We shall understand this clearly if we 
consider their respective actions. For to understand is 
simply to apprehend intelligible truth : and to reason is 



Q.79ART.8 THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA" no 

to advance from one thing understood to another, so as 
to know an intelligible truth. And therefore angels who, 
according to their nature, possess perfect knowledge of 
intelligible truth, have no need to advance from one thing 
to another; but apprehend the truth simply and without 
mental discussion, as Dionysius says {Div. Nom. vii.). But 
man arrives at the knowledge of intelligible truth by advanc- 
ing from one thing to another; and therefore he is called 
rational. Reasoning, therefore, is compared to under- 
standing, as movement is to rest, or acquisition to posses- 
sion ; of which one belongs to the perfect, the other to the 
imperfect. And since movement always proceeds from 
something immovable, and ends in something at rest; 
hence it is that human reasoning, by way of inquiry and 
discovery, advances from certain things simply under- 
stood — namely, the first principles; and, again, by way of 
judgment returns by analysis to first principles, in the light 
of which it examines what it has found. Now it is clear 
that rest and movement are not to be referred to different 
powers, but to one and the same, even in natural things : 
since by the same nature a thing is moved towards a certain 
place, and rests in that place. Much more, therefore, by 
the same power do we understand and reason : and so it is 
clear that in man reason and intellect are the same power. 

Reply Obj. i . That enumeration is made according to the 
order of actions, not according to the distinction of powers. 
Moreover, that book is not of great authority. 

Reply Obj. 2. The answer is clear from what we have 
said. For eternity is compared to time as immovable to 
movable. And thus Boethius compared the intellect to 
eternity, and reason to time. 

Reply Obj. 3. Other animals are so much lower than 
man that they cannot attain to the knowledge of truth, 
which reason seeks. But man attains, although imperfectly, 
to the knowledge of intelligible truth, which angels know. 
Therefore in the angels the power of knowledge is not of 
a different genus from that which is in the human reason, 
but is compared to it as the perfect to the imperfect. 



Ill THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS Q. 79. Art. 9 



Ninth Article, 
whether the higher and lower reason are distinct 

POWERS ? 

We 'Proceed thus to the Ninth Article: — 

Objection i. It would seem that the higher and lower 
reason are distinct powers. F.or Augustine says {De Trin. 
xii. 4, 7), that the image of the Trinity is in the higher part 
of the reason, and not in the lower. But the parts of the 
soul are its powers. Therefore the higher and lower reason 
are two powers. 

Obj. 2. Further, nothing flows from itself. Now, the 
lower reason flows from the higher, and is ruled and 
directed by it. Therefore the higher reason is another 
power from the lower. 

Obj. 3. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic, vi. i) that 
the scientific fart of the soul, by which the soul knows 
necessary things, is another principle, and another part 
from the opinionative and reasoning part by which it know'S 
contingent things. And he proves this from the principle 
that for those things which are generically different, 
generically different parts of the soul are ordained. Now 
contingent and necessary are generically different, as cor- 
ruptible and incorruptible. Since, therefore, necessary is 
the same as eternal, and temporal the same as contingent, 
it seems that what the Philosopher calls the scientific part 
must be the same as the higher reason, which, according to 
Augustine {loc. cit. 7) is intent on the consideration and 
consultation of things eternal: and that what the Philoso- 
pher calls the reasoning or opinionative part is the same as 
the lower reason, which, according to Augustine, is intent 
on the disposal of temporal things. Therefore the higher 
reason is another power than the lower. 

Obj. 4. Further, Damascene says {De Fid. Orth. ii.) that 
opinion rises from imagination : then the mind by judging 
of the truth or error of the opinion discovers the truth: 
whence mens (mind) is derived from metiendo (measuring). 



Q. 79- Art. 9 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 112 

And therefore the intellect regards those things which are 
already subject to judgment and true decision. Therefore 
the opinionative power, which is the lower reason, is distinct 
from the mind and the intellect, by which we may under- 
stand the higher reason. 

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xii. 4) that 
the higher and loxver reason are only distinct by their 
functions. Therefore they are not two powers. 

/ answer that, The higher and lower reason, as they are 
understood by Augustine, can in no way be two powers of 
the soul. For he says that the higher reason is that which 
is intent on the coritoyiplation and consultation of things 
eternal: forasmuch as in contemplation it sees them in 
themselves, and in consultation it takes its rules of action 
from them. But he calls the lower reason that which is 
intent on the disposal of temporal things. Now these two — 
namely, eternal and temporal — are related to our knowledge 
*in this way, that one of them is the means of knowing the 
other. For by way of discovery, we come through know- 
ledge of temporal things to that of things eternal, according 
to the words of the Apostle (Rom. i. 20), The invisible 
things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the 
things that are 7nade : while by way of judgment, from 
eternal things already known, we judge of temporal things, 
and according to laws of things eternal we dispose of 
temporal things. 

But it mav happen that the medium and what is attained 
thereby belong to different habits : as the first indemon- 
strable principles belong to the habit of intellect ; whereas 
the conclusions which we draw from them belong to the 
habit of science. And so it happens that from the principles 
of geometry we draw a conclusion in another science — for 
example, perspective. But the power of the reason is such 
that both medium and term belong to it. For the act of the 
reason is, as it were, a movement from one thing to another. 
But the same movable thing passes through the medium 
and reaches the end. Wherefore the higher and lower 
reasons are one and the same power. But according to 



113 THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS Q. 79- Art. 9 

Augustine they are distinguished by the functions of 
their actions, and according to their various habits : for 
wisdom is attributed to the higher reason, science to the 
lower. 

Reply Ohj. i. We can speak of parts, in whatever way a 
thing is divided. And so far as reason is divided according 
to its various acts, the higher and lower reason are called 
parts; but not because they are different powers. 

Reply Ohj. 2. The lower reason is said to flow from the 
higher, or to be ruled by it, as far as the principles made 
use of by the lower reason are drawn from and directed by 
the principles of the higher reason. 

Reply Ohj. 3. The scientific part, of which the Philoso- 
pher speaks, is not the same as the higher reason : for 
necessary truths are found even among temporal things, of 
which natural science and mathematics treat. And the 
opinionative and ratiocinative part is more limited than the 
lower reason ; for it regards only things contingent. Neither 
must we say, without any qualification, that a power, by 
which the intellect knows necessary things, is distinct from 
a power by which it knows contingent things : because it 
knows both under the same objective aspect — namely, 
under the aspect of being and truth. Wherefore it perfectly 
knows necessary things which have perfect being in truth ; 
since it penetrates to their very essence, from which it 
demonstrates their proper accidents. On the other hand, 
it knows contingent things, but imperfectly ; forasmuch as 
they have but imperfect being and truth. Now perfect and 
imperfect in the action do not vary the power, but they 
vary the actions as to the mode of acting, and consequently 
the principles of the actions and the habits themselves. 
And therefore the Philosopher postulates two lesser parts 
of the soul — namely, the scientific and the ratiocinative, 
not because they are two powers, but because they are 
distinct according to a different aptitude for receiving 
various habits, concerning the variety of which he inquires. 
For contingent and necessary, though differing according 
to their proper genera, nevertheless agree in the common 

1-4 8 



Q.79ART.IO THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA" 114 

aspect of being, which the intellect considers, and to which 
they are variously compared as perfect and imperfect. 

Reply Ohj. 4. That distinction given by Damascene is 
according to the variety of acts, not according to the variety 
of powers. For opinion signifies an act of the intellect 
which leans to one side of a contradiction, whilst in fear of 
the other. While to judge or measure (mensurare) is an 
act of the intellect, applying certain principles to examine 
propositions. From this is taken the word mens (mind). 
Lastly, to understand is to adhere to the formed judgment 
with approval. 

Tenth Article. 

whether intelligence is a power distinct from 

intellect ? 

We proceed thus to the Tenth Article: — 

Objection i . It would seem that the intelligence is another 
power than the intellect. For we read in De Spiritu et 
Anima that ivhen ive ivish to rise from lower to higher 
things, first the sense comes to our aid, then imagination, 
then reason, then intellect, and ajterivards intelligence. But 
imagination and sense are distinct powers. Therefore also 
intellect and intelligence are distinct. 

Ohj. 2. Further, Boethius says {De Consol. v. 4) that 
sense considers man in one way, imagination in another, 
reason in another, intelligence in another. But intellect is 
the same power as reason. Therefore, seemingly, intelli- 
gence is a distinct power from intellect, as reason is a dis- 
tinct power from imagination or sense. 

Obj. 3. Further, actions come before powers, as the 
Philosopher says {De AnitJia ii. 4). But intelligence is an 
act separate from others attributed to the intellect. For 
Damascene says {De Fid. Orth. ii.) that the first movement 
is called intelligence ; but that intelligence which is about a 
certain thing is called intention; that which remains and 
conforms the soul to that which is understood is called 
invention, and invention when it remains in the same man, 
examining and judging of itself, is called phronesis (that is, 



115 THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS Q. 79. Art. lo 

wisdom), and phronesis if dilated makes thought, that is, 
orderly internal speech; from which, they say, comes speech 
expressed by the tongue. Therefore it seems that intelli- 
gence is some special power. 

On the contrary, The Philosopher says {De Anima iii. 6) 
that intelligence is of indivisible things in which there is 
nothing false. But the knowledge of these things belongs 
to the intellect. Therefore the intelligence is not another 
power than the intellect. 

I answer that. This word intelligence properly signifies 
the intellect's very act, which is to understand. However, 
in some works translated from the Arabic, the separate 
substances which we call angels are called intelligences, 
and perhaps for this reason, that such substances are always 
actually understanding. But in works translated from the 
Greek, they are called intellects or minds . Thus intelligence 
is not distinct from intellect, as power is from power; but 
as act is from power. And such a division is recognized 
even by the philosophers. For sometimes they assign four 
intellects — namely, the active and passive intellects, the 
intellect in habit, and the actual intellect. Of which four 
the active and passive intellects are different powers ; just 
as in all things the active power is distinct from the passive. 
But three of these are distinct, as three states of the passive 
intellect, which is sometimes in potentiality only, and thus 
it is called passive; sometimes it is in the first act, which 
is knowledge, and thus it is called intellect in habit; and 
sometimes it is in the second act, which is to consider, and 
thus it is called intellect in act, or actual intellect. 

Reply Obj. i. If this authority is accepted, intelligence 
there means the act of the intellect. And thus it is divided 
against intellect as act against power. 

Reply Obj. 2. Boethius takes intelligence as meaning 
that act of the intellect which transcends the act of the 
reason. Wherefore he also says that reason alone belongs 
to the human race, as intelligence alone belongs to God, 
for it belongs to God to understand all things without any 
investigation. 



3.79. Art. ii THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " ii6 

Reply Obj. 3. All those acts which Damascene enu- 
merates belong to one power — namely, the intellectual 
power. For this power first of all only apprehends some- 
thing; and this act is called intelligence. Secondly, it 
directs what it apprehends to the knowledge of something 
else, or to some operation; and this is called intention. 
And when it goes on in search of what it intends, it is called 
invention. When, by reference to something known for 
certain, it examines what it has found, it is said to know 
or to be wise, which belongs to phronesis or wisdom; for 
it belongs to the wise man to judge, as the Philosopher says 
[Metaph. i. 2). And when once it has obtained something 
for certain, as being fully examined, it thinks about the 
means of making it known to others; and this is the order- 
ing of interior speech, from which proceeds external speech. 
F^or every difference of acts does not make the powers vary, 
but only what cannot be reduced to the one same principle, 
as we have said above (Q. LXXVIII., A. 4). 



Eleventh Artio^e. 

whether the speculative and practical intellects 
are distinct powers ? 

We proceed thus to the Eleventh Article: — 

Objection i. It would seem that the speculative and 
practical intellects are distinct powers. For the appre- 
hensive and motive are different kinds of powers, as is clear 
from De Anima ii. 3. But the speculative intellect is 
merely an apprehensive power; while the practical intellect 
is a motive power. Therefore they are distinct powers. 

Obj. 2. Further, the different nature of the object dif- 
ferentiates the power. But the object of the speculative 
intellect is truth, and of the practical is good; which differ 
in nature. Therefore the speculative and practical intellect 
are distinct powers. 

Obj. 3. Further, in the intellectual part, the practical 
intellect is compared to the speculative, as the estimative 



117 THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS Q.79.ART. u 

is to the imaginative power in the sensitive part. But the 
estimative differs from the imaginative, as power from power, 
as we have said above (Q. LXXVIIL, A. 4). Therefore 
also the speculative intellect differs from the practical. 

On the contrary, The speculative intellect by extension 
becomes practical {De Anima iii. 10). But one power is 
not changed into another. Therefore the speculative and 
practical intellects are not distinct powers. 

I answer that, The speculative and practical intellects are 
not distinct powers. The reason of which is that, as we 
have said above (Q. LXXVIL, A. 3), what is accidental to 
the nature of the object of a power, does not differentiate 
that power; for it is accidental to a thing coloured to be 
man, or to be great or small ; hence all such things are 
apprehended by the same power of sight. Now, to a thing 
apprehended by the intellect, it is accidental whether it be 
directed to operation or not, and according to this the 
speculative and practical intellects differ. For it is the 
speculative intellect which directs what it apprehends, not 
to operation, but to the consideration of truth ; while the 
practical intellect is that which directs what it apprehends 
to operation. And this is what the Philosopher says {De 
Anima iii., loc. cit.); that the speculative differs from the 
practical in its end. Whence each is named from its end : 
the one speculative, the other practical — i.e., operative. 

Reply Obj. i. The practical intellect is a motive power, 
not as executing movement, but as directing towards it; 
and this belongs to it according to its mode of apprehension. 

Reply Obj. 2. Truth and good include one another; for 
truth is something good, otherwise it would not be desir- 
able; and good is something true, otherwise it would not 
be intelligible. Therefore as the object of the appetite may 
be something true, as having the aspect of good, for 
example, when some one desires to know the truth ; so the 
object of the practical intellect is good directed to operation, 
and under the aspect of truth. For the practical intellect 
knows truth, just as the speculative, but it directs the known 
truth to operation. 



g.79.ART.i2 THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA" ii8 

Reply Obj. 3. Many differences differentiate the sensitive 
powers, which do not differentiate the intellectual powers, as 
we have said above (A. 7, ad 2, Q. LXXVIL, A. 3, ad 4). 



Twelfth Article. 

whether synderesis is a special power of the soul 
distinct from the others ? 

We proceed thus to the Tivelfth Article: — 

Objection i. It would seem that synderesis is a special 
power, distinct from the others. For those things which 
fall under one division seem to be of the same genus. But 
in the gloss of Jerome on Ezech. i. 6 synderesis is divided 
against the irascible, the concupiscible, and the rational, 
which are powers. Therefore sy7ideresis is a power. 

Obj. 2. Further, opposite things are of the same genus. 
But synderesis and sensuality seem to be opposed to one 
another because synderesis always incites to good ; while 
sensuality always incites to evil : whence it is signified by 
the serpent, as is clear from Augustine {De Trin. xii. 12, 
13). It seems, therefore, that synderesis is a power just as 
sensuality is. 

Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii. 10) 
that in the natural power of judgment there are certain 
rules and seeds of virtue, both true and unchangeable. 
And this is what we call synderesis. Since, therefore, the 
unchangeable rules which guide our judgment belong to 
the reason as to its higher part, as Augustine says {De 
Trin. xii. 2), it seems that synderesis is the same as 
reason : and thus it is a power. 

On the contrary, According to the Philosopher {Metaph. 
viii. 2), rational powers regard opposite things. But 
synderesis does not regard opposites, but inclines to good 
only. Therefore synderesis is not a power. For if it were 
a power it would be a rational power, since it is not found 
in brute animals. 

/ answer that, Synderesis is not a power but a habit; 
though some held that it is a power higher than reason ; 



119 THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS Q. 79- Art. 12 

while others* said that it is reason itself, not as reason, but 
as a nature. In order to make this clear we must observe 
that, as we have said above (A. 8), man's act of reasoning, 
since it is a kind of movement, proceeds from the under- 
standing of certain things — namely, those which are 
naturally known without any investigation on the part of 
reason, as from an immovable principle, — and ends also at 
the understanding, inasmuch as by means of those prin- 
ciples naturally known, we judge of those things which we 
have discovered by reasoning. Now it is clear that, as the 
speculative reason argues about speculative things, so the 
practical reason argues about practical things. Therefore 
we must have, bestow^ed on us by nature, not only specula- 
tive principles, but also practical principles. Now the first 
speculative principles bestowed on us by nature do not 
belong to a special power, but to a special habit, which 
is called the understanding of fnnciples, as the Philoso- 
pher explains (Ethic, vi. 6). Wherefore the first practical 
principles, bestowed on us by nature, do not belong to 
a special power, but to a special natural habit, which we 
call synderesis. Whence synderesis is said to incite to 
good, and to murmur at evil, inasmuch as through first 
principles we proceed to discover, and judge of what we 
have discovered. It is therefore clear that synderesis is not 
a power, but a natural habit. 

Reply Obj. I. The division given by Jerome is taken 
from the variety of acts, and not from the variety of 
powers ; and various acts can belong to one power. 

Reply Obj. 2. In like manner, the opposition of sensu- 
ality to synderesis is an opposition of acts, and not of the 
different species of one genus. 

Reply Obj. 3. Those unchangeable notions are the first 
practical principles, concerning Avhich no one errs; and 
they are attributed to reason as to a power, and to syn- 
deresis as to a habit. Wherefore we judge naturally both 
by our reason and by synderesis. 

* C/. Alexander of Hales, Sum. Theol. II., Q. LXXIII. 



Q. 79. Art. 13 THE " SUMxMA THEOLOGICA " 120 

Thirteenth Article, 
whether conscience be a power ? 

We proceed thus to the Thirteenth Article: — 

Objection i. It would seem that conscience is a power; 
for Origen says* that conscience is a correcting and 
guiding spirit accompanying the soul, by which it is led 
away jrom evil and made to cling to good. But in the soul, 
spirit designates a power — either the mind itself, accord- 
ing to the text (Eph. iv. 13), Be ye renewed in the spirit of 
your mind — or the imagination, whence imaginary vision 
is called spiritual, as Augustine says {Gen. ad lit. xii. 7, 
24). Therefore conscience is a power. 

Obj. 2. Further, nothings is a subject of sin, except a 
power of the soul. But conscience is a subject of sin ; for 
it is said of some that their mind and conscience are defiled 
(Titus i. 15). Therefore it seems that conscience is a power. 

Obj. 3. Further, conscience must of necessity be either 
an act, a habit, or a power. But it is not an act ; for thus 
it would not always exist in man. Nor is it a habit; for 
conscience is not one thing but many, since we are directed 
in our actions by many habits of knowledge. Therefore 
conscience is a power. 

On the contrary, Conscience can be laid aside. But a 
power cannot be laid aside. Therefore conscience is not a 
power. 

I answer that. Properly speaking conscience is not a 
power, but an act. This is evident both from the very 
name and from those things which in the common way of 
speaking are attributed to conscience. For conscience, 
according to the very nature of the word, implies the rela- 
tion of knowledge to something : for conscience may be 
resolved into cum alio scientia, i.e., knowledge applied to 
an individual case. But the application of knowledge to 
something is done by some act. Wherefore from this 
explanation of the name it is clear that conscience is an act. 
* Commentary on Rom. ii. 15. 



121 THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS Q. 79- Art. 13 

The same is manifest from those things which are at- 
tributed to conscience. For conscience is said to witness, 
to bind, or incite, and also to accuse, torment, or rebuke. 
And all these follow the application of knowledge or science 
to what we do : which application is made in three ways. 
One way in so far as we recognize that we have done or not 
done something; Thy conscience knoweth that thou hast 
often spoken evil of others (Eccles. vii. 23), and according to 
this, conscience is said to witness. In another way, so far 
as through the conscience we judge that something should 
be done or not done; and in this sense, conscience is said 
to incite or to bind. In the third way, so far as by con- 
science we judge that something done is well done or ill 
done, and in this sense conscience is said to excuse, accuse, 
or torment. Now, it is clear that all these things follow the 
actual application of knowledge to what we do. Where- 
fore, properly speaking, conscience denominates an act. 
But since habit is a principle of act, sometimes the name 
conscience is given to the first natural habit — namely, syn- 
deresis : thus Jerome calls synderesis conscience (Gloss. 
Ezech. i. 6); Basil,* the natural power of judgment, and 
Damascene! says that it is the law of our intellect. For it 
is customary for causes and effects to be called after one 
another. 

Reply Ohj. i. Conscience is called a spirit, so far as 
spirit is the same as mind ; because conscience is a certain 
pronouncement of the mind. 

Reply Ohj. 2. The conscience is said to be defiled, not 
as a subject, but as the thing known is in knowledge ; so 
far as someone knows he is defiled. 

Reply Ohj. 3. Although an act does not always remain 
in itself, yet it always remains in its cause, which is power 
and habit. Now all the habits by which conscience is 
formed, although many, nevertheless have their efficacy 
from one first habit, the habit of first principles, which is 
called synderesis. And for this special reason, this habit 
is sometimes called conscience, as we have said above. 
♦ Horn, in princ. Proverb. f De Fide Orihod. iv. 22. 



QUESTION LXXX. 

OF THE APPETITIVE POWERS IN GENERAL. 
(In Two Articles.) 

Next we consider the appetitive powers, concerning which 
there are four heads of consideration : first, the appetitive 
powers in general ; second, sensuality ; third, the will ; 
fourth, the free-will. Under the first there are two points 
of inquiry, (i) Whether the appetite should be considered 
a special power of the soul ? (2) Whether the appetite 
should be divided into intellectual and sensitive as distinct 
powers ? 

First Article, 
whether the appetite is a special power of the soul? 

We proceed thus to the First Article: — 

Objection i. It would seem that the appetite is not a 
special power of the soul. For no power of the soul is to 
be assigned for those things which are common to animate 
and to inanimate things. But appetite is common to 
animate and inanimate things : since all desire good, as the 
Philosopher says {Ethic, i. i). Therefore the appetite is 
not a special power of the soul. 

Ohj. 2. Further, powers are differentiated by their 
objects. But what we desire is the same as what we know. 
Therefore the appetitive power is not distinct from the 
apprehensive power. 

Obj. 3. Further, the common is not divided from the 
proper. But each power of the soul desires some particular 
desirable thing — namely, its own suitable object. There- 
fore, with regard to this object which is the desirable in 
general, we should not assign some particular power 
distinct from the others, called the appetitive power. 

122 



123 THE APPETITIVE POWERS Q. 80. Art. i 

On the contrary, The Philosopher distinguishes {De 
Anima ii. 3) the appetitive from the other powers. Damas- 
cene also {De Fid. Orth. ii. 22) distinguishes the appetitive 
from the cognitive powers. 

/ ansiver that, It is necessary to assign an appetitive 
power to the soul. To make this evident, we must observe 
that some inclination follows every form : for example, fire, 
by its form, is inclined to rise, and to generate its like. 
Now, the form is found to have a more perfect existence 
in those things which participate knowledge than in those 
which lack knowledge. For in those which lack know- 
ledge, the form is found to determine each thing only 
to its own being— that is, to its nature. Therefore this 
natural form is followed by a natural inclination, which 
is called the natural appetite. But in those things which 
have knowledge, each one is determined to its own natural 
being by its natural form, in such a manner that it is 
nevertheless receptive of the species of other things : for 
example, sense receives the species of all things sensible, 
and the intellect, of all things intelligible, so that the soul 
of man is, in a way, all things by sense and intellect : and 
thereby, those things that have knowledge, in a way, ap- 
proach to a likeness to God, in Whom all things pre-exist, 
as Dionysius says (Div. Notn. v.). 

Therefore, as forms exist in those things that have 
knowledge in a higher manner and above the manner of 
natural forms ; so must there be in them an inclination sur- 
passing the natural inclination, which is called the natural 
appetite. And this superior inclination belongs to the 
appetitive power of the soul, through which the animal is 
able to desire what it apprehends, and not only that to 
which it is inclined by its natural form. And so it is 
necessary to assign an appetitive power to the soul. 

Reply Ohj. I. Appetite is found in things which have 
knowledge, above the common manner in which it is found 
in all things, as we have said above. Therefore it is neces- 
sary to assign to the soul a particular power. 

Reply Ohj. 2. What is apprehended and what is desired 



Q.8o. ART.2 THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 124 

are the same in reality, but differ in aspect : for a thing is 
apprehended as something sensible or intelligible, whereas 
it is desired as suitable or good. Now, it is diversity of 
aspect in the objects, and not material diversity, which 
demands a diversity of powers. 

Reply Ohj. 3. Each power of the soul is a form or 
nature, and has a natural inclination to something. Where- 
fore each power desires by the natural appetite that object 
which is suitable to itself. Above which natural appetite 
is the animal appetite, which follows the apprehension, and 
by which something is desired not as suitable to this or that 
power, such as sight for seeing, or sound for hearing ; but 
simply as suitable to the animal. 



Second Article. 

WHETHER THE SENSITIVE AND INTELLECTUAL APPETITES 
ARE DISTINCT POWERS ? 

We proceed thus to the Second Article: — 

Objection i. It would seem that the sensitive and intel- 
lectual appetites are not distinct powers. For powers are 
not differentiated by accidental differences, as we have seen 
above (Q. LXXVIL, A. 3). But it is accidental to the ap- 
petible object whether it be apprehended by the sense or by 
the intellect. Therefore the sensitive and intellectual 
appetites are not distinct powers. 

Obj. 2. Further, intellectual knowledge is of universals; 
and so it is distinct from sensitive knowledge, which is of 
individual things. But there is no place for this distinction 
in the appetitive part : for since the appetite is a movement 
of the soul to individual things, seemingly every act of the 
appetite regards an individual thing. Therefore the intel- 
lectual appetite is not distinguished from the sensitive. 

Obj. 3. Further, as under the apprehensive power, the 
appetitive is subordinate as a lower power, so also is the 
motive power. But the motive power which in man follows 
the intellect is not distinct from the motive power which in 



125 THE APPETITIVE POWERS Q. 80. Art. 2 

animals follows sense. Therefore, for a like reason, neither 
is there distinction in the appetitive part. 

On the contrary, The Philosopher {De Anima iii. 9) dis- 
tinguishes a double appetite, and says {ihid. 11) that the 
higher appetite moves the lower. 

1 answer that, We must needs say that the intellectual 
appetite is a distinct power from the sensitive appetite. 
For the appetitive power is a passive power, which is 
naturally moved by the thing apprehended : wherefore 
the apprehended appetible is a mover which is not moved, 
while the appetite is a mover moved, as the Philosopher 
says in De Anima iii. 10, and Metaph. xii. (Did. xi. 7). 
Now things passive and movable are differentiated accord- 
ing to the distinction of the corresponding active and 
motive principles ; because the motive must be propor- 
tionate to the movable, and the active to the passive : 
indeed, the passive power itself has its very nature from 
its relation to its active principle. Therefore, since what 
is apprehended by the intellect and what is apprehended by 
sense are generically different ; consequently, the intel- 
lectual appetite is distinct from the sensitive. 

Reply Obj. i. It is not accidental to the thing desired to 
be apprehended by the sense or the intellect ; on the con- 
trary, this belongs to it by its nature ; for the appetible does 
not move the appetite except as it is apprehended. Where- 
fore differences in the thing apprehended are of themselves 
differences of the appetible. And so the appetitive powers 
are distinct according to the distinction of the things 
apprehended, as their proper objects. 

Reply Obj. 2. The intellectual appetite, though it tends 
to individual thmgs which exist outside the soul, yet tends 
to them as standing under the universal ; as when it desires 
something because it is good. Wherefore the Philosopher 
says (Rhetoric, ii. 4) that hatred can regard a universal, as 
when we hate every kind of thief. In the same way by the 
intellectual appetite we may desire the immaterial good, 
which is not apprehended by sense, such as knowledge^ 
virtue, and suchlike. 



Q.So.Art. 2 THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA" 126 

Reply Obj. 3. As the Philosopher says {De Anima iii, 
11), a universal opinion does not move except by means of 
a particular opinion ; and in like manner the higher appetite 
moves by means of the lower : and therefore there are not 
two distinct motive powers following the intellect and the 
sense. 



QUESTION LXXXI. 

OF THE POWER OF SENSUALITY. 
(In Three Articles.) 

Next we have to consider the power of sensuality, concern- 
ing which there are three points of inquiry : (i) Whether 
sensuaHty is only an appetitive power ? (2) Whether it is 
divided into irascible and concupiscible as distinct powers ? 
(3) Whether the irascible and concupiscible powers obey 
reason ? 

First Article, 
whether sensuality is only appetitive? 

We proceed thus to the First Article: — 

Objection i. It would seem that sensuality is not only 
appetitive, but also cognitive. For Augustine says {De 
Trin. xii. 12) that the sensual movement of the soul which 
is directed to the bodily senses is common to us and beasts. 
But the bodily senses belong to the apprehensive powers. 
Therefore sensuality is a cognitive power. 

Obj. 2. Further, things which come under one division 
seem to be of one genus. But Augustine {De Trin. xii., 
loc. cit.) divides sensuality against the higher and lower 
reason, which belong to knowledge. Therefore sensuality 
also is apprehensive. 

Obj. 3. Further, in man's temptations sensuality stands 
in the place of the serpent. But in the temptation of our 
first parents, the serpent presented himself as one giving 
information and proposing sin, which belong to the cogni- 
tive power. Therefore sensuality is a cognitive power. 

On the contrary, Sensuality is defined as the appetite of 
things belonging to the body. 

127 



Q.8i. Art. I THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 128 

I answer that, The name sensuality seems to be taken 
from the sensual movement, of which Augustine speaks {De 
Trin. xii. 12, 13), just as the name of a power is taken from 
its act; for instance, sight from seeing. Now the sensual 
movement is an appetite following sensitive apprehension. 
For the act of the apprehensive power is not so properly 
called a movement as the act of the appetite : since the 
operation of the apprehensive power is completed in the 
very fact that the thing apprehended is in the one that 
apprehends : while the operation of the appetitive power is 
completed in the fact that he who desires is borne towards 
the thing desirable. Therefore the operation of the appre- 
hensive power is likened to rest : whereas the operation of 
the appetitive power is rather likened to movement. Where- 
fore by sensual movement we understand the operation of 
the appetitive power : so that sensuality is the name of the 

sensitive appetite. 

Reply Obj. i. By saving that the sensual movement ol 
the soul is directed to the bodily senses, Augustine does not 
give us to understand that the bodily senses are included in 
sensuality, but rather that the movement of sensuality is 
a certain inclination to the bodily senses, since we desire 
things which are apprehended through the bodily senses. 
And thus the bodily senses appertain to sensuality as a 

^'^RTplyOhj. 2. Sensuality is divided against higher and 
lower reason, as having in common with them the act of 
movement : for the apprehensive power, to which belong 
the higher and lower reason, is a motive power; as is 
appetite, to which appertains sensuality. 

Reply Obj. 3. The serpent not only showed and pro- 
posed sin, but also incited to the commission of sin. And 
in this, sensuality is signified by the serpent. 



129 THE SENSITIVE APPETITE Q. 8i. Art. 2 



Second Article. 

whether the sensitive appetite is divided into the 
irascible and concupiscible as distinct powers ? 

We proceed thus to the Second Article: — 

Objection i. It would seem that the sensitive appetite is 
not divided into the irascible and concupiscible as distinct 
powers. For the same power of the soul regards both sides 
of a contrariety, as sight regards both black and white, 
according to the Philosopher {De Anima ii. 11). But suit- 
able and harmful are contraries. Since, then, the con- 
cupiscible power regards what is suitable, while the irascible 
is concerned with what is harmful, it seems that irascible 
and concupiscible are the same power in the soul. 

Ohj. 2. Further, the sensitive appetite regards only what 
is suitable according to the senses. But such is the object 
of the concupiscible power. Therefore there is no sensitive 
appetite differing from the concupiscible. 

Ohj. 3. Further, hatred is in the irascible part : for 
Jerome says on Matt. xiii. 33 : We ought to have the hatred 
of vice in the irascible power. But hatred is contrary 
to love, and is in the concupiscible part. Therefore the 
concupiscible and irascible are the same powers. 

On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Natura 
Hominis) and Damascene {De Fid. Orth. ii. 12) assign two 
parts to the sensitive appetite, the irascible and the con- 
cupiscible. 

/ answer that, The sensitive appetite is one generic power, 
and is called sensuality ; but it is divided into two powers, 
which are species of the sensitive appetite — the irascible and 
the concupiscible. In order to make this clear, we must 
observe that in natural corruptible things there is needed an 
inclination not only to the acquisition of what is suitable 
and to the avoiding of what is harmful, but also to resistance 
against corruptive and contrary agencies which are a hind- 
rance to the acquisition of what is suitable, and are produc- 
tive of harm. For example, fire has a natural inclination, 

I. 4 Q 



Q.Si.Art. 2 THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA" 130 

not only to rise from a lower position, which is unsuitable 
to it, towards a higher position which is suitable, but also 
to resist whatever destroys or hinders its action. There- 
fore, since the sensitive appetite is an inclination following 
sensitive apprehension, as natural appetite is an inclination 
following the natural form, there must needs be in the sensi- 
tive part two appetitive powers — one through which the soul 
is simply inclined to seek what is suitable, according to the 
senses, and to fly from what is hurtful, and this is called 
the concupiscible : and another, whereby an animal resists 
these attacks that hinder what is suitable, and inflict harm, 
and this is called the irascible. Whence we say that its 
object is something arduous, because its tendency is to 
overcome and rise above obstacles. Now these two are not 
to be reduced to one principle : for sometimes the soul 
busies itself with unpleasant things, against the inclination 
of the concupiscible appetite, in order that, following the 
impulse of the irascible appetite, it may fight against 
obstacles. Wherefore also the passions of the irascible 
appetite counteract the passions of the concupiscible appe- 
tite : since concupiscence, on being roused, diminishes 
anger; and anger being roused, diminishes concupiscence 
in many cases. This is clear also from the fact that the 
irascible is, as it were, the champion and defender of the 
concupiscible, when it rises up against what hinders the 
acquisition of the suitable things which the concupiscible 
desires, or against what inflicts harm, from which the con- 
cupiscible flies. And for this reason all the passions of the 
irascible appetite rise from the passions of the concupiscible 
appetite and terminate in them ; for instance, anger rises 
from sadness, and having wrought vengeance, terminates 
in joy. For this reason also the quarrels of animals are 
about things concupiscible — namely, food and sex, as the 
Philosopher says {De Animal, viii.).* 

Reply Obj. i . The concupiscible power regards both what 
is suitable and what is unsuitable. But the object of the 
irascible power is to resist the onslaught of the unsuitable. 

* De Animal. Histor. 



131 THE SENSITIVE APPETITE Q.81.ART.3 

Reply Obj. 2. As in the apprehensive powers of the 
sensitive part there is an estimative power, which perceives 
those things which do not impress the senses, as we have 
said above (Q. LXXVIII., A. 2); so also in the sensitive 
appetite there is a certain appetitive power which regards 
something as suitable, not because it pleases the senses, but 
because it is useful to the animal for self-defence : and this 
is the irascible power. 

Reply Obj. 3. Hatred belongs simply to the concupiscible 
appetite: but by reason of the strife which arises from 
hatred, it may belong to the irascible appetite. 

Third Article. 

WHETHER THE IRASCIBLE AND CONCUPISCIBLE APPETITES 

OBEY REASON? 

We proceed thus to the Third Article:— 

Objection I. It would seem that the irascible and con- 
cupiscible appetites do not obey reason. For irascible and 
concupiscible are parts of sensuality. But sensuality does 
not obey reason, wherefore it is signified by the serpent 
as Augustine says (De Trin. xii. 12, 13). Therefore the 
irascible and concupiscible appetites do not obey reason. 

Obj. 2. Further, what obeys a certain thing does not 
resist It. But the irascible and concupiscible appetites 
resist reason : according to the Apostle (Rom. vii 23) • / 
see another law in my members fighting against the law of 
my mind. Therefore the irascible and concupiscible appe- 
tites do not obey reason. 

06;. 3. Further, as the appetitive power is inferior to the 
rational part of the soul, so also is the sensitive power 
But the sensitive part of the soul does not obey reason : for 
we neither hear nor see just when we wish. Therefore in 
like manner, neither do the powers of the sensitive appetite 
the irascible and concupiscible, obey reason. ' 

On the contrary, Damascene savs {De Fid. Orth ii 12) 
that the part of the soul which is obedient and amenable to 
reason 2s divided into concupiscence and anger 



Q. 8I.ART.3 THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA" 132 

/ answer that, In two ways the irascible and concu- 
piscible powers obey the higher part, in which are the 
intellect or reason, and the will; first, as to the reason, 
secondly as to the wall. They obey the reason in their 
own acts, because in other animals the sensitive appetite is 
naturally moved by the estimative power ; for instance, a 
sheep, esteeming the wolf as an enemy, is afraid. In man 
the estimative power, as we have said above (Q. LXXVIII., 
A. 4), is replaced by the cogitative power, which is called by 
some the particular reason, because it compares individual 
intentions. Wherefore in man the sensitive appetite is 
naturally moved by this particular reason. But this same 
particular reason is naturally guided and moved according 
to the universal reason : wherefore in syllogistic matters 
particular conclusions are drawn from universal proposi- 
tions. Therefore it is clear that the universal reason directs 
the sensitive appetite, which is divided into concupiscible 
and irascible; and this appetite obeys it. But because to 
draw particular conclusions from universal principles is not 
the work of the intellect, as such, but of the reason : hence 
it is that the irascible and concupiscible are said to obey 
the reason rather than to obey the intellect. Anyone can 
experience this in himself : for by applying certain universal 
considerations, anger or fear or the like may be modified or 
excited. 

To the will also is the sensitive appetite subject in execu- 
tion, which is accomplished by the motive power. For in 
other animals movement follows at once the concupiscible 
and irascible appetites : for instance, the sheep, fearing the 
wolf, flies at once, because it has no superior counteracting 
appetite. On the contrary, man is not moved at once, 
according to the irascible and concupiscible appetites : but 
he awaits the command of the will, which is the superior 
appetite. For wherever there is order among a number 
of motive powders, the second only moves by virtue of the 
first : wherefore the lower appetite is not sufficient to cause 
movement, unless the higher appetite consents. And this 
is what the Philosopher says {De Anima. iii. 11), that the 



133 THE SENSITIVE APPETITE Q. 8i. Art. 3 

higher appetite moves the lower appetite, as the higher 
sphere moves the lower. In this way, therefore, the iras- 
cible and concupiscible are subject to reason. 

Reply Obj. i. Sensuality is signified by the serpent, in 
what is proper to it as a sensitive power. But the irascible 
and concupiscible powers denominate the sensitive appetite 
rather on the part of the act, to which they are led by the 
reason, as we have said. 

Reply Obj. 2. As the Philosopher says {Polit. i. 2) : We 
observe in an animal a despotic and a politic principle: for 
the soul dominates the body by a despotic power; but the 
intellect dominates the appetite by a politic and royal power. 
For a power is called despotic whereby a man rules his 
slaves, who have not the right to resist in any way the 
orders of the one that commands them, since they have 
nothing of their own. But that power is called politic and 
royal by which a man rules over free subjects, who, though 
subject to the government of the ruler, have nevertheless 
something of their own, by reason of which they can resist 
the orders of him who commands. And so, the soul is said 
to rule the body by a despotic power, because the members 
of the body cannot in any way resist the sway of the soul, 
but at the soul's command both hand and foot, and what- 
ever member is naturally moved by voluntary movement, 
are moved at once. But the intellect or reason is said to 
rule the irascible and concupiscible by a politic power : 
because the sensitive appetite has something of its own, by 
virtue whereof it can resist the commands of reason. For 
the sensitive appetite is naturally moved, not only by the 
estimative power in other animals, and in man by the cogi- 
tative power which the universal reason guides, but also 
by the imagination and sense. Whence it is that we ex- 
perience that the irascible and concupiscible powers do 
resist reason, inasmuch as we sense or imagine something 
pleasant, which reason forbids, or unpleasant, which reason 
commands. And so from the fact that the irascible and 
concupiscible resist reason in something, we must not con- 
clude that they do not obey. 



Q.Si.Art. 3 THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA" 134 

Reply Obj. 3. The exterior senses require for action ex- 
terior sensible things, whereby they are affected, and the 
presence of which is not ruled by reason. But the interior 
powers, both appetitive and apprehensive, do not require 
exterior things. Therefore they are subject to the com- 
mand of reason, which can not only incite or modify the 
affections of the appetitive power, but can also form the 
phantasms of the imagination. 



QUESTION LXXXII. 

OF THE WILL. 
(/« Five Articles.) 

We next consider the will. Under this head there are five 
points of inquiry : (i) Whether the will desires something 
of necessity ? (2) Whether it desires everything of neces- 
sity ? (3) Whether it is a higher power than the intellect ? 
(4) Whether the will moves the intellect ? (5) Whether the 
will is divided into irascible and concupiscible ? 

First Article, 
whether the will desires something of necessity? 

We proceed thus to the First Article: — 

Objection i. It would seem that the will desires nothing 
of necessity. For Augustine says {De Civ. Dei v. 10) that 
if anything is necessary, it is not voluntary. But whatever 
the will desires is voluntary. Therefore nothing that the 
will desires is desired of necessity. 

Obj. 2. Further, the rational powers, according to the 
Philosopher {Metaph. viii. 2), extend to opposite things. 
But the will is a rational power, because, as he says {De 
Anima iii. 9), the will is in the reason. Therefore the will 
extends to opposite things, and therefore it is determined to 
nothing of necessity. 

Obj. 3. Further, by the will w^e are masters of our own 
actions. But we are not masters of that which is of neces- 
sity. Therefore the act of the will cannot be necessitated. 

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii. 4) that 
all desire happiness with one ivill. Now if this were not 
necesssary, but contingent, there would at least be a few 

135 



g. 82. Art. I THE *' SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 136 

exceptions. Therefore the will desires something of 
necessity. 

/ answer that, The word necessity is employed in many 
ways. For that which must be is necessary. Now that a 
thing must be may belong to it by an intrinsic principle; — 
either material, as when we say that everything composed 
of contraries is of necessity corruptible ; — or formal, as 
when we say that it is necessary for the three angles of a 
triangle to be equal to two right angles. And this is 
natural and absolute necessity. In another way, that a 
thing must be, belongs to it by reason of something 
extrinsic, which is either the end or the agent. On the 
part of the end, as when without it the end is not to be 
attained or so well attained : for instance, food is said to be 
necessary for life, and a horse is necessary for a journey. 
This is called necessity of end, and sometimes also utility. 
On the part of the agent, a thing must be, when someone 
is forced by some agent, so that he is not able to do the 
contrary. This is called necessity of coercion. 

Now this necessity of coercion is altogether repugnant to 
the will. For we call that violent which is against the 
inclination of a thing. But the very movement of the will 
is an inclination to something. Therefore, as a thing is 
called natural because it is according to the inclination of 
nature, so a thing is called voluntary because it is according 
to the inclination of the will. Therefore, just as it is 
impossible for a thing to be at the same time violent and 
natural, so it is impossible for a thing to be absolutely 
coerced or violent, and voluntary. 

But necessity of end is not repugnant t© the will, when 
the end cannot be attained except in one way : thus from 
the will to cross the sea, arises in the will the necessity to 
wish for a ship. 

In like manner neither is natural necessity repugnant to 
the will. Indeed, mere than this, for as the intellect of 
necessity adheres to the first principles, the will must of 
necessity adhere t© the last end, which is happiness : since 
the end is in practical matters what the principle is in 



137 THE WILL Q. 82. Art. 2 

speculative matters. For what befits a thing naturally and 
immovably must be the root and principle of all else apper- 
taining thereto, since the nature of a thing is the first in 
everything, and every movement arises from something 
immovable. 

Reply Obj. i. The words of Augustine are to be under- 
stood of the necessity of coercion. But natural necessity 
does not take away the liberty of the will, as he says himself 
(ibid.). 

Reply Obj. 2. The will, so far as it desires a thing 
naturally, corresponds rather to the intellect as regards 
natural principles than to the reason, which extends to 
opposite things. Wherefore in this respect it is rather an 
intellectual than a rational power. 

Reply Obj. 3. We are masters of our own actions by 
reason of our being able to choose this or that. But choice 
regards not the end, but the means to the end, as the 
Philosopher says {Ethic, iii. 9). Wherefore the desire of 
the ultimate end does not regard those actions of which we 
are masters. 

Second Article, 
whether the will desires of necessity, whatever it 

DESIRES ? 

We proceed thus to the Second Article : — 

Objection i . It would seem that the will desires all things 
of necessity, whatever it desires. For Dionysius says (Div. 
Nom. iv.) that evil is outside the scope of the will. There- 
fore the will tends of necessity to the good which is proposed 
to it. 

Obj. 2. Further, the object of the will is compared to the 
will as the mover to the thing movable. But the movement 
of the movable necessarily follows the mover. Therefore it 
seems that the will's object moves it of necessity. 

Obj. 3. Further, as the thing apprehended by sense is the 
object of the sensitive appetite, so the thing apprehended 
by the intellect is the object of the intellectual appetite, 



Q. 82. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 138 

which is called the will. But what is apprehended by the 
sense moves the sensitive appetite of necessity : for Augus- 
tine says (Gen. ad lit. ix. 14) that animals are moved by 
things seen. Therefore it seems that whatever is appre- 
hended by the intellect moves the will of necessity. 

On the contrary, Augustine says {Retract, i. 9) that it is 
the will by which we sin and live well, and so the will 
extends to opposite things. Therefore it does not desire of 
necessity all things whatsoever it desires. 

I answer that, The will does not desire of necessity what- 
soever it desires. In order to make this evident we must 
observe that as the intellect naturally and of .necessity 
adheres to the first principles, so the will adheres to the 
last end, as we have said already (A. i). Now there are 
some things intelligible which have not a necessary con- 
nection with the first principles ; such as contingent proposi- 
tions, the denial of which does not involve a denial of the 
first principles. And to such the intellect does not assent 
of necessity. But there are some propositions which have 
a necessary connection with the first principles : such as 
demonstrable conclusions, a denial of which involves a 
denial of the first principles. And to these the intellect 
assents of necessity, when once it is aware of the necessary 
connection of these conclusions with the principles; but it 
does not assent of necessity until through the demonstration 
it recognizes the necessity of such connection. It is the 
samfe with the will. For there are certain individual goods 
which have not a necessary connection with happiness, 
because without them a man can be happy : and to such 
the will does not adhere of necessity. But there are some 
things which have a necessary connection with happiness, 
by means of which things man adheres to God, in Whom 
alone true happiness consists. Nevertheless, until through 
the certitude of the Divine Vision the necessity of such 
connection be shown, the will does not adhere to God of 
necessity, nor to those things which are of God. But the 
will of the man who sees God in His Essence of necessity 
adheres to God, just as now we desire of necessity to be 



139 THE WILL 0.82. Art. 3 

happy. It is therefore clear that the will does not desire of 
necessity whatever it desires. 

Reply Obj. i. The will can tend to nothing except under 
the aspect of good. But because good is of many kinds, for 
this reason the will is not of necessity determined to one. 

Reply Ohj. 2. The mover, then, of necessity causes 
movement in the thing movable, when the power of the 
mover exceeds the thing movable, so that its entire capacity 
is subject to the mover. But as the capacity of the will 
regards the universal and perfect good, its capacity is not 
subjected to any individual good. And therefore it is not 
of necessity moved by it. 

Reply Obj. 3. The sensitive power does not compare 
different things with each other, as reason does : but it 
simply apprehends some one thing. Therefore, according 
to that one thing, it moves the sensitive appetite in a deter- 
minate way. But the reason is a power that compares 
several things together : therefore from several things the 
intellectual appetite — that is, the will — may be moved; but 
not of necessity from one thing. 



Third Article. 

whether the will is a higher power than the 

intellect ? 

We proceed thus to the Third Article : — 

Objection i . It would seem that the will is a higher power 
than the intellect. For the object of the will is good and 
the end. But the end is the first and highest cause. There- 
fore the will is the first and highest power. 

Obj. 2. Further, in the order of natural things we observe 
a progress from imperfect things to perfect. And this also 
appears in the powers of the soul : for sense precedes the 
intellect, which is more noble. Now the act of the will, in 
the natural order, follows the act of the intellect. Therefore 
the will is a more noble and perfect power than the intellect. 

Obj. 3. Further, habits are proportioned to their powers, 



g. 82. Aft. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 140 

as perfections to what they make perfect. But the habit 
which perfects the will — namely, charity — is more noble 
than the habits which perfect the intellect : for it is written 
(i Cor. xiii. 2) : // / should know all mysteries, and if I 
should have all faith, and have not charity, I am nothing. 
Therefore the will is a higher power than the intellect. 

On the contrary, The Philosopher holds the intellect to 
be the highest power of the soul {Ethic, x. 7). 

/ ansiver that, The superiority of one thing over another 
can be considered in two ways : absolutely and relatively. 
Now a thing is considered to be such absolutely which is 
considered such in itself : but relatively as it is such with 
regard to something else. If therefore the intellect and will 
be considered with regard to themselves, then the intellect 
is the higher power. And this is clear if we compare their 
respective objects to one another. For the object of the 
intellect is more simple and more absolute than the object 
of the will ; since the object of the intellect is the very idea 
of appetible good ; and the appetible good, the idea of which 
is in the intellect, is the object of the will. Now the more 
simple and the more abstract a thing is, the nobler and 
higher it is in itself; and therefore the object of the intellect 
is higher than the object of the will. Therefore, since the 
proper nature of a power is in its order to its object, it 
follows that the intellect in itself and absolutely is higher 
and nobler than the will. But relatively and by comparison 
with something else, we find that the will is sometimes 
higher than the intellect, from the fact that the object of the 
will occurs in something higher than that in which occurs 
the object of the intellect. Thus, for instance, I might say 
that hearing is relatively nobler than sight, inasmuch as 
something in which there is sound is nobler than something 
in which there is colour, though colour is nobler and simpler 
than sound. For, as we have said above (Q. XVI., A. i ; 
Q. XXVII., A. 4), the action of the intellect consists in 
this — that the idea of the thing understood is in the one who 
understands ; while the act of the will consists in this — that 
the will is inclined to the thing itself as existing in itself. 



'4^ THE WILL Q. 82. ART. 3 

And therefore the Philosopher says in Metaph. vi (Did 
V. 2) that good and evil, which are objects of the will, are in 
things, but truth and error, which are objects of .he intellect 
are m the mind. When, therefore, the thing in which there 
IS good ,s nobler than the soul itself, in which is the idea 
understood; by comparison with such a thing, the will is 
higher than the intellect. But when the thfng which is 
good ,s less noble than the soul, then even in comparison 
with that thmg the intellect is higher than the will. Where- 
fore the love of God is better than the knowledge of God • 
but, on the contrary, the knowledge of corporeal things is 
better than the love thereof. Absolutely] however the 
intellect is nobler than the will. owever, the 

Reply Obj. I. The aspect of causality is perceived by 
companng one thing to another, and in such f comparison 
the Idea of good ,s found to be nobler : but truth sfgnifies 
somethmg more absolute, and extends to the idea of^ good 
Itself : wherefore even good is something true. But afaTn 
truth .s something good : forasmuch as the intelkct fs ^ 
thmg, and truth its end. And among other ends this s the 
mo^ excellent : as also is the intellect among the ot 



tim1tl?/;;:;ecrf ' '"'''" '" °^'" °^ ^^--^-" -d 
LTfv T •' ' '" °"^ ^"^ '^^ ^^"^e thing poten. 

t.ahty precedes act, and imperfection precedes perfect on 
But what precedes absolutely and in the orde of na^ 
more perfect: for thus act precedes potentiality And in 
this way the intellect precedes the willfas the mot ve now " 
precedes the thing movable, and as the active precedes The 

Kepiy 06; 3. This reason is verified of the will as com 



g. 82. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 142 

Fourth Article, 
whether the will ]moves the intellect? 

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article: — 

Objection i. It would seem that the will does not move 
the intellect. For what moves excels and precedes what is 
moved, because what moves is an agent, and the agent is 
nobler than the patient, as Augustine says {Gen. ad lit. 
xii. 16), and the Philosopher {De Anima iii. 5). But the 
intellect excels and precedes the will, as we have said above 
(A. 3). Therefore the will does not move the intellect. 

Obj. 2. Further, what moves is not moved by what is 
moved, except perhaps accidentally. But the intellect 
moves the will, because the good apprehended by the 
intellect moves without being moved; whereas the appetite 
moves and is moved. Therefore the intellect is not moved 
by the will. 

Obj. 3. Further, we can will nothing but what we under- 
stand. If, therefore, in order to understand, the will moves 
by willing to understand, that act of the will must be pre- 
ceded by another act of the intellect, and this act of the 
intellect by another act of the will, and so on indefinitely, 
which is impossible. Therefore the will does not move the 
intellect. 

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fid. Orth. ii. 26) : 
It is in our power to learn an art or not, as we list. But a 
thing is in our power by the will, and we learn art by the 
intellect. Therefore the will moves the intellect. 

/ answer that, A thing is said to move in two ways : 
First, as an end ; for instance, when we say that the end 
moves the agent. In this way the intellect moves the will, 
because the good understood is the object of the will, and 
moves it as an end. Secondly, a thing is said to move as 
an agent, as what alters moves what is altered, and what 
impels moves what is impelled. In this way the will moves 
the intellect, and all the powers of the soul, as Anselm says 
(Eadmer, De $imilitudinibus). The reason is, because 



) 



143 THE WILL 0. 82. Art. 4 

wherever we have order among a number of active powers, 
that power which regards the universal end moves the 
powers which regard particular ends. And we may observe 
this both in nature and in things politic. For the heaven, 
which aims at the universal preservation of things subject 
to generation and corruption, moves all inferior bodies, 
each of which aims at the preservation of its own species or 
of the individual. The king also, who aims at the common 
good of the whole kingdom, by his rule moves all the 
governors of cities, each of whom rules over his own 
particular city. Now the object of the will is good and the 
end m general, and each power is directed to some suitable 
good proper to it, as sight is directed to the perception of 
colour, and the intellect to the knowledge of truth. There- 
fore the will as an agent moves all the powers of the soul 
to their respective acts, except the natural powers of the 
vegetative part, which are not subject to our will. 

Reply Obj. I. The intellect may be considered in two 
ways : as apprehensive of universal being and truth, and as 
a thing and a particular power having a determinate act. 
In like manner also the will may be considered in two 
ways : according to the common nature of its object— that 
IS to say, as appetitive of universal good— and as a deter- 
minate power of the soul having a determinate act. If 
therefore, the intellect and will be compared with one 
another according to the universality of their respective 
objects, then, as we have said above (A. 3), the intellect is 
simply higher and nobler than the will. If, however we 
take the intellect as regards the common nature of its object 
and the will as a determinate power, then again the intellect 
IS higher and nobler than the will, because under the notion 
of being and truth is contained both the will itself, and its 
act and Its object. Wherefore the intellect understands the 
will, and Its act, and its object, just as it understands other 
species of things, as stone or wood, which are contained in 
the common notion of being and truth. But if we consider 
the will as regards the common nature of its object, which 
IS good, and the intellect as a thing and a special power- 



Q.82.ART.5 THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA" 144 

then the intellect itself, and its act, and its object, which is 
truth, each of which is some species of good, are contained 
under the common notion of good. And in this way the 
will is higher than the intellect, and can move it. From 
this we can easily understand why these powers include one 
another in their acts, because the intellect understands that 
the will wills, and the will wills the intellect to understand. 
In the same way good is contained in truth, inasmuch as it 
is an understood truth, and truth in good, inasmuch as it is 

a desired good. 

Reply Obj. 2. The intellect moves the will in one sense, 
and the will moves the intellect in another, as we have said 

above. 

Reply Obj. 3. There is no need to go on indefinitely, but 
we must stop at the intellect as preceding all the rest. Ror 
every movement of the will must be preceded by appre- 
hension, whereas every apprehension is not preceded by an 
act of the will ; but the principle of counselling and under- 
standing is an intellectual principle higher than our intellect 
—namely, God— as also Aristotle says {Eth. Endemic. 
vii. 14), and in this way he explains that there is no need 
to proceed indefinitely. 

Fifth Article. 

WHETHER WE SHOULD DISTINGUISH IRASCIBLE AND CON- 
CUPISCIBLE PARTS IN THE SUPERIOR APPETITE? 

■ \We proceed thus to the Fifth Article ;— 

Objection 1. It would seem that we ought to distinguish 
irascible and concupiscible parts in the superior appetite, 
which is the will. For the concupiscible power is so called 
from concupiscere {to desire), and the irascible part from 
irasci {to be angry). But there is a concupiscence which 
cannot belong to the sensitive appetite, but only to the 
intellectual, which is the will; as the concupiscence of 
wisdom, of which it is said (Wisd. vi. 21): The con- 
cupiscence of wisdom bringeth to the eternal kingdom. 
There is also a certain anger which cannot belong to the 



145 THE WILL Q. 82. Art. 5 

sensitive appetite, but only to the intellectual ; as when our 
anger is directed against vice. Wherefore Jerome com- 
menting on Matt. xiii. 23 warns us to have the hatred of 
vice in the irascible part. Therefore we should distinguish 
irascible and concupiscible parts in the intellectual soul as 
well as in the sensitive. 

Obj. 2. Further, as is commonly said, charitv is in the 
concupiscible, and hope in the irascible part. But they 
cannot be in the sensitive appetite, because their objects are 
not sensible, but intellectual. Therefore we must assign an 
irascible and a concupiscible power to the intellectual part. 
Obj. 3. Further, it is said (De Spiritu et Aniryia) that the 
soul has these powers— namely, the irascible, concupiscible, 
and rational—before it is united to the body. But no power 
of the sensitive part belongs to the soul alone, but to the 
soul and body united, as we have said above (Q. LXXVIIL, 
A A. 5, 8). Therefore the irascible and concupiscible powers 
are in the will, which is the intellectual appetite. 

On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Nat. 
Horn.) says that the irrational part of the soul is divided 
into the desiderative and irascible, and Damascene says the 
same {De Fid. Orth. ii. 12). And the Philosopher says 
(De Anirna iii. 9) that the will is in the reason, while in the 
irrational part of the soul are concupiscence and anger, or 
desire and animus. 

I answer that, The irascible and concupiscible are not 
parts of the intellectual appetite, which is called the will. 
Because, as was said above (Q. LIX., A. 4; Q. LXXIX 
A. 7), a power which is directed to an object according to 
some common notion is not differentiated by special differ- 
ences which are contained under that common notion For 
mstance, because sight regards the visible thing under the 
common notion of something coloured, the visual power is 
not multiplied according to the different kinds of colour • 
but if there were a power regarding white as white, and not 
as something coloured, it would be distinct from a power 
regarding black as black. 

Now the sensitive appetite does not consider the common 

I- 4 

to 



Q.S2. Art. 5 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 146 

notion of good, because neither do the senses apprehend 
the universal. And therefore the parts of the sensitive 
appetite are differentiated by the different notions of par- 
ticular good : for the concupiscible regards as proper to it 
the notion of good, as something pleasant to the senses and 
suitable to nature : whereas the irascible regards the notion 
of good as something that wards off and repels what is 
hurtful. But the will regards good according to the common 
notion of good, and therefore in the will, which is the intel- 
lectual appetite, there is no differentiation of appetitive 
powers, so that there be in the intellectual appetite an 
irascible power distinct from a concupiscible power : just 
as neither on the part of the intellect are the apprehensive 
powers multiplied, although they are on the part of the 
senses. 

Reply Obj. i. Love, concupiscence, and the like can be 
understood in two ways. Sometimes they are taken as 
passions — arising, that is, with a certain commotion of the 
soul. And thus they are commonly understood, and in this 
sense they are only in the sensitive appetite. They may, 
however, be taken in another way, as far as they are simple 
affections without passion or commotion of the soul, and 
thus they are acts of the will. And in this sense, too, they 
are attributed to the angels and to God. But if taken in 
this sense, they do not belong to different powers, but only 
to one power, which is called the will. 

Reply Obj. 2. The will itself may be said to be irascible, 
as far as it wills to repel evil, not from any sudden move- 
ment of a passion, but from a judgment of the reason. 
And in the same way the will may be said to be con- 
cupiscible on account of its desire for good. And thus in 
the irascible and concupiscible are charity and hope — that 
is, in the will as ordered to such acts. And in this way, 
too, we may understand the words quoted (De Spiritu et 
Anima); that the irascible and concupiscible powers are in 
the soul before it is united to the body (as long as we under- 
stand priority of nature, and not of time), although there 
is no need to have faith in what that book says. Whence 
the answer to the third objection is clear. 



QUESTION LXXXIII. 

OF FREE-WILL. 

{In Four Articles.) 

We now inquire concerning free-will. Under this head 
there are four points of inquiry : (i) Whether man has free- 
will ? (2) What is free-will — a power, an act, or a habit? 
(3) If it is a power, is it appetitive or cognitive? (4) If it 
is appetitive, is it the same power as the will, or distinct ? 

First Article, 
whether man has free-will? 

We proceed thus to the First Article: — 

Objection 1. It would seem that man has not free-will. 
For whoever has free-will does what he wills. But man 
does not what he wills; for it is written (Rom. vii. 19): 
For the good ivhich I will I do not, hut the evil which I 
will not, that I do. Therefore man has not free-will. 

Obj. 2. Further, whoever has free-will has in his power 
to will or not to will, to do or not to do. But this is not 
in man's power : for it is written (Rom. ix. 16) : It is not 
of him that willeth — namely, to will — nor of him that run- 
neth — namely, to run. Therefore man has not free-will. 

Obj. 3. Further, what is free is cause of itself, as the 
Philosopher says {Metaph. i. 2). Therefore what is moved 
by another is not free. But God moves the will, for it is 
written (Prov. xxi. i) : The heart of the king is in the hand 
of the Lord; whithersoever He will He shall turn it; and 
(Bhil. ii 13) : It is God Who worketh in you both to will 
and to accomplish. Therefore man has not free-will. 

Obj. 4. Further, whoever has free-will is master of his 

147 



Q. 83. Art. i THE " SUxMMA THEOLOGICA " 148 

own actions. But man is not master of his own actions : 
for it is written (Jer. x. 23) : The way of a man is not his : 
neither is it in a man to walk. Therefore man has not free- 
will. 

Obj. 5. Further, the Philosopher says {Ethic, iii. 5) : 
According as each one is, such does the end seem to him. 
But it is not in our power to be of one quality or another ; 
for this comes to us from nature. Therefore it is natural 
to us to follow some particular end, and therefore we are 
not free in so doing. 

On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. xv. 14) : God made 
man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his 
own counsel; and the gloss adds : That is of his free-will. 

I answer that, Man has free-will : otherwise counsels, ex- 
hortations, commands, prohibitions, rewards and punish- 
ments would be in vain. In order to make this evident, 
we must observe that some things act without judgment ; 
as a stone moves downwards; and in like manner all 
things which lack knowledge. And some act from 
judgment, but not a free judgment; as brute animals. 
For the sheep, seeing the wolf, judges it a thing to be 
shunned, from a natural and not a free judgment, because 
it judges, not from reason, but from natural instinct. And 
the same thing is to be said of any judgment of brute 
animals. But man acts from judgment, because by his ap- 
prehensive power he judges that something should be 
avoided or sought. But because this judgment, in the case 
of some particular act, is not from a natural instinct, but 
from some act of comparison in the reason, therefore he 
acts from free judgment and retains the power of being 
inclined to various things. For reason in contingent 
matters may follow opposite courses, as we see in dialectic 
syllogisms and rhetorical arguments. Now particular 
operations are contingent, and therefore in such matters the 
judgment of reason may follow opposite courses, and is not 
determinate to one. And forasmuch as man is rational is 
it necessary that man have a free-will. 

Reply Obj. i. As we have said above (Q. LXXXI., A. 3, 



149 FREE-WILL g. 83. Art. i 

ad 2), the sensitive appetite, though it obeys the reason, 
yet in a given case can resist by desiring what the reason 
forbids. This is therefore the good which man does not 
when he wishes — namely, not to desire against reason, as 
Augustine says (ibid.). 

Reply Obj. 2. Those words of the Apostle are not to be 
taken as though man does not wish or does not run of 
his free-will, but because the free-will is not sufficient 
thereto unless it be moved and helped by God. 

Reply Obj. 3. Free-will is the cause of its own move- 
ment, because by his free-will man moves himself to act. 
But it does not of necessity belong to liberty that what is 
free should be the first cause of itself, as neither for one 
thing to be cause of another need it be the first cause. God, 
therefore, is the first cause. Who moves causes both natural 
and voluntary. And just as by moving natural causes He 
does not prevent their acts being natural, so by moving 
voluntary causes He does not deprive their actions of being 
voluntary : but rather is He the cause of this very thing in 
them ; for He operates in each thing according to its own 
nature. 

Reply Obj. 4. Man's way is said not to be his in the 
execution of his choice, wherein he may be impeded, 
whether he will or not. The choice itself, however, is in 
us, but presupposes the help of God. 

Reply Obj. 5. Quality in man is of two kinds : natural 
and adventitious. Now the natural quality may be in the 
intellectual part, or in the body and -ts powers. From the 
very fact, therefore, that man is such by virtue of a natural 
quality which is in the intellectual part, he naturally desires 
his last end, which is happiness. Which desire, indeed, is 
a natural desire, and is not subject to free-will, as is clear 
from what we have said abo"e (Q. LXXXIL, AA. i, 2). 
But on the part of the body and its powers man may be 
such by virtue of a natural quality, inasmuch as he is of 
such a temperament or disposition due to any impression 
whatever produced by corporeal causes, which cannot 
affect the intellectual part, since it is not the act of a 



Q. 83. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 150 

corporeal organ. And such as a man is by virtue of a 
corporeal quality, such also does his end seem to him, be- 
cause from such a disposition a man is inclined to choose 
or reject something. But these inclinations are subject to 
the judgment of reason, which the lower appetite obeys, as 
we have said (Q. LXXXI., A. 3). Wherefore this is in no 
way prejudicial to free-will. 

The adventitious qualities are habits and passions, by 
virtue of which a man is inclined to one thing rather than 
to another. And yet even these inclinations are subject to 
the judgment of reason. Such qualities, too, are subject 
to reason, as it is in our power either to acquire them, 
whether by causing them or disposing ourselves to them, 
or to reject them. And so there is nothing in this that is 
repugnant to free-will. 

Second Article, 
whether free-will is a power? 

We proceed thus to the Second Article: — 

Objectio7i I. It would seem that free-will is not a power. 
For free-will is nothing but a free judgment. But judg- 
ment denominates an act, not a power. Therefore free-will 
it not a power. 

Obj. 2. Further, free-will is defined as the faculty of the 
ivill and reason. But faculty denominates a facility of 
power, which is due to a habit. Therefore free-will is 
a habit. Moreover Bernard says {De Gratia et Lib. Arb. 
I, 2) that free-will is the soul's habit of disposing of itself. 
Therefore it is not a power. 

Obj. 3. Further, no natural power is forfeited through 
sin. But free-will is forfeited through sin; for Augustine 
says that man, by abusing free-will, loses both it and him- 
self. Therefore free-will is not a power. 

On the contrary. Nothing but a power, seemingly, is 
the subject of a habit. But free-will is the subject of grace, 
by the help of which it chooses what is good. Therefore 
free-will is a power. 



151 FREE-WILL o. 83. art. 2 

I answer that, Although free-will* in its strict sense 
denotes an act, in the common manner of speaking we call 
free-will, that which is the principle of the act by which 
man judges freely. Now in us the principle of an act is 
both power and habit ; for we say that we know something 
both by knowledge and by the intellectual power. Therefore 
free-will must be either a power or a habit, or a power 
with a habit. That it is neither a habit nor a power to- 
gether with a habit, can be clearly proved in two ways. 
First of all, because, if it is a habit, it must be a natural 
habit; for it is natural to man to have a free-will. But 
there is no natural habit in us with respect to those things 
which come under free-will : for we are naturally inclined 
to those things of which we have natural habits — for 
instance, to assent to first principles : while those things to 
which we are naturally inclined are not subject to free-will, 
as we have said of the desire of happiness (Q. LXXXIL, 
AA. 1,2). Wherefore it is against the very notion of free- 
will that it should be a natural habit. And that it should 
be a non-natural habit is against its nature. Therefore in 
no sense is it a habit. 

Secondly, this is clear because habits are defined as that 
by reason of which we are well or ill disposed with regard to 
actions and passions (Ethic, ii. 5); for by temperance we 
are well-disposed as regards concupiscences, and by in- 
temperance ill-disposed : and by knowledge we are well- 
disposed to the act of the intellect when we know the truth, 
and by the contrary habit ill-disposed. But the free-will is 
indifferent to good or evil choice : wherefore it is impossible 
for free-will to be a habit. Therefore it is a power. 

Reply Ohj. I. It is not unusual for a power to be named 
from its act. And so from this act, which is a free judg- 
ment, is named the power which is the principle of this 
act. Otherwise, if free-will denominated an act, it would 
not always remain in man. 

Reply Ohj. 2. Faculty sometimes denominates a power 
ready for operation, and in this sense faculty is used in 
* Liberum arbitrium— z.^,, free judgment. 



g.8.,AHx.3 THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA" .5^ 

' r -11 Rnt Bernard takes habit, not 

,he definition o. free-w.ll. But B^^" ^ ,,,„;„ 

as divided against power, ''"!// f'^^f J^tion to an act. 
aptitude by which a man has some ^»" °' ^'^^ ._ f„ by 

/„d this may be both by a po- -d by^ ^^^ ,,^ ^,,„„, 

a power man is, as it were, emp 

and by the habit he is apt to act vveU^^^^^^^^^^ ^_^.^^ 

i^.pl, Ob/. 3. ^'\'\2Jy^^:Z vhich is freedom 
falling into sin, not as to nar^^ from fault and 

from ^°^^^'°"'^.".f3%'e shall treat later in the treatise 
unhappiness. Of '^'^ '1^2^^ ^^ this work (I.-II. Q- 
on Morals in the second part oi 
LXXXV.seqq.;Q-CIX.). 

Third Article. 

WHETHER FREE-WILL IS AN APPETITIVE POWER? 

We proceed thus to t(.. T^^^'^;^ i3 „ot an appeti- 
Objection .. It would ''^"^^^l^^^^^, (De Fid. Orlh. 

^ti^di :a<U. But reason is a cogn.t.ve power. There 

fore free-will is a ^°f""":= /"""-..lied as though it were 
0,i. a Further, '--w.l .s - alle^ ^^^ ^^ ^ ^^^_^. .^^ 

a free udgment. But '° ^'^n-e power. 

power. Therefore free-w.ll IS a cogt^^P ^^^^_^.^^ 

free-will is a cog"'"!! P°™"' ,„„her says (EtWc. iii. 3) that 
On the contrary. The Ph os°P J; ^.^^ „, ;„ „,. But 

choice is 1/.^ desneof l^os 'h, g ^^^^^^ ^^^.^^ ,3 

desire is an act of the aPP^t' - P-^,^ ^,„„3,. Therefore 

also But free-will is that oy 

free-will is an appetitive power. ^^^.^^ . j^, 

I answer that, The proper ac of ree ^^^ ^^^^ ^^^ 

we say that we have a ^-^^^^ .^^^^^s' o c There- 

thing while refusing another ; and this 



153 



FREE-WILL Q. 83. Art. 3 



fore we must consider the nature of free-will, by considering 

the nature of choice. Now two things concur in choice : 

one on the part of the cognitive power, the other on the 

part of the appetitive power. On the part of the cognitive 

power, counsel is required, by which we judge one thing 

to be preferred to another : and on the part of the appetitive 

power, it is required that the appetite should accept the 

judgment of counsel. Therefore Aristotle (Ethic, vi. 2) 

leaves it in doubt whether choice belongs principally to 

the appetitive or the cognitive power : since he says that 

choice is either an appetitive intellect or an intellectual 

appetite. But (Etliic. iii., loc. cit.) he inclines to its being 

an intellectual appetite when he describes choice as a desire 

proceeding from counsel. And the reason of this is because 

the proper object of choice is the means to the end : and 

this, as such, is in the nature of that good which is called 

useful : wherefore since good, as such, is the object of the 

appetite, it follows that choice is principally an act of the 

appetitive power. And thus free-will is an appetitive 

power. 

Reply Obj. i. The appetitive powers accompany the ap- 
prehensive, and in this sense Damascene says that free- 
will straightway accompanies the rational power. 

Reply Obj. 2. Judgment, as it were, concludes and ter- 
minates counsel. Now counsel is terminated, first, by 
the judgment of reason ; secondly, by the acceptation of the 
appetite : whence the Philosopher (Ethic, iii., ibid.) says 
that, having formed a judgment by counsel, ive desire in 
accordance with that counsel. And in this sense choice 
itself is a judgment from which free-will takes its name. 

Reply Obj. 3. This comparison which is implied in the 
choice belongs to the preceding counsel, which is an act 
of reason. For though the appetite does not make com- 
parisons, yet forasmuch as it is moved by the apprehensive 
power which does compare, it has some likeness of com- 
parison by choosing one in preference to another. 



I 

Q. 83. Art. 4 THE " SUMiiviA THEOLOGICA " 154 



FOURTI 



Article. 



WHETHER FREE-WILL IS A ? POWER DISTINCT FROM THE 

W f ILL ? 

We proceed thus to the f lourth Article:— 

Objection i. It would se. em that free-will is a power dis- 
tinct from the will. For L )amascene says {De Fid. Orth. 
ii. 22) that 0eX77o-t9 is one^- thing and ^ovXt^ctl^ another. 
But 0e\7/o-i9 is the will, wVhile ^ov\7)ai<i seems to be the 
free-will, because ^ovX'qac^, ^according to him, is the will as 
concerning an object by w:V of comparison between two 
thino-s. Therefore it seems 1 ;hat free-will is a distinct power 

from the will. 

Ohi. 2. Further, powc/s are known by their acts. But 
choice, which is the act o -.f free-will, is distinct from the act 
of willing, because the 'act of the iinll regards the end, 
•whereas choice regards' the means to the end {Ethic, iii. 2). 
Therefore free-will is i i distinct power from the will. 

Obj. '". Further, th'- will is the intellectual appetite. But 
in the intellect there are two powers — the active and the 
passive. Therefore, also on the part of the intellectual ap- 
petite there must bi- another power besides the will. And 
this seemingly, caH only be free-will. Therefore free-will 
is a distinct power f.rom the will. 

On the contrary, iXimascene says {De Fid. Orth. iii. 14) 
free-will is nothing ei'se than the will. 

I answer that, The/ appetitive powers must be propor- 
tionate to the appreh.^nsive powers, as we have said above 
(Q. LXIV., A. 2). N pw, as on the part of the intellectual 
apprehension we have intellect and reason, so on the part 
of the intellectual appetite\we have will, and free-will which 
is nothing else but the poWer of choice. And this is clear 
from their relations to theJr respective objects and acts. 
For the act of understanding implies the simple accepta- 
tion of something; whence we say that we understand 
first principles, which are known of themselves without 
any comparison. But to reason, properly speaking, is to 



155 FREE-WILL g. 83. Art. 4 

come from one thing to the knowledge of another : where- 
fore, properly speaking, we reason about conclusions, which 
are known from the principles. In like manner on the part 
of the appetite to will implies the simple appetite for some- 
thing : wherefore the will is said to regard the end, which is 
desired for itself. But to choose is to desire something for 
the sake of obtaining something else : wherefore, properly 
speaking, it regards the means to the end. Now, in matters 
of knowledge, the principles are related to the conclusion 
to which we assent on account of the principles : just as, in 
appetitive matters, the end is related to the means, which is 
desired on account of the end. Wherefore it is evident that 
as the intellect is to reason, so is the will to the power of 
choice, which is free-will. But it has been shown above 
(Q. LXXIX., A. 8) that it belongs to the same power both 
to understand and to reason, even as it belongs to the same 
power to be at rest and to be in movement. Wherefore it 
belongs also to the same power to will and to choose : and 
on this account the will and the free-will are not two powers, 
but one. 

Reply Obj. i. fiovXfja-i'i is distinct from €)e\i]<n<; on 
account of a distinction, not of powers, but of acts. 

Reply Obj. 2. Choice and will — that is, the act of willing 
— are different acts : yet they belong to the same power, as 
also to understand and to reason, as we have said. 

Reply Obj. 3. The intellect is compared to the will as 
moving the will. And therefore there is no need to distin- 
guish in the will an active and a passive will. 



QUESTION LXXXIV. 

HOW THE SOUL WHILE UNITED TO THE BODY UNDER- 
STANDS CORPOREAL THINGS BENEATH [T. 

(/// Eight Afiicles.) 

We now have to consider the acts of the soul in regard to the 
intellectual and the appetitive powers : for the other powers 
of the soul do not come directly under the consideration of 
the theologian. Furthermore, the acts of the appetitive 
part of the soul come under the consideration of the science 
of morals; wherefore we shall treat of them in the second 
part of this work, to which the consideration of moral 
matters belongs. But of the acts of the intellectual part we 
shall treat now. 

In treating of these acts we shall proceed in the following 
order : First, we shall inquire how the soul understands 
when united to the body ; secondly, how it understands 
when separated therefrom. 

The former of these inquiries will be threefold : (i) How 
the soul understands bodies which are beneath it. (2) How 
it understands itself and things contained in itself. (3) How 
it understands immaterial substances, which are above it. 

In treating of the knowledge of corporeal things there are 
three points to be considered : (i) Through what does the 
soyl know them ? (2) How and in what order does it know 
them ? (3) What does it know in them ? 

Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry : 
(i) Whether the soul knows bodies through the intellect? 
(2) Whether it understands them through its essence, or 
through any species ? (3) If through some species, whether 
the species of all things intelligible are naturally innate in 
the soul ? (4) Whether these species are derived by the 
r' 156 



157 KNOWLEDGE OF BODIES Q. 84. Art. i 

soul from certain separate immaterial forms ? (5) Whether 
our soul sees in the eternal ideas all that it understands? 
(6) Whether it acquires intellectual knowledge from the 
senses? ^(7) Whether the intellect can, through the species 
of which it is possessed, actually understand, without 
turning to the phantasms ? (8) Whether the judgment of 
the intellect is hindered by an obstacle in the sensitive 
powers ? 

First Article. 

whether the soul knows bodies through the 

intellect ? 

We proceed thus to the First Article: — 

Objection i. It would seem that the soul does not know 
bodies through the intellect. For Augustine says {Soliloq. 
ii. 4) that bodies cannot be understood by the i7itellect: nor 
indeed anythitig corporeal unless it can be perceived by the 
senses. He says also {Gen. ad lit. xii. 24) that intellectual 
vision is of those things that are in the soul by their essence. 
But such are not bodies. Therefore the soul cannot know 
bodies through the intellect. 

Obj. 2. Further, as sense is to the intelligible, so is the 
intellect to the sensible. But the soul can by no means, 
through the senses, understand spiritual things, which are 
intelligible. Therefore by no means can it, through the 
intellect, know bodies, which are sensible. 

Obj. 3. Further, the intellect is concerned with things 
that are necessary and unchangeable. But all bodies are 
mobile and changeable. Therefore the soul cannot know 
bodies through the intellect. 

On the contrary, Science is in the intellect. If, therefore, 
the intellect does not know bodies, it follows that there is 
no science of bodies; and thus perishes natural science, 
which treats of mobile bodies. 

/ answer, In order to elucidate this question, that the 
early philosophers, who inquired into the natures of things, 
thought there was nothing in the world save bodies. And 



O. 84. Art. 1 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 158 

because they observed that all bodies are mobile, and 
considered them to be ever in a state of flux, they were 
of opinion that we can have no certain knowledge of the 
true nature of things. For what is in a continual state of 
flux, cannot be grasped with any degree of certitude, for it 
passes away ere the mind can form a judgment thereon :, 
according to the saying of Heraclitus, that it is not possible 
twice to toiich a drop of water in a passing torrent, as the 
Philosopher relates {Metaph. iv., Did. iii. 5). 

After these came Plato, who, wishing to save the certitude 
of our knowledge of truth through the intellect, maintained 
that, besides these things corporeal, there is another genus 
of beings, separate from matter and movement, which beings 
he called species or ideas, by participation of which each one 
of these singular and sensible things is said to be either a 
man, or a horse, or the like. Wherefore he said that 
sciences and definitions, and whatever appertains to the 
act of the intellect, are not referred to these sensible bodies, 
but to those beings immaterial and separate ; so that accord- 
ing to this the soul does not understand these corporeal 
things, but the separate species thereof. 

Now this may be shown to be false for two reasons. 
First, because, since those species are immaterial and im- 
movable, knowledge of movement and matter would be 
excluded from science (which knowledge is proper to natural 
science), and likewise all demonstration through moving 
and material causes. Secondly, because it seems ridiculous, 
when we seek for knowledge of things which are to us 
manifest, to introduce other beings, which cannot be the 
substance of those others, since they differ from them 
^-^ -"ntially : so that granted that we have a knowledge of 
those s ep^rate substances, we cannot for that reason claim 
to form ,^ judgment concerning these sensible things. 

Now 1 --..^prns that Plato strayed from the truth because, 

havmg o ^ ' ^ ^^^^^ ^U j^nowledge takes place through 

some kind of si-^.jj^^^^^^ ^^ thought that the form of the 

thmg kn ^ ^^^ ^^ necessity be in the knower in the 

same ma -^ -^ ^^^q thing known. Then he observed 



159 KNOWLEDGE OF BODIES Q. 84. Art. i 

that the form of the thing understood is in the intellect 
under conditions of universality, immateriality, and im- 
mobility : which is apparent from the very operation of the 
intellect, whose act of understanding has a universal exten- 
sion, and is subject to a certain amount of necessity : for 
the mode of action corresponds to the mode of the agent's 
form. Wherefore he concluded that the things which we 
understand must have in themselves an existence under the 
same conditions of immateriality and immobility. 

But there is no necessity for this. For even in sensible 
things it is to be observed that the form is otherwise in one 
sensible than in another : for instance, whiteness may be of 
great intensity in one, and of a less intensity in another : 
in one we find whiteness with sweetness, in another without 
sweetness. In the same way the sensible form is con- 
ditioned differently in the thing which is external to the 
soul, and in the senses which receive the forms of sensible 
things without receiving matter, such as the colour of gold 
without receiving gold. So also the intellect, according to 
its own mode, receives under conditions of immateriality 
and immobility, the species of material and mobile bodies : 
for the received is in the receiver according to the mode of 
the receiver. We must conclude, therefore, that through 
the intellect the soul knows bodies by a knowledge which is 
immaterial, universal, and necessary. 

Reply Obj. i . These words of Augustine are to be under- 
stood as referring to the medium of intellectual knowledge, 
and not to its object. For the intellect knows bodies by 
understanding them, not indeed through bodies, nor through 
material and corporeal species ; but through immaterial and 
intelligible species, which can be in the soul by their own 
essence. 

Reply Obj. 2. As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii. 29), 
it is not correct to say that as the sense knows only bodies 
so the intellect knows only spiritual things ; for it follows 
that God and the angels would not know^ corporeal things. 
The reason of this diversity is that the lower power does not 
extend to those things that belong to the higher power; 



Q. 84. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 160 

whereas the higher power operates in a '^lore excellent 
manner those things which belong to the lower power. 

Reply Ohj. 3. Every movement presupposes something 
immovable : for when a change of quality occurs, the sub- 
stance remains unmoved; and when there is a change of 
substantial form, matter remains unmoved. Moreover the 
various conditions of mutable things are themselves im- 
movable ; for instance, though Socrates be not always sit- 
ting, yet it is an immovable truth that whenever he does sit 
he remains in one place. For this reason there is nothing to 
hinder our having an immovable science of movable things. 



Second Article. 

whether the soul understands corporeal things 
through its essence? 

Wc proceed thus to the Second Article: — 

Objection i. It would seem that the soul understands 
corporeal things through its essence. For Augustine says 
(De Trin. x. 5) that the soul collects and lays hold of the 
images of bodies "which are formed in the soul and of the 
soul: for in forming them it gives than sornething of its 
own substance. But the soul understands bodies by images 
of bodies. Therefore the soul knows bodies through its 
essence, which it employs for the formation of such images, 
and from which it forms them. 

Obj. 2. Further, the Philosopher says {De Anima iii. 8) 
that the soul, after a fashion, is everything. Since, there- 
fore, like is known by like, it seems that the soul knows 
corporeal things through itself. 

Obj. 3. Further, the soul is superior to corporeal creatures. 
Now lower things are in higher things in a more eminent 
way than in themselves, as Dionysius says {Ccel. Hier. 
xii.). Therefore all corporeal creatures exist in a more 
excellent way in the soul than in themselves. Therefore 
the soul can know corporeal creatures through its essence. 

On the contrary, Augustine says {De Trin. ix. 3) that 



i6i. KNOWLEDGE OF BODIES Q. 84. Art. 2 

the mind gathers knowledge of corporeal things through the 
bodily senses. But the soul itself cannot be known through 
the bodily senses. Therefore it does not know corporeal 
things through itself. 

/ answer that, The ancient philosophers held that the soul 
knows bodies through its essence. For it was universally 
admitted that like is known by like. But they thought that 
the form of the thing known is in the knower in the same 
mode as in the thing known. The Platonists however were 
of a contrary opinion. For Plato, having observed that the 
intellectual soul has an immaterial nature, and an im- 
material mode of knowledge, held that the forms of things 
known subsist immaterially. While the earlier natural 
philosophers, observing that things known are corporeal 
and material, held that things known must exist materially 
even in the soul that knows them. And therefore, in order 
to ascribe to the soul a knowledge of all things, they held 
that it has the same nature in common with all. And 
because the nature of a result is determined by its 
principles, they ascribed to the soul the nature of a prin- 
ciple ; so that those who thought fire to be the principle of 
all, held that the soul had the nature of fire ; and in like 
manner as to air and water. Lastly, Empedocles, who held 
the existence of four material elements and two principles 
of movement, said that the soul was composed of these. 
Consequently, since they held that things exist in the soul 
materially, they maintained that all the soul's knowledge is 
material, thus failing to discern intellect from sense. 

But this opinion will not hold. First, because in the 
material principle of which they spoke, the various results 
do not exist save in potentiality. But a thing is not known 
according as it is in potentiality, but only according as it 
is in act, as is shown Metaph. ix. (Did. viii. 9) : wherefore 
neither is a power known except through its act. It is 
therefore insufficient to ascribe to the soul the nature of the 
principles in order to explain the fact that it knows all, 
unless we further admit in the soul the natures and forms 
of each individual result, for instance, of bone, flesh, and 

I- 4 IX 



Q. 84. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA '» 162 

the like ; thus does Aristotle argue against Empedocles {De 
Anima i. 5). Secondly, because if it were necessary for the 
thing known to exist materially in the knower, there would 
be no reason why things which have a material existence 
outside the soul should be devoid of knowledge ; why, for 
instance, if by fire the soul knows fire, that fire also which 
is outside the soul should not have knowledge of fire. 

We must conclude, therefore, that material things known 
must needs exist in the knower, not materially, but imma- 
terially. The reason of this is, because the act of knowledge 
extends to things outside the knower : for we know things 
even that are external to us. Now by matter the form of a 
thing is determined to some one thing. Wherefore it is 
clear that knowledge is in inverse ratio to materiality. And 
consequently things that are not receptive of forms save 
materially, have no power of knowledge whatever — such as 
plants, as the Philosopher says {De Anima ii. 12). But the 
more immaterially a thing receives the form of the thing 
known, the more perfect is its knowledge. Therefore the 
intellect which abstracts the species not only from matter, 
but also from the individuating conditions of matter, has 
more perfect knowledge than the senses, which receive the 
form of the thing known, without matter indeed, but subject 
to material conditions. Moreover, among the senses, sight 
has the most perfect knowledge, because it is the least 
material, as we have remarked above (Q. LXXVIII., 
A. 3) : while among intellects the more perfect is the more 
immaterial. 

It is therefore clear from the foregoing, that if there be 
an intellect which knows all things by its essence, then its 
essence must needs have all things in itself immaterially; 
thus the early philosophers held that the essence of the soul, 
that it may know all things, must be actually composed 
of the principles of all material things. Now this is proper 
to God, that His Essence comprise all things immaterially, 
as effects pre-exist virtually in their cause. God alone, 
therefore, understands all things through His Essence : but 
neither the human soul nor the angels can do so. 



i63 KNOWLEDGE OF BODIES Q. 84. Art. 2 ^ 

Reply Obj. i. Augustine in that passage is speaking of 

an imaginary vision, which takes place through the image 

of bodies. To the formation of such images the soul gives 

part of its substance, just as a subject is given in order to 

be informed by some form. In this way the soul makes 

such images from itself ; not that the soul or some part of 

the soul be turned into this or that image ; but just as we 

say that a body is made into something coloured because 

of its being informed with colour. That this is the sense, is 

clear from what follows. For he says that the soul keeps 

something — namely, not informed with such image — which 

is able freely to judge of the species of these images: and 

that this is the mind or intellect. And he says that the 

part which is informed with these images — namely, the 

imagination — is common to us and beasts. 

Reply Obj. 2. Aristotle did not hold that the soul is 
actually composed of all things, as did the earlier philoso- 
phers ; he said that the soul is all things, after a fashion, 
forasmuch as it is in potentiality to all — through the senses, 
to all things sensible — through the intellect, to all things 
intelligible. 

Reply Obj. 3. Every creature has a finite and determinate 
essence. Wherefore although the essence of the higher 
creature has a certain likeness to the lower creature, foras- 
much as they have something in common generically, yet 
it has not a complete likeness thereof, because it is deter- 
mined to a certain species other than the species of the 
lower creature. But the Divine Essence is a perfect likeness 
of all, whatsoever may be found to exist in things created, 
being the universal principle of all. 



Q. 84. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 164 



Third Article. 

whether the soul understands all things through 

innate species? 

We proceed thus to the Third Article: — 

Objection i. It would seem that the soul understands all 
things through innate species. For Gregory says, in a 
homily for the Ascension (xxix. in Ev.), that man has 
understatiding in common ivith the angels. But angels 
understand all things through innate species : where- 
fore in the book De Causis it is said that every intelligence 
is full of forms. Therefore the soul also has innate species 
of things, by means of which it understands corporeal 
things. 

Obj. 2. Further, the intellectual soul is more excellent 
than corporeal primary matter. But primary matter was 
created by God under the forms to which it has potentiality. 
Therefore much more is the intellectual soul created by God 
under intelligible species. And so the soul understands 
corporeal things through innate species. 

Obj. 3. Further, no one can answer the truth except con- 
cerning what he knows. But even a person untaught and 
devoid of acquired knowledge, answers the truth to every 
question if put to him in orderly fashion, as we find related 
in the Meno (xv. seqq.) of Plato, concerning a certain indi- 
vidual. Therefore we have some knowledge of things even 
before we acquire knowledge; which would not be the case 
unless we had innate species. Therefore the soul under- 
stands corporeal things through innate species. 

On the contrary, The Philosopher, speaking of the in- 
tellect, says {De Anima iii. 4) that it is like a tablet on 
•which nothing is written. 

I answer that, Since form is the principle of action, a 
thing must be related to the form which is the principle of 
an action, as it is to that action : for instance, if upward 
motion is from lightness, then that which only potentially 
moves upwards must needs be only potentially light, but 



i65 KNOWLEDGE OF BODIES Q. 84. Art. 3 

that which actually moves upwards must needs be actually 
light. Now we observe that man sometimes is only a 
potential knower, both as to sense and as to intellect. And 
he is reduced from such potentiality to act ; — through the 
action of sensible objects on his senses, to the act of sensa- 
tion ; — by instruction or discovery, to the act of under- 
standing. Wherefore we must say that the cognitive soul 
is in potentiality both to the images which are the principles 
of sensing, and to those which are the principles of under- 
standing. For this reason Aristotle (ibid.) held that the 
intellect by which the soul understands has no innate 
species, but is at first in potentiality to all such species. 

But since that which has a form actually, is sometimes 
unable to act according to that form on account of some 
hindrance, as a light thing may be hindered from moving 
upwards ; for this reason did Plato hold that naturally 
man's intellect is filled with all intelligible species, but that, 
by being united to the body, it is hindered from the realiza- 
tion of its act. But this seems to be unreasonable. First, 
because, if the soul has a natural knowledge of all things, it 
seems impossible for the soul so far to forget the existence 
of such knowledge as not to know itself to be possessed 
thereof : for no man forgets what he knows naturally ; that, 
for instance, the whole is larger than the part, and suchlike. 
And especially unreasonable does this seem, if we suppose 
that it is natural to the soul to be united to the body, as we 
have established above (Q. LXXVI., A. i) : for it is un- 
reasonable that the natural operation of a thing be totally 
hindered by that which belongs to it naturally. Secondly, 
the falseness of this opinion is clearly proved from the fact 
that if a sense be wanting, the knowledge of what is appre- 
hended through that sense is wanting also : for instance, a 
man who is born blind can have no knowledge of colours. 
This would not be the case if the soul had innate images of 
all intelligible things. We must therefore conclude that 
the soul does not know corporeal things through innate 
species. 

Reply Oh]'. I. Man indeed has intelligence in common 



Q.84.ART.4 THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA" 166 

with the angels, but not in the same degree of perfection : 
just as the lower £rrades of bodies, which merely exist, 
according to Gregory {loc. cit.), have not the same degree 
of perfection as the higher bodies. For the matter of the 
lower bodies is not totally completed by its form, but is in 
potentiality to forms which it has not : whereas the matter 
of heavenly bodies is totally completed by its form, so that 
it is not in potentiality to any other form, as we have said 
above (Q. LXVI., A. 2). In the same way the angelic 
intellect is perfected by intelligible species, in accordance 
with its nature ; whereas the human intellect is in potenti- 
ality to such species. 

Reply Obj. 2. Primary matter has substantial being 
through its form, consequently it had need to be created 
under some form : else it would not be in act. But when 
once it exists under one form it is in potentiality to others. 
On the other hand, the intellect does not receive sub- 
stantial being through the intelligible species ; and therefore 
there is no comparison. 

Reply Obj. 3. If questions be put in an orderly fashion 
they proceed from universal self-evident principles to what 
is particular. Now by such a process knowledge is pro- 
duced in the mind of the learner. Wherefore when he 
answers the truth to a subsequent question, this is not be- 
cause he had knowledge previously, but because he thus 
learns for the first time. For it matters not whether the 
teacher proceed from universal principles to conclusions 
by questioning or by asserting; for in either case the mind 
of the listener is assured of what follows by that which 
preceded. 

Fourth Article. 

whether the intelligible species are derived by 
the soul from certain separate forms ? 

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article: — 
Objection i. It would seem that the intelligible species 
are derived by the soul from some separate forms. For 
whatever is such by participation is caused by what is such 



i67 KNOWLEDGE OF BODIES Q. 84. Art. 4 

essentially; for instance, that which is on fire is reduced 
to fire as the cause thereof. But the intellectual soul for- 
asmuch as it is actually understanding, participates the 
thing understood : for, in a way, the intellect in act is the 
thing understood in act. Therefore what in itself and in 
its essence is understood in act, is the cause that the intel- 
lectual soul actually understands. Now that which in its 
essence is actually understood is a form existing without 
matter. Therefore the intelligible species, by which the 
soul understands, are caused by some separate forms. 

Ohj. 2. Further, the intelligible is to the intellect, as the 
sensible is to the sense. But the sensible species which are 
in the senses, and by which we sense, are caused by the 
sensible object which exists actually outside the soul. 
Therefore the intelligible species, by which our intellect 
understands, are caused by some things actually intel- 
ligible, existing outside the soul. But these can be nothing 
else than forms separate from matter. Therefore the intel- 
ligible forms of our intellect are derived from some separate 
substances. 

Obj. 3. Further, whatever is in potentiality is reduced 
to act by something actual. If, therefore, our intellect, 
previously in potentiality, afterwards actually under- 
stands, this must needs be caused by some intellect which 
IS always in act. But this is a separate intellect. There- 
fore the intelligible species, by which we actually under- 
stand, are caused by some separate substances. 

On the contrary, If this were true we should not need 
the senses in order to understand. And this is proved to be 
false especially from the fact that if a man be wanting in 
a sense, he cannot have any knowledge of the sensibles 
correspondmg to that sense. 

/ answer that, Some have held that the intelligible species 
of our mtellect are derived from certain separate forms or 
substances. And this in two ways. For Plato, as we 
have said (A. i), held that the forms of sensible things 
subsist by themselves without matter ; for instance, the form 
of a man which he called per se man, and the form or idea 



g. 84. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 168 

of a horse which he called per se horse, and so forth. He 
said therefore that these forms are participated both by our 
soul and by corporeal matter ; by our soul, to the effect of 
knowledge thereof, and by corporeal matter to the effect 
of existence : so that, just as corporeal matter by partici- 
pating the idea of a stone, becomes an individual stone, 
so our intellect, by participating the idea of a stone, is made 
to understand a stone. Now participation of an idea takes 
place by some image of the idea in the participator, just as 
a model is participated by a copy. So just as he held that 
the sensible forms, which are in corporeal matter, are 
derived from the ideas as certain images thereof : so he 
held that the intelligible species of our intellect are images 
of the ideas, derived therefrom. And for this reason, as we 
have said above (A. i), he referred sciences and definitions 
to those ideas. 

But since it is contrary to the nature of sensible things 
that their forms should subsist without matter, as Aristotle 
proves in many ways {Metaph. vi.), Avicenna (De Anima 
V.) setting this opinion aside, held that the intelligible 
species of all sensible things, instead of subsisting in them- 
selves without matter, pre-exist immaterially in the separate 
intellects : from the first of which, said he, such species 
are derived by a second, and so on to the last separate intel- 
lect which he called the active intelligence, from which, 
according to him, intelligible species flow into our souls, 
and sensible species into corporeal matter. And so 
Avicenna agrees with Plato in this, that the intelligible 
species of our intellect are derived from certain separate 
forms ; but these Plato held to subsist of themselves, while 
Avicenna placed them in the active intelligence. They 
differ, too, in this respect, that Avicenna held that the intel- 
ligible species do not remain in our intellect after it has 
ceased actually to understand, and that it needs to turn (to 
the active intellect) in order to receive them anew. Conse- 
quently he does not hold that the soul has innate know- 
ledge, as Plato, who held that the participated ideas remain 
immovablv in the soul. 



i69 KNOWLEDGE OF BODIES Q. 84. Art. 4 

But in this opinion no sufficient reason can be assigned 
for the soul being united to the body. For it cannot be 
said that the intellectual soul is united to the body for 
the sake of the body : for neither is form for the sake of 
matter, nor is the mover for the sake of the moved, but 
rather the reverse. Especially does the body seem neces- 
sary to the intellectual soul, for the latter's proper operation 
which is to understand : since as to its being the soul does 
not depend on the body. But if the soul by its very nature 
had an inborn aptitude for receiving intelligible species 
through the influence of only certain separate principles, 
and were not to receive them from the senses, it would not 
need the body in order to understand : wherefore to no 
purpose would it be united to the body. 

But if it be said that our soul needs the senses in order 
to understand, through being in some way awakened by 
them to the consideration of those things, the intelligible 
species of which it receives from the separate principles : 
even this seems an insufficient explanation. For this 
awakening does not seem necessary to the soul, except in 
as far as it is overcome by sluggishness, as the Platonists 
expressed it, and by forgetfulness, through its union with 
the body : and thus the senses would be of no use to the 
intellectual soul except for the purpose of removing the 
obstacle which the soul encounters through its union with 
the body. Consequently the reason of the union of the 
soul with the body still remains to be sought. 

And if it be said with Avicenna, that the senses are 
necessary to the soul, because by them it is roused to turn 
to the active intelligence from which it receives the species : 
neither is this a sufficient explanation. Because if it is 
natural for the soul to understand through species derived 
from the active intelligence, it follows that at times the soul 
of an individual wanting in one of the senses can turn to 
the active intelligence, either from the inclination of its 
very nature, or through being roused by another sense, to 
the effect of receiving the intelligible species of which the 
corresponding sensible species are wanting. And thus a 



g. 84. Art. 5 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 170 

man born blind could have knowledge of colours ; which is 
clearly untrue. We must therefore conclude that the intel- 
ligible species, by which our soul understands, are not 
derived from separate forms. 

Reply Obj. I. The intelligible species which are partici- 
pated by our intellect are reduced, as to their first cause, 
to a first principle which is by its essence intelligible— 
namely, God. But they proceed from that principle by 
means of the sensible forms and material things, from 
which we gather knowledge, as Dionysius says (Div. 
Nom. vii.). 

Reply Obj. 2. Material things, as to the -being which 
they have outside the soul, may be actually sensible, but 
not actually intelligible. Wherefore there is no comparison 
between sense and intellect. 

Reply Obj. 3. Our passive intellect is reduced from 
potentiality to act by some being in act, that is, by the 
active intellect, which is a power of the soul as we have 
said (Q. LXXIX., A. 4); and not by a separate intel- 
ligence, as proximate cause, although perchance as remote 
cause. 

Fifth Article. 

WHETHER THE INTELLECTUAL SOUL KNOWS MATERIAL 
THINGS IN THE ETERNAL TYPES ? 

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article: — 

Objection i. It would seem that the intellectual soul does 
not know material things in the eternal types. For that in 
which anything is known must itself be known more and 
previously. But the intellectual soul of man, in the present 
state of life, does not know the eternal types : for it does 
not know God in Whom the eternal types exist, but is 
united to God as to the unknown, as Dionysius says (Myst. 
Theolog. i.). Therefore the soul does not know all in the 
eternal types. 

Obj. 2. Further, it is written (Rom. i. 20) that the in- 
visible things of God are clearly seen . . . by the things 



I7ii KNOWLEDGE OF BODIES Q. 84. Art. 5 

that are made. But among the invisible things of God are 
the eternal types. Therefore the eternal types are known 
through creatures and not the converse. 

Obj. 3. Further, the eternal types are nothing else but 
ideas, for Augustine says (QQ. LXXXIIL, qu. 46) that 
ideas are permanent types existing in the Divine mind. 
If therefore we say that the intellectual soul knows all 
things in the eternal types, we come back to the opinion 
of Plato who said that all knowledge is derived from them. 

On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess, xii. 25) : // 
we both see that what you say is true, and if we both see 
that what I say is true, where do we see this, I pray? 
Neither do I see it in you, nor do you see it in me : but we 
both see it in the unchangeable truth which is above our 
minds. Now the unchangeable truth is contained in the 
eternal types. Therefore the intellectual soul knows all 
true things in the eternal types. 

/ answer that, As Augustine says {De Doctr. Christ. 
ii. 11) : If those who are called philosophers said by chance 
anything that was true and consistent with our faith, we 
must claim it from them as from unjust possessors. For 
some of the doctriyies of the heathens are spurious i^iiita- 
tions or superstitious inventions, which we must be careful 
to avoid when we renounce the society of the heathens. 
Consequently whenever Augustine, who w^as imbued with 
the doctrines of the Platonists, found in their teaching any- 
thing consistent with faith, he adopted it : and those things 
which he found contrary to faith he amended. Now Plato 
held, as we have said above (A. 4), that the forms of things 
subsist of themselves apart from matter; and these he 
called ideas, by participation of which he said that our 
intellect knows all things : so that just as corporeal matter 
by participating the idea of a stone becomes a stone, so 
our intellect, by participating the same idea, has know- 
ledge of a stone. But since it seems contrary to faith that 
forms of things should subsist of themselves outside the 
things themselves and apart from matter, as the Platonists 
held, asserting that per se life or per se wisdom are creative 



Q. 84- Art. 5 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 172 

substances, as Dionysius relates {Div. Nom. xi.); therefore 
Augustine (QQ.LXXXIIL, loc.cit.),ioT the ideas defended 
by Plato, substituted the types of all creatures existing in 
the Divine mind, according to which types all things are 
made in themselves, and are known to the human soul. 

When, therefore, the question is asked : Does the human 
soul know all things in the eternal types ? we must reply 
that one thing is said to be known in another in two wa}s. 
First, as in an object itself known ; as one may see in a 
mirror the images of things reflected therein. In this way 
the soul, in the present state of life, cannot see all things in 
the eternal types, for they see God, and all things in Him. 
Secondly, one thing is said to be known in another as in a 
principle of knowledge : thus we might say that we see in 
the sun what we see by the sun. And thus we must needs 
say that the human soul knows all things in the eternal 
types, since by participation of these types we know all 
things. For the intellectual light itself which is in us, is 
nothing else than a participated likeness of the uncreated 
light, in which are contained the eternal types. Whence it 
is written (Ps. iv. 6, 7), Many say; who showeth us good 
things? which question the Psalmist answers, The light of 
Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us, as though 
he were to say : By the seal of the Divine light in us, all 
things are made known to us. 

But since besides the intellectual light which is in us, 
intelligible species, which are derived from things, are 
required in order for us to have knowledge of material 
things ; therefore this same knowledge is not due merely to 
a participation of the eternal types, as the Platonists held, 
maintaining that the mere participation of ideas sufficed 
for knowledge. Wherefore Augustine says {De Trin. 
iv. 16) : Although the philosophers prove by convincing 
arguments that all things occur in time according to the 
eternal types, were they able to see in the eternal types, or 
to find out from them how many kinds of animals there are 
and the origin of each? Did they not seek for this in- 
formation from the story of times and places? 



173 KNOWLEDGE OF BODIES Q. 84. Art. 6 

But that Augustine did not understand all things to be 
known in their eternal types or in the unchangeable truth, 
as though the eternal types themselves were seen, is clear 
from what he says {QQ. LXXXIIL, loc. cit.) — viz., that 
not each and every rational soul can be said to be worthy of 
that vision, namely, of the eternal types, but only those that 
are holy and pure, such as the souls of the blessed. 

From what has been said the objections are easily solved. 



Sixth Article. 

whether intellectual knowledge is derived from 

sensible things ? 

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article: — 

Objection i. It would seem that intellectual knowledge 
is not derived from sensible things. For Augustine says 
(QQ. LXXXIIL, qu. 9) that we cannot expect to learn the 
fulness of truth from the senses of the body. This he 
proves in two ways. First, because, whatever the bodily 
senses reach, is continually being changed; and what is 
never the same cannot be perceived. Secondly, because, 
whatever we perceive by the body, even when not present 
to the senses, may be present to the imagination, as when 
we are asleep or angry: yet we cannot discern by the 
senses, whether what we perceive be the sensible object, 
or the deceptive image thereof. Now nothing can be per- 
ceived which cannot be distinguished from its counterfeit. 
And so he concludes that we cannot expect to learn the 
truth from the senses. But intellectual knowledge appre- 
hends the truth. Therefore intellectual knowledge cannot 
be conveyed by the senses. 

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii. 16): 
We must not think that the body can make any impression 
on the spirit, as though the spirit were to supply the place 
of matter in regard to the body's action; for that which 
acts is in every way more excellent than that which it acts 
on. Whence he concludes that the body does not ca^lse its 



g. 84. Art. 6 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 174 

image in the spirit, but the spirit causes it in itself. There- 
fore intellectual knowledge is not derived from sensible 
things. 

Ohj. 3. Further, an effect does not surpass the power of 
its cause. But intellectual knowledge extends beyond 
sensible things : for we understand some things which 
cannot be perceived by the senses. Therefore intellectual 
knowledge is not derived from sensible things. 

On the contrary, The Philosopher says {Metaph. i. i ; 
Poster, ii. 15) that the principle of knowledge is in the 
senses. 

/ answer that, On this point the philosophers held three 
opinions. For Democritus held that all knowledge is 
caused by images issuing from the bodies we think of and 
entering into our souls, as Augustine says in his letter to 
Dioscorus (cxviii. 4). And Aristotle says {De Somn. et 
Vigil.) that Democritus held that knowledge is caused by 
a discharge of images. And the reason for this opinion 
was that both Democritus and the other early philosophers 
did not distinguish between intellect and sense, as Aristotle 
relates (De Anima iii. 3). Consequently, since the sense is 
affected by the sensible, they thought that all our know- 
ledge is affected by this mere impression brought about by 
sensible things. Which impression Democritus held to be 
caused by a discharge of images. 

Plato, on the other hand, held that the intellect is dis- 
tinct from the senses : and that it is an immaterial power 
not making use of a corporeal organ for its action. And 
since the incorporeal cannot be affected by the corporeal, 
he held that intellectual knowledge is not brought about 
by sensible things affecting the intellect, but by separate 
intelligible forms being participated by the intellect, as we 
have said above (AA. 4, 5). Moreover he held that sense 
is a power operating of itself. Consequently neither is 
sense, since it is a spiritual power, affected by the sensible : 
but the sensible organs are affected by the sensible, the 
result being that the soul is in a way roused to form within 
itself the species of the sensible. Augustine seems to touch 
on this opinio^ {Gen. ad lit. xii. 24) where he says that the 



175 KNOWLEDGE OF BODIES Q. 84. Art. 6 

body feels not, but the soul through the body, which it 
makes use of as a kind of messenger, for reproducing 
within itself what is announced from without. Thus 
according to Plato, neither does intellectual knowledge 
proceed from sensible knowledge, nor sensible knowledge 
exclusively from sensible things; but these rouse the 
sensible soul to the sentient act, while the senses rouse the 
intellect to the act of understanding. 

Aristotle chose a middle course. For with Plato he 
agreed that intellect and sense are different. But he held 
that the sense has not its proper operation wdthout the co- 
operation of the body ; so that to feel is not an act of the 
soul alone, but of the composite. And he held the same in 
regard to all the operations of the sensitive part. Since, 
therefore, it is not unreasonable that the sensible objects 
which are outside the soul should produce some effect in 
the composite, Aristotle agreed with Democritus in this, 
that the operations of the sensitive part are caused by the 
impression of the sensible on the sense: not by a discharge, 
as Democritus said, but by some kind of operation. For 
Democritus maintained that every operation is by way of 
a discharge of atoms, as we gather fom De Genet, i 8 
But Aristotle held that the intellect has an operation which 
is mdependent of the body's co-operation. Now nothing 
corporeal can make an impression on the incorporeal. And 
therefore in order to cause the intellectual operation, 
accordmg to Aristotle, the impression caused by the sen- 
sible does not suffice, but something more noble is re- 
quired, for the agent is more noble than the patient as he 
says (ibid. 5). Not, indeed, in the sense that the intel- 
lectual operation is effected in us by the mere impression 
of some superior beings, as Plato held ; but that the higher 
and more noble agent which he calls the active intellect 
of wnich we have spoken above (Q. LXXIX \A t, 4)' 
causes the phantasms received from the senses ' to' be 
actually intelligible, by a process of abstraction 

According to this opinion, then, on the part of the 
phantasms, intellectual knowledge is caused by the senses 
But since the phantasms cannot of themselves affect the 



Q. 84. Art. 6 THE " SUM MA THEOLOGICA " 176 

passive intellect, and require to be made actually intel- 
ligible by the active intellect, it cannot be said that sensible 
knowledge is the total and perfect cause of intellectual 
knowledge, but rather that it is in a way the material cause. 

Reply Obj. I. Those words of Augustine mean that we 
must not expect the entire truth from the senses. For the 
light of the active intellect is needed, through which we 
achieve the unchangeable truth of changeable things, and 
discern things themselves from their likeness. 

Reply Obj. 2. In this passage Augustine speaks not of 
intellectual but of imaginary knowledge. And since, 
according to the opinion of Plato, the imagination has an 
operation which belongs to the soul only, Augustine, in 
order to show that corporeal images are impressed on the 
imagination, not by bodies but by the soul, uses the same 
argument as Aristotle does in proving that the active 
intellect must be separate, namely, because the agent is 
more noble than the patient. And without doubt, accord- 
ing to the above opinion, in the imagination there must 
needs be not only a passive but also an active power. But 
if we hold, according to the opinion of Aristotle, that the 
action of the imagination is an action of the composite, 
there is no difficulty ; because the sensible body is more 
noble than the organ of the animal, in so far as it is com- 
pared to it as a being in act to a being in potentiality ; even 
as the object actually coloured is compared to the pupil 
which is potentially coloured. It may, however, be said, 
although the first impression of the imagination is through 
the agency of the sensible, since fancy is movement pro- 
duced in accordance with sensation {De Anima iii. 3), that 
nevertheless there is in man an operation which by 
synthesis and analysis forms images of various things, 
even of things not perceived by the senses. And Augus- 
tine's words may be taken in this sense. 

Reply Obj. 3. Sensitive knowledge is not the entire cause 
of intellectual knowledge. And therefore it is not strange 
that intellectual knowledge should extend further than 
sensitive knowledge. 



177 KNOWLEDGE OF BODIES Q. 84. Art. 7 



Seventh Article. 

WHETHER THE INTELLECT CAN ACTUALLY UNDERSTAND 
THROUGH THE INTELLIGIBLE SPECIES OF WHICH IT IS 
POSSESSED, WITHOUT TURNING TO THE PHANTASMS? 

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article: — 

Objection i. It would seem that the intellect can actually 
understand through the intelligible species of which it is 
possessed, without turning to the phantasms. For the in- 
tellect is made actual by the intelligible species by which it 
is informed. But if the intellect is in act, it understands. 
Therefore the intelligible species suffices for the intellect to 
understand actually, without turning to the phantasms. 

Obj. 2. Further, the imagination is more dependent on 
the senses than the intellect on the imagination. But the 
imagination can actually imagine in the absence of the 
sensible. Therefore much more can the intellect understand 
without turning to the phantasms. 

Obj. 3. There are no phantasms of incorporeal things : 
for the imagination does not transcend time and space. If 
therefore, our intellect cannot understand anything actu- 
ally without turning to the phantasms, it follows that it 
cannot understand anything incorporeal. Which is clearly 
false : for we understand truth, and God, and the angels 

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii. 7) 
that the soul understands nothing without a phantasm 

I answer that, In the present state of life in which the 

sou is united to a passible body, it is impossible for our 

intellect to understand anything actually, except by turning 

to the phantasms. And of this there are two indications 

^irst o all because the intellect, being a power that does 

not make use of a corporeal organ, would in no way be 

hmdered in its act through the lesion of a corporeal organ, 

If for Its act there were not required the act of some powe^ 

that does make use of a corporeal organ. Now sense 

imagination and the other powers belonging to the sensi' 

tiye part, make use of a corporeal organ. Wherefore it is 
I. 4 



13 



Q. 84. Art. 7 THE " SUM MA THEOLOGICA " 178 

clear that for the intellect to understand actually, not only 
when it acquires fresh knowledge, but also when it applies 
knowledge already acquired, there is need for the act of the 
imagination and of the other powers. For when the act of 
the imagination is hindered by a lesion of the corporeal 
organ, for instance, in a case of frenzy ; or when the act of 
the memory is hindered, as in the case of lethargy, we see 
that a man is hindered from actually understanding things 
of which he had a previous knowledge. Secondly, anyone 
can experience this of himself, that when he tries to under- 
stand something, he forms certain phantasms to serve him 
by way of examples, in which as it were he examines what 
he is desirous of understanding. For this reason it is that 
when we wish to help someone to understand something, we 
lay examples before him, from which he forms phantasms 
for the purpose of understanding. 

Now the reason of this is that the power of knowledge is 
proportioned to the thing known. Wherefore the proper 
object of the angelic intellect, which is entirely separate 
from a body, is an intelligible substance separate from a 
body. Whereas the proper object of the human intellect, 
which is united to a body, is a quiddity or nature existing 
in corporeal matter; and through such natures of visible 
things it rises to a certain knowledge of things invisible. 
Now it belongs to such a nature to exist in an individual, 
and this cannot be apart from corporeal matter : for instance, 
it belongs to the nature of a stone to be in an individual 
stone, and to the nature of a horse to be in an individual 
horse, and so forth. Wherefore the nature of a stone or 
any material thing cannot be known completely and truly, 
except in as much as it is known as existing in the indi- 
vidual. Now we apprehend the individual through the 
senses and the imagination. And, therefore, for the in- 
tellect to understand actually its proper object, it must of 
necessity turn to the phantasms in order to perceive the 
universal nature existing in the individual. But if the 
proper object of our intellect were a separate form ; or if, as 
the Platonists say, the natures of sensible things subsisted 



179 KNOWLEDGE OF BODIES Q. 84. Art. 8 

apart from the individual ; there would be no need for the 
intellect to turn to the phantasms whenever it understands. 
Reply Obj. I. The species preserved in the passive in- 
tellect exist there habitually when it does not understand 
them actually, as we have said above (Q. LXXIX., A. 6). 
Wherefore for us to understand actually, the fact that the 
species are preserved does not suffice ; we need further to 
make use of them in a manner befitting the things of which 
they are the species, which things are natures existing in 
individuals. 

Reply Obj. 2. Even the phantasm is the likeness of an 
individual thing; wherefore the imagination does not need 
any further likeness of the individual, whereas the intellect 
does. 

Reply Obj. 3. Incorporeal things, of which there are no 
phantasms, are known to us by comparison with sensible 
bodies of which there are phantasms. Thus we understand 
truth by considering a thing of which we possess the truth ; 
and God, as Dionysius says {Div. Norn, i.), we know as 
cause, by way of excess and by way of remotion. Other 
mcorporeal substances we know, in the present state of life, 
only by way of remotion or by some comparison to cor- 
poreal things. And, therefore, when we understand some- 
thing about these things, we need to turn to phantasms of 
bodies, although there are no phantasms of the things 
themselves. 

Eighth Article. 

WHETHER THE JUDGMENT OF THE INTELLECT IS HINDERED 
THROUGH SUSPENSION OF THE SENSITIVE POWERS? 

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article:— 

Objection i. It would seem that the judgment of the 
intellect is not hindered by suspension of the sensitive 
powers. For the superior does not depend on the inferior. 
But the judgment of the intellect is higher than the senses. 
Therefore the judgment of the intellect is not hindered 
through suspension of the senses. 



g. 84. Art. 8 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 180 

Obj. 2. Further, to syllogize is an act of the intellect. 
But during sleep the senses are suspended, as is said in 
De Somn. et Vig. (i.) and yet it sometimes happens to us 
to syllogize while asleep. Therefore the judgment of the 
intellect is not hindered through suspension of the senses. 

On the contrary, What a man does while asleep, against 
the moral law, is not imputed to him as a sin ; as Augustine 
says {Gen. ad lit. xii. 15). But this would not be the case 
if man, while asleep, had free use of his reason and intellect. 
Therefore the judgment of the intellect is hindered by 
suspension of the senses. 

/ answer that, As we have said above (A. 7), our in- 
tellect's proper and proportionate object is the nature of a 
sensible thing. Now a perfect judgment concerning any- 
thing cannot be formed, unless all that pertains to that 
thing's nature be known ; especially if that be ignored which 
is the term and end of judgment. Now the Philosopher 
says {De Coel. in.), that as the end of a practical science is 
action, so the end of natural science is that which is per- 
ceived principally through the senses; for the smith does 
not seek knowledge of a knife except for the purpose of 
action, in order that he may produce a certain individual 
knife; and in like manner the natural philosopher does not 
seek to know the nature of a stone and of a horse, save for 
the purpose of knowing the essential properties of those 
things which he perceives with his senses. Now it is clear 
that a smith cannot judge perfectly of a knife unless he 
knows the action of the knife : and in like manner the 
natural philosopher cannot judge perfectly of natural things, 
unless he knows sensible things. But in the present state of 
life whatever we understand, we know by comparison to 
natural sensible things. Consequently it is not possible 
for our intellect to form a perfect judgm.ent, while the senses 
are suspended, through which sensible things are known 
to us. 

Reply Ohj. I. Although the intellect is superior to the 
senses, nevertheless in a manner it receives from the senses, 
and its first and principal objects are founded in sensible 



i8i KNOWLEDGE OF BODIES Q. 84. Art. 8 

things. And therefore suspension of the senses necessarily 
involves a hindrance to the judgment of the intellect. 

Reply Obj. 2. The senses are suspended in the sleeper 
through certain evaporations and the escape of certain ex- 
halations, as we read in De Somn. et Vig. (iii.). And, 
therefore, according to the amount of such evaporation, the 
senses are more or less suspended. For when the amount is 
considerable, not only are the senses suspended, but also 
the imagination, so that there are no phantasms; thus does 
it happen, especially when a man falls asleep after eating 
and drinking copiously. If, however, the evaporation be 
somewhat less, phantasms appear, but distorted and without 
sequence; thus it happens in a case of fever. And if the 
evaporation be still more attenuated, the phantasms will 
have a certain sequence : thus especially does it happen 
towards the end of sleep, in sober men and those who are 
gifted with a strong imagination. If the evaporation be 
very slight, not only does the imagination retain its freedom, 
but also the common sense is partly freed ; so that some- 
times while asleep a man may judge that what he sees is 
a dream, discerning, as it were, between things and their 
images. Nevertheless, the common sense remains partly 
suspended; and therefore, although it discriminates some 
images from the reality, yet is it always deceived in some 
particular. Therefore, while man is asleep, according as 
sense and imagination are free, so is the judgment of his 
intellect unfettered, though not entirely. Consequently, if 
a man syllogizes while asleep, when he wakes up he in- 
variably recognizes a flaw in some respect. 



QUESTION LXXXV. 

OF THE MODE AND ORDER OF UNDERSTANDING. 

{hi Eight Articles.) 

,We come now to consider the mode and order of understand- 
ing. Under this head there are eight points. of inquiry: 
(i) Whether our intellect understands by abstracting the 
species from the phantasms ? (2) Whether the intelligible 
species abstracted from the phantasms are what our intellect 
understands, or that whereby it understands? (3) Whether 
our intellect naturally first understands the more universal? 
(4) Whether our intellect can know many things at the same 
time? (5) Whether our intellect understands by the pro- 
cess of composition and division ? (6) Whether the in- 
tellect can err ? (7) Whether one intellect can understand 
better than another ? (8) Whether our intellect under- 
stands the indivisible before the divisible? 

First Article. 

whether our intellect understands corporeal and 
material things by abstraction from phantasms ? 

We proceed thus to the First Article : — 

Ob]'ectio7i I. It would seem that our intellect does not 
understand corporeal and material things by abstraction 
from the phantasms. For the intellect is false if it under- 
stands an object otherwise than as it really is. Now the 
forms of material things do not exist as abstracted from the 
particular things represented by the phantasms. Therefore, 
if we understand material things by abstraction of the 
species from the phantasm, there will be error in the intellect. 

Obj. 2. Further, material things are those natural things 

182 



i83 HOW THE SOUL KNOWS Q. 85. Aki. i 

which include matter in their definition. But nothing can 
be understood apart from that which enters into its defini- 
tion. Therefore material things cannot be understood apart 
from matter. Now matter is the principle of individualiza- 
tion. Therefore material things cannot be understood by 
abstraction of the universal from the particular, which is 
the process whereby the intelligible species is abstracted 
from the phantasm. 

Ohj. 3. Further, the Philosopher says {De Anima iii. 7) 
that the phantasm is to the intellectual soul what colour is 
to the sight. But seeing is not caused by abstraction of 
species from colour, but by colour impressing itself on the 
sight. Therefore neither does the act of understanding take 
place by abstraction of something from the phantasm, but 
by the phantasm impressing itself on the intellect. 

Ohj. 4. Further, the Philosopher says {De Anima iii. 5) 
there are two things in the intellectual soul — the passive 
intellect and the active intellect. But it does not belong 
to the passive intellect to abstract the intelligible species 
from the phantasm, but to receive them when abstracted. 
Neither does it seem to be the function of the active intellect, 
which is related to the phantasm, as light is to colour ; since 
light does not abstract anything from colour, but rather 
streams on to it. Therefore in no way do we understand by 
abstraction from phantasms. 

Ohj. 5. Further, the Philosopher (De Anima iii. 7) says 
that the intellect understands the species in the phantasm ; 
and not, therefore, by abstraction. 

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii. 4) 
that things are intelligihle in proportion as they are separ- 
ahle from matter. Therefore material things must needs be 
understood according as they are abstracted from matter 
and from material images, namely, phantasms. 

/ answer that, As stated above (Q. LXXXIV., A. 7), the 
object of knowledge is proportionate to the power of know- 
ledge. Now there are three grades of the cognitive powers. 
For one cognitive power, namely, the sense, is the act of a 
corporeal organ. And therefore the object of every sensi- 



Q. 85. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 184 

tive power is a form as existing in corporeal matter. And 
since such matter is the principle of individuality, therefore 
every power of the sensitive part can only have knowledge 
of the individual. There is another grade of cognitive 
power which is neither the act of a corporeal organ, nor m 
any way connected with corporeal matter ; such is the angelic 
intellect, the object of whose cognitive power is therefore 
a form existing apart from matter : for though angels know 
material things, yet they do not know them save in some- 
thing immaterial, namely, either in themselves or in God. 
But the human intellect holds a middle place :- for it is not 
the act of an organ ; yet it is a power of the soul which is the 
form of the body, as is clear from what we have said above 
(Q. LXXVI., A. i). And therefore it is proper to it to 
know a form existing individually in corporeal matter, but 
not as existing in this individual matter. But to know what 
is in individual matter, not as existing in such matter, is to 
abstract the form from individual matter which is repre- 
sented by the phantasms. Therefore we must needs say that 
our intellect understands material things by abstracting from 
the phantasms; and through material things thus considered 
we acquire some knowledge of immaterial things, just as, 
on the contrary, angels know material things through the 
immaterial. 

But Plato, considering only the immateriality of the 
human intellect, and not its being in a way united to the 
body, held that the objects of the intellect are separate ideas ; 
and that we understand not by abstraction, but by participat- 
ing things abstract, as stated above (Q. LXXXIV., A. i). 
Reply Obj. i. Abstraction may occur in two ways: 
First, by way of composition and division ; thus we may 
understand that one thing does not exist in some other, or 
that it is separate therefrom. Secondly, by way of simple 
and absolute consideration ; thus we understand one thing 
without considering the other. Thus for the intellect to 
abstract one from another things which are not really 
abstract from one another, does, in the first mode of abstrac- 
tion, imply falsehood. But, in the second mode of abstrac- 



185 HOW THE SOUL KNOWS Q. 85. Art. i 

tion, for the intellect to abstract things which are not really 
abstract from one another, does not involve falsehood, as 
clearly appears in the case of the senses. For if we under- 
stood or said that colour is not in a coloured body, or that 
it is separate from it, there would be error in this opinion 
or assertion. But if we consider colour and its properties, 
without reference to the apple which is coloured ; or if we 
express in word what we thus understand, there is no error 
in such an opinion or assertion, because an apple is not 
essential to colour, and therefore colour can be understood 
independently of the apple. Likewise, the things which 
belong to the species of a material thing, such as a stone, 
or a man, or a horse, can be thought of apart from the 
mdividualizing principles which do not belong to the notion 
of the species. This is what we mean by abstracting the 
universal from the particular, or the intelligible species 
from the phantasm; that is, by considering the nature of 
the species apart from its individual qualities represented 
by the phantasms. If, therefore, the intellect is said to be 
false when it understands a thing otherwise than as it is, 
that IS so, if the word otherwise refers to the thing under' 
stood; for the intellect is false when it understands a thino- 
otherwise than as it is ; and so the intellect would be false 
if It abstracted the species of a stone form its matter in such 
a way as to regard the species as not existing in matter 
as Plato held. But it is not so, if the word otherwise be 
taken as referring to the one who understands. For it is 
quite true that the mode of understanding, in one who 
understands, is not the same as the mode of a thing in 
existmg : since the thing understood is immaterially in the 
one who understands, according to the mode of the intellect 
and not materially, according to the mode of a material thing! 
Reply Ohj. 2. Some have thought that the species of a 
natural thmg is a form only, and that matter is not part 
of the species. If that were so, matter would not enter 
into the definition of natural things. Therefore it must be 
said otherwise, that matter is twofold, common, and situate 
or individual; common, such as flesh and bone; and 



Q. 85. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 186 

individual, as this flesh and these bones. The intellect 
therefore abstracts the species of a natural thing from the 
individual sensible matter, but not from the common sen- 
sible matter ; for example, it abstracts the species of man 
from this flesh and these bones, which do not belong to the 
species as such, but to the individual {Metaph. vii., Did. 
vi. 10), and need not be considered in the species : whereas 
the species of man cannot be abstracted by the intellect 
from flesh and bones. 

Mathematical species, however, can be abstracted by the 
intellect from sensible matter, not only from individual, 
but also from common matter ; not from common intelli- 
gible matter, but only from individual matter. For sensible 
matter is corporeal matter as subject to sensible qualities, 
such as being cold or hot, hard or soft, and the like : while 
intelligible matter is substance as subject to quantity. Now 
it is manifest that quantity is in substance before other 
sensible qualities are. Hence quantities, such as number, 
dimension, and figures, which are the terminations of 
quantity, can be considered apart from sensible qualities; 
and this is to abstract them from sensible matter ; but they 
cannot be considered without understanding the substance 
which is subject to the quantity ; for that would be to 
abstract them from common intelligible matter. Yet they 
can be considered apart from this or that substance; for 
that is to abstract them from individual intelligible matter. 
But some things can be abstracted even from common in- 
telligible matter, such as being, unity, power, act, and the 
like ; all these can exist without matter, as is plain regarding 
immaterial things. Because Plato failed to consider the 
twofold kind of abstraction, as above explained {ad i), he 
held that all those things which we have stated to be 
abstracted by the intellect, are abstract in reality. 

Reply Obj. 3. Colours, as being in individual corporeal 
matter, have the same mode of existence as the power of 
sight : and therefore they can impress their own image on 
the eye. But phantasms, since they are images of indi- 
viduals, and exist in corporeal organs, have not the same 



i87 HOW THE SOUL KNOWS Q. 85. Art. i 

mode of existence as the human intellect, and therefore 
have not the power of themselves to make an impression 
on the passive intellect. This is done by the power of the 
active intellect which by turning towards the phantasm 
produces in the passive intellect a certain likeness which 
represents, as to its specific conditions only, the thing 
reflected in the phantasm. It is thus that the intelligible 
species is said to be abstracted from the phantasm; not 
that the identical form which previously was in the phan- 
tasm is subsequently in the passive intellect, as a body 
transferred from one place to another. 

Reply Obj. 4. Not only does the active intellect throw 
light on the phantasm ; it does more ; by its own power it 
abstracts the intelligible species from the phantasm. It 
throws light on the phantasm, because, just as the sensi- 
tive part acquires a greater power by its conjunction with 
the intellectual part, so by the power of the active intellect 
the phantasms are made more fit for the abstraction there- 
from of intelligible intentions. Furthermore, the active in- 
tellect abstracts the intelligible species from the phantasm, 
forasmuch as by the power of the active intellect we are 
able to disregard the conditions of individuality, and to 
take into our consideration the specific nature, the image of 
which informs the passive intellect. 

Reply Obj. 5. Our intellect both abstracts the intel- 
ligible species from the phantasms, inasmuch as it con- 
siders the natures of things in universal, and, nevertheless, 
understands these natures in the phantasms, since it cannot 
understand even the things of which it abstracts the species 
without turning to the phantasms, as we have said above 
(Q. LXXXIV., A. 7). 



Q.iiS.ARr.2 THH "SUMMA THEOLOGICA" i8S 



Second Article. 

whether the intelligible species abstracted from the 
phantasm is related to our intellect as that 
which is understood ? 

We proceed thus to the Second Article: — 

Objection i. It would seem that the inteUigible species 
abstracted from the phantasm is related to our intellect 
as that which is understood. For the understood in act 
is in the one who understands : since the understood in act 
is the intellect itself in act. But nothing of what is under- 
stood is in the intellect actually understanding, save the 
abstracted intelligible species. Therefore this species is 
what is actually understood; 

Ohj. 2. Further, what is actually understood must be in 
something; else it would be nothing. But it is not in 
something outside the soul : for, since what is outside the 
soul is material, nothing therein can be actually under- 
stood. Therefore what is actually understood is in the 
intellect. Consequently it can be nothing else than the 
aforesaid intelligible species. 

Ohj. 3. Further, the Philosopher says (i Peri Herm. i.) 
that ivords are signs of the passions in the soul. But words 
signify the things understood, for we express by word 
what we understand. Therefore these passions of the soul, 
viz., the intelligible species, are what is actually under- 
stood. 

On the contrary, The intelligible species is to the intellect 
what the sensible image is to the sense. But the sensible 
image is not what is perceived, but rather that by which 
sense perceives. Therefore the intelligible species is not 
what is actually understood, but that by which the intellect 
understands. 

/ answer that, Some have asserted that our intellectual 
faculties know only the impression made on them ; as, for 
example, that sense is cognizant only of the impression 
made on its own organ. According to this theory, the 



i89 HOW THE SOUL KNOWS Q. 85. Art. 2 

intellect understands only its own impression, namely, the 
intelligible species which it has received, so that this species 
is what is understood. 

This is, however, manifestly false for two reasons. First, 
because the things we understand are the objects of science; 
therefore if what we understand is merely the intelligible 
species in the soul, it would follow that every science would 
not be concerned with objects outside the soul, but only 
with the intelligible species within the soul ; thus, according 
to the teaching of the Platonists all science is about ideas, 
which they held to be actually understood.* Secondly, it 
is untrue, because it would lead to the opinion of the 
ancients who maintained that whatever seems, is true,-[ and 
that consequently contradictories are true simultaneously. 
For if the faculty knows its own impression only, it can 
judge of that only. Now a thing seems, according to the 
impression made on the cognitive facultv. Consequently 
the cognitive faculty will always judge of its own impres- 
sion as such; and so every judgment will be true: for 
instance, if taste perceived only its own impression, when 
anyone with a healthy taste perceives that honey is sweet 
he would judge truly ; and if anyone with a corrupt taste 
perceives that honey is bitter, this would be equally true • 
for each would judge according to the impression on his 
taste. Thus every opinion would be equally true; in fact 
every sort of apprehension. ' 

Therefore it must be said that the intelligible species is 
rekted to the intellect as that by which it understands: 
which IS proved thus. There is a twofold action (Metaph. 
IX., Did. viii. 8), one which remains in the agent- for 
instance, to see and to understand; and another which 
passes into an external object ; for instance, to heat and to 
cut; and each of these actions proceeds in virtue of some 
form. And as the form from which proceeds an act tending 
to something external is the likeness of the object of the 
action as heat in the heater is a likeness of the thing 
heated ; so the form from which proceeds an action remain- 
• C/. Q. LXXXIV., A. I. t Cf. Arist., Mefapii. iii. 5. 



g. 85. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 190 

ing in the agent is the likeness of the object. Hence that by 
which the sight sees is the likeness of the visible thing; 
and the likeness of the thing understood, that is, the 
intelligible species, is the form by which the intellect 
understands. But since the intellect reflects upon itself, 
by such reflection it understands both its own act of intelli- 
gence, and the species by which it understands. Thus the 
intelligible species is that which is understood secondarily; 
but that which is primarily understood is the object, of 
which the species is the likeness. This also appears from 
the opinion of the ancient philosophers, who said that like 
is known by like. For they said that the soul knows the 
earth outside itself by the earth within itself; and so of 
the rest. If, therefore, we take the species of the earth 
instead of the earth, according to Aristotle {De Anima iii. 
8), who says that a stone is not in the soul, hut only the 
likeness of the stone ; it follows that the soul knows external 
things by means of its intelligible species. 

Reply Obj. i. The thing understood is in the intellect by 
its own likeness ; and it is in this sense that we say that 
the thing actually understood is the intellect in act, because 
the likeness of the thing understood is the form of the 
intellect, as the likeness of a sensible thing is the form of 
the sense in act. Hence it does not follow that the intel- 
ligible species abstracted is what is actually understood ; 
but rather that it is the likeness thereof. 

Reply Obj. 2. In these words the thing actually under- 
stood there is a double implication : — the thing which is 
understood, and the fact that it is understood. In like 
manner the words abstract universal imply two things, the 
nature of a thing and its abstraction or universality. There- 
fore the nature itself to which it occurs to be understood, 
abstracted or considered as universal is only in indivi- 
duals ; but that it is understood, abstracted or considered 
as universal is in the intellect. We see something similar 
to this in the senses. For the sight sees the colour of the 
apple apart from its smell. If therefore it be asked where 
is the colour which is seen apart from the smell, it is quite 



191 HOW THE SOUL KNOWS Q. 85. Art. 3 

clear that the colour which is seen is only in the apple : but 
that it be perceived apart from the smell, this is owing to 
the sight, forasmuch as the faculty of sight receives the 
likeness of colour and not of smell. In like manner 
humanity understood is only in this or that man ; but that 
humanity be apprehended without conditions of indivi- 
duality, that is, that it be abstracted and consequently 
considered as universal, occurs to humanity inasmuch as it 
is brought under the consideration of the intellect, in which 
there is a likeness of the specific nature, but not of the 
principles of individuality. 

Reply Obj. 3. There are two operations in the sensitive 
part. One, in regard of impression only, and thus the 
operation of the senses takes place by the senses being 
impressed by the sensible. The other is formation, inas- 
much as the imagination forms for itself an image of an 
absent thing, or even of something never seen. Both of 
these operations are found in the intellect. For in the first 
place there is the passion of the passive intellect as informed 
by the intelligible species ; and then the passive intellect 
thus informed forms a definition, or a division, or a com- 
position, expressed by a word. Wherefore the concept 
conveyed by a word is its definition; and a proposition 
conveys the intellect's division or composition. Words do 
not therefore signify the intelligible species themselves; 
but that which the intellect forms for itself for the purpose 
of judging of external things. ^ 

Third Article. 

WHETHER THE MORE UNIVERSAL IS FIRST IN OUR 
INTELLECTUAL COGNITION ? 

We proceed thus to the Third Article ■— 

Objection I. It would seem that the more universal is not 

more known m its own nature, is secondarily and less 
known in relation to ourselves. But universals come firs 
as regards their nature, because that is first '^^hich does 



g. 85. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " .192 

not involve the existence of its correlative {Categor. ix.). 
Therefore the universals are secondarily known as regards 
our intellect. 

Obj. 2. Further, the composite precedes the simple in 
relation to us. But universals are the more simple. There- 
fore they are known secondarily by us. 

Obj. 3. Further, the Philosopher says (Phys. i. i), that 
the object defined comes in our knowledge before the parts 
of its definition. But the more universal is part of the 
definition of the less universal, as aniiual is part of the 
definition of man. Therefore the universals are secondarily 
known by us. 

Obj. 4. Further, we know causes and principles by their 
effects. But universals are principles. Therefore universals 
are secondarily known by us. 

On the contrary, We must proceed from the universal to 
the singular and individual {Phys. i. ibid.). 

I ansiver that, In our knowledge there are two things to 
be considered. First, that intellectual knowledge in some 
degree arises from sensible knowledge : and, because sense 
has singular and individual things for its object, and 
intellect has the universal for its object, it follows that our 
knowledge of the former comes before our knowledge of 
the latter. Secondly, we must consider that our intellect 
proceeds from a state of potentiality to a state of actuality ; 
and every power thus proceeding from potentiality to 
actuality comes first to an incomplete act, which is the 
medium between potentiality and actuality, before ac- 
complishing the perfect act. The perfect act of the intellect 
is complete knowledge, when the object is distinctly and 
determinately known ; whereas the incomplete act is im- 
perfect knowledge, when the object is known indistinctly, 
and as it were confusedly. A thing thus imperfectly 
known, is known partly in act and partly in potentiality, 
and hence the Philosopher says {Phys. i. ibid.), that what 
is manifest and certain is known to vs at first confusedly ; 
afterwards we know it by distinguishing its principles and 
elements. Now it is evident that to know an object that 



193 HOWT THE SOUL KNOWS Q.Ss.Art.s 

comprises many things, without proper knowledge of each 
thing contained in it, is to know that thing confusedly. 
In this way we can have knowledge not only of the 
universal whole, which contains parts potentially, but also 
of the integral whole ; for each whole can be known con- 
fusedly, without its parts being known. But to know dis- 
tinctly what is contained in the universal whole is to know 
the less common, as to know animal indistinctly is to know 
it as animal; whereas to know animal distinctly is to know 
it as rational or irrational animal, that is, to know a man or 
a lion : therefore our intellect knows animal before it 
knows man ; and the same reason holds in comparing any 
more universal idea with the less universal. 

Moreover, as sense, like the intellect, proceeds from 
potentiality to act, the same order of knowledge appears 
in the senses. For by sense we judge of the more common 
before the less common, in reference both to place and 
time; in reference to place, when a thing is seen afar off 
it is seen to be a body before it is seen to be an animal ; 
and to be an animal before it is seen to be a man, and to be 
a man before it is seen to be Socrates or Plato ; and the 
same is true as regards time, for a child can distinguish 
man from not man before he distinguishes this man from 
that, and therefore children at first call all men fathers, and 
later on distinguish each one from the others {Phys. i. 
ibid.). The reason of this is clear : because he who knows 
a thing indistinctly is in a state of potentiality as regards 
its principle of distinction ; as he who knows genus is in a 
state of potentiality as regards difference. Thus it is 
evident that indistinct knowledge is midway between 
potentiality and act. 

We must therefore conclude that knowledge of the 
singular and individual is prior, as regards us, to the know- 
ledge of the universal; as sensible knowledge is prior to 
intellectual knowledge. But in both sense and intellect the 
knowledge of the more common precedes the knowledge of 
the less common. 

Reply Obj, I. The universal can be considered in two 
»•4 ,3 



Q.85.ART.3 THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA" 194 

ways. First, the universal nature may be considered to- 
gether with the intention of universaHty. And since the 
intention of universality — viz., the relation of one and the 
same to many — is due to intellectual abstraction, the 
universal thus considered is a secondary consideration. 
Hence it is said {De Anima i. i) that the universal anivial 
is either nothing or something secondary. But according 
to Plato, who held that universals are subsistent, the 
universal considered thus would be prior to the particular, 
for the latter, according to him, are mere participations of 
the subsistent universals which he called ideas. 

Secondly, the universal can be considered in the nature 
itself — for instance, animality or humanity as existing in 
the individual. And thus we must distinguish two orders 
of nature : one, by way of generation and time ; and thus 
the imperfect and the potential come first. In this way the 
more common comes first in the order of nature ; as appears 
clearly in the generation of man and animal ; for the animal 
is generated before man, as the Philosopher says {De 
Gener. Animal, ii. 3). The other order is the order of per- 
fection or of the intention of nature : for instance, act 
considered absolutely is naturally prior to potentiality, and 
the perfect to the imperfect : thus the less common comes 
naturally before the more common ; as man comes before 
animal. For the intention of nature does not stop at the 
generation of animal, but goes on to the generation 
of man. 

Reply Obj. 2. The more common universal may be com- 
pared to the less common, as the whole, and as the part. 
As the whole, considering that in the more universal is 
potentially contained not only the less universal, but also 
other things, as in animal is contained not only man but 
also horse. As part, considering that the less common con- 
tains in its idea not only the more common, but also more ; 
as man contains not only animal but also rational. There- 
fore anittial in itself comes into our knowledge before 7nan ; 
but man comes before animal considered as part of the 
sam.e idea. ^ 



195 HOW THE SOUL KNOWS Q. 85. Art. 3 

Reply Ohj. 3. A part can be known in two ways. First, 
absolutely considered in itself; and thus nothing prevents 
the parts being known before the whole, as stones are 
known before a house is known. Secondly, as belonging 
to a certain whole; and thus we must needs know the 
whole before its parts. For we know a house vaguely 
before we know its different parts. So likewise principles 
of definition are known before the thing defined is known ; 
otherwise the thing defined would not be known at all. 
But as parts of the definition they are known after. For 
we know man vaguely as man before we know how to 
distinguish all that belongs to human nature. 

Reply Ohj. 4. The universal, as understood with the in- 
tention of universality, is, indeed, in a way, a principle of 
knowledge, in as far as the intention of universality results 
from the mode of understanding by way of abstraction. 
But what is a principle of knowledge is not of necessity a 
principle of existence, as Plato thought : since at times we 
know a cause through its effect, and substance through 
accidents. Wherefore the universal thus considered, ac- 
cording to the opinion of Aristotle, is neither a principle 
of existence, nor a substance, as he makes clear (Metaph. 
vii., Did. vi. 13). But if we consider the generic or specific 
nature itself as existing in the singular, thus in a way it is 
in the nature of a formal principle in regard to the 
singulars : for the singular is the result of matter, while the 
idea of species is from the form. But the generic nature is 
compared to the specific nature rather after the fashion of 
a material principle, because the generic nature is taken 
from that which is material in a thing, while the idea of 
species is taken from that which is formal : thus the notion 
of animal is taken from the sensitive part, whereas the 
notion of man is taken from the intellectual part. Thus it 
IS that the ultimate intention of nature is to the species and 
not to the individual, or the genus : because the form is 
the end of generation, while matter is for the sake of the 
form. Neither is it necessary that, as regards us, know- 
ledge of any cause or principle should be secondary : since 



Q. 85. Art. 4 THE *' SUMMA THEOLOGICA '* 196 

at times through sensible causes we become acquainted with 
unknown effects, and sometimes conversely. 



Fourth Article. 

whether we can understand many things at the 

same time? 

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article: — 

Objectioji I. It would seem that we can understand many 
things at the same time. For intellect is above time, 
whereas the succession of before and after belongs to time. 
Therefore the intellect does not understand different things 
in succession, but at the same time. 

Obj. 2. Further, there is nothing to prevent different 
forms not opposed to each other from actually being in the 
same subject, as, for instance, colour and smell are in the 
apple. But intelligible species are not opposed to each 
other. Therefore there is nothing to prevent the same 
intellect being in act as regards different intelligible 
species, and thus it can understand many things at the same 
time. 

Ohj. 3. Further, the intellect understands a whole at the 
same time, such as a man or a house. But a whole contains 
many parts. Therefore the intellect understands many 
things at the same time. 

Obj. 4. Further, we cannot know the difference between 
two things unless we know both at the same time {De 
Anima iii. 2), and the same is to said of any other com- 
parison. But our intellect knows the difference and com- 
parison between one thing and another. Therefore it 
knows many things at the same time. 

On the contrary, It is said {Topic, ii. 10) that understand- 
ing is of one thing only, knowledge is of many. 

I afiswer that. The intellect can, indeed, understand 
many things as one, but not as many : that is to say 
by one but not by many intelligible species. For the mode 
of every action follows the form which is the prmciple of 
that action. /Therefore whatever things the im'ellect can 



197 HOW THE SOUL KNOWS Q. 85. Art. 4 

understand under one species, it can understand at the 
same time : hence it is that God sees all things at the same 
time, because He sees all in one, that is, in His Essence. 
But whatever things the intellect understands under 
different species, it does not understand at the same time. 
The reason of this is that it is impossible for one and the 
same subject to be perfected at the same time by many 
forms of one genus and diverse species, just as it is im- 
possible for one and the same body at the same time to 
have different colours or different shapes. Now all intelli- 
gible species belong to one genus, because they are the 
perfections of one intellectual faculty : although the things 
which the species represent belong to different genera. 
Therefore it is impossible for one and the same intellect to 
be perfected at the same time by different intelligible species 
so as actually to understand different things. 

Reply Ohj. i. The intellect is above that time, which is 
the measure of the movement of corporeal things. But 
the multitude itself of intelligible species causes a certain 
vicissitude of intelligible operations, according as one 
operation succeeds another. And this vicissitude is called 
time by Augustine, who says (Gen. ad lit. viii. 20, 22), 
that God moves the spiritual creature through time. 

Reply Ohj. 2. Not only is it impossible for opposite 
forms to exist at the same time in the same subject, but 
neither can any forms belonging to the same genus, 
although they be not opposed to one another, as is clear 
from the examples of colours and shapes. 

Reply Ohj. 3. Parts can be understood in two ways. 
First, in a confused way, as existing in the whole, and thus 
they are known through the one form of the whole, and so 
are known together. In another way they are known dis- 
tmctly : thus each is known by its species ; and so they are 
not understood at the same time. 

Reply Ohj. 4. If the intellect sees the difference or com- 
parison between one thing and another, it knows both in 
relation to their difference or comparison ; just, as we have 
said above {ad 3), as it knows the parts in the whole. 



Q. 8s. Art. 5 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 198 



Fifth Article. 

whether our intellect understands by 
composition and division? 

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article: — 

Objection 1. It would seem that our intellect does not 
understand by composition and division. For composition 
and division are only of many ; whereas the intellect 
cannot understand many things at the same time. There- 
fore it cannot understand by composition and division. 

Obj. 2. Further, every composition and division implies 
past, present, or future time. But the intellect abstracts 
from time, as also from other individual conditions. There- 
fore the intellect does not understand by composition and 
division. 

Obj. 3. Further, the intellect understands things by a 
process of assimilation to them. But composition and 
division are not in things, for nothing is in things but 
what is signified by the predicate and the subject, and 
which is one and the same, provided that the composition 
be true, for man is truly what animal is. Therefore the 
intellect does not act by composition and division. 

On the contrary, Words signify the conceptions of the 
intellect, as the Philosopher says (Peri Herm. i.). But in 
words we find composition and division, as appears in 
affirmative and negative propositions. Therefore the intel- 
lect acts by composition and division. 

I answer that, The human intellect must of necessity 
understand by composition and division. For since the 
intellect passes from potentiality to act, it has a likeness to 
things which are generated, which do not attain to perfec- 
tion all at once but acquire it by degrees : so likewise the 
human intellect does not acquire perfect knowledge by the 
first act of apprehension ; but it first apprehends something 
about its object, such as its quiddity, and this is its first 
and proper object ; and then it understands the properties, 
accidents, and the various relations of the essence. Thus 



199 HOW THE SOUL KNOWS Q. 85. Art. 5 

it necessarily compares one thing with another by composi- 
tion or division ; and from one composition and division it 
proceeds to another, which is the process of reasoning. 

But the angelic and the Divine intellect, like all in- 
corruptible things, have their perfection at once from the 
beginning. Hence the angelic and the Divine intellect 
have the entire knowledge of a thing at once and perfectly ; 
and hence also in knowing the quiddity of a thing they 
know at once whatever we can know by composition, divi- 
sion, and reasoning. Therefore the human intellect knows 
by composition, division, and reasoning. But the Divine 
and the angelic intellect know, indeed, composition, divi- 
sion, and reasoning, not by the process itself, but by under- 
standing the simple essence. 

Reply Ohj. i. Composition and division of the intellect 
are made by differentiating and comparing. Hence the 
intellect knows many things by composition and division, 
as by knowing the difference and comparison of things. 

Reply Ohj. 2. Although the intellect abstracts from the 
phantasms, it does not understand actually without turning 
to the phantasms, as we have said (A. i, and Q. LXXXIV., 
A. 7). And forasmuch as it turns to the phantasms, com- 
position and division of the intellect involve time. 

Reply Ohj. 3. The likeness of a thing is received into the 
intellect according to the mode of the intellect, not accord- 
ing to the mode of the thing. Wherefore something on the 
part of the thing corresponds to the composition and 
division of the intellect ; but it does not exist in the same 
way in the intellect and in the thing. For the proper object 
of the human intellect is the quiddity of a material thing, 
which comes under the action of the senses and the 
imagination. Now in a material thing there is a twofold 
composition. First, there is the composition of form with 
matter; and to this corresponds that composition of the 
intellect whereby the universal whole is predicated of its 
part : for the genus is derived from common matter, while 
the difference that completes the species is derived from the 
form, and the particular from individual matter. The 



Q. 85. Art. 6 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 200 

second composition is of accident with subject : and to this 
real composition corresponds that composition of the intel- 
lect, whereby accident is predicated of subject, as when we 
say the man is white. Nevertheless composition of the 
intellect differs from composition of things ; for in the latter 
the things are diverse, whereas composition of the intellect 
is a sign of the identity of the components. For the above 
composition of the intellect does not imply that man and 
whiteyiess are identical, but the assertion, the man is white, 
means that the -ynan is something having whiteness: and 
the subject, which is a man, is identified with a subject 
having whiteness. It is the same with the composition 
of form and matter : for animal signifies that which has a 
sensitive nature ; rational, that which has an intellectual 
nature ; man, that which has both ; and Socrates that 
which has all these things together with individual matter ; 
and according to this kind of identity our intellect pre- 
dicates the composition of one thing with another. 

Sixth Article, 
whether the intellect can be false? 

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article: — 

Objection i. It would seem that the intellect can be false ; 
for the Philosopher says {Metaph. vi.. Did. v. 4) that truth 
and falsehood are in the mind. But the mind and intellect 
are the same, as is shown above (Q. LXXIX., A. i). 
Therefore falsehood may be in the mind. 

Ohj. 2. Further, opinion and reasoning belong to the 
intellect. But falsehood exists in both. Therefore false- 
hood can be in the intellect. 

Ohj. 3. Further, sin is in the intellectual faculty. But 
sin involves falsehood : for those err that work evil (Prov. 
xiv. 22). Therefore falsehood can be in the intellect. 

On the contrary, Augustine says {QQ. LXXXIIL, qu. 
32), that everyone who is deceived, does not rightly under- 
stand that wherein he is deceived. And the Philosopher 
says {De Artlima iii. 10), that the intellect is always true. 



201 HOW THE SOUL KNOWS Q. 85. Art. 6 

/ ansiver that, The Philosopher {ibid. 6) compares intel- 
lect with sense on this point. For sense is not deceived in 
its proper object, as sight in regard to colour; save acci- 
dentally through some hindrance occurring to the sensile 
organ — for example, the taste of a fever-stricken person 
judges a sweet thing to be bitter, through his tongue being 
vitiated by ill humours. Sense, however, may be deceived 
as regards common sensible objects, as size or figure ; 
when, for example, it judges the sun to be only a foot in 
diameter, whereas in reality it exceeds the earth in size. 
Much more is sense deceived concerning accidental sensible 
objects, as when it judges that vinegar is honey by reason 
of the colour being the same. The reason of this is 
evident; for every faculty, as such, is per se directed to its 
proper object; and things of this kind are always the same. 
Hence, so long as the faculty exists, its judgment concern- 
ing its own proper object does not fail. Now the proper 
object of the intellect is the quiddity of a material thing; 
and hence, properly speaking, the intellect is not at fault 
concerning this quiddity; whereas it may go astray as 
regards the surroundings of the thing in its essence or 
quiddity, in referring one thing to another, as regards 
composition or division, or also in the process of reason- 
ing. Therefore, also in regard to those propositions, which 
are understood as soon as the terms thereof are understood, 
the intellect cannot err, as in the case of first principles 
from which arises infallible truth in the certitude of scientific 
conclusions. 

The intellect, however, may be accidentally deceived in 
the quiddity of composite things, not by the defect of its 
organ, for the intellect is a faculty that is independent of 
an organ ; but on the part of the composition affecting the 
definition, when, for instance, the definition of a thing is 
false in relation to something else, as the definition of a 
circle applied to a triangle; or when a definition is false in 
itself as involving the composition of things incompatible ; 
as, for instance, to describe anything as a rational winged 
animal. Hence as regards simple objects not subject to 



g. 85. ART. 7 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 202 

composite definitions we cannot be deceived unless, indeed, 
we understand nothing whatever about them, as is said 
Metaph. ix. (Did. viii. 10). . 

Reply Obj. i. The Philosopher says that falsehood is in 
the intellect in regard to composition and division. The 
same answer applies to the second objection concerning 
opinion and reasoning, and to the third objection, concern- 
ing the error of the sinner, who errs in the practical 
jud-ment of the appetible object. But in the absolute 
consideration of the quiddity of a thing, and of those things 
which are known thereby, the intellect is never deceived. 
In this sense are to be understood the authorities quoted in 
proof of the opposite conclusion. 

Seventh Article. 

WHETHER ONE PERSON CAN UNDERSTAND ONE AND THE 
SAME THING BETTER THAN ANOTHER CAN? 

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article:— 
Objection i . It would seem that one person cannot under- 
stand one and the same thing better than another can. For 
Augustine says {QQ. LXXXIII., qu. 32), Whoever under- 
stands a thing otherwise than as it is, does not understand 
it at all. Hence it is clear that there is a perfect understand- 
ing than which none other is more perfect: and therefore 
there are not infinite degrees of understanding a thing: nor 
can one person understand a thing better than another can. 
Obj 2. Further, the intellect is true in its act of under- 
standing. But truth, being a certain equality between 
thought and thing, is not subject to more or less ; for a 
thing cannot be said to be more or less equal. Therefore 
a thing cannot be more or less understood. 

Obj. 3. Further, the intellect is the most formal of all 
that is in man. But different forms cause different species. 
Therefore if one man understands better than another, it 
would seem that they do not belong to the same species. 

On the contrary, Experience shows that some understand 
more profoundly than do others ; as one who carries a con- 



203 HOW THE SOUL KNOWS Q. 85. Art. 7 

elusion to its first principles and ultimate causes understands 
it better than the one who reduces it only to its proximate 



causes. 



/ answer that, A thing being understood more by one 
than by another may be taken in two senses. First, so that 
the word more be taken as determining the act of under- 
standmg as regards the thing understood; and thus, one 
cannot understand the same thing more than another, 
because to understand it otherwise than as it is, either 
better or worse, would entail being deceived, and such a 
one would not understand it, as Augustine argues {loc. cit ) 
In another sense the word more can be taken as determining 
the act of understanding on the part of him who under- 
stands; and so one may understand the same thing better 
than someone else, through having a greater power of 
understandmg : just as a man may see a thing better with 
his bodily sight, whose power is greater, and whose sight 
IS more perfect. The same applies to the intellect in two 
ways. First, as regards the intellect itself, which is more ' 
perfect For it is plain that the better the disposition of a 
body, the better the soul allotted to it; which clearly appears 
in things of different species : and the reason thereof is that 
act and form are received into matter according to matter's 
capacity : thus because some men have bodies of better 
disposition their souls have a greater power of understand- 
mg, wherefore it is said {De Anima ii. 9), that it is to be 

Secondly, this occurs in regard to the lower powers of 
whK:h the mtellect has need in its operation : for tl^^se in 
whom the imaginative, cogitative and memorative powers 
are of better disposition, are better disposed to understand 

The reply to the first objection is clear from the above- 
hkewise the reply to the second, for the truth of the intdlect' 
Til 'nl'-' '"^'"'^^ understanding a thing as it is 
Reply Objs- The difference of form which is due o'nly to 
the different disposition of matter, causes not a specific bu^ 
orilyanumerical difference : for different individual's hfvedif 
ferent forms, diversified according to the difference of matter 



Q. 85. Art. 8 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 204 



Eighth Article. 

whether the intellect understands the indivisible 
before the divisible? 

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article : — 

Objection i. It would seem that the intellect understands 
the indivisible before the divisible. For the Philosopher 
says {Phys. i. i) that we ujiderstand and know from the 
knoivledge of principles and elements. But principles are 
indivisible, and elements are of divisible things. Therefore 
the indivisible is known to us before the divisible. 

Obj. 2. Further, the definition of a thing contains what is 
known previously, for a definition proceeds from the first 
and more known, as is said Topic, vi. 4. But the in- 
divisible is part of the definition of the divisible; as a point 
comes into the definition of a line; for as Euclid says, a 
line is length without breadth, the extremities of which are 
points; also unity comes into the definition of number, for 
number is multitude measured by one, as is said Meiaph. x. 
(Did. ix. 6). Therefore our intellect understands the in- 
divisible before the divisible. 

Obj. 3. Further, Like is known by like. But the in- 
divisible is more like to the intellect than is the divisible; 
because the intellect is simple (De Anima iii. 4). Therefore 
our intellect first knows the indivisible. 

On the contrary, It is said {ibid. 6) that the indivisible 
is expressed as a privation. But privation is known 
secondarily. Therefore likewise is the indivisible. 

/ answer that. The object of our intellect in its present 
state is the quiddity of a material thing, which it abstracts 
from the phantasms, as above stated (Q. LXXXIV., A. 7). 
And since that which is known first and of itself by our 
cognitive power is its proper object, we must consider its 
relationship to that quiddity in order to discover in what 
order the indivisible is known. Now the indivisible is 
threefold, as is said De Anima iii. 6. First, the continuous 
is indivisible, since actually it is undivided, although poten- 



205 HOW THE SOUL KNOWS Q. 85. Art. 8 

tially divisible : and this indivisible is known to us before 
its division, which is a division into parts : because con- 
fused knowledge is prior to distinct knowledge, as we have 
said above (A. 3). Secondly, the indivisible is so called in 
relation to species, as man's reason is something indivisible. 
This way, also, the indivisible is understood before its 
division into logical parts, as we have said above (ibid.) ; 
and again before the intellect composes and divides by 
affirmation and negation. The reason of this is that both 
these kinds of indivisible are understood by the intellect of 
itself, as being its proper object. The third kind of in- 
divisible is what is altogether indivisible, as a point and 
unity, which cannot be divided either actually or potentially. 
And this indivisible is known secondarily, through the 
privation of divisibility. Wherefore a point is defined by 
way of privation as that which has no parts: and in like 
manner the notion of one is that it is indivisible, as stated 
in Metaph. x. (Did. ix. i). And the reason of this is that 
this indivisible has a certain opposition to a corporeal being, 
the quiddity of which is the primary and proper object of 
the intellect. 

But if our intellect understood by participation of certain 
separate indivisible (forms), as the Platonists maintained, 
it would follow that a like indivisible is understood pri- 
marily : for according to the Platonists what is first is first 
participated by things. 

Reply Obj. i. In the acquisition of knowledge, principles 
and elements are not always (known) first : for sometimes 
from sensible effects we arrive at the knowledge of principles 
and intelligible causes. But in perfect knowledge, the 
knowledge of effects always depends on the knowledge of 
principles and elements : for as the Philosopher says in the 
same passage : Then do ive consider that we know, when we 
can resolve principles into their causes. 

Reply Obj. 2. A point is not included in the definition of 
a line in general : for it is manifest that in a line of in- 
definite length, and in a circular line, there is no point, save 
potentially. Euclid defines a finite straight line : and there- 



g.85.ART. 8. THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 206 

fore he mentions a point in the definition, as the hmit in the 
definition of that which is Hmited. — Unity is the measure of 
number : wherefore it is included in the definition of a 
measured number. But it is not included in the definition 
of the divisible, but rather conversely. 

Reply Obj. 3. The likeness through which we understand 
is the species of the known in the knower; therefore a thing 
is known first, not on account of its natural likeness to the 
cognitive power, but on account of the power's aptitude for 
the object : otherwise sight would perceive hearing rather 
than colour. 



QUESTION LXXXVI. 

WHAT OUR INTELLECT KNOWS IN MATERIAL THINGS. 

{In Four Articles.) 

We now have to consider what our intellect knows in 
material things. Under this head there are four points of 
inquiry : (y) Whether it knows singulars ? (2) Whether 
it knows the infinite ? (3) Whether it knows contingent 
things ? (4) Whether it knows future things ? 

First Article, 
whether our intellect knows singulars ? 

We proceed thus to the First Article: — 

Objection i. It would seem that our intellect knows 
singulars. For whoever knows composition, knows the 
terms of composition. But our intellect knows this com- 
position; Socrates is a man: for it belongs to the intellect 
to form a proposition. Therefore our intellect knows this 
singular, Socrates. 

Obj. 2. Further, the practical intellect directs to action. 
But action has relation to singular things. Therefore the 
intellect knows the singular. 

Obj. 3. Further, our intellect understands itself. But in 
itself it is a singular, otherwise it would have no action 
of its own ; for actions belong to singulars. Therefore our 
intellect knows singulars. 

Obj. 4. Further, a superior power can do whatever is 
done by an inferior power. But sense knows the singular. 
Much more, therefore, can the intellect know it. 

On the contrary, The Philosopher says {Phys. i. 5), that 
the universal is known by reason; and the singular is 
known by sense. 

207 



g. 86. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 208 

/ ans-wer that, Our intellect cannot know the singular 
in material things directly and primarily. The reason of 
this is that the principle of singularity in material things is 
individual matter, whereas our intellect, as we have said 
above (Q. LXXXV., A. i), understands by abstracting the 
intelligible species from such matter. Now what is 
abstracted from individual matter is the universal. Hence 
our intellect knows directly the universal only. But in- 
directly, and as it were by a kind of reflexion, it can know 
the singular, because, as we have said above (Q. LXXXV., 
A. 7), even after abstracting the intelligible species, the 
intellect, in order to understand, needs to turn to the 
phantasms in which it understands the species, as is said 
De Anima iii. 7. Therefore it understands the universal 
directly through the intelligible species, and indirectly the 
singular represented by the phantasm. And thus it forms 
the proposition, Socrates is a 7nan. Wherefore the reply 
to the first objection is clear. 

Reply Obj. 2. The choice of a particular thing to be done 
is as the conclusion of a syllogism formed by the practical 
intellect, as is said Ethic, vii. 3. But a singular proposi- 
tion cannot be directly concluded from a universal pro- 
position, except through the medium of a singular proposi- 
tion. Therefore the universal principle of the practical 
intellect does not move save through the medium of the 
particular apprehension of the sensitive part, as is said 
De Ani^na iii. 1 1. 

Reply Obj. 3. Intelligibility is incompatible with the 
singular not as such, but as material, for nothing can be 
understood otherwise than immaterially. Therefore if there 
be an immaterial singular such as the intellect, there is no 
reason why it should not be intelligible. 

Reply Obj. 4. The higher power can do what the lower 
power can, but in a more eminent way. Wherefore what 
the sense knows materially and concretely, which is to 
know the singular directly, the intellect knows immaterially 
and in the abstract, which is to know the universal. 



209 WHAT THE SOUL KNOWS Q. 86. Art. 2 



Second Article. 

WHETHER OUR INTELLECT CAN KNOW THE INFINITE? 

We proceed thus to the Second Article:— 

Objection i. It would seem that our intellect can know 
the infinite. For God excels all infinite things. But our 
intellect can know God, as we have said above (Q. XH., 
A I). Much more, therefore, can our intellect know all 
other infinite things. 

Obj. 2. Further, our intellect can naturally know genera 

and species. But there is an i"nf;r.;f,r ^r ^ • • 

f ijui Liiere is an innnity ot species in some 

genera, as in number, proportion, and figure. Therefore 
our intellect can know the infinite. 

Obj. 3. Further, if one body can coexist with another 
in the same place, there is nothing to prevent an infinite 
number of bodies being in one place. But one intelligible 
species can exist with another in the same intellect for 
many things can be habitually known at the same t'ime. 
Therefore our intellect can have an habitual knowledge of 
an infinite number of things. 



06/. 4. Further, as the intellect is not a corporeal faculty 
as we have said (Q. LXXVI., A. i), it appears to be an 
infinite power. But an infinite power has a capacity for 
an infinite object. Therefore our intellect can know the 

innniff» 



infinite. 



On the contrary, It is said (Phys. i. 4) that tlie infinite 
considered as such, is unknown. 

I answer that Since a faculty and its object are pro- 
porfonal to each other, the intellect must be related to the 
'"ufT'Z: '" °'J''^'' "':'* '^ 'he quiddity of a material 
actually, but only potentially, in the sense of one suc- 

s oot"en.rn ' '^ " "'" ''"■ '"■ '■ Therefore 1«^^ ,y 
s potentially .n our m.nd through its considering succes- 
sively one thmg after another . because never does our 

I- 4 

14 



2IO 



Q. 86. ART. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 

On the other hand, our intellect cannot understand 
the infinite either actually or habitually. Not actually, 
for our intellect cannot know actually at the same time, 
except what it knows through one species. But the mfinite 
is not represented by one species, for if it were it would be 
something whole and complete. Consequendy it cannot be 
understood except by a successive consideration of one 
part after another, as is clear from its definition {ibtd 
iii 6) : for the infinite is that from which, however much 
we 7nay take, there always remains something to he taken 
Thus the infinite could not be known actually, unless all 
its parts were counted : which is impossible. 

For the same reason we cannot have habitual know- 
ledge of the infinite : because in us habitual knowledge 
results from actual consideration : since by understanding 
we acquire knowledge, as is said Ethic, ii. i. Wherefore 
it would not be possible for us to have a habit of an infinity 
of things distinctly known, unless we had already con- 
sidered the entire infinity thereof, counting them according 
to the succession of our knowledge : which is impossible. 
And therefore neither actually or habitually can our intel- 
lect know the infinite, but only potentially, as explained 

above. . 

Reply Ob/, i. As we have said above (Q. Vll., A. i), 
God is'called infinite, because He is a form unlimited by 
matter; whereas in material things, the term infinite is 
applied to that which is deprived of any formal term. And 
form being known in itself, whereas matter cannot be 
known without form, it follows that the material infinite is 
in itself unknowable. But the formal infinite, God, is of 
Himself known ; but He is unknown to us by reason of our 
feeble intellect, which in its present state has a natural 
aptitude for material objects only. Therefore we cannot 
know God in our present life except through material 
effects. In the future life this defect of intellect will be 
removed by the state of glory, when we shall be able to 
see the Essence of God Himself, but without being able to 
comprehend Him. 



211 WHAT THE SOUL KNOWS Q. 86. Art. 3 

Reply Obj. 2. The nature of our mind is to know species 
abstracted from phantasms; therefore it cannot know 
actually or habitually species of numbers or figures that 
are not in the imagination, except in a general way and in 
their universal principles ; and this is to know them 
potentially and confusedly. 

Reply Obj. 3. If two or more bodies were in the same 
place, there would be no need for them to occupy the 
place successively, in order for the things placed to be 
counted according to this succession of occupation. On 
the other hand, the intelligible species enter into our intel- 
lect successively ; since many things cannot be actually 
understood at the same time : and therefore there must 
be a definite and not an infinite number of species in our 
intellect. 

Reply Obj. 4. As our intellect is infinite in power, so 
does it know the infinite. For its power is indeed infinite 
inasmuch as it is not terminated by corporeal matter. 
Moreover it can know the universal, which is abstracted 
from individual matter, and which consequently is not 
limited to one individual, but. considered in itself, extends 
to an infinite number of individuals. 



Third Article, 
whether our intellect can know contingent things ? 

We proceed thus to the Third Article : — 

Objection i. It would seem that the intellect cannot know 
contingent things : because, as the Philosopher says 
{Ethic, vi. 6), the objects of understanding, wisdom and 
knowledge are not contingent, but necessary things. 

Obj. 2. Further, as stated in Phys. iv. 12, what some- 
times is and sometimes is not, is measured by time. Now 
the intellect abstracts from time, and from other material 
conditions. Therefore, as it is proper to a contingent thing 
sometime to be and sometime not to be, it seems that con- 
tingent things are not known by the intellect. 



Q. 86. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 212 

On the contrary, All knowledge is in the intellect. But 
some sciences are of contingent things, as the moral 
sciences, the objects of which are human actions subject to 
free-will ; and, again, the natural sciences in as far as they 
relate to things generated and corruptible. Therefore the 
intellect knows contingent things. 

/ answer that, Contingent things can be considered in 
two ways; either as contingent, or as containing some 
element of necessity, since every contingent thing has in it 
something necessary : for example, that Socrates runs, is 
in itself contingent ; but the relation of running to motion 
is necessary, for it is necessary that Socrates move if he 
runs. Now contingency arises from matter, for con- 
tingency is a potentiality to be or not to be, and poten- 
tiality belongs to matter ; whereas necessity results from 
form, because whatever is consequent on form is of neces- 
sity in the subject. But matter is the individualizing prin- 
ciple : whereas the universal comes from, the abstraction 
of the form from the particular matter. Moreover it was 
laid down above (A. i) that the intellect of itself and 
directly has the universal for its object ; while the object of 
sense is the singular, which in a certain way is the indirect 
object of the intellect, as w^e have said above (ibid.). 
Therefore the contingent, considered as such, is known 
directly by sense and indirectly by the intellect; while the 
universal and necessary principles of contingent things 
are known only by the intellect. Hence if we consider the 
objects of science in their universal principles, then all 
science is of necessary things. But if we consider the 
things themselves, thus some sciences are of necessary 
things, some of contingent things. 

From which the replies to the objections are clear. 



213 WHAT THE SOUL KNOWS Q. 86. Art. 4 

Fourth Article, 
whether our intellect can know the future? 

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article: — 

Objection i. It would seem that our intellect knows the 
future. For our intellect knows by means of intelligible 
species abstracted from the here and now, and related in- 
differently to all time. But it can know the present. There- 
fore it can know the future. 

Ohj. 2. Further, man, while his senses are in suspense, 
can know some future things, as in sleep, and in frenzy. 
But the intellect is freer and more vigorous when removed 
from sense. Therefore the intellect of its own nature can 
know the future. 

Ohj. 3. The intellectual knowledge of man is superior 
to any knowledge of brutes. But some animals know the 
future; thus crows by their frequent cawing foretell rain. 
Therefore much more can the intellect know^ the future. 

On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. viii. 6, 7), There is 
great affliction for man, because he is ignorant of things 
past; and things to come he cannot knoiv by any 
messenger. 

I answer that. We must apply the same distinction to 
future things, as we applied above (A. 3) to contingent 
things. For future things considered as subject to time are 
singular, and the human intellect knows them by reflexion 
only, as stated above (A. i). But the principles of future 
things may be universal ; and thus they may enter the 
domain of the intellect and become the objects of science. 

Speaking, however, of the knowledge of the future in a 
general way, we must observe that the future mav be 
known in two ways : either in itself, or in its cause. The 
future cannot be known in itself save by God alone; to 
Whom even that is present which in the course of events 
is future, forasmuch as from eternity His glance embraces 
the whole course of time, as we have said above when 
treating of God's knowledge (Q. XIV., A. 13). But for- 



Q.86.ART.4 THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA" 214 

asmuch as it exists in its cause, the future can be known 
by us also. And if, indeed, the cause be such as to have a 
necessary connection with its future result, then the future 
is known with scientific certitude, just as the astronomer 
foresees the future eclipse. If, however, the cause be such 
as to produce a certain result more frequently than not, 
then can the future be known more or less conjecturally, 
according as its cause is more or less inclined to produce 
the effect. 

Reply Obj. i. This argument considers that knowledge 
which is drawn from universal causal principles; from 
these the future may be known, according to the order of 
the effects to the cause. 

Reply Obj. 2. As Augustine says {Confess, xii.),* the 
soul has a certain power of forecasting, so that by its very 
nature it can know the future ; hence when withdrawn from 
corporeal sense, and, as it w^ere, concentrated on itself, it 
shares in the knowledge of the future. Such an opinion 
would be reasonable if we were to admit that the soul 
receives knowledge by participating the ideas as the 
Platonists maintained, because in that case the soul by its 
nature would know the universal causes of all effects, and 
would only be impeded in its knowledge by the body; 
and hence when withdrawn from the corporeal senses it 
would know the future. 

But since it is connatural to our intellect to know things, 
not thus, but by receiving its knowledge from the senses ; 
it is not natural for the soul to know the future when with- 
drawn from the senses : rather does it know the future by 
the impression of superior spiritual and corporeal causes; 
of spiritual causes, when by Divine power the human intel- 
lect is enlightened through the ministry of angels, and the 
phantasms are directed to the knowledge of future events ; 
or, by the influence of demons, when the imagination is 
moved regarding the future known to the demons, as ex- 
plained above (Q. LVII., A. 3). The soul is naturally 
more inclined to receive these impressions of spiritual 

^- * Gen. ad lit. xii. 13. 



215 WHAT THE SOUL KNOWS Q. 86. Art. 4 

causes when it is withdrawn from the senses, as it is then 
nearer to the spiritual world, and freer from external dis- 
tractions. — The same may also come from superior cor- 
poreal causes. For it is clear that superior bodies influence 
inferior bodies. Hence, in consequence of the sensitive 
faculties being acts of corporeal organs, the influence of 
the heavenly bodies causes the imagination to be affected, 
and so, as the heavenly bodies cause many future events, 
the imagination receives certain images of some such 
events. These images are perceived more at night and 
while we sleep than in the daytime and while we are awake, 
because, as stated in De Somn. et Vig. ii.,* impressions 
made hy day are evanescent. The night air is calmer, when 
silence reigns, hence bodily impressions are made in sleep, 
when slight internal movements are felt more than in 
wakefulness, and such movements produce in the imagina- 
tion images from which the future may he foreseen. 

Reply Obj. 3. Brute animals have no power above the 
imagination wherewith to regulate it, as man has his 
reason, and therefore their imagination follows entirely the 
influence of the heavenly bodies. Thus from such animals' 
movements some future things, such as rain and the like, 
may be known rather than from human movements 
directed by reason. Hence the Philosopher says (ibid.), 
that some who are most imprudent are most far-seeing ; for 
their intelligence is not burdened with cares, but is as it 
were barren and bare of all anxiety, moving at the caprice 
of whatever is brought to bear on it. 

* De Divinat. per somn. ii. 



QUESTION LXXXVII. 

HOW THE INTELLECTUAL SOUL KNOWS ITSELF 
AND ALL WITHIN ITSELF. 

(In Four Articles.) 

We have now to consider how the intellectual soul knows 
itself and all within itself. Under this head there are four 
points of inquiry : (X|k'Wh«ther the soul knows itself by 
its own essence ? (2) Whether it knows its own habits ? 
^ How does the intellect know its own act ? (4) How 
does it know the act of the will ? 

First Article. 

whether the intellectual soul knows itself by 

its essence? 

We proceed thus to the First Article: — 

Objection i. It would seem that the intellectual soul 
knows itself by its own essence. For Augustine says {De 
Trin. ix. 3), that the mind knows itself by itself, because it 
is incorporeal. 

Obj. 2. Further, both angels and human souls belong to 
the genus of intellectual substance. But an angel under- 
stands itself by its own essence. Therefore likewise does 
the human soul. 

Obj. 3. Further, in things void of matter, the intellect 
a7id that which is understood are the same (De Anima iii. 4). 
But the human mind is void of matter, not being the act 
of a body, as stated above (Q. LXXVI., A. i). Therefore 
the intellect and its object are the same in the human 
mind ; and therefore the human mind understands itself by 
its own essence. 

/• 216 



217 HOW THE SOUL KNOWS g. 87. Art. i 

On the contrary, It is said (De Anima iii., ibid.) that the 
intellect understands itself in the same way as it under- 
stands other things. But it understands other things, not 
by their essence, but by their similitudes. Therefore it 
does not understand itself by its own essence. 

I answer that, Everything is knowable so far as it is in 
act, and not, so far as it is in potentiality (Metaph. ix., 
Did. viii. 9) : for a thing is a being, and is true, and there- 
fore knowable, according as it is actual. This is quite 
clear as regards sensible things, for the eye does not see 
what is potentially, but what is actually coloured. In like 
manner it is clear that the intellect, so far as it knows 
material things, does not know save what is in act : and 
hence it does not know primary matter except as propor- 
tionate to form, as is stated Phys. i. 7. Consequently im- 
material substances are intelligible by their own essence, 
according as each one is actual by its own essence. 

Therefore it is that the Essence of God, the pure and 
perfect act, is simply and perfectly in itself intelligible; 
and hence God by His own Essence knows Himself, and 
all other things also. The angelic essence belongs, indeed, 
to the genus of intelligible things as act, but not as a pure 
act, nor as a complete act, and hence the angel's act of 
intelligence is not completed by his essence. For although 
an angel understands himself by his own essence, still he 
cannot understand all other things by his own essence ; for 
he knows things other than himself by their likenesses. 
Now the human intellect is only a potentiality in the genus 
of intelligible beings, just as primary matter is a potentialitv 
as regards sensible beings ; and hence it is called possible * 
Therefore in its essence the human mind is potentially 
understanding. Hence it has in itself the power to under- 
stand, but not to be understood, except as it is made actual. 
For even the Platonists asserted that an order of intelligible 
beings existed above the order of intellects, forasmuch as the 
intellect understands only by participation of the intelligible ; 

* Possi6//zs,— elsewhere in this translation rendered 'passive.' — Ed. 



Q. 87. Art. I THE '' SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 218 

for they said that the participator is below what it partici- 
pates. If, therefore, the human intellect, as the Platonists 
held, became actual by participating separate intelligible 
forms, it would understand itself by such participation of 
incorporeal beings. But as in this life our intellect has 
material and sensible things for its proper natural object, 
as stated above (Q. LXXXIV., A. 7), it understands itself 
according as it is made actual by the species abstracted 
from sensible things, through the light of the active intel- 
lect, which not only actuates the intelligible things them- 
selves, but also, by their instrumentality, actuates the 
passive intellect. Therefore the intellect knows itself not 
by its essence, but by its act. This happens in two ways : 
In the first place, singularly^ as when Socrates or Plato 
perceives that he has an intellectual soul because he per- 
ceives that he understands. In the second place, uni- 
versally, as when we consider the nature of the human mind 
from knowledge of the intellectual act. It is true, however, 
that the judgment and force of this knowledge, whereby 
we know the nature of the soul, comes to us according to 
the derivation of our intellectual light from the Divine 
Truth which contains the types of all things as above stated 
(Q. LXXXIV., A. 5). Hence Augustine says {De Trin. 
ix. 6) : We gaze on the inviolable truth whence we can as 
perfectly as possible define, not what each man's mind 
is, but what it ought to be in the light of the eternal types. 
There is, however, a difference between these two kinds 
of knowledge, and it consists in this that the mere presence 
of the mind suffices for the first ; the mind itself being the 
principle of action whereby it perceives itself, and hence it 
is said to know itself by its own presence. But as regards 
the second kind of knowledge, the mere presence of the 
mind does not suffice, and there is further required a 
careful and subtle inquiry. Hence many are ignorant of 
the soul's nature, and many have erred about it. So 
Augustine says {De Trin. x. 9), concerning such mental 
inquiry : Let the mind strive not to see itself as if it were 
absent, but to discerii itself as present — i.e., to know how 



219 HOW THE SOUL KNOWS Q. 87. Art. i 

it differs from other things ; which is to know its essence 
and nature. 

Reply Ohj. i. The mind knows itself by means of itself, 
because at length it acquires knowledge of itself, though 
led thereto by its own act : — because it is itself that it 
knows, since it loves itself, as he says in the same passage. 
For a thing can be called self-evident in two ways, either 
because we can know it by nothing else except itself, as 
first principles are called self-evident ; or because it is not 
accidentally knowable, as colour is visible of itself, where- 
as substance is visible by its accident. 

Reply Ohj. 2. The essence of an angel is as an act in the 
genus of intelligible things, and therefore it is both intel- 
lect and the thing understood. Hence an angel apprehends 
his own essence through itself : not so the human mind, 
which is either altogether in potentiality to intelligible 
things, — as is the passive intellect, — or is the act of intel- 
ligible things abstracted from the phantasms, — as is the 
active intellect. 

Reply Ohj. 3. This saying of the Philosopher is uni- 
versally true in every kind of intellect. For as sense in act 
is the sensible in act, by reason of the sensible likeness 
which is the form of sense in act, so likewise the intellect in 
act is the object understood in act, by reason of the like- 
ness of the thing understood, which is the form of the intel- 
lect in act. So the human intellect, which becomes actual 
by the species of the object understood, is itself understood 
by the same species as by its own form. Now to say that 
in things without matter the intellect and what is under- 
stood are the same, is equal to saying that as regards things 
actually understood the intellect and what is understood 
are the same. For a thing is actually understood in that it 
is immaterial. But a distinction must be drawn : since the 
essences of some things are immaterial, — as the separate 
substances called angels, each of which is understood and 
understands, whereas there are other things whose essences 
are not wholly immaterial, but only the abstract likenesses 
thereof. Hence the Commentator says {De Anima iii.) 



Q. 87. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 220 

that the proposition quoted is true only of separate sub- 
stances ; because in a sense it is verified in their regard, 
and not in regard of other substances, as already stated 
{Reply Obj. 2). 

Second Article. 

whether our intellect knows the habits of the 
soul by their essence? 

We proceed thus to the Second Article: — 

Objection i. It would seem that our intellect knows the 
habits of the soul by their essence. For Augustine says 
{De Trin. xiii. i) : Faith is n^t seen in the heart wherein it 
abides, as the soul of a man may be seen by another from 
the movement of the body; but we know most certainly 
that it is there, and conscience proclaims its existence ; and 
the same principle applies to the other habits of the soul. 
Therefore the habits of the soul are not known by their 
acts, but by themselves. 

Obj. 2. Further, material things outside the soul are 
known by their likeness being present in the soul, and are 
said therefore to be known by their likenesses. But the 
soul's habits are present by their essence in the soul. 
Therefore the habits of the soul are known bv their essence. 

■1' 

Obj. 3. Further, whatever is the cause of a thing being 
such is still more so. But habits and intelligible species 
cause things to be known by the soul. Therefore they 
are still more known by the soul in themselves. 

On the contrary, Habits like powers are the principles of 
acts. But as is said {De Anima ii. 4), acts and operations 
are logically prior to powers. Therefore in the same way 
they are prior to habits ; and thus habits, like the powers, 
are known by their acts. 

/ answer that, A habit is a kind of medium between 
mere power and mere act. Now, it has been said (A. i) 
that nothing is known but as it is actual : therefore so 
far as a habit fails in being a perfect act, it falls short in 
being of itself/ knowable, and can be known only by its 



221 HOW THE SOUL KNOWS Q. 87. Art. 2 

act ; thus, for example, anyone knows he has a habit from 
the fact that he can produce the act proper to that habit ; 
or he may inquire into the nature and idea of the habit by 
considering the act. The first kind of knowledge of the 
habit arises from its being present, for the very fact of its 
presence causes the act whereby it is known. The second 
kind of knowledge of the habit arises from a careful inquiry, 
as is explained above of the mind (A. i). 

Reply Ohj. i. Although faith is not known by external 
movement of the body, it is perceived by the subject where- 
in it resides, by the interior act of the heart. For no one 
knows that he has faith unless he knows that he believes. 

Reply Obj. 2. Habits are present in our intellect, not as 
its object, — since, in the present state of life, our intellect's 
object is the nature of a material thing as stated above 
(Q. LXXXIV., A. 7), — but as that by which it understands. 

Reply Ohj. 3. The axiom, whatever is the cause of a thing 
being such, is still more so, is true of things that are 
of the same order, for instance, of the same kind of cause ; 
for example, we may say that health is desirable on account 
of life, and therefore life is more desirable still. But if we 
take things of different orders the axiom is not true : for we 
may say that health is caused by medicine, but it does not 
follow that medicine is more desirable than health, for 
health belongs to the order of final causes, whereas 
medicine belongs to the order of efficient causes. So of two 
things belonging essentially to the order of the objects 
of knowledge, the one which is the cause of the other being 
known, is the more known, as principles are more known 
than conclusions. But habit as such does not belong to the 
order of objects of knowledge; nor are things know^n on 
account of the habit, as on account of an object knowm, 
but as on account of a disposition or form whereby the 
subject knows : and therefore the argument does not prove. 



Q. 87. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 222 

Third Article, 
whether our intellect knows its own act? 

We proceed thus to the Third Article: — 

Objection i. It would seem that our intellect does not 
know its own act. For what is known is the object of the 
knowing faculty. But the act differs from the object. 
Therefore the intellect does not know its own act. 

Obj. 2. Further, whatever is known is known by some 
act. If, then, the intellect knows its own act, it knows it by 
some act, and again it knows that act by some other act ; 
this is to proceed indefinitely, which seems impossible. 

Obj. 3. Further, the intellect has the same relation to its 
act as sense has to its act. But the proper sense does not 
feel its own act, for this belongs to the common sense, as 
stated De Anima iii. 2. Therefore neither does the intellect 
understand its own act. 

On the contrary, Augustine says {De Trin. x. 11), / 
tmderstand that I tuiderstand. 

I answer that, As stated above (AA. i, 2) a thing is intel- 
ligible according as it is in act. Now the ultimate perfec- 
tion of the intellect consists in its own operation : for this 
is not an act tending to something else in which lies the 
perfection of the work accomplished, as building is the per- 
fection of the thing built; but it remains in the agent as 
its perfection and act, as is said Metaph. ix. (Did. viii. 8). 
Therefore the first thing understood of the intellect is its 
own act of understanding. This occurs in different ways 
with different intellects. For there is an intellect, namely, 
the Divine, which is Its own act of intelligence, so that in 
God the understanding of His intelligence, and the under- 
standing of His Essence, are one and the same act, because 
fi\'-? Essence is His act of understanding. But there is 
another iniv-^llect, the angelic, which is not its own act of 
understanding, as we have said above (Q. LXXIX. A. i), 
and yet the first c bject of that act is the angelic essence. 
Wherefore altl^ough there is a logical distinction between 



223 HOW THE SOUL KNOWS Q. 87. Art. 3 

the act whereby he understands that he understands, and 
that whereby he understands his essence, yet he under- 
stands both by one and the same act; because to under- 
stand his own essence is the proper perfection of his 
essence, and by one and the same act is a thing, together 
with its perfection, understood. And there is yet another, 
namely, the human intellect, which neither is its own act 
of understanding, nor is its own essence the first object of 
its act of understanding, for this object is the nature of a 
material thing. And therefore that which is first known by 
the human intellect is an object of this kind, and that which 
is known secondarily is the act by which that object is 
known ; and through the act the intellect itself is known, 
the perfection of which is this act of understanding. For 
this reason did the Philosopher assert that objects are 
known before acts, and acts before powers {De Anima ii. 4). 
Reply Obj. I. The object of the intellect is something 
universal, namely, being and the true, in which the act also 
of understanding is comprised. Wherefore the intellect can 
understand its own act. But not primarily, since the first 
object of our intellect, in this state of life, is not every being 
and everything true, but beijig and true, as considered in 
material things, as we have said above (Q. LXXXIV., 
A. 7), from which it acquires knowledge of all other things! 
Reply Obj. 2. The intelligent act of the human intellect 
is not the act and perfection of the material nature under- 
stood, as if the nature of the material thing and the intelli- 
gent act could be understood by one act ; just as a thing 
and its perfection are understood by one act. Hence the 
act whereby the intellect understands a stone is distinct 
from the act whereby it understands that it understands a 
stone ; and so on. Nor is there any difficulty in the intellect 
being thus potentially infinite, as explained above (Q 
LXXXVI., A. 2). ^^' 

Reply Obj. 3. The proper sense feels by reason of the 
immutation in the material organ caused by the external 
sensible. A material object, however, cannot immute itself; 
but one is immuted by another, and therefore the act of 



Q. 87. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 224 

the proper sense is perceived by the common sense. The 
intellect, on the contrary, does not perform the act of 
understanding by the material immutation of an organ ; 
and so there is no comparison. 



Fourth Article. 

whether the intellect understands the act 
of the will ? 

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article: — 

Objection i. It would seem that the intellect does not 
understand the act of the will. For nothing is known by the 
intellect, unless it be in st)me present in the intellect. 
But the act of the will is not in the intellect ; since the will 
and the intellect are distinct. Therefore the act of the will 
is not known by the intellect. 

Ohj. 2. Further, the act is specified by the object. But 
the object of the will is not the same as the object of the 
intellect. Therefore the act of the will is specifically 
distinct from the object of the intellect, and therefore the 
act of the will is not known by the intellect. 

Obj. 3. Augustine {Confess, x. 17) says of the soul's 
affections that they are knoivn neither by linages as bodies 
are known; nor by their presence, like the arts; but by 
certain notions. Now it does not seem that there can be in 
the soul any other notions of things, but either the essences 
of things known or the likenesses thereof. Therefore it 
seems impossible for the intellect to know such affections 
of the soul as the acts of the will. 

On the contrary, Augustine says {De Trin. x. 11), / 
understand that I will. 

I answer that, As stated above (Q. LIX., A. i), the act 
of the will is nothing but an inclination consequent on the 
form understood; just as the natural appetite is an inclina- 
tion consequent on the natural form. Now the inclination 
of a thing resides in it according to its mode of existence; 
and hence the natural inclination resides in a natural thing 
naturally, and the inclination called the sensible appetite 



225 HOW THE SOUL KNOWS Q. 87. Art. 4 

is in the sensible thing sensibly; and likewise the intelli- 
gible inclination, which is the act of the will, is in the intel- 
ligent subject intelligibly, as in its principle and proper 
subject. Hence the Philosopher expresses himself thus 
{De Anima iii. 9),— that the will is in the reason. Now 
whatever is intelligibly in an intelligent subject, is under- 
stood by that subject. Therefore the act of the will is 
understood by the intellect, both inasmuch as one knows 
that one wills ; and inasmuch as one knows the nature of 
this act, and consequently, the nature of its principle which 
is the habit or power. 

Reply Ohj. I. This argument would hold good if the will 
and the mtellect were in different subjects, as they are 
distmct powers; for then whatever was in the will would 
not be m the intellect. But as both are rooted in the same 
substance of the soul, and since one is in a certain way 
the prmciple of the other, consequently what is in the will 
IS, m a certam way, also in the intellect. 

Reply Ohj. 2. The good and the true which are the 
objects of the will and of the intellect, differ logically but 

? vvtrr'^'"'"^ ^" '^' °'^^'' ^^ ^^^ J^^^^ ^^id above (Q. 
LXXXn., A. 4, ad r ; Q. XVI., A. 4, ad i) ; for the true 

IS good and the good is true. Therefore the objects of the 
will fall under the intellect, and those of the intellect can 
fall under the will. 

Reply Ohj. 3. The affections of the soul are in the intel- 
lect not by similitude only, like bodies; nor by beine 
present in their subject, as the arts ; but as the thing caused 
is in Its principle, which contains some notion of the thing 
caused And so Augustine says that the soul's affections 
are in the memory by certain notions. 



^- 4 



QUESTION LXXXVIII. 

HOW THE HUMAN SOUL KNOWS WHAT IS ABOVE ITSELF. 

{In Three Articles.) 

We must now consider how the human soul knows what 
is above itself, viz., immaterial substances. Under this 
head there are three points of inquiry : (i) Whether the 
human soul in the present state of life can understand the 
immaterial substances called angels, in themselves? (2) 
Whether it can arrive at the knowledge thereof by the 
knowledge of material things ? (3) Whether God is the 
first object of our knowledge ? 

First Article. 

whether the human soul in the present state of life 
can understand lmmaterial substances in them- 
SELVES ? 

We proced thus to the First Article: — 

Objection i. It would seem that the human soul in the 
present state of life can understand immaterial substances 
in themselves. For Augustine {De Trin. ix. 3) says :As 
the mind itself acquires the knoivledge of corporeal things 
by means of the corporeal senses, so it gains from itself the 
knowledge of incorporeal things. But these are the im- 
material substances. Therefore the human mind under- 
stands immaterial substances. 

Obj. 2. Further, like is known by like. But the human 
mind is more akin to immaterial than to material things ; 
since its own nature is immaterial, as is clear from what 
we have said above (Q. LXXVL, A. i). Since then our 
mind understands material things, much more is it able to 
understand immaterial things. 

226 



227 HOW THE SOUL KNOWS Q. 88. Art. : 

Ohj. 3. Further, the fact that objects which are in them- 
selves most sensible are not most felt by us, comes from 
sense being corrupted by their very excellence. But the 
intellect is not subject to such a corrupting influence from 
its object as is stated De Anima iii. 4. Therefore things 
which are in themselves in the highest degree of intelli- 
gibility, are likewise to us most intelligible. As material 
things, however, are intelligible only so far as we make 
them actually so by abstracting them from material condi- 
tions, it is clear that those substances are more intelligible 
m themselves whose nature is immaterial. Therefore they 
are much more known to us than are material things. 

Obj. 4. Further, the Commentator says (Metaph. ii.) 
that, nature would he frustrated in its end were we unable 
to understand abstract substances, because it would have 
made what in itself is naturally intelligible not to be under- 
stood at all. But in nature nothing is idle or purpose- 
less. Therefore immaterial substances can be understood 
by us. 

Obj. 5. Further, as sense is to the sensible, so is intellect 
to the intelligible. But our sight can see all things cor- 
poreal, whether superior and incorruptible; or lower and 
corruptible. Therefore our intellect can understand all 
mtelhgible substances, even the superior and immaterial 

On the contrary, It is written (Wisd. ix. 16) : The things 
that are in heaven who shall search out? But these sub- 
stances are said to be in heaven, according to Matthew 
xviii. 10, Their angels in heaven, etc. Therefore im- 
material substances cannot be known by human investiffa- 



tion 



/ answer that. In the opinion of Plato, immaterial sub- 
stances are not only understood by us, but are the objects 
we understand first of all. For Plato taught that im- 
material subsisting forms, which he called Ideas, are the 
proper objects of our intellect, and are thus first and fer se 
understood by us; and, further, that material objects are 
known by the soul inasmuch as phantasy and sense are 
mixed up with the mind. Hence the purer the intellect is 



Q88/ART. I THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA" 228 

so much the more clearly does it perceive the intelligible 
truth of immaterial things. 

But in Aristotle's opinion, which experience cor- 
roborates, our intellect in its present state of life has a 
natural relationship to the natures of material things ; and 
therefore it can only understand by turning to the 
phantasms, as we have said above (Q. LXXXIV., A. 7). 
Thus it clearly appears that immaterial substances which 
do not fall under sense and imagination, cannot first and 
per se be known by us, according to the mode of know- 
ledge which experience proves us to have. 

Nevertheless Averroes {Comment. De Anima iii.) teaches 
that in this present life man can in the end arrive at the 
knowledge of separate substances by being coupled or 
united to some separate substance, which he calls the 
active intellect, and which, being a separate substance 
itself, can naturally understand separate substances. 
Hence, when it is perfectly united to us so that by its means 
we are able to understand perfectly, we also shall be able 
to understand separate substances, as in the present life 
through the medium of the passive intellect united to us, 
we can understand material things. Now he said that the 
active intellect is united to us, thus. — For since we under- 
stand by means of both the active intellect and intelligible 
objects, as, for instance, we understand conclusions by 
principles understood ; it is clear that the active intellect 
must be compared to the objects understood, either as the 
principal agent is to the instrument, or as form to matter. 
For an action is ascribed to two principles in one of these 
two ways ; to a principal agent and to an instrument, 
as cutting to the workman and the saw ; to a form and its 
subject, as heating to heat and fire. In both these ways 
the active intellect can be compared to the intelligible 
object as perfection is to the perfectible, and as act is to 
potentiality. Now a subject is made perfect and receives 
its perfection at one and the same time, as the reception 
of what is actually visible synchronizes with the reception 
of light in the ^ye. Therefore the passive intellect receives 



229 HOW THE SOUL KNOWS Q. 88. Art. i 

the intelligible object and the active intellect together ; and 
the more numerous the intelligible objects received, so 
much the nearer do we come to the point of perfect union 
between ourselves and the active intellect ; so much so that 
when we understand all the intelligible objects, the active 
intellect becomes one with us, and by its instrumentality 
we can understand all things material and immaterial. In 
this he makes the ultimate happiness of man to consist. 
Nor, as regards the present inquiry, does it matter whether 
the passive intellect in that state of happiness understands 
separate substances by the instrumentality of the active 
intellect, as he himself maintains, or whether (as he says 
Alexander holds) the passive intellect can never understand 
separate substances (because according to him it is cor- 
ruptible), but man understands separate substances by 
means of the active intellect. 

This opinion, however, is untrue. First, because, sup- 
posing the active intellect to be a separate substance, we 
could not formally understand by its instrumentality, for 
the medium of an agent's formal action consists in its form 
and act, since every agent acts according to its actuality, 
as was said of the passive intellect (Q. LXX., A. i). 
Secondly, this opinion is untrue, because in the above 
explanation, the active intellect, supposing it to be a 
separate substance, would not be joined to us in its sub- 
stance, but only in its light, as participated in things 
understood; and would not extend to the other acts of the 
active intellect so as to enable us to understand immaterial 
substances ; just as when we see colours set off by the sun, 
we are not united to the substance of the sun so as to act 
like the sun, but its light only is united to us, that we may 
see the colours. Thirdly, this opinion is untrue, because 
granted that, as above explained, the active intellect were 
united to us in substance, still it is not said that it is wholly 
so united in regard to one intelligible object, or two ; 
but rather in regard to all intelligible objects. But all such 
objects together do not equal the force of the active intellect, 
as it is a much greater thing to understand separate sub- 



Q. 88. Art. 1 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 230 

stances than to understand all material things. Hence it 
clearly follows that the knowledge of all material things 
would not make the active intellect to be so united to us as 
to enable us by its instrumentality to understand separate 
substances. 

Fourthly, this opinion is untrue, because it is hardly 
possible for anyone in this world to understand all material 
things : and thus no one, or very few, could reach to perfect 
felicity; which is against what the Philosopher says (Ethic. 
i. 9), that happiness is a kind of common good, communic- 
able to all capable of virtue. Further, it is unreasonable 
that only the few of any species attain to the end of the 
species. 

Fifthly, the Philosopher expressly says (Ethic, i. 10), that 
happiness is an operation according to perfect virtue; and 
after enumerating many virtues in the tenth book, he con- 
cludes (ch. 7) that ultimate happiness consisting in the 
knowledge of the highest things intelligible is attained 
through the virtue of wisdom, which in the sixth chapter 
he had named as the chief of speculative sciences. Hence 
Aristotle clearly places the ultimate felicity of man in the 
knowledge of separate substances, obtainable by speculative 
science; and not by being united to the active intellect, as 
some imagined. 

.^' Sixthly, as was shown above (Q. LXXIX., A. 4), the 
active intellect is not a separate substance ; but a faculty of 
the soul, extending itself actively to the same objects to 
which the passive intellect extends receptively ; because, as 
is stated (De Anima iii. 5), the passive intellect is all things 
potentially, and the active intellect is all things in act. 
Therefore both intellects, according to the present state of 
life, extend to material things only, which are made actually 
intelligible by the active intellect, and are received in the 
passive intellect. Hence in the present state of life we cannot 
understand separate immaterial substances in themselves, 
either by the passive or by the active intellect. 

Reply Obj. i. Augustine may be taken to mean that the 
knowledge of incorporeal things in the mind can be gained 



231 HOW THE SOUL KNOWS Q. 88. Art. i 

by the mind itself. This is so true that philosophers also 
say that the knowledge concerning the soul is a principle 
for the knowledge of separate substances. For by knowing 
itself, it attains to some knowledge of incorporeal sub- 
stances, such as is within its compass ; not that the know- 
ledge of itself gives it a perfect and absolute knowledge of 
them. 

Reply Obj. 2. The likeness of nature is not a sufficient 
cause of knowledge ; otherwise what Empedocles said 
would be true — that the soul needs to have the nature of all 
in order to know all. But knowledge requires that the 
likeness of the thing known be in the knower, as a kind of 
form thereof. Now our passive intellect, in the present 
state of life, is such that it can be informed with similitudes 
abstracted from phantasms : and therefore it knows material 
things rather than immaterial substances. 

Reply Obj. 3. There must needs be some proportion be- 
tween the object and the faculty of knowledge ; such as of 
the active to the passive, and of perfection to the perfectible. 
Hence that sensible objects of great power are not grasped 
by the senses, is due not merely to the fact that they corrupt 
the organ, but also to their being improportionate to the 
sensitive power. And thus it is that immaterial substances 
are improportionate to our intellect, in our present state of 
life, so that it cannot understand them. 

Reply Obj. 4. This argument of the Commentator fails 
in several ways. First, because if separate substances are 
not understood by us, it does not follow that they are not 
understood by any intellect ; for they are understood by 
themselves, and by one another. 

Secondly, to be understood by us is not the end of 
separate substances : while only that is vain and purpose- 
less, which fails to attain its end. It does not follow, there- 
fore, that immaterial substances are purposeless, even if 
they are not understood by us at all. 

Reply Obj. 5. Sense knows bodies, whether superior or 
inferior, in the same way, that is, by the sensible acting on 
the organ. But we do not understand material and im- 



Q. 88. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 232 

material substances it, the same way. The former we 
understand by a process of abstraction, wh.ch is impossible 
in the case of the latter, for there are no phantasms of 
what is immaterial. 

Second Article. 

WHETHER OUR INTELLECT CAN UNDERSTAND IMMATERL.L 
SUBSTANCES THROUGH ITS KNOWLEDGE OF MATERIAL 
THINGS ? 

We -broceed thus to the Second Article :— 
Objection I. It would seem^that our intellect can know 
immaterial substances through the knowledge of material 
Ihincs. For Dionysius says (Ccel. Hier. i.) that the human 
mind cannot he raised up to immaterial contemplation of 
the heavenly hierarchies, unless it is led thereto by material 
guidance according to its own nature. Therefore we can be 
led bv material things to know immaterial substances. 

Obi 2. Further, science resides in the intellect. But 
there are sciences and definitions of immaterial substances ; 
for Damascene defines an angel {De Fid. Orth. n 3) ; and 
we find angels treated of both in theology and philosophy. 
Therefore immaterial substances can be understood by us 

Obi -; Further, the human soul belongs to the genus of 
immaterial substances. But it can be understood by us 
through its act by which it understands material things 
Therefore also other material substances can be understood 
by us, through their material effects. 

Obi. 4. Further, the only cause which cannot be corn- 
prehended through its effects is that which is infinitely 
distant from them, and this belongs to God alone. There- 
fore other created immaterial substances can be understood 
by us through material things. ■ ^ ,u ^ 

On the contrary, Dionysius says {Div. horn. 1.) that 
intelligible things cannot be understood through sensible 
things, nor composite things through simple, nor incor- 
poreal through corporeal. 

I answer that, Averroes says {De Anima iii.) that a philo- 



233 HOW THE SOUL KNOWS Q. 88. Art. 2 

sopher named Avempace* taught that by the understand- 
ing of natural substances we can be led, according to true 
philosophical principles, to the knowledge of immaterial 
substances. For since the nature of our intellect is to 
abstract the quiddity of material things from matter, any- 
thing material residing in that abstracted quiddity can again 
be made subject to abstraction ; and as the process of ab- 
straction cannot go on for ever, it must arrive at length at 
some immaterial quiddity, absolutely without matter; and 
this would be the understanding of immaterial substance. 

Now this opinion would be true, were immaterial sub- 
stances the forms and species of these material things ; as 
the Platonists supposed. But supposing, on the contrary, 
that immaterial substances differ altogether from the quid- 
dity of material things, it follows that, however much our 
intellect abstract the quiddity of material things from 
matter, it could never arrive at anything akin to immaterial 
substance. Therefore we are not able perfectly to under- 
j-tand immaterial substances through material substances. 

Reply Ohj. i. From material things we can rise to some 
kind of knowledge of immaterial things, but not to the per- 
fect knowledge thereof ; for there is no proper and adequate 
proportion between material and immaterial things, and 
the likenesses drawn from material things for the under- 
standing of immaterial things are very dissimilar there- 
from, as Dionysius says {Coel. Hier. ii.). 

Reply Ohj. 2. Science treats of higher things principally 
by way of negation. Thus Aristotle {De Coel. i. 3) explains 
the heavenly bodies by denying to them inferior corporeal 
properties. Hence it follows that much less can immaterial 
substances be known by us in such a way as to make us 
know their quiddity ; but we may have a scientific know- 
ledge of them by way of negation and by their relation to 
material things. 

Reply Ohj. 3. The human soul understands itself through 
its own act of understanding, which is proper to it, showing 
perfectly its power and nature. But the power and nature 

* Ibn-Badja, Arabian Philosopher; ob. 1138. 



Q. 88. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA»' 234 

of immaterial substances cannot be perfectly known through 
such act, nor through any other material thing, because 
there is no proportion between the latter and the power of 
the former. 

Reply Obj. 4. Created immaterial substances are not in 
the same natural genus as material substances, for they do 
not agree in power or in matter ; but they belong to the 
same logical genus, becau.se even immaterial substances 
are in the predicament of substance, as their essence is 
distinct from their existence. But God has no connection 
with material things, as regards either natural genus or 
logical genus ; because God is in no genus, as stated above 
(Q. III., A. 5). Hence througTi the likeness derived from 
material things we can know something positive concerning 
the angels, according to some common notion, though not 
according to the specific nature; whereas we cannot acquire 
any such knowledge at all about God. 

Third Article, 
whether god is the first object known by the human 

MIND ? 

We proceed thus to the Third Article: — 

Objection i. It would seem that God is the first object 
known by the human mind. For that object in which all 
others are known, and by which we judge others, is the 
first thing known to us ; as light is to the eye, and first 
principles to the intellect. But we know all things in the 
light of the first truth, and thereby judge of all things, as 
Augustine says {De Trin. xii. 2; De Vera Rel. xxxi.*). 
Therefore God is the first object known to us. 

Obj. 2. Further, whatever causes a thing to be such is 
more so. But God is the cause of all our knowledge; for 
He is the true light which enlighteneth every man that 
cometh into this world (Jo. i. 9). Therefore God is our 
first and most known object. 

Obj. 3. Further, what is first known in the image is the 

* Confess, xii. 25. 



235 HOW THE SOUL KNOWS Q. 88. Art. 3 

exemplar to which it is made. But in our mind is the 
image of God, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii. 4, 7). 
Therefore God is the first object known to our mind. 

On the contrary, No man hath seen God at any time 
(Jo. i. 18). 

/ answer that, Since the human intellect in the present 
state of life cannot understand even immaterial created 
substances (A. i), much less can it understand the essence 
of the uncreated substance. Hence it must be said simply 
that God is not the first object of our knowledge. Rather 
do we know God through creatures, according to the 
Apostle (Rom. i. 20), the invisible things of God are clearly 
seen, being understood by the things that are made: while 
the first object of our knowledge in this life is the quiddity 
of a material thing, which is the proper object of our intel- 
lect, as appears above in many passages (Q. LXXXIV. 
A. 7 ; Q. LXXXV., A. 8 ; Q. LXXXVH., A. 2, ad 2). 

Reply Obj. i. We see and judge of all things in the light 
of the first truth, forasmuch as the light itself of our mind, 
whether natural or gratuitous, is nothing else than the 
impression of the first truth upon it, as stated above, 
(Q. Xn., A. 2). Hence, as the light itself of our intellect 
is not the object it understands, but the medium whereby 
it understands, much less can it be said that God is the first 
object known by our intellect. 

Reply Obj. 2. The axiom, Whatever causes a thing to be 
such is more so, must be understood of things belonging to 
one and the same order, as explained above (Q. LXXXVH., 
A. 2, ad 3). Other things than God are known because of 
God ; not as if He were the first known object, but because 
He is the first cause of our faculty of knowledge. 

Reply Obj. 3. If there existed in our souls a perfect 
image of God, as the Son is the perfect image of the Father, 
our mind would know God at once. But the image in our 
mind is imperfect; hence the argument does not prove. 



QUESTION LXXXIX. 

OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE SEPARATED SOUL. 

{In Eight Articles.) 

We must now consider the knowledge of the separated 
souL Under this head there are eight points of inquiry : 
(i) Whether the soul separated from the body can under- 
stand ? (2) Whether it understands separate substances ? 
(3) Whether it understands all natural things ? (4) Whether 
it understands individuals and singulars? (5) Whether 
the habits of knowledge acquired in this life remain ? 
(6) Whether the soul can use the habit of knowledge 
here acquired? (7) Whether local distance impedes the 
separated soul's knowledge? (8) Whether souls separated 
from the body know what happens here? 

First Article. 

whether the separated soul can understand 

anything ? 

We proceed thus to the First Article : — 

Objection i. It would seem that the soul separated from 
the body can understand nothing at all. For the Philoso- 
pher says {De Anima i. 4), that the understanding is cor- 
rupted together ivith its interior pri^iciple. But by death 
all human interior principles are corrupted. Therefore also 
the intellect itself is corrupted. 

Obj. 2. Further, the human soul is hindered from under- 
standing when the senses are tied, and by a distracted 
imagination, as explained above (Q. LXXXIV., AA. 7, 8). 
But death destroys the senses and imagination, as we have 
shown above (9. LXXVII., A. 8). Therefore after death 
the soul understands nothing. 

236 



237 SEPARATE SOUL'S KNOWLEDGE Q. 89. Art. i 

Ohj. 3. Further, if the separated soul can understand, 
this must be by means of some species. But it does not 
understand by means of innate species, because it has none 
such ; being at first like a tablet on which nothing is written : 
nor does it understand by species abstracted from things, 
for it does not then possess organs of sense and imagina- 
tion which are necessary for the abstraction of species : nor 
does it understand by means of species, formerly abstracted 
and retained in the soul ; for if that were so, a child's soul 
would have no means of understanding at all : nor does 
it understand by means of intelligible species divinely in- 
fused, for such knowledge would not be natural, such as we 
treat of now, but the effect of grace. Therefore the soul 
apart from the body understands nothing. 

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima i. i), 
// the soul had no proper operation, it could not be separ- 
ated from the body. But the soul is separated from the 
body ; therefore it has a proper operation, and above all, 
that which consists in intelligence. Therefore the soul can 
understand when it is apart from the body. 

I answer that. The difficulty in solving this question 
arises from the fact that the soul united to the body can 
understand only by turning to the phantasms, as experi- 
ence shows. Did this not proceed from the soul's very 
nature, but accidentally through its being bound up with 
the body, as the Platonists said, the difficulty would 
vanish ; for in that case when the body was once removed, 
the soul would at once return to its own nature, and would 
understand intelligible things simply, without turning to 
'the phantasms, as is exemplified in the case of other separ- 
ate substances. In that case, however, the union of soul 
and body would not be for the soul's good, for evidently it 
would understand worse in the body than out of it ; but for 
the good of the body, which would be unreasonable, since 
matter exists on account of the form, and not the form for 
the sake of the matter. But if we admit that the nature of the 
soul requires it to understand by turning to the phantasms, 
it will seem, since death does not change its nature, that it 



Q. 89. Art. 1 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 238 

can then naturally understand nothing; as the phantasms 
are wanting to which it may turn. 

To solve this difficulty we must consider that as nothing 
acts except so far as it is actual, the mode of action in 
every agent follows from its mode of existence. Now the 
soul has one mode of being when in the body, and another 
when apart from it, its nature remaining always the same ; 
but this does not mean that its union with the body is an 
accidental thing, for, on the contrary, such union belongs 
to its very nature, just as the nature of a light object is not 
changed, when it is in its proper place, which is natural to 
it, and outside its proper place, which is beside its nature. 
The soul, therefore, when united to the body, consistently 
with that mode of existence, has a mode of understanding, 
by turning to corporeal phantasms, which are in corporeal 
organs ; but when it is separated from the body, it has a 
mode of understanding, by turning to simply intelligible 
objects, as is proper to other separate substances. Hence 
it is as natural for the soul to understand by turning to 
the phantasms as it is for it to be joined to the body; but 
to be separated from the body is not in accordance with 
its nature, and likewise to understand without turning to 
the phantasms is not natural to it ; and hence it is united 
to the body in order that it may have an existence and an 
operation suitable to its nature. But here again a difficulty 
arises. For since nature is always ordered to what is best, 
and since it is better to understand by turning to simply 
intelligible objects than by turning to the phantasms; God 
should have ordered the soul's nature so that the nobler 
way of understanding would have been natural to it, and it 
would not have needed the body for that purpose. 

In order to resolve this difficulty we must consider that 
while it is true that it is nobler in itself to understand by 
turning to something higher than to understand by turning 
to phantasms, nevertheless such a mode of understanding 
was not so perfect as regards what was possible to the soul. 
This will appear if we consider that every intellectual sub- 
stance possesses intellective power by the influence of the 



239 SEPARATE SOUL'S KNOWLEDGE Q. 89. Art. i 

Divine light, which is one and simple in its first principle, 
and the farther off intellectual creatures are from the first 
principle so much the more is the light divided and diversi- 
fied, as is the case with lines radiating from the centre of 
a circle. Hence it is that God by His one Essence under- 
stands all things ; while the superior intellectual substances 
understand by means of a number of species, which never- 
theless are fewer and more universal and bestow a deeper 
comprehension of things, because of the efficaciousness of 
the intellectual power of such natures : whereas the inferior 
intellectual natures possess a greater number of species, 
which are less universal, and bestow a lower degree of com- 
prehension, in proportion as they recede from the intel- 
lectual power of the higher natures. If, therefore, the 
inferior substances received species in the same degree of 
universality as the superior substances, since they are 
not so strong in understanding, the knowledge which 
they would derive through them would be imperfect, and 
of a general and confused nature. We can see this to a 
certain extent in man, for those who are of weaker intellect 
fail to acquire perfect knowledge through the universal con- 
ceptions of those who have a better understanding, unless 
things are explained to them singly and in detail. Now it 
is clear that in the natural order human souls hold the 
lowest place among intellectual substances. But the per- 
fection of the universe required various grades of being. 
If, therefore, God had willed human souls to understand 
in the same way as separate substances, it would follow 
that human knowledge, so far from being perfect, would be 
confused and general. Therefore to make it possible for 
human souls to possess perfect and proper knowledge they 
were so made that their nature required them to be joined 
to bodies, and thus to receive the proper and adequate 
knowledge of sensible things from the sensible things them- 
selves; thus we see in the case of uneducated men that they 
have to be taught by sensible examples. 

It is clear then that it was for the soul's good that it was 
united to a body, and that it understands by turning to the 



Q. 89. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA '» 240 

phantasms. Nevertheless it is possible for it to exist apart 
from the body, and also to understand in another way. 

Reply Obj. i. The Philosopher's words carefully ex- 
amined will show that he said this on the previous supposi- 
tion that understanding is a movement of body and soul as 
united, just as sensation is, for he had not as yet explained 
the difiference between intellect and sense. We may also 
say that he is referring to the way of understanding by 
turning to phantasms. This is also the meaning of the 
second objection. 

Reply Obj. 3. The separated soul does not understand by 
way of innate species, nor by species abstracted then, nor 
only by species retained, and this the objection proves ; but 
the soul in that state understands by means of participated 
species arising from the influence of the Divine light, 
shared by the soul as by other separate substances ; though 
in a lesser degree. Hence as soon as it ceases to act by 
turning to corporeal (phantasms), the soul turns at once 
to the superior things ; nor is this way of knowledge un- 
natural, for God is the author of the influx both of the light 
of grace and of the light of nature. 



Second Article. 

.whether the separated soul understands separate 

substances ? 

We proceed thus to the Second Article: — 
Objection i. It would seem that the separated soul does 
not understand separate substances. For the soul is more 
perfect when joined to the body than when existing apart 
from it, being an essential part of human nature ; and every 
part of a whole is more perfect when it exists in that whole. 
But the soul in the body does not understand separate sub- 
stances, as shown above (Q. LXXXVHI., A. i). There- 
fore much less is it able to do so when apart from the body. 

Obj. 2. Further, whatever is known is known either by 
its presence oj? by its species. But separate substances 



241 SEPARATE SOUL'S KNOWLEDGE Q. 89. Art. 2 

cannot be known to the soul by their presence, for God 
alone can enter into the soul; nor by means of species 
abstracted by the soul from an angel, for an angel is more 
simple than a soul. Therefore the separated soul cannot 
at all understand separate substances. 

Obj. 3. Further, some philosophers said that the ultimate 
happiness of man consists in the knowledge of separate 
substances. If, therefore, the separated soul can under- 
stand separate substances, its happiness would be secured 
by its separation alone; which cannot reasonably be said. 

On the contrary, Souls apart from the body know other 
separated souls; as we see in the case of the rich man in 
hell, who saw Lazarus and Abraham (Luke xvi. 23). 
Therefore separated souls see the devils and the angels. * 
/ answer that, As Augustine says (De Trin. ix. 3), our 
mind acquires the knowledge of incorporeal things by 
itself— i.e., by knowing itself (Q. LXXXVIIL, A. i, ad i). 
Therefore from the knowledge which the separated soul has 
of itself, we can judge how it knows other separate things. 
Now it was said above (A. i), that as long as it is united to 
the body the soul understands by turning to phantasms, 
and therefore it does not understand itself save through be- 
coming actually intelligent by means of ideas abstracted 
from phantasms ; for thus it understands itself through its 
own act, as shown above (Q. LXXXVIL, A. i). When, 
however, it is separated from the body, it understands no 
longer by turning to phantasms, but by turning to simply 
mtelhgible objects; hence in that state it understands itself 
through itself. Now, every separate substance understands 
what IS above itself and what is below itself, according to 
the mode of its substance (De Causis, viii.) : for a thing is 
understood according as it is in the one who understands ; 
while one thing is in another according to the nature of 
that in which it is. And the mode of existence of a separated 
soul IS inferior to that of an angel, but is the same as that 
of other separated souls. Therefore the soul apart from the 
body has perfect knowledge of other separated souls, but it 
has an imperfect and defective knowledge of the angels so 
'•4 16 



Q. 89. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 242 

far as its natural knowledge is concerned. But the know- 
ledge of glory is otherwise. 

Reply Obj. I. The separated soul is, indeed, less perfect 
considering its nature in which it communicates with the 
nature of the body : but it has a greater freedom of intelli- 
gence, since the weight and care of the body is a clog upon 
the clearness of its intelligence in the present life. 

Reply Obj. 2. The separated soul understands the angels 
by means of divinely impressed ideas; which, however, fail 
to give perfect knowledge of them, forasmuch as the nature 
of the soul is inferior to that of an angel. 

Reply Obj. 3. Man's ultimate happiness consists not in 
the knowledge of any separate substances ; but in the know- 
ledge of God, Who is seen only by grace. The knowledge 
of other separate substances if perfectly understood gives 
great happiness — not final and ultimate happiness. But the 
separated soul does not understand them perfectly, as was 
shown above in this article. 



Third Article, 
whether the separated soul knows all natural 

THINGS ? 

We proceed thus to the Third Article: — 

Objection i . It would seem that the separated soul knows 
all natural things. For the types of all natural things exist 
in separate substances. Therefore, as separated souls know 
separate substances, they also know all natural things. 

Obj. 2. Further, whoever understands the greater intel- 
ligible, will be able much more to understand the lesser 
intelligible. But the separated soul understands immaterial 
substances, which are in the highest degree of intelligibility. 
Therefore much more can it understand all natural things 
which are in a lower degree of intelligibility. 

On the contrary, The devils have greater natural know- 
ledge than the separated soul ; yet they do not know all 
natural things, but have to learn many things by long 



243 SEPARATE SOUL'S KNOWLEDGE Q. 89. ^Art. 3 

experience, as Isidore says {De Summo Bono i.). Therefore 
neither can the separated soul know all natural things. 

Further, if the soul as soon as separated gained know- 
ledge of all natural things, the efforts of men to know 
would be vain and profitless. But this would be unreason- 
able. Therefore the separated soul does not know all 
natural things. 

/ answer that, As stated above (A. i), the separated soul, 
like the angels, understands by means of species received 
from the influence of the Divine light. Nevertheless, as 
the soul by nature is inferior to an angel, to whom this 
kind of knowledge is natural, the soul apart from the body 
through such species does not receive perfect knowledge, 
but only a general and confused kind of knowledge. Separ- 
ated souls, therefore, have the same relation through such 
species to imperfect and confused knowledge of natural 
things as the angels have to the perfect knowledge thereof. 
Now angels through such species know all natural things 
perfectly ; because all that God has produced in the respec- 
tive natures of natural things has been produced by Him in 
the angelic intelligence, as Augustine says {Gen. ad lit. 
ii. 8). Hence it follows that separated souls know all 
natural things not with a certain and proper knowledge, but 
in a general and confused manner. 

Reply Obj. i. Even an angel does not understand all 
natural things through his substance, but through certain 
species, as stated above (Q. LXXXVH., A. i). So it does 
not follow that the soul knows all natural things because 
it knows separate substances after a fashion. 

Reply Obj. 2. As the soul separated from the body does 
not perfectly understand separate substances, so neither 
does it know all natural things perfectly ; but it knows 
them confusedly, as above explained in this article. 

Reply Obj. 3. Isidore speaks of the knowledge of the 
future which neither angels, nor demons, nor separated 
souls, know except so far as future things pre-exist in their 
causes or are known by Divine revelation. But we are here 
treating of the knowledge of natural things. 



Q. 89. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 244 

Reply Ohj. 4. Knowledge acquired here by study is 
proper and perfect; the knowledge of which we speak is 
confused. Hence it does not follow that to study in order 
to learn is useless. 



/ Fourth Article. 

''^ whether the separated soul knows singulars? 

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article: — 

Objection i. It would seem that the separated soul does 
not know singulars. For no cognitive power besides the in- 
tellect remains in the separated soul, as is clear from what 
has been said above (Q. LXXVU., A. 8). But the intellect 
cannot know singulars, as we have shown (Q. LXXXVI., 
A. i). Therefore the separated soul cannot know singulars. 

Ohj. 2. Further, the knowledge of the singular is more 
determinate than knowledge of the universal. But the 
separated soul has no determinate knowledge of the species 
of natural things, therefore much less can it know singulars. 

Obj. 3. Further, if it knew the singulars, yet not by 
sense, for the same reason it would know all singulars. But 
it does not know all singulars. Therefore it knows none. 

On the contrary, The rich man in hell said : I have five 
brethren (Luke xvi. 28). 

/ answer that, Separated souls know some singulars, but 
not all, not even all present singulars. To understand this, 
we must consider that there is a twofold way of knowing 
things, one by means of abstraction from phantasms, and 
in this way singulars cannot be directly known by the 
intellect, but only indirectly, as stated above (Q. LXXXVI., 
A. i). The other way of understanding is by the infusion 
of species by God, and in that way it is possible for the 
intellect to know singulars. For as God knows all things, 
universal and singular, by His Essence, as the cause of 
universal and individual principles (Q. XIV., A. 2), so like- 
wise separate substances can know singulars by species 
which are a kind of participated similitude of the Divine 
Essence. There is a difference, however, between angels 



245 SEPARATE SOUL'S KNOWLEDGE Q. Sq/Art. 5 

and separated souls in the fact that through these species 
the angels have a perfect and proper knowledge of things ; 
whereas separated souls have only a confused knowledge. 
Hence the angels, by reason of their perfect intellect, 
through these species, know not only the specific natures 
of things, but also the singulars contained in those species ; 
whereas separated souls by these species know only those 
singulars to which they are determined by former know- 
ledge in this life, or by some affection, or by natural apti- 
tude, or by the disposition of the Divine order; because 
whatever is received into anything is conditioned according 
to the mode of the recipient. 

Reply Ohj. i. The intellect does not know the singular 
by way of abstraction ; neither does the separated soul know 
it thus ; but as explained above. 

Reply Ohj. 2. The knowledge of the separated soul is 
confined to those species or individuals to which the soul 
has some kind of determinate relation, as we have said. 

Reply Ohj. 3. The separated soul has not the same rela- 
tion to all singulars, but one relation to some, and another 
to others. Therefore there is not the same reason why it 
should know all singulars. 

/ 
Fifth Article. 

whether the habit of knowledge here acquired 
remains in the separated soul ? 

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article: — 

Objection i. It would seem that the habit of knowledge 
acquired in this life does not remain in the soul separated 
from the body : for the Apostle says : Knoivledge shall be 
destroyed (i Cor. xiii. 8). 

Ohj. 2. Further, some in this world who are less good 
enjoy knowledge denied to others who are better. If, there- 
fore, the habit of knowledge remained in the soul after 
death, it would follow that some who are less good would, 
even in the future life, excel some who are better; which 
seems unreasonable. 



Q. 89. »„. 5 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " .46 
Obj. 3. Further, separated souls will Dos^e<;« t„„, 1 j 

exist m the same subject, which cannot be 

■hat a Aaki ,s a quality hard to remol: yet sZetimel 
ko^ledge ,s destroyed by sickness or the like. BuTlZl 
life there ,s no change so thorough as death Th» r 
seen,s that the habit of knowledg^ is dest'ed bv 7 " 
On the contrary. Jerome says (Ep. Uil ad PaTum) 

/ answer that. Some say that the habit of knowIed=-e re 
sides not in the intellect itself h„f ;„ .1, •> '"«leage re- 
namelv ,!,„ • ■ ' ""' '" "^'^ sensitive powers 

lect. If this were true, it would follow that when the bod v 
^: t'Tde^LS; ^"-■-- -- ac,uire;::,?.t 

• H,f "1' r*"! ''"""'^'i&^ «sides in the intellect which is 
the abode of specie': as th» Di,i , ' """^" 'S 

iii. 4) the hlr ; f , ^'"'°«P''" says (De Anima 
oartlv ,•„ !? r knowledge here acquired must be 

intellec t'^'°'''^^^ --'«ve powers, and partly in the 

f^thicI^rorletr:rise^s^°";^*7!;^^-^^^^^^ 
rL:s;L:t?-'--=-»~t:^S 

the action^f the in', llect X?'it .''"'"'' V" "^°"*"^ 
sider the intelligible obectBn I '° '^"" '° '°"- 

the same distinction is to be applied to habit. ' 



t* 



247 SEPARATE SOUL'S KNOWLEDGE Q. 89. Art. 5 

Knowledge, therefore, acquired in the present life does 
not remain in the separated soul, as regards what belongs 
to the sensitive powers ; but as regards what belongs to 
the intellect itself, it must remain ; because, as the Philoso- 
pher says {De Long, et Brev. Vitce ii.), a form may be 
corrupted in two ways ; first, directly, when corrupted by 
its contrary, as heat, by cold; and, secondly, indirectly, 
when its subject is corrupted. Now it is evident that human 
knowledge is not corrupted through corruption of the sub- 
ject, for the intellect is an incorruptible faculty, as above 
stated (Q. LXXIX., A. 2, ad 2). Neither can the intelligible 
species in the passive intellect be corrupted by their con- 
trary; for there is no contrary to intelligible intentions, 
above all as regards simple intelligence of what a thing is. 
But contrariety may exist in the intellect as regards mental 
composition and division, or also reasoning ; so far as what 
is false in statement or argument is contrary to truth. 
And thus knowledge may be corrupted by its contrary 
when a false argument seduces anyone from the knowledge 
of truth. For this reason the Philosopher in the above 
work mentions two ways in which knowledge is corrupted 
directly : namely, forgetfulness on the part of the memora- 
tive power, and deception on the part of a false argument. 
But these have no place in the separated soul. Therefore 
we must conclude that the habit of knowledge, so far as 
it is in the intellect, remains in the separated soul. 

Reply Ohj. i. The Apostle is not speaking of knowledge 
as a habit, but as to the act of knowing ; and hence he says, 
in proof of the assertion quoted. Now, I know in part. 

Reply Ohj. 2. As a less good man may exceed a better 
man in bodily stature, so the same kind of man may have 
a habit of knowledge in the future life which a better man 
may not have. Such knowledge, however, cannot be com- 
pared with the other prerogatives enjoyed by the better man. 

Reply Ohj. 3. These two kinds of knowledge are not of 
the same species, so there is no impossibility. 

Reply Ohj. 4. This objection considers the corruption of 
knowledge on the part of the sensitive powers. 



Q. 89. Art. 6 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 24S 



Sixth Article. 

whether the act of knowledge acquired here 
remains in the separated soul? 

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article: — 

Objection i. It would seem that the act of knowledge 
here acquired does not remain in the separated soul. For 
the Philosopher says {De Anima i. 4), that when the body 
is corrupted, the soul neither remembers nor loves. But to 
consider what is previously known is an act of memory. 
Therefore the separated soul cannot retain an act of know- 
ledge here acquired. 

Obj. 2. Further, intelligible species cannot have greater 
power in the separated soul than they have in the soul 
united to the body. But in this life we cannot understand 
by intelligible species without turning to phantasms, as 
shown above (Q. LXXXIV., A. 7). Therefore the separated 
soul cannot do so, and thus it cannot understand at all by 
intelligible species acquired in this life. 

Obj. 3. Further, the Philosopher says {Ethic, ii. i), that 
habits produce acts similar to those whereby they are ac- 
quired. But the habit of knowledge is acquired here by 
acts of the intellect turning to phantasms : therefore it can- 
not produce any other acts. These acts, however, are not 
adapted to the separated soul. Therefore the soul in the 
state of separation cannot produce any act of knowledge 
acquired in this life. 

On the contrary, It was said to Dives in hell (Luke xvi. 
25) : Remember thou didst receive good things in thy life-//^ 
time. 

I answer that, Action offers two things for our considera- 
tion — its species and its mode. Its species comes from the 
object, whereto the faculty of knov.'ledge is directed by the 
(intelligible) species, which is the object's similitude; 
whereas the mode is gathered from the power of the 
agent. Thus that a person see a stone is due to the species 
of the stone in his eye; but that he see it clearly, is due 



249 SEPARATE SOUL'S KNOWLEDGE Q. 89. Art. 7 

to the eye's visual power. Therefore as the intelligible 
species remain in the separated soul, as stated above (A. 5), 
and since the state of the separated soul is not the same as it 
is in this life, it follows that through the intelligible species 
acquired in this life the soul apart from the body can under- 
stand what it understood formerly, but in a different way ; 
not by turning to phantasms, but by a mode suited to a soul 
existing apart from the body. Thus the act of knowledge 
here acquired remains in the separated soul, but in a dif- 
ferent way. 

Reply Ohj. i. The Philosopher speaks of remembrance, 
according as memory belongs to the sensitive part, but not 
as belonging in a way to the intellect, as explained above 
(Q. LXXIX., A. 6). 

Reply Ohj. 2. The different mode of intelligence is pro- 
duced by the different state of the intelligent soul ; not by 
diversity of species. 

Reply Ohj. 3. The acts which produce a habit are like 
the acts caused by that habit, in species, but not in mode. 
For example, to do just things, but not justly, that is, 
pleasurably, causes the habit of political justice, whereby we 
act pleasurably. (C/. Arist. Eth. v. 8 : Magn. Moral. 
i- 34-) 

Seventh Article. 

whether local distance impedes the knowledge 
in the separated soul? 

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article: — 
Objection i. It would seem that local distance impedes 
the separated soul's knowledge. For Augustine says {De 
Cura pro Mort. xiii.), that the souls of the dead are where 
they cannot know what is done here. But they know what 
is done among themselves. Therefore local distance 
impedes the knowledge in the separated soul. 

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says {De Divin. Daemon. 
iii.), that the demons' rapidity of viovement enables them, 
to tell things unknown to us. But agility of movement 



Q. 89. Art. 7 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 250 

would be useless in that respect unless their knowledge was 
impeded by local distance; which, therefore, is a much 
greater hindrance to the knowledge of the separated soul, 
whose nature is inferior to the demon's. 

Obj. 3. Further, as there is distance of place, so is there 
distance of time. But distance of time impedes knowledge 
in the separated soul, for the soul is ignorant of the future. 
Therefore it seems that distance of place also impedes its 
knowledge. 

On the contrary, It is written (Luke xvi. 23), that Dives, 
lifting up his eyes when he was in torment, saw Abraham 
afar off. Therefore local distance does not impede know- 
ledge in the separated soul. 

/ answer that, Some have held that the separated soul 
knows the singular by abstraction from the sensible. If 
that were so, it might be that local distance would impede 
its knowledge ; for either the sensible would need to act 
upon the soul, or the soul upon t-he sensible, and in either 
case a determinate distance would be necessary. This is, 
however, impossible, because abstraction of the species 
from the sensible is done through the senses and other 
sensible faculties which do not remain actually in the soul 
apart from the body. But the soul when separated under- 
stands singulars by species derived from the Divine light, 
which is indifferent to what is near or distant. Hence 
knowledge in the separated soul is not hindered by local 
distance. 

Reply Obj. i. Augustine says that the souls of the 
departed cannot see what is done here, not because they 
are there, as if impeded by local distance; but for some 
other cause, as we shall explain (A. 8). 

Reply Obj. 2. Augustine speaks there in accordance 
with the opinion that demons have bodies naturally united 
to them, and so have sensitive powers, which require local 
distance. In the same book he expressly sets down this 
opinion, though apparently rather by way of narration 
than of assertion, as we may gather from De Civ. Dei 
xxi. 10. 



251 SEPARATE SOUL'S KNOWLEDGE Q. 89. Art. 8 

Reply Ohj. 3. The future, which is distant in time, does 
not actually exist, and therefore is not knowable in itself, 
because so far as a thing falls short of being, so far does it 
fall short of being knowable. But what is locally distant 
exists actually, and is knowable in itself. Hence we cannot 
argue from distance of time to distance of place. 

Eighth Article. ^ 

whether separated souls know what takes place 

ON EARTH ? 

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article: — 

Objection i. It would seem that separated souls know 
what takes place on earth ; for otherwise they would have 
no care for it, as they have, according to what Dives said 
(Luke xvi. 27, 28), / have five brethren . . . he may testify 
unto them, lest they also come into the place of torments. 
Therefore separated souls know what passes on earth. 

Obj. 2. Further, the dead often appear to the living, 
asleep or awake, and tell them of what takes place here ; 
as Samuel appeared to Saul (i Kings xxviii. 11). But this 
could not be unless they knew what takes place here. 
Therefore they know what takes place on earth. 

Obj. 3. Further, separated souls know what happens 
among themselves. If, therefore, they do not know what 
takes place among us, it must be by reason of local dis- 
tance; which has been shown to be false (A. 7). 

On the contrary, It is written (Job xiv. 21) : He will not 
understand whether his children come to honour or dis- 
honour. 

I answer that, By natural knowledge, of which we are 
treating now, the souls of the dead do not know what 
passes on earth. This follows from what has been laid 
down (A. 4), since the separated soul has knowledge of 
singulars, by being in a way determined to them, either by 
some vestige of previous knowledge or affection, or by the 
Divine order. Now the souls departed are in a state of 
,*;eparation from the living, both by Divine order and by 



Q. 89. Art. 8 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 252 

their mode of existence, whilst they are joined to the world 
of incorporeal spiritual substances ; and hence they are ignor- 
ant of what goes on among us. Whereof Gregory gives the 
reason thus : The dead do not know how the living act, for 
the life of the spirit is far from the life of the flesh; and so, 
as corporeal things differ from incorporeal in genus, so 
they are distinct in knowledge (Moral, xii.). Augustine 
seems to say the same (De Cura pro Mort. xiii.), when he 
asserts that, the souls of the dead have no concern in the 
affairs of the living. 

Gregory and Augustine, however, seem to be divided in 
opinion as regards the souls of the blessed in heaven, for 
Gregory continues the passage above quoted : The case of 
the holy souls is different, for since they see the light of 
Almighty God, we cannot believe that external things are 
unknown to them. But Augustine {De Cura pro Mort. 
xiii.) expressly says : The dead, even the saints, do not 
know what is done by the living or by their own children, 
as a gloss quotes on the text, Abraham hath not known us 
(Isa. Ixiii. 16). He confirms this opinion by saving that 
he was not visited, nor consoled in sorrow by his mother, 
as when she was alive; and he could not think it possible 
that she was less kind when in a happier state ; and again 
by the fact that the Lord promised to king Josias that he 
should die, lest he should see his people's afflictions 
(4 Kings xxii. 20). Yet Augustine says this in doubt; 
and premises, Let every one take, as he pleases, what I say. 
Gregory, on the other hand, is positive, since he says, 
We cannot believe. His opinion, indeed, seems to be the 
more probable one, — that the souls of the blessed who see 
God do know all that passes here. For they are equal to 
the angels, of whom Augustine says that they know what 
happens among those living on earth. But as the souls of 
the blessed are most perfectly united to Divine justice, they 
do not suffer from sorrow, nor do they interfere in mun- 
dane affairs, except in accordance with Divine justice. 

Reply Obj. i. The souls of the departed may care for 
the living, even if ignorant of their state ; just as we care 



253 SEPARATE SOUL'S KNOWLEDGE Q. 89. Art. 8 

for the dead by pouring forth prayer on their behalf, 
though we are ignorant of their state. Moreover, the 
affairs of the living can be made known to them not im- 
mediately, but souls who pass hence thither, or by angels 
and demons, or even by the revelation of the Holy Ghost, 
as Augustine says in the same book. 

Reply Obj. 2. That the dead appear to the living in any 
way whatever is either by the special dispensation of God ; 
in order that the souls of the dead may interfere in affairs 
of the living; — and this is to be accounted as miraculous. 
Or else such apparitions occur through the instrumentality 
of bad or good angels, without the knowledge of the de- 
parted ; as may likewise happen when the living appear, 
without their own knowledge, to others living, as Augus- 
tine says in the same book. And so it may be said of 
Samuel that he appeared through Divine revelation ; 
according to Ecclus. xlvi. 23, he slept, and told the king 
the end of his life. Or, again, this apparition was procured 
by the demons ; unless, indeed, the authority of Ecclesias- 
ticus be set aside through not being received by the Jews as 
canonical Scripture. 

Reply Obj. 3. This kind of ignorance does not proceed 
from the obstacle of local distance, but from the cause 
mentioned above. 



QUESTION XC. 

OF THE FIRST PRODUCTION OF MAN'S SOUL. 

{In Four Articles.) 

After the foregoing we must consider the first production 
of man, concerning which there are four subjects of treat- 
ment : (i) The production of man himself. (2) The end of 
this production. (3) The state and condition of the first 
man. (4) The place of his abode. Concerning the pro- 
duction of man, there are three things to be considered : 
(i) The production of man's soul. (2) The production of 
man's body. (3) The production of the woman. 

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry : 
(i) Whether man's soul was something made, or was of 
the Divine substance? (2) Whether, if made, it was 
created ? (3) Whether it was made by angelic instru- 
mentality ? (4) Whether it was made before the body ? 

First Article. 

WHETHER THE SOUL WAS MADE, OR WAS OF GOD's 

SUBSTANCE? 

We proceed thus to the First Article: — 

Objection i. It would seem that the soul was not made, 
but was of God's substance. For it is written (Gen. ii. 7) : 
God formed man of the slitne of the earth, and breathed 
into his face the breath of life, and man ivas made a living 
soul. But he who breathes sends forth something of him- 
self. Therefore the soul, whereby man lives, is of the 
Divine substance. 

Obj. 2. Further, as above explained (Q. LXXV., A. 5), 
the soul is a simple form. But a form is an act. Therefore 

254 



255 PRODUCTION OF MAN'S SOUL Q- 90. Art. 1 

the soul is a pure act; which applies to God alone. There- 
fore the soul is of God's substance. 

Obj. 3. Further, things that exist and do not differ are 
the same. But God and the mind exist, and in no way 
differ, for they could only be differentiated by certain 
differences, and thus would be composite. Therefore God 
and the human mind are the same. ^- .. 

On the contrary, Augustine {De Orig. Animce iii. 15) 
mentions certain opinions which he caWs exceedingly and 
evidently ferverse, and contrary to the Catholic Faith, 
among which the first is the opinion that God made the 
soul not out of nothing, but from Himself. 

I answer that. To say that the soul is of the Divine 
substance involves a manifest improbability. For, as is clear 
from what has been said (Q. LXXVII., A. 2 ; Q. LXXIX., 
A. 2; Q. LXXXIV., A. 6), the human soul is sometimes 
in a state of potentiality to the act of intelligence, — acquires 
its knowledge somehow from things, — and has various 
powers; all of which are incompatible with the Divine 
Nature, Which is a pure act, — receives nothing from any 
other, — and admits of no variety in itself, as we have 
proved (Q. III., AA. i, 7; Q. IX., A. i). 

This error seems to have originated from two statements 
of the ancients. For those who first began to observe the 
nature of things, being unable to rise above their imagina- 
tion, supposed that nothing but bodies existed. Therefore 
they said that God was a body, which they considered to 
be the principle of other bodies. And since they held that 
the soul was of the same nature as that body which thev 
regarded as the first principle, as is stated De Anima i. 2, 
it followed that the soul was of the nature of God Himself. 
According to this supposition, also, the Manichseans, think- 
ing that God was a corporeal light, held that the soul was 
part of that light, bound up with the body. 

Then a further step in advance was made, and some 
surmised the existence of something incorporeal, not apart 
from the body, but the form of a body ; so that Varro said, 
God is a soul governing the world by move^nent and reason, 



Q. 90. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 256 

as Augustine relates {De Civ. Dei vii. 6).* So some 
supposed man's soul to be part of that one soul, as man is 
a part of the whole world ; for they were unable to go so far 
as to understand the different degrees of spiritual substance, 
except according to the distinction of bodies. 

But, all these theories are impossible, as proved above 
(Q. III., AA. I, 8; and Q. LXXV., A. i), wherefore it is 
evidently false that the soul is of the substance of God. 

Reply Obj. i. The term " breathe" is not to be taken 
in the material sense ; but as regards the act of God, to 
breathe (spirare), is the same as to make a spirit. Moreover, 
in the material sense, man by breathing does not send 
forth anything of his own substance, but an extraneous 
thing. 

Reply Obj. 2. Although the soul is a simple form in its 
essence, yet it is not its own existence, but is a being by 
participation, as above explained (Q. LXXV., A. 5, ad 4). 
Therefore it is not a pure act like God. 

Reply Obj. 3. That which differs, properly speaking, 
differs in something ; wherefore we seek for difference where 
we find also resemblance. For this reason things which 
differ must in some way be compound ; since they differ in 
something, and in something resemble each other. In this 
sense, although all that differ are diverse, yet all things that 
are diverse do not differ. For simple things are diverse; 
yet do not differ from one another by differences which 
enter into their composition. For instance, a man and a 
horse differ by the difference of rational and irrational ; but 
we cannot say that these again differ by some further 
difference. 

Second Article, 
whether the soul was produced by creation? 

We proceed thus to the Second Article: — 
Objection i. It would seem that the soul was not pro- 
duced by creation. For that which has in itself something 

* The words as quoted are to be found iv. 31. 



257 PRODUCTION OF MAN'S SOUL Q. 90. Art. 2 

material is produced from matter. But the soul is in part 
material, since it is not a pure act. Therefore the soul was 
made of matter ; and hence it was not created. 

Obj. 2. Further, every actuality of matter is educed from 
the potentiality of that matter; for since matter is in poten- 
tiality to act, any act pre-exists in matter potentially. But 
the soul is the act of corporeal matter, as is clear from its 
definition. Therefore the soul is educed from the poten- 
tiality of matter. 

Obj. 3. Further, the soul is a form. Therefore, if the 
soul is created, all other forms also are created. Thus no 
forms would come into existence by generation ; which is 
not true. 

On the contrary, It is written (Gen. i. 27) : God created 
man to His own image. But man is like to God in his soul. 
Therefore the soul was created. 

/ answer that, The rational soul can be made only by 
creation; which, however, is not true of other forms. The 
reason is because, since to be made is the way to existence, 
a thing must be made in such a way as is suitable to its 
mode of existence. Now that properly exists which itself 
has existence; as it were, subsisting in its own existence. 
Wherefore only substances are properly and truly called 
beings; whereas an accident has not existence, but some- 
thing is (modified) by it, and so far is it called a being ; for 
instance, whiteness is called a being, because by it some- 
thing is white. Hence it is said Metaph. vii. (Did. vi. i) 
that an accident should be described as of something rather 
than as something. The same is to be said of all non- 
subsistent forms. Therefore, properly speaking, it does 
not belong to any non-existing form to be made ; but such 
are said to be made through the composite substances being 
made. On the other hand, the rational soul is a subsistent 
form, as above explained (Q. LXXV., A. 2). Wherefore 
it is competent to be and to be made. And since it cannot 
be made of pre-existing matter, — whether corporeal, which 
would render it a corporeal being, — or spiritual, which 
would involve the transmutation of one spiritual substance 
1-4 17 



Q. 90. Art. 3 THE " SUM MA THEOLOGICA " 258 

into another, we must conclude that it cannot exist except 
by creation. 

^" Reply Obj. i. The soul's simple essence is as the material 
element, while its participated existence is its formal ele- 
ment ; which participated existence necessarily co-exists 
with the soul's essence, because existence naturally follows 
the form. The same reason holds if the soul is supposed to 
be composed of some spiritual matter, as some maintain ; 
because the said matter is not in potentiality to another 
form, as neither is the matter of a celestial body ; otherwise 
the soul would be corruptible. Wherefore the soul cannot 
in any way be m.ade of pre-existent matter. 

Reply Obj. 2. The production of act from the poten- 
tiality of matter is nothing else but something becoming 
actual that previously was in potentiality. But since the 
rational soul does not depend in its existence on corporeal 
matter, and is subsistent, and exceeds the capacity of 
corporeal matter, as we have seen (Q. LXXV., A. 2), it is 
not educed from the potentiality of matter. 

Reply Obj. 3. As we have said, there is no comparison 
between the rational soul and other forms. 

A^ Third Article. 

WHETHER THE RATIONAL SOUL IS PRODUCED BY GOD 

IMMEDIATELY ? 

We proceed thus to the Third Article: — 

Objection 1. It would seem that the rational soul is not 
immediately made by God, but by the instrumentality of 
the angels. For spiritual things have more order than 
corporeal things. But inferior bodies are produced by 
means of the superior, as Dionysius says {Div. Nom. iv.). 
Therefore also the inferior spirits, who are the rational 
souls, are produced by means of the superior spirits, the 
angels. 

Obj. 2. Further, the end corresponds to the beginning of 
things; for God is the beginning and end of all. Therefore 
the issue of things from their beginning corresponds to the 



259 PRODUCTION OF MAN'S SOUL Q. 90. Art. 4 

forwarding of them to their end. But inferior things are 
forwarded by the higher, as Dionysius says {Eccl. Hier. v) ; 
therefore also the inferior are produced into existence by 
the higher, and souls by angels. 

Obj. 3. Further, perfect is that ivhich can produce its 
like, as is stated Metaph. v. But spiritual substances are 
much more perfect than corporeal. Therefore, since bodies 
produce their like in their own species, much more are 
angels able to produce something specifically inferior to 
themselves; and such is the rational soul. J/ 

On the contrary, It is written (Gen. ii. 7) that God Him- 
self breathed into the face of man the breath of life. 

I answer that. Some have held that angels, acting by the 
power of God, produce rational souls. But this is quite 
impossible, and is against faith. For it has been proved 
that the rational soul cannot be produced except by creation. 
Now, God alone can create ; for the first agent alone can act 
without presupposing the existence of anything ; while the 
second cause always presupposes something derived from 
the first cause, as above explained (Q. LXXV., A. 3) : and 
every agent, that presupposes something to its act, acts by 
making a change therein. Therefore everything else acts 
by producing a change, whereas God alone acts by creation. 
Since, therefore, the rational soul cannot be produced by a 
change in matter, it cannot be produced, save immediately 
by God. 

Thus the replies to the objections are clear. For that 
bodies produce their like or something inferior to them- 
selves, and that the higher things lead forward the inferior, 
— all these things are effected through a certain transmu- 
tation. 

Fourth Article. 

WHETHER THE HUMAN SOUL WAS PRODUCED BEFORE 

THE BODY ? 

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : — 
Objection i. It would seem that the human soul was 
made before the body. For the work of creation preceded 



Q.90. Art.4 the "SUMMA THEOLOGICA" 260 

the work of distinction and adornment, as shown above 
(Q. LXVL, A. I ; Q. LXX., A. i). But the soul was made 
by creation ; whereas the body was made at the end of the 
work of adornment. Therefore the soul of man was made 
before the body. 

Obj. 2. Further, the rational soul has more in common 
with the angels than with the brute animals. But angels 
were created before bodies, or at least, at the beginning 
with corporeal matter; whereas the body of man was 
formed on the sixth day, when also the animals were made. 
Therefore the soul of man was created before the body. 

Obj. 3. Further, the end is proportionate to the beginning. 
But in the end the soul outlasts the body. Therefore in 
the beginning it was created before the body. 

On the contrary, The proper act is produced in its proper 
potentiality. Therefore, since the soul is the proper act of 
the body, the soul was produced in the body. 

/ answer that, Origen {Peri Archon i. 7, 8) held that not 
only the soul of the first man, but also the souls of all men 
were created at the same time as the angels, before their 
bodies : because he thought that all spiritual substances, 
whether souls or angels, are equal in their natural con- 
dition, and differ only by merit; so that some of them — 
namely, the souls of men or of heavenly bodies — are united 
to bodies while others remain in their diflFerent orders 
entirely free from matter. Of this opinion we have already 
spoken (Q. XLVII., A. 2); and so we need say nothing 
about it here. 

Augustine, however (Gen. ad lit. vii. 24), says that the 
soul of the first man was created at the same time as the 
angels, before the body, for another reason; because he 
supposes that the body of man, during the work of the six 
days, was produced, not actually, but only as to some 
causal virtues; which cannot be said of the soul, because 
neither was it made of any pre-existing corporeal or spiritual 
matter, nor could it be produced from any created virtue. 
Therefore it seems that the soul itself, during the work of 
the six days, when all things were made, was created, 



26i PRODUCTION OF MAN'S SOUL Q. 90. Art. 4 

together with the angels ; and that afterwards, by its own 
will, was joined to the service of the body. But he does not 
say this by way of assertion ; as his words prove. For he ^ 
says {loc. cit. 29) : We may believe, if neither Scripture nor 
reason forbid, that man was made on the sixth day, in the 
sense that his body was created as to its causal virtue in the 
elements of the world, but that the soul was already created. 
Now this could be upheld by those who hold that the soul 
has of itself a complete species and nature, and that it is 
not united to the body as its form, but as its administrator. 
But if the soul is united to the body as its form, and is 
naturally a part of human nature, the above supposition is 
quite impossible. For it is clear that God made the first 
things in their perfect natural state, as their species 
required. Now the soul, as a part of human nature, has its 
natural perfection only as united to the body. Therefore it 
would have been unfitting for the soul to be created without 
the body. 

Therefore, if we admit the opinion of Augustine about 
the work of the six days (Q. LXXIV., A. 2), we may say 
that the human soul preceded in the work of the six days 
by a certain generic similitude, so far as it has intellectual 
nature in common with the angels ; but was itself created 
at the same time as the body. According to other saints, 
both the body and soul of the first man were produced in 
the work of the six days. 

Reply Obj. i. If the soul by its nature were a complete 
species, so that it might be created as to itself, this reason 
would prove that the soul was created by itself in the begin- 
ning. But as the soul is naturally the form of the body, it 
was necessarily created, not separately, but in the body. 

Reply Obj. 2 . The same observation applies to the second 
objection. For if the soul had a species of itself it would 
have something still more in common with the angels. 
But, as the form of the body, it belongs to the animal 
genus, as a formal principle. 

Reply Obj. 3. That the soul remains after the body, is 
due to a defect of the body, namely, death. Which defect 
was not due when the soul was first created. 



QUESTION XCI. 

THE PRODUCTION OF THE FIRST MAN'S BODY. 

{In Four Articles.) 

We have now to consider the production of the first man's 
body Under this head there are four points of inquiry • 
(I) 1 he matter from which it was produced. (2) The author 
by whom it was produced. (3) The disposition it received 
in Its production . (4) The mode and order of its production . 

First Article. 

WHETHER THE BODY OF THE FIRST MAN WAS MADE OF 
THE SLIME OF THE EARTH? 

We proceed thus to the First Article:— 

Objection I. It would seem that the body of the first man 
was not made of the slime of the earth. For it is an act of 
greater power to make something out of nothing than out 
of something; because not being is farther off from actual 
existence than being in potentiality. But since man is the 
most honourable of God's lower creatures, it was fitting 
that m the production of man's body, the power of God 
should be most clearly shown. Therefore it should not have 
been made of the slime of the earth, but out of nothing. 

ear^h/' h . 'n '^^ ^''"'"^^ ^°^'^^ ^^^ nobler than 

earthly bodies. But the human body has the greatest 

nobihty ; since ,t is perfected by the noblest form, which is 
the rational soul. Therefore it should not be made of an 
earthly body, but of a heavenly body. 

Obj. 3. Further, fire and air are nobler bodies than earth 
and water, as is clear from their subtlety. Therefore since 

262 



263 PRODUCTION OF MAN'S BODY Q- 9^- Art. i 

the human body is most noble, it should rather have been 
made of fire and air than of the slime of the earth. 

Obj. 4. Further, the human body is composed of the four 
elements. Therefore it was not made of the slime of the 
earth, but of the four elements. 

On the contrary, It is written (Gen. ii. 7) : God made 
man of the slime of the earth. 

I answer that, As God is perfect in His works, He 
bestowed perfection on all of them according to their 
capacity : God's ivorks are perfect (Deut. xxxii. 4). He 
Himself is simply perfect by the fact that all things are 
pre-contained in Him, not as component parts, but as 
united in one simple whole, as Dionysius says {Div. 
Nom. v.); in the same way as various effects pre-exist in 
their cause, according to its one virtue. This perfection is 
bestowed on the angels, inasmuch as all things which are 
produced by God in nature through various forms come 
under their knowledge. But on man this perfection is 
bestowed in an inferior way. For he does not possess a 
natural knowledge of all natural things, but is in a manner 
composed of all things, since he has in himself a rational 
soul of the genus of spiritual substances, and in likeness to 
the heavenly bodies he is removed from contraries by an 
equable temperament. As to the elements, he has them in 
their very substance, yet in such a way that the higher 
elements, fire and air, predominate in him by their power ; 
for life is mostly found where there is heat, which is from 
fire ; and where there is humour, which is of the air. But 
the inferior elements abound in man by their substance; 
otherwise the mingling of elements would not be evenly 
balanced, unless the inferior elements, which have the less 
power, predominated in quantity. Therefore the body of 
man is said to have been formed from the slime of the 
earth; because earth and water mingled are called slime, 
and for this reason man is called a little world, because 
all creatures of the world are in a way to be found in 
him. 

Reply Obj. i. The power of the Divme Creator was 



Q. 91. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 264 

manifested in man's body when its matter was produced by 
creation. But it was fitting that the human body should be 
made of the four elements, that man might have something 
in common with the inferior bodies, as being something 
between spiritual and corporeal substances. 

Reply Obj. 2. Although the heavenly body is in itself 
nobler than the earthly body, yet for the acts of the rational 
soul the heavenly body is less adapted. For the rational 
soul receives the knowledge of truth in a certain way 
through the senses, the organs of which cannot be formed 
of a heavenly body which is impassible. Nor is it true that 
something of the fifth essence enters materially into the 
composition of the human body, as some say, who suppose 
that the soul is united to the body by means of light. For, 
first of all, what they say is false — that light is a body. 
Secondly, it is impossible for something to be taken from 
the fifth essence, or from a heavenly body, and to be 
mingled with the elements, since a heavenly body is 
impassible ; wherefore it does not enter into the composition 
of mixed bodies, except as in the effects of its power. 

Reply Obj. 3. If fire and air, whose action is of greater 
power, predominated also in quantity in the human body, 
they would entirely draw the rest into themselves, and there 
would be no equalitv in the mingling, such as is required in 
the composition of man, for the sense of touch, w'hich is 
the foundation of the other senses. For the organ of any 
particular sense must not actually have the contraries of 
which that sense has the perception, but only potentially; 
either in such a way that it is entirely void of the whole 
genus of such contraries, — thus, for instance, the pupil of 
the eye is without colour, so as to be in potentiality as 
regards all colours ; which is not possible in the organ of 
touch, since it is composed of the very elements, the 
qualities of which are perceived by that sense : — or so that 
the organ is a medium between two contraries, as must 
needs be the case with regard to touch ; for the medium is 
in potentiality to the extremes. 
/f Reply Obj. 4. In the slime of the earth are earth, and 



265 PRODUCTION OF MAN'S BODY Q. 91- Art. 2 

water binding the earth together. Of the other elements, 
Scripture makes no mention, because they are less in 
quantity in the human body, as we have said ; and because 
also in the account of the Creation no mention is made of 
fire and air, which are not perceived by senses of uncultured 
men such as those to whom the Scripture was immediately 
addressed. 

Second Article. 

whether the human body was immediately 
produced by god ? 

We proceed thus to the Second Article: — 

Objection 1. It would seem that the human body was not 
produced by God immediately. For Augustine says {De 
Trin. iii. 4), that corporeal things are disposed by God 
through the angels. But the human body was made of 
corporeal matter, as stated above (A. i). Therefore it was 
produced by the instrumentality of the angels, and not 
immediately by God. 

Obj. 2. Further, whatever can be made by a created 
power, is not necessarily produced immediately by God. 
But the human body can be produced by the created power 
of a heavenly body ; for even certain animals are produced 
from putrefaction by the active power of a heavenly body ; 
and Albumazar says that man is not generated where heat 
and cold are extreme, but only in temperate regions. There- 
fore the human body was not necessarily produced imme- 
diately by God. 

Obj. 3. Further, nothing is made of corporeal matter 
except by some material change. But all corporeal change 
is caused by a movement of a heavenly body, which is the 
first movement. Therefore, since the human body was 
produced from corporeal matter, it seems that a heavenly 
body had part in its production, 

Obj. 4. Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. vii. 24) that 
man's body was made during the work of the six days, 
according to the causal virtues which God inserted in cor- 
poreal creatures ; and that afterwards it was actually pro- 



Q. 91- Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 266 

duced. But what pre-exists in the corporeal creature by 
reason of causal virtues can be produced by some corporeal 
body. Therefore the human body was produced by some 
created power, and not immediately by God. 

On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. xvii. i) : God 
created man out of the earth, 

I answer that, The first formation of the human body 
could not be by the instrumentality of any created power, 
but was immediately from God. Some, indeed, supposed 
that the forms which are in corporeal matter are derived 
from some immaterial forms ; but the Philosopher refutes 
this opinion (Metaph. vii.), for the reason that forms 
cannot be made in themselves, but only in the composite, 
as we have explained (Q. LXV., A. 4); and because the 
agent must be like its effect, it is not fitting that a pure 
form, not existing in matter, should produce a form which 
is in matter, and which form is only made by the fact that 
the composite is made. So a form which is in matter can 
only be the cause of another form that is in matter, accord- 
ing as composite is made by composite. Now God, though 
He is absolutely immaterial, can alone by His own power 
produce matter by creation : wherefore He alone can pro- 
duce a form in matter, without the aid of any preceding 
material form. For this reason the angels cannot transform 
a body except by making use of something in the nature of 
a seed, as Augustine says {De Trin. iii. 19). Therefore as 
no pre-existing body had been formed whereby another 
body of the same species could be generated, the first 
human body was of necessity made immediately by God. 

Reply Obj. i. Although the angels are the ministers of 
God, as regards what He does in bodies, yet God does 
something in bodies beyond the angels' power, as, for 
instance, raising the dead, or giving sight to the blind : 
and by this power He formed the body of the first man from 
the slime of the earth. Nevertheless the angels could act as 
ministers in the formation of the body of the first man, in 
the same way as they will do at the last resurrection, by 
collecting the dust. 



26; PRODUCTION OF MAN'S BODY Q. 91- Art. 3 

Reply Obj. 2. Perfect animals, produced from seed, can- ■" 
not be made by the sole power of a heavenly body, as 
Avicenna imagined; although the power of a heavenly body 
may assist by co-operation in the work of natural genera- 
tion, as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii. 26), man and the 
sun beget man from matter. For this reason, a place of 
moderate temperature is required for the production of man 
and other perfect animals. But the power of heavenly 
bodies suffices for the production of some imperfect animals 
from properly disposed matter : for it is clear that more 
conditions are required to produce a perfect than an 
imperfect thing. 

Reply Obj. 3. The movement of the heavens causes 
natural changes ; but not changes that surpass the order of 
nature, and are caused by the Divine Power alone, as for 
the dead to be raised to life, or the blind to see : like to 
which also is the making of man from the slime of the earth. 

Reply Obj. 4. An effect may be said to pre-exist in the 
causal virtues of creatures, in two ways. First, both in 
active and in passive potentiality, so that not only can it be 
produced out of pre-existing matter, but also that some 
pre-existing creature can produce it. Secondly, in passive 
potentiality only ; that is, that out of pre-existing matter 
it can be produced by God. In this sense, according to 
Augustine, the human body pre-existed in the previous 
works in their causal virtues. 

Third Article. /^ 

whether the body of man was given an apt 

disposition ? 

We proceed thus to the Third Article : — 

Objection 1. It would seem that the body of man was not 
given an apt disposition. For since man is the noblest of 
animals, his body ought to be the best disposed in what is 
proper to an animal, that is, in sense and movement. But 
some animals have sharper senses and quicker movement 
than man; thus dogs have a keener smell, and birds a 



Q. 91. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 268 

swifter flight. Therefore man's body was not aptly dis- 
posed. 

Obj. 2. Further, perfect is what lacks nothing. But the 
human bodv lacks more than the body of other animals, for 
these are provided with covering and natural arms of 
defence, in which man is lacking. Therefore the human 
body is very imperfectly disposed. 

Obj. 3. Further, man is more distant from plants than he 
is from the brutes. But plants are erect in stature, while 
brutes are prone in stature. Therefore man should not be 
of erect stature. 

On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. vii. 30) :' God made 
man right. 
r^ / ansiver that, All natural things were produced by the 
Divine art, and so may be called God's w'orks of art. Now 
every artist intends to give to his work the best disposition ; 
not absolutely the best, but the best as regards the proposed 
end ; and even if this entails some defect, the artist cares 
not : thus, for instance, when a man makes himself a saw 
for the purpose of cutting, he makes it of iron, which is 
suitable for the object in view ; and he does not prefer to 
make it of glass, though this be a more beautiful material, 
because this very beauty would be an obstacle to the end he 
has in view. Therefore God gave to each natural being the 
best disposition ; not absolutely so, but in view of its proper 
end. This is what the Philosopher says {Phys. ii. 7) : And 
because it is better so, not absolutely, but for each one's 
substance. 

Now' the proximate end of the human body is the rational 
soul and its operations ; since matter is for the sake of the 
form, and instruments are for the action of the agent. I 
say, therefore, that God fashioned the human body in that 
disposition which was best, as most suited to such a form 
and to such operations. If defect exists in the disposition 
of the human body, it is well to observe that such defect 
arises as a necessary result of the matter, from the conditions 
required in the body, in order to make it suitably propor- 
tioned to the soul and its operations. 



269 PRODUCTION OF MAN'S BODY Q. 91- Art. 3 

Reply Obj. i . The sense of touch, which is the foundation 
of the other senses, is more perfect in man than in any 
other animal ; and for this reason man must have the most 
equable temperament of all animals. Moreover man excels 
all other animals in the interior sensitive powers, as is clear 
from what we have said above (Q. LXXVIIL, A. 4). But by 
a kind of necessity, man falls short of the other animals in 
some of the exterior senses; thus of all animals he has the 
least sense of smell. For man of all animals needs the 
largest brain as compared to the body; both for his greater 
freedom of action in the interior powers required for the 
intellectual operations, as we have seen above (Q. LXXXI V., 
A. 7); and in order that the low temperature of the brain 
may modify the heat of the heart, which has to be consider- 
able in man for him to be able to stand up erect. So that 
the size of the brain, by reason of its humidity, is an 
impediment to the smell, which requires dryness. In the 
same way, we may suggest a reason why some animals 
have a keener sight, and a more acute hearing than man ; 
namely, on account of a hindrance to his senses arising 
necessarily from the perfect equability of his temperament. 
The same reason suffices to explain why some animals are 
more rapid in movement than man, since this excellence 
of speed is inconsistent with the equability of the human 
temperament. 

Reply Obj. 2 . Horns and claws, which are the weapons of 
some animals, and toughness of hide and quantity of hair 
or feathers, which are the clothing of animals, are signs of 
an abundance of the earthly element; which does not agree 
with the equability and softness of the human temperament. 
Therefore such things do not suit the nature of man. 
Instead of these, he has reason and hands whereby he can 
make himself arms and clothes, and other necessaries of 
life, of infinite variety. Wherefore the hand is called by 
Aristotle {De Anima iii. 8), the organ of organs. Moreover 
this was more becoming to the rational nature, which is 
capable of conceiving an infinite number of things, so as to 
make for itself an infinite number of instruments. 



^ 



Q. 91. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 270 

Reply Obj. 3. An upright stature was becoming to 
man for four reasons. First, because the senses are given 
to man, not only for the purpose of procuring the necessaries 
of life, for which they are bestowed on other animals, but 
also for the purpose of knowledge. Hence, whereas the 
other animals take delight in the objects of the senses onlv 
as ordered to food and sex, man alone takes pleasure in the 
beauty of sensible objects for its own sake. Therefore, as 
the senses are situated chiefly in the face, other animals 
have the face turned to the ground, as it were for the purpose 
of seeking food and procuring a livelihood ; whereas man 
has his face erect, in order that by the senses, and chieflv 
by sight, which is more subtle and penetrates further into 
the differences of things, he may freely survey the sensible 
objects around him, both heavenly and earthly, so as to 
gather intelligible truth from all things. Secondly, for the 
greater freedom of the acts of the interior powers ; the brain, 
wherein these actions are, in a way, performed, not being 
low down, but lifted up above other parts of the body. 
Thirdly, because if man's stature were prone to the ground 
he would need to use his hands as fore-feet ; and thus their 
utility for other purposes would cease. Fourthly, because 
if man's stature were prone to the ground, and he used his 
hands as fore-feet, he would be obliged to take hold of his 
food with his mouth. Thus he would have a protruding 
mouth, with thick and hard lips, and also a hard tongue, so 
as to keep it from being hurt by exterior things ; as 
we see in other animals. Moreover, such an atti- 
tude would quite hinder speech, which is reason's proper 
operation. 

Nevertheless, though of erect stature, man is far above 
plants. For man's superior part, his head, is turned towards 
the superior part of the world, and his inferior part is turned 
towards the inferior world ; and therefore he is perfectly 
disposed as to the general situation of his body. Plants 
have the superior part turned towards the lower world, 
since their roots correspond to the mouth ; and their inferior 
part towards the upper world. But brute animals have a 



271 PRODUCTION OF MAN'S BODY Q. 91- Art. 4 

middle disposition, for the superior part of the animal is 
that by which it takes food, and the inferior part that by 
which it rids itself of the surplus. 



Fourth Article. 

whether the production of the human body is 
fittingly described in scripture? 

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : — 

Objection i. It would seem that the production of the 
human body is not fittingly described in Scripture. For, as 
the human body was made by God, so also were the other 
works of the six days. But in the other works it is written, 
God said; Let it be made, and it was made. Therefore the 
same should have been said of man. 

Obj. 2. Further, the human body was made by God 
immediately, as explained above (A. 2). Therefore it was 
not fittingly said, Let us make man. 

Obj. 3. Further, the form of the human body is the soul 
itself which is the breath of life. Therefore, having said, 
God made man of the slime of the earth, he should not have 
added : And He breathed into him the breath of life. 

Obj. 4. Further, the soul, which is the breath of life, is in 
the whole body, and chiefly in the heart. Therefore it was 
not fittingly said : He breathed into his face the breath of 
life. 

Obj. 5. Further, the male and female sex belong to the 
body, while the image of God belongs to the soul. But the 
soul, according to Augustine {Gen. ad lit. vii. 24), was 
made before the body. Therefore having said: To His 
image He made them, he should not have added, male and 
female He created them. 

On the contrary, Is the authority of Scripture. 

Reply Obj. i. As Augustine observes (Gen. ad lit. v\. 12), 
man surpasses other things, not in the fact that God Him- 
self made man, as though He did not make other things; 
since it is written (Ps. ci. 26), The work of Thy hands is the 



Q. 91. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 272 

heaven, and elsewhere (Ps. xciv. 5), His hands laid down 
the dry land; but in this, that man is made to God's image. 
Yet in describing man's production, Scripture uses a special 
way of speaking, to show that other things were made for 
man's sake. For we are accustomed to do with more 
deliberation and care what we have chiefly in mind. 

Reply Obj. 2. We must not imagine that when God said 
Let us make man, He spoke to the angels, as some were 
perverse enough to think. But by these words is signified 
the plurality of the Divine Person, Whose image is more 
clearly expressed in man. 

Reply Obj. 3. Some have thought that man's body was 
formed first in priority of time, and that afterwards the soul 
was infused into the formed body. But it is inconsistent 
with the perfection of the production of things, that God 
should have made either the body without the soul, or the 
soul without the body, since each is a part of human nature. 
This is especially unfitting as regards the body, for the body 
depends on the soul, and not the soul on the body. 

To remove the difficulty some have said that the words, 
God made man, must be understood of the production of 
the body with the soul ; and that the subsequent words, and 
He breathed into his face the breath of life, should be under- 
stood of the Holy Ghost; as the Lord breathed on His 
Apostles, saying. Receive ye the Holy Ghost (Jo. xx. 22). 
But this explanation, as Augustine says {De Civ. Dei 
xiii. 24), is excluded by the very words of Scripture. For 
we read farther on. And man was made a living soul; which 
words the Apostle (i Cor. xv. 45) refers not to spiritual life, 
but to animal life. Therefore, by breath of life we must 
understand the soul, so that the words. He breathed into 
his face the breath of life, are a sort of exposition of what 
goes before ; for the soul is the form of the body. 

Reply Obj. 4, Since vital operations are more clearly 
seen in man's face, on account of the senses which are there 
expressed; therefore Scripture says that the breath of life 
was breathed into man's face. 

Reply Obj. 5. According to Augustine {Gen. ad lit. 



273 PRODUCTION OF MAN'S BODY Q. 91- Art. 4 

iv. 34), the works of the six days were done all at one time ; 
wherefore according to him man's soul, which he holds to 
have been made with the angels, was not made before the 
sixth day ; but on the sixth day both the soul of the first 
man was made actually, and his body in its causal elements. 
But other doctors hold that on the sixth day both body and 
soul of man were actually made. 



I. 4 



18 



QUESTION XCII. 

THE PRODUCTION OF THE WOMAN. 

{In Four Articles.) 

We must next consider the production of the woman. Under 
this head there are four points of inquiry : (i) Whether the 
woman should have been made in that first production of 
things ? (2) Whether the woman should have been made 
from man? (3) Whether of man's rib? (4) Whether the 
woman was made immediately by God ? 

First Article. 

whether the woman should have been i^iade in the 
first production of things ? 

We proceed thus to the First Article: — 

Objection i. It would seem that the woman should not 
have been made in the first production of things. For the 
Philosopher says {De Gener. Animal, ii. 3), that the female 
is a misbegotten male. But nothing misbegotten or defec- 
tive should have been in the first production of things. 
Therefore woman should not have been made at that first 
production. 

Obj. 2. Further, subjection and limitation were a result 
of sin, for to the woman was it said after sin (Gen. iii. 16) : 
Thou shall be under the man's power; and Gregory says 
that, Where there is no sin, there is no inequality. But 
woman is naturally of less strength and dignity than man ; 
for the agent is alivays more honourable than the patient, as 
Augustine says {Gen. ad lit. xii. 16). Therefore woman 
should not have been made in the first production of things 
before sin. 

Obj. 3. Further, occasions of sin should be cut off. But 
^ 274 



275 PRODUCTION OF WOMAN Q. 92. Art. i 

God foresaw that the woman would be an occasion of sin to 
man. Therefore He should not have made woman. 

On the contrary, It is written (Gen. ii. 18) : It is not good 
for man to be alone; let us make him a helper like to himself. 

I answer that, It was necessary for woman to be made, as 
the Scripture says, as a helper to man ; not, indeed, as a 
helpmate in other works, as some say, since man can be 
more efficiently helped by another man in other works ; but 
as a helper in the work of generation. This can be made 
clear if we observe the mode of generation carried out in 
various living things. Some living things do not possess 
in themselves the power of generation, but are generated by 
some other specific agent, such as some plants and animals 
by the influence of the heavenly bodies, from some fitting 
matter and not from seed : others possess the active and 
passive generative power together ; as we see in plants 
which are generated from seed ; for the noblest vital func- 
tion in plants is generation. Wherefore we observe that in 
these the active power of generation invariably accompanies 
the passive power. Among perfect animals the active power 
of generation belongs to the male sex, and the passive power 
to the female. And as among animals there is a vital 
operation nobler than generation, to which their life is 
principally directed; therefore the male sex is not found 
in continual union with the female in perfect animals, but 
only at the time of coition ; so that we may consider that by 
this means the male and female are one, as in plants they 
are always united; although in some cases one of them 
preponderates, and in some the other. But man is yet 
further ordered to a still nobler vital action, and that is 
intellectual operation. Therefore there was greater reason 
for the distinction of these two forces in man ; so that the 
female should be produced separately from the male ; 
although they are carnally united for generation. Therefore 
directly after the formation of woman, it was said : And 
they shall he two in one flesh (Gen. ii. 24). 

Reply Obj. i. As regards the individual nature, woman 
is defective and misbegotten, for the active force in the male 



Q. 92. Art. 2 THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 276 

seed tends to the production of a perfect likeness in the 
masculine sex ; while the production of woman comes from 
defect in the active force or from some material indisposi- 
tion, or even from some external influence; such as that of 
a south wind, which is moist, as the Philosopher observes 
{De Gener. Animal, iv. 2). On the other hand, as regards 
human nature in general, woman is not misbegotten, but is 
included in nature's intention as directed to the work of 
generation. Now the general intention of nature depends on 
God, Who is the universal Author of nature. Therefore, 
in producing nature, God formed not only the male but also 
the female. 

Reply Obj, 2. Subjection is twofold. One is servile, by 
virtue of which a superior makes use of a subject for his 
own benefit; and this kind of subjection began after sin. 
There is another kind of subjection, which is called economic 
or civil, whereby the superior makes use of his subjects for 
their own benefit and good; and this kind of subjection 
existed even before sin. For good order would have been 
wanting in the human family if some were not governed by 
others wiser than themselves. So by such a kind of sub- 
jection woman is naturally subject to man, because in man 
the discretion of reason predominates. Nor is inequality 
among men excluded by the state of innocence, as we shall 
prove (Q. XCVL, A. 3). 

Reply Obj. 3. If God had deprived the world of all those 
things which proved an occasion of sin, the universe would 
have been imperfect. Nor was it fitting for the common 
good to be destroyed in order that individual evil might be 
avoided ; especially as God is so powerful that He can 
direct any evil to a good end. 

Second Article. 

whether woman should have been made from man? 

We proceed thus to the Second Article: — 
Objection i. It would seem that woman should not have 
been made from man. For sex belongs both to man and 



277 PRODUCTION OF WOMAN Q. 92. Art. 2 

animals. But in the other animals the female was not made 
from the male. Therefore neither should it have been so 
with man. 

Obj. 2. Further, things of the same species are of the 
same matter. But male and female are of the same species. 
Therefore, as man was made of the slime of the earth, so 
woman should have been made of the same, and not from 
man. 

Ohj. 3. Further, woman was made to be a helpmate to 
man in the work of generation. But close relationship 
makes a person unfit for that office ; hence near relations 
are debarred from intermarriage, as is written (Lev. xviii. 6). 
Therefore woman should not have been made from man. 

On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. xvii. 5) : He 
created of him, that is, out of man, a helpmate like to 
himself, that is, woman. 

/ ansiuer that, When all things were first formed, it was 
more suitable for the woman to be made from the man than 
(for the female to be from the male) in other animals. 
First, in order thus to give the first man a certain dignity 
consisting in this, that as God is the principle of the whole 
universe, so the first man, in likeness to God, was the 
principle of the whole human race. Wherefore Paul says 
that God made the ivhole luiman race from one (Acts 
xvii. 26). Secondly, that man might love woman all the 
more, and cleave to her more closely, knowing her to be 
fashioned from himself. Hence it is written (Gen. ii. 23, 24) : 
She was taken out of man, -wherefore a man shall leave 
father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife. This was 
most necessary as regards the human race, in which the 
male and female live together for life ; which is not the case 
with other animals. Thirdly, because, as the Philosopher 
says (Ethic, viii. 12), the human male and female are 
united, not only for generation, as with other animals, but 
also for the purpose of domestic life, in which each has his 
or her particular duty, and in which the man is the head of 
the woman. Wherefore it was suitable for the woman to 
be made out of man, as out of her principle. Fourthly, 



Q. 92. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 278 

there is a sacramental reason for this. For by this is 
signified that the Church takes her origin from Christ. 
Wherefore the Apostle says (Eph. v. 32) : This is a great 
sacrament ; hut I speak in Christ and in the Church. 

Reply Obj. i is clear from the foregoing. 

Reply Obj. 2. Matter is that from which something is 
made. Now created nature has a determinate principle; 
and since it is determined to one thing, it has also a deter- 
minate mode of proceeding. Wherefore from determinate 
matter it produces something in a determinate species. On 
the other hand, the Divine Power, being infinite, can 
produce things of the same species out of any matter, such 
as a man from the slime of the earth, and a woman from a 
man. 

Reply Obj. 3. A certain affinity arises from natural 
generation, and this is an impediment to matrimony. 
Woman, however, was not produced from man by natural 
generation, but by the Divine Power alone. W^herefore 
Eve is not called the daughter of Adam ; and so this argu- 
ment does not prove. 

Third Article. 

whether the woman was fittingly made from the 

rib of man? 

We proceed thus to the Third Article: — 

Objection 1. It would seem that the woman should not 
have been formed from the rib of man. For the rib was 
much smaller than the woman's body. Now from a smaller 
thing a larger thing can be made only — either by addition 
(and then the woman ought to have been described as made 
out of that which was added, rather than out of the rib 
itself) ; — or by rarefaction, because, as Augustine says 
{Gen. ad lit. x.) : A body cannot increase in bulk except by 
rarefaction. But the woman's body is not more rarefied 
than man's — at least, not in the proportion of a rib to 
Eve's body. Therefore Eve was not formed from a rib of 
Adam. 



279 PRODUCTION OF WOMAN g. 92. Art. 3 

Obj. 2. Further, in those things which were first created 
there was nothing superfluous. Therefore a rib of Adam 
belonged to the integrity of his body. So, if a rib was 
removed, his body remained imperfect; which is unreason- 
able to suppose. 

Obj. 3. Further, a rib cannot be removed from man 
without pain. But there was no pain before sin. Therefore 
it was not right for a rib to be taken from the man, that 
Eve might be made from it. 

On the contrary, It is written (Gen. ii. 22) : God built the 
rib, which He took from Adam, into a 'woman. 

1 answer that. It was right for the woman to be made 
from a rib of man. First, to signify the social union of 
man and woman, for the woman should neither use 
authority over man, and so she was not made from his 
head; nor was it right for her to be subject to man's con- 
tempt as his slave, and so she was not made from his feet. 
Secondly, for the sacramental signification ; for from the 
side of Christ sleeping on the Cross the Sacraments flowed 
— namely, blood and water — on which the Church was 
established. 

Reply Obj. i. Some say that the woman's body was 
formed by a material increase, without anything being 
added ; in the same way as our Lord multiplied the five 
loaves. But this is quite impossible. For such an increase 
of matter would either be by a change of the very substance 
of the matter itself, or by a change of its dimensions. Not 
by change of the substance of the matter, both because 
matter, considered in itself, is quite unchangeable, since it 
has a potential existence, and has nothing but the nature of 
a subject, and because quantity and size are extraneous to 
the essence of matter itself. Wherefore multiplication of 
matter is quite unintelligible, as long as the matter itself 
remains the same without anything added to it; unless it 
receives greater dimensions. This implies rarefaction, 
which is for the same matter to receive greater dimensions, 
as the Philosopher says (Pliys. iv.). To say, therefore, 
that the same matter is enlarged, without being rarefied, is 



Q. 92. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 280 

to combine contradictories — viz., the definition with the 
absence of the thing defined. 

Wherefore, as no rarefaction is apparent in such multi- 
plication of matter, we must admit an addition of matter : 
either by creation or, which is more probable, by con- 
version. Hence Augustine says {Tract, xxiv., in Joan.) 
that Christ filled five thousand men ivith five loaves, in the 
same way as from a few seeds He produces the harvest of 
corn — that is, by transformation of the nourishment. 
Nevertheless, we sav that the crowds were fed with five 
loaves, or that woman was made from the rib, because an 
addition was made to the already existing matter of the 
loaves and of the rib. 

Reply Obj. 2. The rib belonged to the integral perfection 
of Adam, not as an individual, but as the principle of the 
human race ; just as the semen belongs to the perfection of 
the begetter, and is released by a natural and pleasurable 
operation. Much more, therefore, was it possible that by 
the Divine power the body of the woman should be pro- 
duced from the man's rib. 

From this it is clear how to answer the third objection. 

Fourth Article, 
whether the woman was formed immediately 

BY GOD? 

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article: — 

Objection i. It w'ould seem that the woman was not 
formed immediately by God. For no individual is pro- 
duced immediately by God from another individual alike 
in species. But the woman was made from a man who is 
of the same species. Therefore she was not made im- 
mediately by God. 

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine {De Trin. iii. 4) says that 
corporeal things are governed by God through the angels. 
But the woman's body was formed from corporeal matter. 
Therefore it was made through the ministry of the angels, 
and not immediately by God. 



28i PRODUCTION OF WOMAN Q. 92. Art. 4 

Obj. 3. Further, those things which pre-exist in 
creatures as to their causal virtues are produced by the 
power of some creature, and not immediately by God. 
But the woman's body was produced in its causal virtues 
among the first created works, as Augustine says {Gen. ad 
lit. ix. 15). Therefore it was not produced immediately 
by God. 

On the contrary, Augustine says, in the same work : God 
alone, to Whotn all nature owes its existence, co^ild form 
or build up the woman from the man's rib. 

I answer that, As was said above (A. 2, ad 2), the natural 
generation of every species is from some determinate matter. 
Now the matter whence man is naturally begotten is the 
human semen of man or woman. Wherefore from any 
other matter an individual of the human species cannot 
naturally be generated. Now God alone, the Author of 
nature, can produce an effect into existence outside the 
ordinary course of nature. Therefore God alone could 
produce either a man from the slime of the earth, or a 
woman from the rib of man. 

Reply Obj. i. This argument is verified when an indi- 
vidual is begotten, by natural generation, from that which 
is like it in the same species. 

Reply Obj. 2. As Augustine says {Gen. ad lit. ix. 15), we 
do not know whether the angels were employed by God in 
the formation of the woman ; but it is certain that, as the 
body of man was not formed by the angels from the slime 
of the earth, so neither was the body of the woman formed 
by them from the man's rib. 

Reply Obj. 3. As Augustine says {ibid. 18) : The first 
creation of things did not demand that woman should be 
made thus; it made it possible for her to be thus made. 
Therefore the body of the woman did indeed pre-exist in 
these causal virtues, in the things first created ; not as 
regards active potentiality, but as regards a potentiality 
passive in relation to the active potentiality of the Creator. 



QUESTION XCIII. 

THE END OR TERM OF THE PRODUCTION OF MAN. 

(In Nine Articles.) 

We now treat of the end or term of man's production, in- 
asmuch as he is said to be made to the image and likeness 
of God. There are under this head nine points of inquiry : 
(i) Whether the image of God is in man? (2) Whether 
the image of God is in irrational creatures ? (3) Whether the 
image of God is in the angels more than in man ? (4) Whether 
the image of God is in every man ? (5) Whether the 
image of God is in man by comparison with the Essence, 
or with all the Divine Persons, or with one of them ? 
(6) Wliether the image of God is in man, as to his mind 
only? (7) Whether the image of God is in man's power 
or in his habits and acts? (8) Whether the image of God 
is in man by comparison with every object ? (9) Of the 
difference between image and likeness. 

First Article, 
whether the image of god is im man? 

We proceed thus to the First Article: — 

Objection i. It would seem that the image of God is not 
in man. For it is written (Isa. xl. 18) : To ivhom have you 
likened God? or what image will you make for Him? 

Obj. 2. Further, to be the image of God is the property 
of the First-Begotten, of Whom the Apostle says (Col. 
i. 15) : Who is the image of the invisible God, the First- 
Born of every creature. Therefore the image of God is not 
to be found in man. 

Obj. 3. Further, Hilary says (De Synod.*) that an 

• Super i. can. Synod. Ancyr. 
282 



283 PRODUCTION OF MAN Q. 93- Art. i 

image is of the same species as that which it represents ; 
and he also says that an image is the undivided and united 
likeness of one thing adequately representing another. But 
there is no species common to both God and man ; nor can 
there be a comparison of equality between God and man. 
Therefore there can be no image of God in man. 

On the contrary, It is written (Gen. i. 26) : Let Us make 
man to Our own image and likeness. 

I answer that, As Augustine says (QQ. LXXXIIL; qu. 
74): Where an image exists, there forthwith is likeness; 
but where there is likeness, there is not necessarily an 
image. Hence it is clear that likeness is essential to an 
image; and that an image adds something to likeness — 
namely, that it is copied from something else. For an 
image is so called because it is produced as an imitation of 
something else ; wherefore, for instance, an egg, however 
much like and equal to another egg, is not called an image 
of the other egg, because it is not copied from it. 

But equality does not belong to the essence of an image ; 
for, as Augustine says (ibid.) : Where there is an image 
there is not necessarily equality, as we see in a person's 
image reflected in a glass. Yet this is of the essence of a 
perfect image; for in a perfect image nothing is wanting 
that is to be found in that of which it is a copy. Now it is 
manifest that in man there is some likeness to God, copied 
from God as from an exemplar ; yet this likeness is not one 
of equality, for such an exemplar infinitely excels its copy. 
Therefore there is in man a likeness to God ; not, indeed, a 
perfect likeness, but imperfect. And Scripture implies the 
same when it says that man was made to God's likeness ; for 
the preposition to signifies a certain approach, as of some- 
thing at a distance. 

Reply Obj. i. The Prophet speaks of bodily images made 
by man. Therefore he says pointedly : What image will 
you make for Him? But God made a spiritual image to 
Himself in man. 

Reply Obj. 2. The First-Born of creatures is the perfect 
Image of God, reflecting perfectly that of which He is the 



Q. 93- Art. 2 THE "SUMiMA THEOLOGICA" 284 

Image, and so He is said to be the Image, and never to the 
image. But man is said to be both image by reason of the 
likeness; and to the image by reason of the imperfect like- 
ness. And since the perfect likeness to God cannot be 
except in an identical nature, the Image of God exists in 
His first-born Son ; as the image of the king is in his son, 
who is of the same nature as himself : whereas it exists in 
man as in an alien nature, as the image of the king is in a 
silver coin, as Augustine explains in De decern Chordis 
{Serm. ix. al. xcvi., De Tempore). 

Reply Obj. 3. As unity means absence of division, a 
species is said to be the same as far as it is one. Now a thing 
is said to be one not only numerically, specifically, or 
generically, but also according to a certain analogy or pro- 
portion. In this sense a creature is one with God, or like 
to Him ; but when Hilary says of a thing which adequately 
represents another, this is to be understood of a perfect 
image. 

Second Article. 

whether the image of god is to be found in 
irrational creatures? 

We proceed thus to the Second Article: — 

Objectioji I. It would seem that the image of God is to be 
found in irrational creatures. For Dionysius says (Div. 
Nom. ii.) : Effects are contingent images of their causes. 
But God is the cause not only of rational, but also of irra- 
tional creatures. Therefore the image of God is to be found 
in irrational creatures. 

Obj. 2. Further, the more distinct a likeness is, the nearer 
it approaches to the nature of an image. But Dionysius 
says (Div. Nom. iv.) that the solar ray has a very great 
similitude to the Divine goodness. Therefore it is made to 
the image of God. 

Obj. 3. Further, the more perfect anything is in good- 
ness, the more it is like God. But the whole universe is 
more perfect in goodness than man ; for though each indi- 



285 PRODUCTION OF MAN Q. 93- Art. 2 

vidual thing is good, all things together are called very 
good (Gen. i. 31). Therefore the whole universe is to the 
image of God, and not only man. 

Obj. 4. Further, Boethius {De Consol. iii.) says of God : 
Holding the world in His mind, and forming it into His 
image. Therefore the whole world is to the image of God, 
and not only the rational creature. 

On the contrary, Augustine says {Gen, ad lit. vi. 12) : 
Man's excellence C07isists in the fact that God made him to 
His oivn image by giving him an intellectual soul, which 
raises him above the beasts of the field. Therefore things 
without intellect are not made to God's image. 

/ answer that, Not every likeness, not even what is copied 
from something else, is sufficient to make an image ; for if 
the likeness be only generic, or existing by virtue of some 
common accident, this does not suffice for one thing to be 
the image of another. For instance, a worm, though from 
man it may originate, cannot be called man's image, merely 
because of the generic likeness. Nor, if anything is made 
white like something else, can we say that it is the image 
of that thing; for whiteness is an accident belonging to 
many species. But the nature of an image requires likeness 
in species ; thus the image of the king exists in his son : or, 
at least, in some specific accident, and chiefly in the shape ; 
thus, we speak of a man's image in copper. Whence Hilary 
says pointedly that an image is of the same species. 

Now it is manifest that specific likeness follows the 
ultimate difference. But some things are like to God first 
and most commonly because they exist ; secondly, because 
they live; and thirdly because they know or understand; 
and these last, as Augustine says (QQ. LXXXIII. ; qu. 51), 
approach so near to God in likeness, that among all creatures 
nothing comes nearer to Him. It is clear, therefore, that 
intellectual creatures alone, properly speaking, are made to 
God's image. 

Reply Obj. i. Everything imperfect is a participation of 
what is perfect. Therefore even what falls short of the 
nature of an image, so far as it possesses any sort of like- 



Q. 93ART.3 THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA" 286 

ness to God, participates in some degree the nature of an 
image. So Dionysius says that effects are contingent images 
of their causes; that is, as much as they happen (contingit) 
to be so, but not absolutely. 

Reply Obj. 2. Dionysius compares the solar ray to Divine 
goodness, as regards its causality ; not as regards its natural 
dignity which is involved in the idea of an image. 

Reply Ohj. 3. The universe is more perfect in goodness 
than the intellectual creature as regards extension and 
diffusion ; but intensively and collectively the likeness to 
the Divine goodness is found rather in the intellectual 
creature, which has a capacity for the highest ^ood. Or 
else we may say that a part is not rightly divided against 
the whole, but only against another part. Wherefore, when 
we say that the intellectual nature alone is to the image of 
God, we do not mean that the universe in any part is not to 
God's image, but that the other parts are excluded. 

Reply Obj. 4. Boethius here uses the word image to 
express the likeness which the product of an art bears to the 
artistic species in the mind of the artist. Thus every creature 
is an image of the exemplar type thereof in the Divine mind. 
We are not, however, using the word image in this sense ; 
but as it implies a likeness in nature, that is, inasmuch as 
all things, as being, are like to the First Being; as living, 
like to the First Life ; and as intelligent, like to the Supreme 
Wisdom. 

Third Article. 

whether the angels are more to the image of god 

than man is? 

We proceed thus to the Third Article: — 

Objection i. It would seem that the angels are not more 
to the image of God than man is. For Augustine says in a 
sermon de Imagine xliii. {de verbis Apost. xxvii.) that God 
granted to no other creature besides man to be to His 
image. Therefore it is not true to say that the angels are 
more than man to the image of God. 



28; PRODUCTION OF MAN Q. 93- 'Art. 3 

Obj. 2. Further, according to Augustine {QQ. LXXXIII. ; 
qu. 51), man is so mtich to God's image that God did not 
make any creature to be between Him and man: and there- 
fore nothing is more akin to Him. But a creature is called 
God's image so far as it is akin to God. Therefore the 
angels are not more to the image of God than man. 

Obj. 3. Further, a creature is said to be to God's image 
so far as it is of an intellectual nature. But the intellectual 
nature does not admit of intensity or remissness ; for it is 
not an accidental thing, since it is a substance. Therefore 
the angels are not more to the image of God than man. 

On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. in Evang. xxxiv.) : 
The angel is called a " seal of resemblance " (Ezech. xxviii. 
12) because in him the resemblance of the Divine image is 
•wrought with greater expression. 

I answer that, We may speak of God's image in two 
ways. First, we may consider in it that in which the image 
chiefly consists, that is, the intellectual nature. Thus the 
image of God is more perfect in the angels than in man, 
because their intellectual nature is more perfect, as is clear 
from what has been said (Q. LVIII., A. 3; Q. LXXIX., 
A. 8). Secondly, we may consider the image of God in 
man as regards its accidental qualities, so far as to observe 
in man a certain imitation of God, consisting in the fact 
that man proceeds from man, as God from God ; and also in 
the fact that the whole human soul is in the whole body, 
and again, in every part, as God is in regard to the whole 
world. In these and the like things the image of God is 
more perfect in man than it is in the angels. But these do 
not of themselves belong to the nature of the Divine image 
in man, unless we presuppose the first likeness, which is in 
the intellectual nature; otherwise even brute animals 
would be to God's image. Therefore, as in their intel- 
lectual nature, the angels are more to the image of God 
than man is, we must grant that, absolutely speaking, the 
angels are more to the image of God than man is, but that 
in some respects man is more like to God. 

Reply Obj. i. Augustine excludes the inferior creatures 



Q. 93- Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA" 288 

bereft of reason from the image of God; but not the 
angels. 

Reply Ohj. 2. As fire is said to be specifically the most 
subtle of bodies, while, nevertheless, one kind of fire is 
more subtle than another; so we say that nothing is more 
like to God than the human soul in its generic and intel- 
lectual nature, because as Augustine had said previously, 
things which have knoivledge, are so near to Him in like- 
ness thai of all creatures none are nearer. Wherefore this 
does not mean that the angels are not more to God's image. 

Reply Ohj. 3. When we say that substance does not 
admit of more or less, we do not mean that one species of 
substance is not more perfect than another; but that one 
and the same individual does not participate in its specific 
nature at one time more than at another ; nor do we mean 
that a species of substance is shared among different indi- 
viduals in a greater or lesser degree. 



Fourth Article, 
whether the image of god is found in every man? 

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : — 

Objection i. It would seem that the image of God is not 
found in every man. For the Apostle says that man is the 
image of God, but woman is the image (Vulg., glory) of 
man (i Cor. xi. 7). Therefore, as woman is an individual 
of the human species, it is clear that every individual is not 
an image of God. 

Obj. 2. Further, the Apostle says (Rom. viii, 29) : Whom 
God foreknew, He also predestinated to be made conform- 
able to the image of His Son. But all men are not predes- 
tinated. Therefore all men have not the conformity of image. 

Ohj. 3. Further, likeness belongs to the nature of the 
image, as above explained (A. i). But by sin man becomes 
unlike God. Therefore he loses the image of God. 

On the contrary, it is written (Ps. xxxviii. 7) : Surely man 
passeth as an image. 



289 PRODUCTION OF MAN Q. 93- Art. 4 

/ answer that, Since man is said to be to the image of 
God by reason of his intellectual nature, he is the most 
perfectly like God according to that in which he can best 
imitate God in his intellectual nature. Now the intellectual 
nature imitates God chiefly in this, that God understands 
and loves Himself. Wherefore we see that the image of 
God is in man in three ways. First, inasmuch as man 
possesses a natural aptitude for understanding and loving 
God; and this aptitude consists in the very nature of the 
mind, which is common to all men. Secondly, inasmuch as 
man actually or habitually knows and loves God, though 
imperfectly ; and this image consists in the conformity of 
grace. Thirdly, inasmuch as man knows and loves God 
perfectly ; and this image consists in the likeness of glory. 
Wherefore on the words. The light of Thy countenance, O 
Lord, is signed upon us (Ps. iv. 7), the gloss distinguishes 
a threefold image, of creation, of re-creation, and of like- 
ness. The first is found in all men, the second only in the 
just, the third only in the blessed. 

Reply Obj. i. The image of God, in its principal signifi- 
cation, namely the intellectual nature, is found both in man 
and in woman. Hence after the words, To the image of 
God He created him, it is added, Male and female He 
created them (Gen. i. 27). Moreover it is said them in the 
plural, as Augustine {Gen. ad lit, iii. 22) remarks, lest it 
should be thought that both sexes were united in one indi- 
vidual. But in a secondary sense the image of God is 
found in man, and not in woman : for man is the beginning 
and end of woman ; as God is the beginning and end of 
every creature. So when the Apostle had said that man is 
the image and glory of God, but woman is the glory of 
man, he adds his reason for saying this : For man is not of 
woman, hut woman of man; and man was not created for 
woman, but woman for man. 

Reply Objs. 2 and 3. These reasons refer to the image 
consisting in the conformity of grace and glory. 



1.4 



19 



Q. 93 Art. 5 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 290 



Fifth Article. 

whether the image of god is in man according to the 

trinity of persons ? 

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article: — 

Objection i. It would seem that the image of God does 
not exist in man as to the Trinity of Persons. For Augus- 
tine says (Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum, i.) : One in 
essence is the Godhead of the Holy Trinity ; and one is the 
image to which man ivas made. And Hilary {De Trin. v.) 
*ays : Man is made to the image of that ivhich is common 
in the Trinity. Therefore the image of God in man is of 
the Divine Essence, and not of the Trinity of Persons. 

Obj. 2. Further, it is said (De Eccl. Dogmat.) that the 
image of God in man is to be referred to eternity. Damas- 
cene also says {De Fid. Orth. ii. 12) that the image of God 
in man belongs to him as an intelligent being endowed 
with free-will and self -movement. Gregory of Nyssa {De 
Homin. Opificio, xvi.) also asserts that, when Scripture 
says that man was made to the ijyiage of God, it means that 
human nature was made a participator of all good: for the 
Godhead is the fulness of goodness. Now all these things 
belong more to the unity of the Essence than to the dis- 
tinction of the Persons. Therefore the image of God in 
man regards, not the Trinity of Persons, but the unity of 
the Essence. 

Obj. 3. Further, an image leads to the knowledge of that 
of which it is the image. Therefore, if there is in man the 
image of God as to the Trinity of Persons ; since man can 
know himself by his natural reason, it follows that by his 
natural knowledge man could know the Trinity of the 
Divine Persons ; which is untrue, as was shown above 
(Q. XXXH., A. i). 

Obj. 4. Further, the name of Image is not applicable to 
any of the Three Persons, but only to the Son ; for Augus- 
tine says {De Trin. vi. 2) that the Son alone is the image of 
the Father. Therefore, if in man there were an image of 



291 PRODUCTION OF MAN Q- 93 Art. 5 

God as regards the Person, this would not be an image of 
the Trinity, but only of the Son. 

On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. iv.) : The 
plurality of the Divine Persons is proved from the fact that 
man is said to have been made to the image of God. 

I ansiver that, as we have seen (Q. XL., A. 2), the dis- 
tinction of the Divine Persons is only according to origin, 
or, rather, relations of origin. Now the mode of origin is 
not the same in all things, but in each thing is adapted to 
the nature thereof; animated things being produced in one 
way, and inanimate in another; animals in one way, and 
plants in another. Wherefore it is manifest that the dis- 
tinction of the Divine Persons is suitable to the Divine 
Nature ; and therefore to be to the image of God by imita- 
tion of the Divine Nature does not exclude being to the 
same image by the representation of the Divine Persons : 
but rather one follows from the other. We must, therefore, 
say that in man there exists the image of God, both as 
regards the Divine Nature and as regards the Trinity of 
Persons; for also in God Himself there is one Nature in 
Three Persons. 

Thus it is clear how to solve the first two objections. 

Reply Ohj. 3. This argument would avail if the image of 
God in man represented God in a perfect manner. But, 
as Augustine says (De Trin. xv. 6), there is a great dif- 
ference between the trinity within ourselves and the Divine 
Trinity. Therefore, as he there says : We see, rather than 
believe, the trinity which is in ourselves ; whereas we believe 
rather than see that God is Trinity. 

Reply Obj. 4. Some have said that in man there is an 
image of the Son only. Augustine rejects this opinion 
(De Trin. xii. 5, 6). First, because as the Son is like to the 
Father by a likeness of essence, it would follow of necessity 
if man were made in likeness to the Son, that he is made to 
the likeness of the Father. Secondly, because if man were 
made only to the image of the Son, the Father would not 
have said. Let Us make man to Our oivn image and like- 
ness; but to Thy image. When, therefore, it is written, 



Q 93- Art. 6 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 292 

He made hun to the image of God, the sense is not that the 
Father made man to the image of the Son only, Who is 
God, as some explained it, but that the Divine Trinity made 
man to Its image, that is, of the whole Trinity. When it 
is said that God made man to His image, this can be under- 
stood in two ways : first, so that this preposition to points 
to the term of the making, and then the sense is. Let Us 
make man in such a way that Our image may be in him. 
Secondly, this preposition to may point to the exemplar 
cause, as when we say. This book is made (like) to that 
one. Thus the image of God is the very Essence of God, 
Which is incorrectly called an image forasmuch as image 
is put for the exemplar. Or, as some say, the Divine 
Essence is called an image because thereby one Person 
imitates another. 

Sixth Article. 

whether the image of god is in man as regards 

the mind only? 

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article: — 

Objection i. It would seem that the image of God is not 
only in man's mind. For the Apostle says (i Cor. xi. 7) 
that the man is the image . . . of God. But man is not only 
mind. Therefore the image of God is to be observed not 
only in his mind. 

Obj. 2. Further, it is written (Gen. i. 27) : God created 
man to His own image; to the image of God He created 
him; male and female He created them. But the distinction 
of male and female is in the body. Therefore the image of 
God is also in the body, and not only in the mind. 

Obj. 3. Further, an image seems to apply principally to 
the shape of a thing. But shape belongs to the body. 
Therefore the image of God is to be seen in man's body 
also, and not only in his mind. 

Obj. 4. Further, according to Augustine {Gen. ad lit. xii. 
7, 24) there is a threefold vision in us, corporeal, spiritual, 
or imaginary, and intellectual. Therefore, if in the intel- 



293 PRODUCTION OF iMAN Q. 93- Art. 6 

lectual vision that belongs to the mind there exists in us a 
trinity by reason of which we are made to the image of 
God, for the like reason there must be another trinity in the 
others. 

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. iv. 23, 24) : 
Be reneived in the spirit of your mind, and put on the new 
man. Whence we are given to understand that our renewal 
which consists in putting on the new man, belongs to the 
mind. Now, hesays(Col. iii. 10) : Putting on the new man ; 
him who is renewed unto knowledge of God, according to 
the image of Him that created him, where the renewal which 
consists in putting on the new man is ascribed to the image 
of God. Therefore to be to the image of God belongs to 
the mind only. 

/ answer that, While in all creatures there is some kind of 
likeness to God, in the rational creature alone we find a 
likeness of image as we have explained above (AA. i, 2); 
whereas in other creatures we find a likeness by way of a 
trace. Now the intellect or mind is that whereby the 
rational creature excels other creatures ; wherefore this image 
of God is not found even in the rational creature except in 
the mind; while in the other parts, which the rational 
creature may happen to possess, we find the likeness of a 
trace, as in other creatures to which, in reference to such 
parts, the rational creature can be likened. We may easily 
understand the reason of this if we consider the way in 
which a trace, and the way in which an image, represents 
anything. An image represents something by likeness in 
species, as we have said ; while a trace represents something 
by way of an effect, which represents the cause in such a 
way as not to attain to the likeness of species. For imprints 
which are left by the movements of animals are called 
traces: so also ashes are a trace of fire, and desolation of 
the land a trace of a hostile army. 

Therefore we may observe this difference between rational 
creatures and others, both as to the representation of the 
likeness of the Divine Nature in creatures, and as to the 
representation in them of the uncreated Trinity. For as to 



Q. 93- Art. 6 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA" 294 

the likeness of the Divine Nature, rational creatures seem to 
attain, after a fashion, to the representation of the species, 
inasmuch as they imitate God, not only in being and life, 
but also in intelligence, as above explained (A. 2) ; whereas 
other creatures do not understand, although we observe in 
them a certain trace of the Intellect that created them, if 
we consider their disposition. Likewise, as the uncreated 
Trinity is distinguished by the procession of the Word from 
the Speaker, and of Love from both of these, as we have 
seen (O. XXVIIL, A. 3); so we may say that in rational 
creatures wherein we find a procession of the word in the 
intellect, and a procession of the love in the will, there exists 
an image of the uncreated Trinity, by a certain representa- 
tion of the species. In other creatures, however, we do not 
find the principle of the word, and the word and love; but 
we do see in them a certain trace of the existence of these in 
the Cause that produced them. For the fact that a creature 
has a modified and finite nature, proves that it proceeds 
from a principle; while its species points to the (mental) 
word of the maker, just as the shape of a house points to the 
idea of the architect; and order points to the maker's love 
by reason of which he directs the effect to a good end; as 
also the use of the house points to the will of the architect. 
So we find in man a likeness to God by way of an image in 
his mind ; but in the other parts of his being by way of a 
trace. 

Reply Obj. i. Man is called the image of God; not that 
he is essentially an image ; but that the image of God is im- 
pressed on his mind; as a coin is an image of the king, as 
having the image of the king. Wherefore there is no need 
to consider the image of God as existing in every part of 
man. 

Reply Ohj. 2. As Augustine says {De Trin. xii. 5), some 
have thought that the image of God was not in man indi- 
vidually, but severally. They held that the man represents 
the Person of the Father; those horn of man denote the 
person of the Son; and that the ivo7nan is a third person in 
likeness to the Holy Ghost, since she so proceeded from man 



295 PRODUCTION OF MAN Q. 93- Art. 6 

as not to he his son or daughter. All of this is manifestly 
absurd ; first, because it would follow that the Holy Ghost 
is the principle of the Son, as the woman is the principle of 
the man's offspring; secondly, because one man would be 
only the image of one Person ; thirdly, because in that case 
Scripture should not have mentioned the image of God in 
man until after the birth of the offspring. Therefore we 
must understand that when Scripture had said, to the image 
of God He created him, it added, male and female He 
created them, not to imply that the image of God came 
through the distinction of sex, but that the image of God 
belongs to both sexes, since it is in the mind, wherein there 
is no sexual distinction. Wherefore the Apostle (Col. iii. 
10), after saying. According to the image of Him that 
created him, added, Where there is neither male nor female* 
(Vulg., neither Gentile nor Jew). 

Reply Obj. 3. Although the image of God in man is not 
to be found in his bodily shape, yet because the body of 
man alone among terrestrial animals is not inclined prone to 
the ground, but is adapted to look upward to heaven, for this 
reason we may rightly say that it is made to God's image 
and likeness, rather than the bodies of other animals, as 
Augustine remarks (QQ. LXXXIII.; qu. 51). But this is 
not to be understood as though the image of God were in 
man's body; but in the sense that the very shape of the 
human body represents the image of God in the soul by 
way of a trace. 

Reply Obj. 4. Both in the corporeal and in the imaginary 
vision we may find a trinity, as Augustine says {De Trin. 
xi. 2). For in corporeal vision there is first the species of 
the exterior body; secondly, the act of vision, which occurs 
by the impression on the sight of a certain likeness of the 
said species ; thirdly, the intention of the will applying the 
sight to see, and to rest on what is seen. 

Likewise, in the imaginary vision we find first the species 
kept in the memory; secondly, the vision itself, which is 
caused by the penetrative power of the soul, that is, the 
* These words are in reality from Gal. iii. 28. 



Q. 93. Art. 7 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA" 296 

faculty of imngination, informed by the species; and 
thirdly, we find the intention of the will joining both 
together. But each of these trinities falls short of the 
Divine image. For the species of the external body is 
extrinsic to the essence of the soul ; while the species in the 
memory, though not extrinsic to the soul, is adventitious to 
it; and thus in both cases the species falls short of repre- 
senting the connaturality and co-eternity of the Divine 
Persons. The corporeal vision, too, does not proceed only 
from the species of the external body, but from this, and at 
the same time from the sense of the seer; in like manner 
imaginary vision is not from the species only which is pre- 
served in the memory, but also from the imagination. For 
these reasons the procession of the Son from the Father 
alone is not suitably represented. Lastly the intention of 
the will joining the two together, does not proceed from 
them either in corporeal or spiritual vision. Wherefore the 
procession of the Holy Ghost from the Father and the Son 
is not thus properly represented. 

Seventh Article. 

WHETHER the IMAGE OF GOD IS TO BE FOUND IN THE ACTS 

OF THE SOUL? 

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article: — 

Objection i. It would seem that the image of God is not 
found in the acts of the soul. For Augustine says {De Civ. 
Dei xi. 26), that man ivas made to God's image, inasinuch 
as we exist and kno'iv that ive exist, and love this existence 
and knoivledge. But to exist does not signify an act. 
Therefore the image of God is not to be found in the soul's 
acts. 

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine (De Trin. ix. 4) assigns God's 
image in the soul to these three things — mind, knowledge, 
and love. But mind does not signify an act, but rather the 
power or the essence of the intellectual soul. Therefore 
the image of God does not extend to the acts of the soul. 

Obj. 3. Further, Augustine (De Trin. x. 11) assigns the 



297 PRODUCTION OF MAN Q. 93- Art. 7 

image of the Trinity in the soul to meviory, understanding, 
and ivill. But these three are natural poivers of the soul, as 
the Master of the Sentences says (i Sent., D. iii.). There- 
fore the image of God is in the powers, and does not extend 
to the acts of the soul. 

Obj. 4. Further, the image of the Trinity always remains 
in the soul. But an act does not always remain. Therefore 
the image of God does not extend to the acts. 

On the contrary, Augustine (De Trin. xi. 2 seqq.) assigns 
the trinity in the lower part of the soul, in relation to the 
actual vision, whether sensible or imaginative. Therefore, 
also, the trinity in the mind, by reason of which man is like 
to God's image, must be referred to actual vision. 

/ answer that. As above explained (A. 2), a certain repre- 
sentation of the species belongs to the nature of an image. 
Hence, if the image of the Divine Trinity is to be found in 
the soul, we must look for it where the soul approaches the 
nearest to a representation of the species of the Divine 
Persons. Now the Divine Persons are distinct from each 
other by reason of the procession of the Word from the 
Speaker, and the procession of Love connecting Both. But 
in our soul word cannot exist ivithout actual thought, as 
Augustine says (De Trin. xiv. 7). Therefore, first and 
chiefly, the image of the Trinity is to be found in the acts 
of the soul, that is, inasmuch as from the knowledge which 
we possess, by actual thought we form an internal word; 
and thence break forth into love. But, since the principles 
of acts are the habits and powers, and everything exists 
virtually in its principle, therefore, secondarily and conse- 
quently, the image of the Trinity may be considered as 
existing in the powers, and still more in the habits, foras- 
much as the acts virtually exist therein. 

Reply Obj. I. Our being bears the image of God so far 
as it is proper to us, and excels that of the other animals, 
that is to say, in so far as we are endowed with a mind. 
Therefore, this trinity is the same as that which Augustine 
mentions {De Trin. ix. 4), and which consists in mind, 
knowledge, and love. 



Q. 93- Art. 7 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 298 

Reply Obj. 2. Augustine observed this trinity, first, as 
existing in the mind. But because the mind, though it 
knows itself entirely in a certain degree, yet also in a way 
does not know itself — namely, as being distinct from others 
(and thus also it searches itself, as Augustine subsequently 
proves — De Trin. x. 3, 4); therefore, as though knowledge 
were not in equal proportion to mind, he takes three things 
in the soul which are proper to the mind, namely, memory, 
understanding, and will ; which everyone is conscious of 
possessing; and assigns the image of the Trinity pre- 
eminently to these three, as though the first assignation 
were in part deficient. 

Reply Obj. 3. As Augustine proves {De Trin. xiv. 7), we 
may be said to understand, will^ and to love certain things, 
both when we actually consider them, and when we do not 
think of them. When they are not under our actual con- 
sideration, they are objects of our memory only, which, 
in his opinion, is nothing else than habitual retention of 
knowledge and love.* But since, as he says, a ivord cannot 
be there ivithout actual thought (for ive think everything 
that ive say, even if we speak with that interior word belong- 
ing to no nation's tongue), this image chiefly consists in 
these three things, memory, understanding, and will. And 
bv understanding I mean here that whereby we understand 
with actual thought; and by will, love, or dilection I mean 
that which unites this child with its parent. From which it 
is clear that he places the image of the Divine Trinity more 
in actual understanding and will, than in these as existing 
in the habitual retention of the memory ; although even 
thus the image of the Trinity exists in the soul in a certain 
degree, as he says in the same place. Thus it is clear that 
memory, understanding, and will are not three powers as 
stated in the Sentences. 

^'^''ply Obj. 4. Someone might answer by referring to 
Augus jjj^g.g statement {De Trin. xiv. 6), that the mind ever 
remem ^ itself, ever understands itself, ever loves itself; 

whicn ^-jtake to mean that the soul ever actually under- 

* C/. Q. LXXIX., A. 7, ad i. 



299 PRODUCTION OF MAN Q. 93- Art. 8 

stands, and loves itself. But he excludes this interpreta- 
tion by adding that it does not always think of itself as 
actually distinct from other things. Thus it is clear that the 
soul always understands and loves itself, not actually but 
habitually; though we might say that by perceiving its 
own act, it understands itself whenever it understands 
anything. But since it is not always actually understand- 
ing, as in the case of sleep, we must say that these acts, 
although not always actually existing, yet ever exist in their 
principles, the habits and powers. Wherefore, Augustine 
says {De Trin. xiv. 4) : // the rational soul is made to the 
image of God in the sense that it can make use of reason 
and intellect to understand and consider God, then the 
image of God was in the soul from the beginning of its 
existence. 



Eighth Article. 

whether the image of the divine trinity is in the soul 
only by comparison with god as its object? 

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article: — 

Objection i. It would seem that the image of the Divine 
Trinity is in the soul not only by comparison with God as 
its object. For the image of the Divine Trinity is to be 
found in the soul, as shown above (A. 7), according as the 
word in us proceeds from the speaker; and love from both. 
But this is to be found in us as regards any object. There- 
fore the image of the Divine Trinity is in our mind as 
regards any object. 

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says {De Trin. xii. 4) that 
when we seek trinity in the soul, we seek it in the whole of 
the soul, without separating the process of reasoning in 
temporal matters from the consideration of things eternal. 
Therefore the image of the Trinity is to be found in the 
soul, even as regards temporal objects. 

Obj. 3. Further, it is by grace that we can know and love 
God. If, therefore, the image of the Trinity is found in the 
soul by reason of the memory, understanding, and will or 



Q.93. Art. 8 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA" 300 

love of God, this image is not in man by nature but by 
grace, and thus is not common to all. 

Obj. 4. Further, the saints in heaven are most perfectly 
conformed to the image of God by the beatific vision ; where- 
fore it is written (2 Cor. iii. 18) : We . . . are transformed 
into the same image jrom glory to glory. But temporal 
things are known by the beatific vision. Therefore the 
image of God exists in us even according to temporal things. 

On the contrary, Augustine says {De Trin. xiv. 12) : The 
image of God exists in the mind, not because it has a re- 
membrance of itself, loves itself, and understands itself ; but 
because it can also remember, understand, and love God 
by Whom it was made. Much less, therefore, is the image 
of God in the soul, in respect of other objects. 

/ ajiswer that, As above explained (AA. 2, 7), image 
means a likeness which in some degree, however small, 
attains to a representation of the species. Wherefore we 
need to seek in the image of the Divine Trinity in the soul 
some kind of representation of species of the Divine Per- 
sons, so far as this is possible to a creature. Now the 
Divine Persons, as above 'stated (AA. 6, 7), are distin- 
guished from each other acf ording to the procession of the 
word from the speaker, and the procession of love from 
both. Moreover the Wore of God is born of God by the 
knowledge of Himself; a- d Love proceeds from God ac- 
cording as He loves Hims .If. But it is clear that diversity 
of objects diversifies the pecies of word and love; for in 
the human mind the speues of a stone is specifically dif- 
ferent fro ^^_ h'^ a- n *-"^^^'' while also the love regarding 

each o^ ', • ^.^.o/^jfi/ally different. Hence we refer the 
_ . . . i them IS specinc -^ 

Div»' . • ^^„ *^ the verbal concept born of the 

.^^•.ne image m man to j • j .u r tu 

•'" , J t n^A „„^ tr^ t'le love derived therefrom. 1 hus 
.knowledge of God, and to ti .. 1 

r r^^A ic- fr.,.nH Jr! the soul according as the soul 
the image of God is touna in , f . 

r- A r.,. r^r^cc^ccpt; fl ^ature that enables it to turn 
turns to God, or possesses a . , . . 

to God Now the mind may tu^n towards an object in two 
ways • directly and immediate!)', or indirectly and medi- 
atelv • as, for instance, when anyone sees a -^,an reflected in 
a looking-glass he may be said to be turned towards that 



30I PRODUCTION OF MAN Q. 93- Art. 8 

man. So Augustine says {De Trin. xiv. 8), that the mind 
remembers itself, understands itself, and loves itself. If 
we perceive this, ive perceive a trinity, not, indeed, God, 
but, nevertheless, rightly called the image of God. But 
this is due to the fact, not that the mind reflects on itself 
absolutely, but that thereby it can furthermore turn to 
God, as appears from the authority quoted above (Arg. On 
the contrary). 

Reply Obj. i . For the notion of an image it is not enough 
that something proceed from another, but it is also neces- 
sary to observe what proceeds and whence it proceeds ; 
namely, that what is Word of God proceeds from know- 
ledge of God. 

Reply Obj. 2. In all the soul we may see a kind of trinity, 
not, however, as though besides the action of temporal 
things and the contemplation of eternal things, any third 
thing should be required to make up the trinity, as he adds 
in the same passage. But in that part of the reason which 
is concerned with temporal things, although a trijiity may 
be found, yet the image of God is not to be seen there, as he 
says farther on ; forasmuch as this knowledge of temporal 
things is adventitious to the soul. Moreover even the habits 
whereby temporal things are known are not always present ; 
but sometimes they are actually present, and sometimes 
present only in memory even after they begin to exist in 
the soul. Such is clearly the case with faith, which comes 
to us temporally for this present life; while in the future 
life faith will no longer exist, but only the remembrance of 
faith. 

Reply Obj. 3. The meritorious knowledge and love of 
God can be in us only by grace. Yet there is a certain 
natural knowledge and love as seen above (Q. XII., A. 12 ; 
Q. LVL, A. 3; Q. LX., A. 5). This, too, is natural that 
the mind, in order to understand God, can make use of 
reason, in which sense we have already said that the image 
of God abides ever in the soul ; whether this image of God 
he so obsolete, as it were clouded, as almost to amount to 
nothing, as in those who have not the use of reason ; or 



Q. 93. Art. 9 THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 302 

obscured and disfigured, as in sinners; or clear and beauti- 
ful, as in the just ; as Augustine says {De Trin. xiv. 6). 

Reply Obj. 4. By the vision of glory temporal things will 
be seen in God Himself; and such a vision of things tem- 
poral will belong to the image of God. This is what Augus- 
tine means (ibid.), when he says that in that nature to which 
the mind ivill blissfully adhere, whatever it sees it will see 
as unchangeable ; for in the Uncreated Word are the types 
of all creatures. 

Ninth Article. 

whether '* likeness " is properly distinguished from 

"image"? 

We -proceed thus to the Ninth Article: — 

Objection i. It would seem that likeness is not properly 
distinguished from image. For genus is not properly dis- 
tinguished from species. Now, likeness is to image as 
genus to species : because, where there is image, forthwith 
there is likeness, but not conversely as Augustine says (QQ. 
LXXXHI.; qu. 74). Therefore likeness is not properly to 
be distinguished from image. 

Obj. 2. Further, the nature of the image consists not only 
in the representation of the Divine Persons, but also in the 
representation of the Divine Essence, to which representa- 
tion belong immortality and indivisibility. So it is not true 
to say that the likeness is in the essence because it is im- 
mortal and indivisible ; whereas the image is in other things 
(2 Sent., D. xvi.). 

Obj. 3. Further, the image of God in man is threefold, — 
the image of nature, of grace and of glory, as above ex- 
plained (A. 4). But innocence and righteousness belong to 
grace. Therefore it is incorrectly said (ibid.) that the image 
is taken from the memory, the understanding, and the will, 
while the likeness is from innocence and righteousness. 

Obj. 4. Further, knowledge of truth belongs to the 
intellect, and love of virtue to the will; which two things 
are parts of the image. Therefore it is incorrect to say 



303 PRODUCTION OF MAN Q. 93- Art. 9 

(ibid.) that the image consists in the knoivledge of truth, 
and the likeness in the love of virtue. 

On the contrary, Augustine says (QQ. LXXXIIL; qu. 
51) : Some consider that these two ivere mentioned not 
without reason, namely ' image ' and ' likeness/ since, if 
they meant the same, one would have sufficed. 

I answer that. Likeness is a kind of unity, for oneness in 
quality causes likeness, as the Philosopher says {Metaph. 
v.. Did. iv. 15). Now, since one is a transcendental, it is 
both common to all, and adapted to each single thing, just 
as the good and the true. Wherefore, as the good can be 
compared to each individual thing both as its preamble, and 
as subsequent to it, as signifying some perfection in it, so 
also in the same way there exists a kind of comparison 
between likeness and image. For the good is a preamble 
to man, inasmuch as man is an individual good ; and, again, 
the good is subsequent to man, inasmuch as we may say of 
a certain man that he is good, by reason of his perfect 
virtue. In like manner, likeness may be considered in the 
light of a preamble to image, inasmuch as it is something 
more general than image, as we have said above (A. i) ; 
and, again, it may be considered as subsequent to image, 
inasmuch as it signifies a certain perfection of image. For 
we say that an image is like or unlike what it represents, 
according as the representation is perfect or imperfect. 
Thus likeness may be distinguished from image in two 
ways : first as its preamble and existing in more things, and 
in this sense likeness regards things which are more common 
than the intellectual properties, wherein the image is pro- 
perly to be seen. In this sense it is stated (QQ. LXXXIII. ; 
qu. 51) that the spirit (namely, the mind) without doubt was 
made to the image of God. But the other parts of man, 
belonging to the soul's inferior faculties, or even to the 
body, are in the opinion of some made to God's likeness. 
In this sense he says (De Quant. AnimcB ii.) that the like- 
ness of God is found in the soul's incorruptibility; for cor- 
ruptible and incorruptible are differences of universal beings. 
But likeness may be considered in another way, as signify- 



Q. 93- Art. 9 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 304 

ing the expression and perfection of the image. In this 
sense Damascene says {De Fid. Orth. ii. 12) that the image 
implies an ifitelUgent being, endoived with free-will and 
self-movement, whereas likeness implies a likeness of power, 
as far as this may be possible in man. In the same sense 
likeness is said to belong to the love of virtue: for there is 
no virtue without love of virtue. 

Reply Obj. i. Likeness is not distinct from image in the 
general notion of likeness (for thus it is included in image) ; 
but so far as any likeness falls short of image, or again, as 
it perfects the idea of image. 

Reply Obj. 2. The soul's essence belongs to the image, 
as representing the Divine Essence in those things which 
belong to the intellectual nature; but not in those condi- 
tions subsequent to general notions of being, such as sim- 
plicity and indissolubility. 

Reply Obj. 3. Even certain virtues are natural to the 
soul, at least, in their seeds, by reason of which we may 
say that a natural likeness exists in the soul. Nor is it 
unfitting to use the term iynage from one point of view, and 
from another the term likeness. 

Reply Obj. 4. Love of the word, which is knowledge 
loved, belongs to the nature of image; but love of virtue 
belongs to likeness, as virtue itself belongs to likeness. 



QUESTION XCIV. 

OF THE STATE AND CONDITION OF THE FIRST MAN AS 
REGARDS HIS INTELLECT. 

{In Four Articles.) 

We next consider the state or condition of the first man ; 
first, as regards his soul; secondly as regards his body. 
Concerning the first there are two things to be considered : 
(i) The condition of man as to his intellect; (2) the con- 
dition of man as to his will. 

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry : 
(i) Whether the first man saw the Essence of God? 
(2) Whether he could see the separate substances, that 
is, the angels ? (3) Whether he possessed all knowledge ? 
(4) Whether he could err or be deceived ? 

First Article, 
whether the first man saw god through his essence? 

We proceed thus to the First Article: — 

Objection i. It would seem that the first man saw God 
through His Essence. For man's happiness consists in the 
vision of the Divine Essence. But the first man, while 
established in Paradise, led a life of happiness in the enjoy- 
ment of all things, as Damascene says {De Fid. Orth. ii. 1 1). 
And Augustine says {De Civ. Dei xiv. 10) : 7/ man was 
gifted with the same tastes as now, how happy must he 
have been in Paradise, that place of ineffable happiness ! 
Therefore the first man in Paradise saw God through His 
Essence. 

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says {De Civ. Dei xiv. loc. 
cit.) that the first man lacked nothing which his good-will 
might obtain. But our good-will can obtain nothing better 

1. 4 305 20 



Q. 94- Art. I THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA" 306 

than the vision of the Divine Essence. Therefore man saw 
God through His Essence. 

Obj. 3. Further, the vision of God in His Essence is 
whereby God is seen without a medium or enigma. But 
man in the state of innocence saw God immediately, as the 
Master of the Sentences asserts (4 Sent., D, i.). He also 
saw without an enigma, for an enigma implies obscurity, 
as Augustine says {De Trin. xv. 9). Now, obscurity 
resulted from sin. Therefore man in the primitive state 
saw God through His Essence. 

On the contrary. The Apostle says (i Cor. xv. 46) : That 
ivas not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural. 
But to see God through His Essence is most spiritual. 
Therefore the first man in the primitive state of his natural 
life did not see God through His Essence. 

/ answer that, The first man did not see God through 
His Essence if we consider the ordinary state of that life; 
unless, perhaps, it be said that he saw God in a vision, 
when God cast a deep sleep upon Adam (Gen. ii. 21). The 
reason is because, since in the Divine Essence is beatitude 
itself, the intellect of a man who sees the Divine Essence 
has the same relation to God as a man has to beatitude. 
Now it is clear that man cannot willingly be turned away 
from beatitude, since naturally and necessarily he desires 
it, and shuns unhappiness. Wherefore no one who sees 
the Essence of God can willingly turn away from God, 
which means to sin. Hence all who see God through His 
Essence are so firmly established in the love of God, that 
for eternity they can never sin. Therefore, as Adam did 
sin, it is clear that he did not see God through His Essence. 

Nevertheless he knew God with a more perfect knowledge 
than we do now. Thus in a sense his knowledge was mid- 
way between our knowledge in the present state, and the 
knowledge we shall have in heaven, when we see God 
through His Essence. To make this clear, we must con- 
sider that the vision of God through His Essence is contra- 
distinguished from the vision of God through His creatures. 
Now the higher the creature is, and the more like it is to 



307 INTELLECT OF FIRST MAN Q- 94- Art. i 

God, the more clearly is God seen in it ; for instance, a man 
is seen more clearly through a mirror in which his image is 
the more clearly expressed. Thus God is seen in a much 
more perfect manner through His intelligible effects than 
through those which are only sensible or corporeal. But in 
his present state man is impeded as regards the full and 
clear consideration of intelligible creatures, because he is 
distracted by and occupied with sensible things. Now, it 
is written (Eccles. vii. 30) : God made man right. And man 
was made right by God in this sense, that in him the lower 
powers were subjected to the higher, and the higher nature 
was made so as not to be impeded by the lower. Where- 
fore the first man was not impeded by exterior things from 
a clear and steady contemplation of the intelligible effects 
which he perceived by the radiation of the first truth, 
whether by a natural or by a gratuitous knowledge. Hence 
Augustine says {Gen. ad lit. xi. 33) that, perhaps God tised 
to speak to the first man as He speaks to the angels; by 
shedding on his mind a ray of the unchangeable truth, yet 
without bestotving on him the experience oj which the angels 
are capable in the participation oj the Divine Essence. 
Therefore, through these intelligible effects of God, man 
knew God then more clearly than we know Him now. 

Reply Obj. i. Man was happy in Paradise, but not with 
that perfect happiness to which he was destined, which 
consists in the vision of the Divine Essence. He was, 
however, endowed with a life of happiness in a certain 
measure, as Augustine says {ibid., 18), so far as he was 
gifted with natural integrity and perfection. 

Reply Obj. 2. A good will is a well-ordered will ; but the 
will of the first man would have been ill-ordered had he 
wished to have, while in the state of merit, what had been 
promised to him as a reward. 

Reply Obj. 3. A medium (of knowledge) is twofold; one 
through which, and, at the same time, in which, something 
is seen, as, for example, a man is seen through a mirror, 
and is seen with the mirror : another kind of medium is 
that whereby we attain to the knowledge of something 



Q. 94- Art. 2 THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 308 

unknown; such as the medium in a demonstration. God 
was seen without this second kind of medium, but not 
without the first kind. For there was no need for the first 
man to attain to the knowledge of God by demonstration 
drawn from an effect, such as we need; since he knew God 
simultaneously in His effects, especially in the intelligible 
effects, according to His capacity. Again, we must remark 
that the obscurity which is implied in the word enigma may 
be of two kinds : first, so far as every creature is something 
obscure when compared with the immensity of the Divine 
light; and thus Adam saw God in an enigma, because 
he saw Him in a created eEect : secondly, we may take 
obscurity as an effect of sin, so far as man is impeded in 
the consideration of intelligible things by being preoccupied 
with sensible things; in which sense Adam did not see God 
in an enigma. 



Second Article. 

whether adam in the state of innocence saw the 
angels through their essence? 

We proceed thus to the Second Article: — 

Objection i. It would seem that Adam, in the state of 
innocence, saw the angels through their essence. For 
Gregory says (Dialog, iv. i) : In Paradise man was accus- 
tomed to enjoy the words of God ; and by purity of heart and 
loftiness of vision to have the company of the good 
angels. 

Obj. 2. Further, the soul in the present state is impeded 
from the knowledge of separate substances by union with a 
corruptible body which is a load upon the soul, as is written 
Wisdom ix. 15. Wherefore the separate soul can see 
separate substances, as above explained (Q. LXXXIX., 
A. 2). But the body of the first man was not a load upon 
his soul; for the latter was not corruptible. Therefore he 
was able to see separate substances. 

Obj. 3. Further, one separate substance knows another 



I 



309 INTELLECT OF FIRST MAN Q. 94- Art. 2 

separate substance, by knowing itself {De Causis xiii.). 
But the soul of the first man knew itself. Therefore it 
knew separate substances. 

Oti the contrary, The soul of Adam was of the same 
nature as ours. But our souls cannot now understand 
separate substances. Therefore neither could Adam's soul. 

/ ansiver that, The state of the human soul may be dis- 
tinguished in two ways. First, from a diversity of mode in 
its natural existence ; and in this point the state of the 
separate soul is distinguished from the state of the soul 
joined to the body. Secondly, the state of the soul is dis- 
tinguished in relation to integrity and corruption, the state 
of natural existence remaining the same : and thus the state 
of innocence is distinct from the state of man after sin. For 
man's soul, in the state of innocence, was adapted to perfect 
and govern the body ; wherefore the first man is said to 
have been made into a living soul; that is, a soul giving life 
to the body, — namely animal life. But he was endowed 
with integrity as to this life, in that the body was entirely 
subject to the soul, hindering it in no way, as we have 
said above (A. i). Now it is clear from what has been 
already said (Q. LXXXIV., A. 7; Q. LXXXV., A. i; 
Q. LXXXIX., A. i) that since the soul is adapted to perfect 
and govern the body, as regards animal life, it is fitting that 
it should have that mode of understanding which is by 
turning to phantasms. Wherefore this mode of under- 
standing was becoming to the soul of the first man also. 

Now, in virtue of this mode of understanding, there are 
three degrees of movement in the soul, as Dionysius says 
{Div. Nam. iv.). The first is by the soul passi7ig from 
exterior things to concentrate its powers on itself; the 
second is by the soul ascending so as to be associated with 
the united superior powers, namely the angels; the third is 
when the soul is led on yet further to the supreme good, 
that is, to God. 

In virtue of the first movement of the soul from exterior 
things to itself, the soul's knowledge is perfected. This 
is because the intellectual operation of the soul has a 



Q. 94 'Art. 2 THE *'SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 310 

natural order to external things, as we have said above 
(Q. LXXXVIL, A. 3) : and so by the knowledge thereof, 
our intellectual operation can be known perfectly, as an act 
through its object. And through the intellectual operation 
itself, the human intellect can be known perfectly, as a 
power through its proper act. But in the second movement 
we do not find perfect knowledge. Because, since the angel 
does not understand by turning to phantasms, but by a far 
more excellent process, as we have said above (O. LV., 
A. 2); the above-mentioned mode of knowledge, by which 
the soul knows itself, is not sufficient to lead it to the know- 
ledge of an angel. Much less does the third movement lead 
to perfect knowledge : for even the angels themselves, by 
the fact that they know themselves, are not able to arrive at 
the knowledge of the Divine Substance, by reason of its 
surpassing excellence. Therefore the soul of the first man 
could not see the angels in their essence. Nevertheless he 
had a more excellent mode of knowledge regarding the 
angels than we possess, because his knowledge of intel- 
ligible things within him was more certain and fixed than 
our knowledge. And it was on account of this excellence of 
knowledge that Gregory says that he enjoyed the company 
of the angelic spirits. 

This makes clear the reply to the first objection. 

Reply Obj. 2. That the soul of the first man fell short of 
the knowledge regarding separate substances, was not 
owing to the fact that the body was a load upon it ; but to 
the fact that its connatural object fell short of the excellence 
of separate substances. We, in our present state, fall short 
on account of both these reasons. 

Reply Obj. 3. The soul of the first man was not able to 
arrive at knowledge of separate substances by means of its 
self-knowledge, as we have shown above ; for even each 
separate ..substance knows others in its own measure. 



\ 



311 INTELLECT OF FIRST MAN Q. 94- Art. 3 

Third Article, 
whether the first man knew all things ? 

We proceed thus to the Third Article: — 

Objection i. It would seem that the first man did not 
know all things. For if he had such knowledge it would be 
either by acquired species, or by connatural species, or by 
infused species. Not, however, by acquired species; for 
this kind of knowledge is acquired by experience, as stated 
in Metaph. i. i ; and the first man had not then gained 
experience of all things. Nor through connatural species, 
because he was of the same nature as we are ; and our soul, 
as Aristotle says {De Anima iii. 4), is like a clean tablet on 
which nothing is written. And if his knowledge came by 
infused species, it would have been of a different kind from 
ours, which we acquire from things themselves. 

Obj. 2. Further, individuals of the same species have 
the same way of arriving at perfection. Now other men 
have not, from the beginning, knowledge of all things, but 
they acquire it in the course of time according to their 
capacity. Therefore neither did Adam know all things 
when he was first created. 

Obj. 3. Further, the present state of life is given to man, 
in order that his soul may advance in knowledge and merit ; 
indeed, the soul seems to be united to the body for that 
purpose. Now man would have advanced in merit in that 
state of life ; therefore also in knowledge. Therefore he 
was not endowed with knowledge of all things. 

On the contrary, Man named the animals (Gen. ii. 20). 
But names should be adapted to the nature of things. 
Therefore Adam knew the animals' natures; and in like 
manner he was possessed of the knowledge of all other 
things. 

/ answer that, In the natural order, perfection comes 
before imperfection, as act precedes potentiality; for what- 
ever is in potentiality is made actual only by something 
actual. And since God created things not only for their 



Q. 94- Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA" 312 

own existence, but also that they might be the principles of 
other things; so creatures were produced in their perfect 
state to be the principles as regards others. Now man can 
be the principle of another man, not only by generation of 
the body, but also by instruction and government. Hence, 
as the first man was produced in his perfect state, as regards 
his body, for the work of generation, so also was his soul 
established in a perfect state to instruct and govern others. 

Now no one can instruct others unless he has knowledge, 
and so the first man was established by God in such a 
manner as to have knowledge of all those things for which 
man has a natural aptitude. And such are whatever are 
virtually contained in the first self-evident principles, that 
is, whatever truths man is naturally able to know. More- 
over, in order to direct his own life and that of others, man 
needs to know not only those things which can be naturally 
known, but also things surpassing natural knowledge; 
because the life of man is directed to a supernatural end : 
just as it is necessary for us to know the truths of faith in 
order to direct our own lives. Wherefore the first man 
was endowed with such a knowledge of these supernatural 
truths as was necessary for the direction of human life in 
that state. But those things which cannot be known by 
merely human effort, and which are not necessary for the 
direction of human life, were not known by the first man ; 
such as the thoughts of men, future contingent events, and 
some individual facts, as for instance the number of pebbles 
in a stream ; and the like. 

Reply Ohj. I. The first man had knowledge of all things 
by divinely infused species. Yet his knowledge was not 
different from ours ; as the eyes which Christ gave to the 
man born blind were not different from those given by 
nature. 

Reply Obj. 2. To Adam, as being the first man, was due 
a degree of perfection which was not due to other men, as 
is clear from what is above explained. 

Reply Obj. 3. Adam would have advanced in natural 
knowledge, not in the number of things known, but in the 



313 INTELLECT OF FIRST MAN Q. 94- Art. 4 

manner of knowing; because what he knew speculatively 
he would subsequently have known by experience. But 
as regards supernatural knowledge, he would also have 
advanced as regards the number of things known, by 
further revelation ; as the angels advance by further 
enlightenment. Moreover there is no comparison between 
advance in knowledge and advance in merit ; since one man 
cannot be a principle of merit to another, although he can 
be to another a principle of knowledge. 

Fourth Article. 

.whether man in his first state could be 

deceived ? 

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article: — 

Objection i. It would seem that man in his primitive 
state could have been deceived. For the Apostle says 
(i Tim. ii. 14) that the woman being seduced was in the 
transgression. 

Obj. 2. Further, the Master says (2 Sent., D. xxi.) that, 
the woman was not frightened at the serpent speaking, 
because she thought that he had received the faculty of 
speech from God. But this was untrue. Therefore before 
sin the woman was deceived. 

Obj. 3. Further, it is natural that the farther off anything 
is from us, the smaller it seems to be. Now, the nature of 
the eyes is not changed by sin. Therefore this would have 
been the case in the state of innocence. Wherefore man 
would have been deceived in the size of what he saw, just 
as he is deceived now. 

Obj. 4. Further, Augustine says {Gen. ad lit. xii. 2) that, 
in sleep the soul adheres to the images of things as if they 
were the things themselves. But in the state of innocence 
man would have eaten and consequently have slept and 
dreamed. Therefore he would have been deceived, adhering 
to images as to realities. 

Obj. 5. Further, the first man would have been ignorant 
of other men's thoughts, and of future contingent events, 



Q. 94- Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 314 

as stated above (A. 3). So if anyone had told him what 
was false about these things, he would have been deceived. 

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii. 18) : 
To regard what is true as false, is not natural to man as 
created; but is a punishment of man condemned. 

I answer that, in the opinion of some, deception may 
mean two things; namely, any slight surmise, in which 
one adheres to what is false, as though it were true, but 
without the assent of belief; — or it mav mean a firm belief. 
Thus before sin Adam could not be deceived in either of 
these ways as regards those things to which his knowledge 
extended ; but as regards things to which his knowledge did 
not extend, he might have been deceived, if we take decep. 
tion in the wide sense of the term for any surmise without 
assent of belief. This opinion was held with the idea that 
it is not derogatory to man to entertain a false opinion in 
such matters, and that provided he does not assent rashly, 
he is not to be blamed. 

Such an opinion, however, is not fitting as regards the 
integrity of the primitive state of life ; because, as Augustine 
says (De Civ. Dei xiv. 10), in that state of life sin was 
avoided without struggle, and while it remained so, no evil 
could exist. Now it is clear that as truth is the good of the 
intellect, so falsehood is its evil, as the Philosopher says 
{Ethic, vi. 2). So that, as long as the state of innocence 
continued, it was impossible for the human intellect to 
assent to falsehood as if it were truth. For as some per- 
fections, such as clarity, were lacking in the bodily members 
of the first man, though no evil could be therein ; so there 
could be in his intellect the absence of some knowledge, 
but no false opinion. 

This is clear also from the very rectitude of the primitive 
state, by virtue of which, while the soul remained subject 
to God, the lower faculties in man were subject to the 
higher, and were no impediment to their action. And 
from what has preceded (Q. LXXXV., A. 6), it is clear that 
as regards its proper object the intellect is ever true; and 
hence it is never deceived of itself ; but whatever deception 



315 INTELLECT OF FIRST MAN Q. 94- Art. 4 

occurs must be ascribed to some lower faculty, such as the 
imagination or the like. Hence we see that when the natural 
power of judgment is free we are not deceived by such 
images, but only when it is not free, as is the case in sleep. 
Therefore it is clear that the rectitude of the primitive state 
was incompatible with deception of the intellect. 

Reply Obj. I. Though the woman was deceived before 
she sinned in deed, still it was not till she had already 
sinned by interior pride. For Augustine says {Gen. ad lit. 
xi. 30) that, the ivonian could not have believed the words of 
the serpent, had she not already acquiesced in the love of 
her own power, and in a presumptioji of self-conceit. 

Reply Obj. 2. The woman thought that the serpent had 
received this faculty, not as acting in accordance with 
nature, but by virtue of some supernatural operation. We 
need not, however, follow the Master of the Sentences in 
this point. 

Reply Obj. 3. Were anything presented to the imagina- 
tion or sense of the first man, not in accordance with the 
nature of things, he would not have been deceived, for his 
reason would have enabled him to judge the truth. 

Reply Obj. 4. A man is not accountable for what occurs 
during sleep; as he has not then the use of his reason, 
wherein consists man's proper action. 

Reply Obj. 5. If anyone had said something untrue as 
regards future contingencies, or as regards secret thoughts, 
man in the primitive state would not have believed it was 
so : but he might have believed that such a thing was 
possible ; which would not have been to entertain a false 
opinion. 

It might also be said that he would have been divinely 
guided from above, so as not to be deceived in a matter to 
which his knowledge did not extend. 

If any object, as some do, that he was not guided, when 
tempted, though he was then most in need of guidance, we 
reply that man had already sinned in his heart, and that he 
failed to have recourse to the Divine aid. 



QUESTION XCV. 

OF THINGS PERTAINING TO THE FIRST MAN'S WILL- 
NAMELY, GRACE AND RIGHTEOUSNESS. 

{In Four Articles.) 

We next consider what belongs to the will of the first man ; 
concerning which there are two points for treatment : 
(i) The grace and righteousness of the first man ; (2) the use 
of righteousness as regards his dominion over other things. 
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry : 
(i) Whether the first man was created in grace ? (2) Whether 
in the state of innocence he had passions of the soul ? 
(3) Whether he had all virtues ? (4) Whether what he did 
would have been as meritorious as now ? 



First Article, 
whether the first man was created in grace? 

We proceed thus to the First Article: — 

Objection i. It would seem that the first man was not 
created in grace. For the Apostle, distinguishing between 
Adam and Christ, says (i Cor. xv. 45) : The first Adam 
ivas made into a living soul; the last Adam into a quicken- 
ing spirit. But the spirit is quickened by grace. Therefore 
Christ alone was made in grace. 

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test., 
qu. 123*) that Adam did not possess the Holy Ghost. But 
whoever possesses grace, has the Holy Ghost. Therefore 
Adam was not created in grace. 

Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says {De Correp. et Grat. x.) 

• Work of an anonymous author, among the supposititious works of 
S, Augustine. 

316 



317 RIGHTEOUSNESS OF FIRST MAN Qgs-ARr. i 

that God so ordered the life of angels and men, as to shoiv 
first ivhat they could do by free-will, then what they can do 
hy His grace, and by the discernment of righteousness. 
God thus first created men and angels in the state of natural 
free-will only; and afterwards bestowed grace on them. 

Obj. 4. Further, the Master says (2 Sent., D. xxiv.) : 
When man was created he was given sufficient help to 
stand, but not sufficient to advance. But whoever has grace 
can advance by merit. Therefore the first man was not 
created in grace. 

Obj. 5. Further, the reception of grace requires the 
consent of the recipient, since thereby a kind of spiritual 
marriage takes place between God and the soul. But 
consent presupposes existence. Therefore man did not 
receive grace in the first moment of his creation. 

Obj. 6. Further, nature is more distant from grace than 
grace is from glory, which is but grace consummated. But 
in man grace precedes glory. Therefore much more did 
nature precede grace. 

On the contrary, Man and angel are both ordained to 
grace. But the angels were created in grace, for Augustine 
says {De Civ. Dei xii. 9) : God at the same time fashioned 
their nature and endowed them with grace. Therefore man 
also was created in grace. 

/ answer that, Some say that man was not created in 
grace ; but that it was bestowed on him subsequently before 
sin : and many authorities of the Saints declare that man 
possessed grace in the state of innocence. 

But the very rectitude of the primitive state, wherewith 
man was endowed by God, seems to require that, as others 
say, he was created in grace, according to Eccles. vii. 30, 
God made man right. For this rectitude consisted in his 
reason being subject to God, the lower powers to reason, 
and the body to the soul : and the first subjection was the 
cause of both the second and the third ; since while reason 
was subject to God, the lower powers remained subject to 
reason, as Augustine says.* Now it is clear that such a 
* Cf. De Civ. Dei xiii. 13 ; De Pecc. Merit, et Remiss, i. 16. 



Q. 95- Art. I THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA" 318 

subjection of the body to the soul and of the lower powers 
to reason, was not from nature; otherwise it would have 
remained after sin ; since even in the demons the natural 
gifts remained after sin, as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. 
iv.)- Hence it is clear that also the primitive subjection by 
virtue of which reason was subject to God, was not a merely 
natural gift, but a supernatural endowment of grace; for it 
is not possible that the effect should be of greater eflficiency 
than the cause. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei 
xiii. 13) that, as soon as they disobeyed the Divine command, 
and forfeited Diviyie grace, they were ashamed of their 
nakedness, for they felt the impulse of disobedience in the 
flesh, as though it were a punishment corresponding to their 
own disobedience. Hence if the loss of grace dissolved the 
obedience of the flesh to the soul, we may gather that the 
inferior powers were subjected to the soul through grace 
existing therein. 

Reply Obj. i. The Apostle in these words means to show 
that there is a spiritual body, if there is an animal body, 
inasmuch as the spiritual life of the body began in Christ, 
who is the firstborn of the dead, as the body's animal life 
began in Adam. From the Apostle's w'ords, therefore, we 
cannot gather that Adam had no spiritual life in his soul ; 
but that he had not spiritual life as regards the body. 

Reply Obj. 2. As Augustine says in the same passage, it 
is not disputed that Adam, like other just souls, was in some 
degree gifted with the Holy Ghost; but he did not possess 
the Holy Ghost, as the faithful possess Him now, who are 
admitted to eternal happiness directly after death. 

Reply Obj. 3. This passage from Augustine does not 
assert that angels or men were created with natural free-will 
before they possessed grace ; but that God shows first what 
their free-will could do before being confirmed in grace, 
and what they acquired afterwards by being so confirmed. 

Reply Obj. 4. The Master here speaks according to the 
opinion of those who held that man was not created in 
grace, but only in a state of nature. We may also say that, 
though man was created in grace, yet it was not by virtue 



319 RIGHTEOUSNESS OF FIRST MAN Q. 95- Art. 2 

of the nature wherein he was created that he could advance 
by merit, but by virtue of the grace which was added. 

Reply Obj. 5. As the motion of the will is not continuous 
there is nothing against the first man having consented to 
grace even in the first moment of his existence. 

Reply Obj. 6. We merit glory by an act of grace ; but we 
do not merit grace by an act of nature ; hence the com- 
parison fails. 

Second Article. 

whether passions existed in the soul of the 

first man ? 

We proceed thus to the Second Article: — 

Objection i. It would seem that the first man's soul had 
no passions. For by the passions of the soul the flesh 
lusteth against the spirit (Gal. v. 7). But this did not 
happen in the state of innocence. Therefore in the state of 
innocence there were no passions of the soul. 

Obj. 2. Further, Adam's soul was nobler than his body. 
But his body was impassible. Therefore no passions were 
in his soul. 

Obj. 3. Further, the passions of the soul are restrained 
by the moral virtues. But in Adam the moral virtues were 
perfect. Therefore the passions were entirely excluded 
from him. 

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv. 10) 
that in our first parents there ivas undisturbed love of God, 
and other passions of the soul. 

7 answer that. The passions of the soul are in the sensual 
appetite, the object of which is good and evil. Wherefore 
some passions of the soul are directed to what is good, as 
love and joy; others to what is evil, as fear and sorrow. 
And since in the primitive state, evil was neither present 
nor imminent, nor was any good wanting which a good-will 
could desire to have then, as Augustine says (ibid.), there- 
fore Adam had no passion with evil as its object ; such as 
fear, sorrow, and the like; neither had he passions in 



Q. 95- Art. 3 THE " SUiMiMA THEOLOGICA " 320 

respect of good not possessed, but to be possessed then, as 
burning concupiscence. But those passions which regard 
present good, as joy and love ; or which regard future good 
to be had at the proper time, as desire and hope that casteth 
not down, existed in the state of innocence; otherwise, 
however, than as they exist in ourselves. For our sensual 
appetite, wherein the passions reside, is not entirely subject 
to reason ; hence at times our passions forestall and hinder 
reason's judgment ; at other times they follow after reason's 
judgment, accordingly as the sensual appetite obeys reason 
to some extent. But in the state of innocence the inferior 
appetite was wholly subject to reason : so that in that state 
the passions of the soul existed only as consequent upon 
the judgment of reason. 

Reply Ohj. i. The flesh -lusts against the spirit by the 
rebellion of the passions against reason; which could not 
occur in the state of innocence. 

Reply Ohj. 2. The human body was impassible in the 
state of innocence as regards the passions which alter the 
disposition of nature, as will be explained later on 
(Q. XCVII., A. 2); likewise the soul was impassible as 
regards the passions which impede the free use of reason. 

Reply Ohj. 3. Perfection of moral virtue does not wholly 
take awav the passions, but regulates them ; for the tem- 
perate man desires as he ought to desire, and what he ought 
to desire, as stated in Elhic. iii. 11. 



Third Article, 
whether adam had all the virtues ? 

We proceed thus to the Third Article: — 

Ohjection i. It would seem that Adam had not all the 
virtues. For some virtues are directed to curb the passions : 
thus immoderate concupiscence is restrained by temperance, 
and immoderate fear by fortitude. But in the state of inno- 
cence no immoderation existed in the passions. Therefore 
neither did these virtues then exist. 



321 RIGHTEOUSNESS OF FIRST MAN Q. 95- Art. 3 

Obj. 2. Further, some virtues are concerned with the 
passions which have evil as their object ; as meekness with 
anger; fortitude with fear. But these passions did not exist 
in the state of innocence, as stated above (A. 2). Therefore 
neither did those virtues exist then. 

Ohj. 3. Further, penance is a virtue that regards sin 
committed. Mercy, too, is a virtue concerned with un- 
happiness. But in the state of innocence neither sin nor 
unhappiness existed. Therefore neither did those virtues 
exist. 

Ohj. 4. Further, perseverance is a virtue. But Adam 
possessed it not; as proved by his subsequent sin. There- 
fore he possessed not every virtue. 

Ohj. 5. Further, faith is a virtue. But it did not exist 
in the state of innocence ; for it implies an obscurity of 
knowledge which seems to be incompatible with the per- 
fection of the primitive state. 

On the contrary, Augustine says, in a homily {Serm. 
contra Judceos) : The prince of sin overcame Adam ivho 
was made from the slime of the earth to the image of God, 
adorned 7vith modesty, restrained hy temperance, refulgent 
ivith hrightness. 

I answer that, in the state of innocence man in a certain 
sense possessed all the virtues ; and this can be proved 
from what precedes. For it was shown above (A. i) that 
such was the rectitude of the primitive state, that reason 
was subject to God, and the lower powers to reason. Now 
the virtues are nothing but those perfections whereby 
reason is directed to God, and the inferior powers regulated 
according to the dictate of reason, as will be explained in 
the Treatise on the Virtues (I.-II., Q. LXIIL, A. 2). 
Wherefore the rectitude of the primitive state required that 
man should in a sense possess every virtue. 

It must, however, be noted that some virtues of their very 
nature do not involve imperfection, such as charity and 
justice; and these virtues did exist in the primitive state 
absolutely, both in habit and in act. But other virtues are 
of such a nature as to imply imperfection either in their 

1.4 21 



Q. 95- Art. 3 THE ** SUMMA THEOLOGICA" 322 

act, or on the part of the matter. If such imperfection be 
consistent with the perfection of the primitive state, such 
virtues necessarily existed in that state; as faith, which is 
of things not seen, and hope which is of things not yet 
possessed. For the perfection of that state did not extend 
to the vision of the Divine Essence, and the possession of 
God with the enjoyment of final beatitude. Hence faith 
and hope could exist in the primitive state, both as to habit 
and as to act. But any virtue which implies imperfection 
incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state, 
could exist in that state as a habit, but not as to the act ; 
for instance, penance, which is sorrow for sin committed; 
and mercy, which is sorrow for others' unhappiness; 
because sorrow, guilt, and unhappiness are incompatible 
with the perfection of the primitive state. Wherefore such 
virtues existed as habits in the first man, but not as to their 
acts ; for he was so disposed that he would repent, if there 
had been a sin to repent for ; and had he seen unhappiness 
in his neighbour, he would have done his best to remedy it. 
This is in accordance with what the Philosopher says, 
Shame, which regards what is ill done, may be found in a 
virtuous man, but only conditionally ; as being so dis- 
posed that he would be ashamed if he did wrong {Ethic. 

iv. 9). 

Reply Obj. i. It is accidental to temperance and fortitude 

to subdue superabundant passion, in so far as they are in 
a subject which happens to have superabundant passions : 
and yet those virtues are per se competent to moderate the 

passions. u- ♦ 

Reply Obj. 2. Passions which have evil for their object 
were incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state, 
if that evil be in the one affected by the passion ; such as fear 
and sorrow. But passions which relate to evil in another 
are not incompatible with the perfection of the primitive 
state- for in that state man could hate the demons' malice, 
as he' could love God's goodness. Thus the virtues which 
relate to such passions could exist in the primitive state, 
in habit and in act. Virtues, however, relating to passions 



323 RIGHTEOUSNESS OF FIRST MAN Q. 95- Art. 4 

which regard evil in the same subject, if relating to such 
passions only, could not exist in the primitive state in act, 
but only in habit, as we have said above of penance and of 
mercy. But other virtues there are which have relation 
not to such passions only, but to others ; such as temper- 
ance, which relates not only to sorrow, but also to joy ; and 
fortitude, which relates not only to fear, but also to daring 
and hope. Thus the act of temperance could exist in the 
primitive state, so far as it moderates pleasure; and in like 
manner fortitude, as moderating daring and hope, but not 
as moderating sorrow and fear. 

Reply Obj. 3 appears from what has been said above. 

Reply Obj. 4. Perseverance may be taken in two ways : 
in one sense as a particular virtue, signifying a habit 
whereby a man makes a choice of persevering in good ; in 
that sense Adam possessed perseverance. In another sense 
it is taken as a circumstance of virtue ; signifying a certain 
uninterrupted continuation of virtue; in which sense Adam 
did not possess perseverance. 

Reply Obj. 5 appears from what has been said above. 



Fourth Article. 

whether the actions of the first man were less 
meritorious than ours are? 

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article: — 

Objection i. It would seem that the actions of the first 
man were less meritorious than ours are. For grace is given 
to us through the mercy of God, Who succours most those 
who are most in need. Now we are more in need of grace 
than was man in the state of innocence. Therefore grace is 
more copiously poured out upon us; and since grace is the 
source of merit, our actions are more meritorious. 

Obj. 2. Further, struggle and difficulty are required for 
merit; for it is written (2 Tim. ii. 5): He . . . is not 
crowned except he strive lawfully; and the Philosopher 
says {Ethic, ii. 3) : The object of virtue is the difficult and 



Q. 95- Art. 4 THE " SUM MA TIIEOLOGICA" 324 

the good. But there is more strife and difficulty now. 
Therefore there is greater efficacy for merit. 

Obj. 3. Further, the Master says (2 Sent., D. xxiv.) that 
man ii'ould not have merited in resisting temptation; 
•whereas he does merit now, when he resists. Therefore our 
actions are more meritorious than in the primitive state. 

On the contrary, if such were the case, man would be 
better off after sinning. 

/ answer that. Merit as regards degree may be gauged in 
two ways. First, in its root, which is grace and charity. 
Merit thus measured corresponds in degree to the essential 
reward, which consists in the enjoyment of God ; for the 
greater the charity whence our actions proceed, the more 
perfectly shall we enjoy God. Secondly, the degree of 
merit is measured by the degree of the action itself. This 
degree is of two kinds, absolute and proportional. The 
widow who put two mites into the treasury performed a 
deed of absolutely less degree than others who put great 
sums therein. But in proportionate degree the widow gave 
more, as Our Lord said ; because she gave more in propor- 
tion to her means. In each of these cases the degree of 
merit corresponds to the accidental reward, which consists 
in rejoicing for created good. 

We conclude therefore that in the state of innocence 
man's works were more meritorious than after sin was 
committed, if we consider the degree of merit on the part 
of grace, which would have been more copious as meeting 
with no obstacle in human nature : and in like manner, if 
we consider the absolute degree of the work done ; because, 
as man would have had greater virtue, he would have per- 
formed greater works. But if we consider the proportionate 
degree, a greater reason for merit exists after sin, on account 
of man's weakness; because a small deed is more beyond 
the capacity of one who works with difficulty than a great 
deed is beyond one who performs it easily. 

Reply Ohj. 1. After sin man requires grace for more 
things than before sin ; but he does not need grace more : 
forasmuch as man even before sin required grace to obtain 



325 RIGHTEOUSNESS OF FIRST MAN Q. 95- Art. 4 

eternal life, which is the chief reason for the need of grace. 
But after sin man required grace also for the remission of 
sin, and for the support of his weakness. 

Reply Obj. 2. Difficulty and struggle belong to the 
degree of merit according to the proportionate degree of 
the work done, as above explained. It is also a sign of the 
will's promptitude striving after what is difficult to itself : 
and the promptitude of the will is caused by the intensity 
of charity. Yet it may happen that a person performs an 
easy deed with as prompt a will as another performs an 
arduous deed ; because he is ready to do even what may be 
difficult to him. But the actual difficulty, by its penal 
character, enables the deed to satisfy for sin. 

Reply Obj. 3. The first man would not have gained 
merit in resisting temptation, according to the opinion of 
those who say that he did not possess grace ; even as now 
there is no merit to those who have not grace. But in this 
point there is a difference, inasmuch as in the primitive 
state there was no interior impulse to evil, as in our present 
state. Hence man was more able then than now to resist 
temptation even without grace. 



QUESTION XCVI. 

OF THE MASTERSHIP BELONGING TO MAN IN THE 
STATE OF INNOCENCE. 

{In Four Articles.) 

We next consider the mastership which belonged to man in 
the state of ifinocence. Under this head there are four 
points of inquiry : (i) Whether man in the state of inno- 
cence was master over the animals ? (2) Whether he was 
master over all creatures ? (3) Whether in the state of 
innocence all men were equal ? (4) Whether in that state 
man would have been master over men ? 



First Article. 

whether adam in' the state of innocence had 
mastership over the animals ? 

We proceed thus to the First 'Article: — 

Objection i. It would seem that in the state of innocence 
Adam had no mastership over the animals. For Augustine 
says {Gen. ad lit. ix. 14), that the animals were brought to 
Adam, under the direction of the angels, to receive their 
names from him. But the angels need not have intervened 
thus, if man himself were master over the animals. There- 
fore in the state of innocence man had no mastership of the 
animals. 

Obj. 2. Further, it is unfitting that elements hostile to 
one another should be brought under the mastership of one. 
But many animals are hostile to one another, as the sheep 
and the wolf. Therefore all animals were not brought under 
the mastership of man. 

326 



327 FIRST MAN'S MASTERSHIP Q. 96. Art. i 

Obj. 3. Further, Jerome* says : God gave man master- 
ship over the animals, although before sin he had no need 
of them: for God foresaw that after sin animals would 
become useful to man. Therefore, at least before sin, it 
was unfitting for man to make use of his mastership. 

Obj. 4. Further, it is proper to a master to command. 
But a command is not given rightly save to a rational 
being. Therefore man had no mastership over the irra- 
tional animals. 

On the contrary, It is written (Gen. i. 26) : Let him have 
dominion over the fishes of the sea, and the birds of the air, 
and the beasts of the earth (Vulg., atid the whole earth). 

I answer that. As above stated (Q. XCV., A. i) for his 
disobedience to God, man was punished by the disobedience 
of those creatures which should be subject to him. There- 
fore in the state of innocence, before man had disobeyed, 
nothing disobeyed him that was naturally subject to him. 
Now all animals are naturally subject to man. This can be 
proved in three ways. First, from the order observed by 
nature; for just as in the generation of things we perceive 
a certain order of procession of the perfect from the im- 
perfect (thus matter is for the sake of form ; and the im- 
perfect form, for the sake of the perfect), so also is there 
order in the use of natural things ; thus the imperfect are for 
the use of the perfect ; as the plants make use of the earth 
for their nourishment, and animals make use of plants, and 
man makes use of both plants and animals. Therefore it 
is in keeping with the order of nature, that man should 
be master over animals. Hence the Philosopher says 
{Politic, i. 5) that the hunting of wild animals is just and 
natural, because man thereby exercises a natural right. 
Secondly, this is proved from the order of Divine Providence 
which always governs inferior things by the superior. 
Wherefore, as man, being made to the image of God, is 
above other animals, these are rightly subject to his govern- 

* The words quoted are not in S. Jerome's works. S. Thomas may 
have had in mind Bede, Ilexaem., as quoted in the Glossa ordinaria 
on Gen, i. 26. 



Q. 96. Art. I THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 328 

ment. Thirdly, this is proved from a property of man and 
of other animals. For we see in the latter a certain par- 
ticipated prudence of natural instinct, in regard to certain 
particular acts ; whereas man possesses a universal prudence 
as regards all practical matters. Now whatever is partici- 
pated is subject to what is essential and universal. There- 
fore the subjection of other animals to man is proved to be 
natural. 

Reply Ohj. i. A higher power can do many things that 
an inferior power cannot do to those which are subject to 
them. Now an angel is naturally higher than man. There- 
fore certain things in regard to animals could be done by 
angels, which could not be done by man ; for instance, the 
rapid gathering together of all the animals. 

Reply Ohj. 2. In the opinion of some, those animals 
which now are fierce and kill others, would, in that state, 
have been tame, not only in regard to man, but also in 
regard to other animals. But this is quite unreasonable. 
For the nature of animals was not changed by man's sin, as 
if those whose nature now it is to devour the flesh of others, 
would then have lived on herbs, as the lion and falcon. 
Nor does Bede's gloss on Gen. i. 30, say that trees and 
herbs were given as food to all animals and birds, but to 
some. Thus there would have been a natural antipathy 
between some animals. They would not, however, on this 
account have been excepted from the mastership of man : 
as neither at present are they for that reason excepted from 
the mastership of God, Whose Providence has ordained all 
this. Of this Providence man would have been the executor, 
as appears even now in regard to domestic animals, since 
fowls are given by men as food to the trained falcon. 

Reply Obj. 3. In the state of innocence man would not 
have had any bodily need of animals ; — neither for clothing, 
since then they were naked and not ashamed, there being 
no inordinate motions of concupiscence, — nor for food, 
since they fed on the trees of paradise, — nor to carry him 
about, his body being strong enough for that purpose. 
But man needed animals in order to have experimental 



329 FIRST MAN'S MASTERSHIP Q. 96. Art. 2 

knowledge of their natures. This is signified by the fact 
that God led the animals to man, that he might give them 
names expressive of their respective natures. 

Reply Obj. 4. All animals by their natural instinct have 
a certain participation of prudence and reason : which 
accounts for the fact that cranes follow their leader, and 
bees obey their queen. So all animals would have obeyed 
man of their own accord, as in the present state some 
domestic animals obey him. 

Second Article. 

whether man had mastership over all other 

creatures ? 

We proceed thus to the Second Article: — 

Objection 1. It would seem that in the state of innocence 
man would not have had mastership over all other creatures. 
For an angel naturally has a greater power than man. But, 
as Augustine says {De Trin. iii. 8), corporeal matter would 
not have obeyed even the holy angels. Much less therefore 
would it have obeyed man in the state of innocence. 

Obj. 2. Further, the only powers of the soul existing in 
plants are nutritive, augmentative, and generative. Now 
these do not naturally obey reason ; as we can see in the case 
of any one man. Therefore, since it is by his reason that 
man is competent to have mastership, it seems that in the 
state of innocence man had no dominion over plants. 

Obj. 3. Further, whosoever is master of a thing, can 
change it. But man could not have changed the course of 
the heavenly bodies ; for this belongs to God alone, as 
Dionysius says {Ep. ad Polycarp, vii.). Therefore man 
had no dominion over them. 

On the contrary, It is written (Gen. i. 26) : That he may 
have dominion over . . . every creature. 

I answer that, Man in a certain sense contains all things; 
and so according as he is master of what is within himself, 
in the same way he can have mastership over other things. 
Now we may consider four things in man : his reason, 



Q. 96. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 330 

which makes him hke to the angels; his sensitive powers, 
whereby he is like the animals; his natural forces, which 
liken him to the plants; and the body itself, wherein he is 
like to inanimate things. Now in man reason has the 
position of a master and not of a subject. Wherefore man 
had no mastership over the angels in the primitive state; 
so when we read all creatures, we must understand the 
creatures which are not made to God's image. Over the 
sensitive powers, as the irascible and concupiscible, which 
obey reason in some degree, the soul has mastership bv 
commanding. So in the state of innocence man had master- 
ship over the animals by commanding them. . But of the 
natural powers and the body itself man is master not by 
commanding, but by using them. Thus also in the state of 
innocence man's mastership^^ over plants and inanimate 
things consisted not in commanding or in changing them, 
but in making use of them without hindrance. 

The answers to the objections appear from the above. 



Third Article, 
whether men were equal in the state of innocence? 

We proceed thus to the Third Article: — 

Objection i. It w-ould seem that in the state of innocence 
all would have been equal. For Gregory says (Moral, xxi.) : 
Where there is no sin, there is no inequality. But in the 
state of innocence there was no sin. Therefore all were 
equal. 

Obj. 2. Further, likeness and equality are the basis of 
mutual love, according to Ecclus. xiii. 19, Every beast 
loveth its like; so also every man him that is nearest to 
himself. Now in that state there was among men an 
abundance of love, which is the bond of peace. Therefore 
all were equal in the state of innocence. 

Obj. 3. Further, the cause ceasing, the effect also ceases. 
But the cause of present inequality among men seems to 
arise, on the part of God, from the fact that He rewards 



331 FIRST MAN'S MASTERSHIP Q. 96. Art. 3 

some and punishes others ; and on the part of nature, from 
the fact that some, through a defect of nature, are born 
weak and deficient, others strong and perfect, which would 
not have been the case in the primitive state. Therefore, etc. 

On the contrary, It is written (Rom. xiii. i) : The things 
which are of God, are well ordered (Vulg., Those that are, 
are ordained of God). But order chiefly consists in in- 
equahty ; for Augustine says {De Civ. Dei xix. 13) : Order 
disposes things equal and unequal in their proper place. 
Therefore in the primitive state, which was most proper 
and orderly, inequality would have existed. 

/ answer that, We must needs admit that in the primitive 
state there would have been some inequality, at least as 
regards sex, because generation depends upon diversity of 
sex : and likewise as regards age ; for some would have 
been born of others ; nor would sexual union have been 
sterile. 

Moreover, as regards the soul, there would have been 
inequality as to righteousness and knowledge. For man 
worked not of necessity, but of his own free-will, by virtue 
of which man can apply himself, more or less, to action, 
desire, or knowledge ; hence some would have made a 
greater advance in virtue and knowledge than others. 

There might also have been bodily disparity. For the 
human body was not entirely exempt from the laws of 
nature, so as not to receive from exterior sources more or 
less advantage and help : since indeed it was dependent on 
food wherewith to sustain life. 

So we may say that, according to the climate, or the 
movement of the stars, some would have been born more 
robust in body than others, and also greater, and more 
beautiful, and i'n all ways better disposed ; so that, how- 
ever, in those who were thus surpassed, there would have 
been no defect or fault either in soul or body. 

Reply Obj. I. By those words Gregory means to exclude 
such inequality as exists between virtue and vice; the result 
of which is that some are placed in subjection to others as 
a penalty. 



Q. 96. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 332 

Reply Obj. 2. Equality is the cause of equality in mutual 
love. Yet between those who are unequal there can be a 
greater love than between equals ; although there be not an 
equal response : for a father naturally loves his son more 
than a brother loves his brother; although the son does not 
love his father as much as he is loved by him. 

Reply Obj. 3. The cause of inequality could be on the 
part of God; not indeed that He would punish some and 
reward others, but that He would exalt some above others ; 
so that the beauty of order would the more shine forth 
among men. Inequality might also arise on the part of 
nature as above described, without any defect .of nature. 

Fourth, Article. 

whether in the state of innocence man would have 
been master over man? 

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article: — 

Objection 1. It would seem that in the state of innocence 
man would not have been master over man. For Augustine 
says {De Civ. Dei xix. 15) : God willed that man, ivho was 
endowed with reason and made to His image, should rule 
over none but irratio7ial creatures; not over men, but over 
cattle. 

Obj. 2. Further, what came into the world as a penalty 
for sin would not have existed in the state of innocence. 
But man was made subject to man as a penalty ; for after 
sin it was said to the woman (Gen. iii. 16) : Thou shalt be 
under thy husband's power. Therefore in the state of 
innocence man would not have been subject to man. 

Obj. 3. Further, subjection is opposed to liberty. But 
liberty is one of the chief blessings, and would not have 
been lacking in the state of innocence, where nothing was 
wanting that man's good-will could desire, as Augustine 
says {De Civ. Dei xiv. 10). Therefore man would not have 
been master over man in the state of innocence. 

On the contrary, The condition of man in the state of 
innocence was not more exalted than the condition of the 



333 FIRST MAN'S MASTERSHIP Q. 96. Art. 4 

angels. But among the angels some rule over others; and 
so one order is called that of Dominations. Therefore it 
was not beneath the dignity of the state of innocence that 
one man should be subject to another. 

/ answer that, Mastership has a twofold meaning. First, 
as opposed to slavery, in which sense a master means one 
to whom another is subject as a slave. In another sense 
mastership is referred in a general sense to any kind of 
subject ; and in this sense even he who has the office of 
governing and directing free men, can be called a master. 
In the state of innocence man could have been a master of 
men, not in the former but in the latter sense. This dis- 
tinction is founded on the reason that a slave differs from a 
free man in that the latter has the disposal of himself, as is 
stated in the beginning of the Metaphysics, whereas a slave 
is ordered to another. So that one man is master of another 
as his slave when he refers the one whose master he is, to 
his own — namely, the master's use. And since every man's 
proper good is desirable to himself, and consequently it is 
a grievous matter to anyone to yield to another what ought 
to be one's own, therefore such dominion implies of 
necessity a pain inflicted on the subject; and consequently 
in the state of innocence such a mastership could not have 
existed between man and man. 

But a man is the master of a free subject, by directing 
him either towards his proper welfare, or to the common 
good. Such a kind of mastership would have existed in 
the state of innocence between man and man, for two 
reasons. First, because man is naturally a social being, 
and so in the state of innocence he would have led a social 
life. Now a social life cannot exist among a number of 
people unless under the presidency of one to look after 
the common good; for many, as such, seek many things, 
whereas one attends only to one. Wherefore the Philo- 
sopher says, in the beginning of the Politics, that wherever 
many things are directed to one, we shall always find one 
at the head directing them. Secondly, if one man surpassed 
another in knowledge and virtue, this would not have been 



Q. 96. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA" 334 

fitting unless these gifts conduced to the benefit of others, 
according to i Pet. iv. 10, As every vian hath received 
grace, ministering the same one to another. Wherefore 
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix. 14) : Just men command 
not by the love of domineering, but by the service of 
counsel: and {ibid. 15): The natural order of things 
requires this; and thus did God make man. 

Erom this appear the repUes to the objections which are 
founded on the first-mentioned mode of mastership. 



\ 



QUESTION XCVII. 

OF THE PRESERVATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN THE 

PRIMITIVE STATE. 

{In Four Articles.) 

We next consider what belongs to the bodily state of the 
first man : first, as regards the preservation of the indi- 
vidual ; secondly, as regards the preservation of the species. 
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry : 
(i) Whether man in the state of innocence was immortal? 
(2) Whether he was impassible ? (3) Whether he stood in 
need of food ? (4) Whether he would have obtained im- 
mortality by the tree of life ? 

First Article. 

whether in the state of innocence man would have 

been immortal? 

We proceed thus to the First Article: — 

Objection i. It would seem that in the state of innocence 
man was not immortal. For the term mortal belongs to the 
definition of man. But if you take away the definition, you 
take away the thing defined. Therefore as long as man 
was man he could not be immortal. 

Obj. 2. Further, corruptible and incorruptible are gener- 
ically distinct, as the Philosopher says {Metaph, x., Did. 
ix. 10). But there can be no passing from one genus to 
another. Therefore if the first man was incorruptible, man 
could not be corruptible in the present state. 

Obj. 3. Further, if man were immortal in the state of 
innocence, this would have been due either to nature or to 
grace. Not to nature, for since nature does not change 

335 



Q. 97- Art. I THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 336 

within the same species, he would also have been immortal 
now. Likewise neither would this be owing to grace; for 
the first man recovered grace by repentance, according to 
Wisdom X. 2 : He brought him out of his sins. Hence he 
would have regained his immortality ; which is clearly not 
the case. Therefore man was not immortal in the state of 
innocence. 

Obj. 4. Further, immortality is promised to man as a 
reward, according to Apoc. xxi. 4 : Death shall be no more. 
But man was not created in the state of reward, but that he 
might deserve the reward. Therefore man was not immortal 
in the state of innocence. 

On the contrary, It is written (Rom, v. 12) : By sin death 
came into the "world. Therefore man was immortal before 
sin. 

/ answer that, A thing may be incorruptible in three 
ways. F'irst, on the part of matter — that is to say, either 
because it possesses no matter, like an angel ; or because it 
possesses matter that is in potentiality to one form only, 
like the heavenly bodies. Such things as these are incor- 
ruptible by their very nature. Secondly, a thing is 
incorruptible in its form, inasmuch as being by nature 
corruptible, yet it has an inherent disposition which pre- 
serves it wholly from corruption ; and this is called incor- 
ruptibility of glory; because, as Augustine says (Ep. ad 
Dioscor .) : God made man's soul of such a poiverful nature, 
that from its fulness of beatitude, there redounds to the 
body a fulness of health, ivith the vigour of incorruption. 
Thirdly, a thing may be incorruptible on the part of its 
efficient cause; in this sense man was incorruptible and 
immortal in the state of innocence. For, as Augustine says 
(QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test., qu. 19*) : God made man immortal 
as long as he did not sin; so that he might achieve for him- 
self life or death. For man's body was indissoluble not by 
reason of any intrinsic vigour of immortality, but by reason 
of a supernatural force given by God to the soul, whereby 
it was enabled to preserve the body from all corruption so 

* See footnote, p. 316, 



\T 



337 FIRST MAN'S IMMORTALITY 

long as it remained itself subject to God. This entirely 
agrees with reason ; for since the rational soul surpasses 
the capacity of corporeal matter, as above explained 
(Q. LXXVI., A. i), it was most properly endowed at the 
beginning with the power of preserving the body in a 
manner surpassing the capacity of corporeal matter. 

Replv Obj. I and 2. These objections are founded on 
natural incorruptibility and immortality. 

Reply Obj. 3. This power of preserving the body was 
not natural to the soul, but was the gift of grace. And 
though man recovered grace as regards remission of guilt 
and the merit of glory ; yet he did not recover immortality, 
the loss of which was an effect of sin ; for this was reserved 
for Christ to accomplish, by Whom the defect of nature 
was to be restored into something better, as we shall explain 
further on (P. III., Q. XIV., A. 4, ad i). 

Reply Obj. 4. The promised reward of the immortality 
of glory differs from the immortality which was bestowed 
on man in the state of innocence. 



Second Article. 

whether in the state of innocence man would have 

been passible? 

We proceed thus to the Second Article: — 

Objection i. It would seem that in the state of innocence 
man was passible. For sensation is a kind of passion. But 
in the state of innocence man would have been sensitive. 
Therefore he would have been passible. 

Obj. 2. Further, sleep is a kind of passion. Now, man 
slept in the state of innocence, according to Gen. ii. 21, God 
cast a deep sleep upon Adam. Therefore he would have 
been passible. 

Obj. 3. Further, the same passage goes on to say that 
He took a rib out of Adam. Therefore he was passible even 
to the degree of the cutting out of part of his body. 

Obj, 4. Further, man's body was soft. But a soft body 
is naturally passible as regards a hard body ; therefore if a 

1. 4 22 



Q. 97- Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 338 

hard body had come in contact with the soft body of the 
first man, the latter would have suffered from the impact. 
Therefore the first man was passible. 

On the contrary, Had man been passible, he would have 
been also corruptible, because, as the Philosopher says 
{Top. vi. 3) : Excessive suffering "d-'astes the very substance. 

I answer that, Passion may be taken in two senses. 
First, in its proper sense, and thus a thing is said to suffer 
when changed from its natural disposition. For passion is 
the effect of action ; and in nature contraries are mutually 
active or passive, according as one thing changes another 
from its natural disposition. Secondly, passion can be 
taken in a general sense for any kind of change, even if 
belonging to the perfecting process of nature. Thus 
understanding and sensation are said to be passions. In 
this second sense, man was passible in the state of inno- 
cence, and was passive both in soul and body. In the first 
sense, man was impassible, both in soul and body, as he 
was likewise immortal ; for he could curb his passion, as he 
could avoid death, so long as he refrained from sin. 

Thus it is clear how to reply to the first two objections ; 
since sensation and sleep do not remove from man his 
natural disposition, but are ordered to his natural welfare. 

Reply Obj. 3. As already explained (O. XCII., A. 3, 
ad 2), the rib was in Adam as the principle of the human 
race, as the semen in man, who is a principle through 
generation. Hence as man does not suffer any natural 
deterioration by seminal issue; so neither did he through 
the separation of the rib. 

Reply Obj. 4. Man's body in the state of innocence 
could be preserved from suffering injury from a hard body; 
partly by the use of his reason, whereby he could avoid 
what was harmful ; and partly also by Divine Providence, 
so preserving him, that nothing of a harmful nature could 
come upon him unawares. 



339 FIRST MAN'S IMMORTALITY ^. 97- Art. 3 



Third Article. 

whether in the state of inn'ocence man had 
need of food ? 

We ■proceed thus to the Third Article: — 

Objection i. It would seem that in the state of innocence 
man did not require food. For food is necessary for man 
to restore what he has lost. But Adam's body suffered no 
loss, as being incorruptible. Therefore he had no need of 
food. 

Obj. 2. Further, food is needed for nourishment. But 
nourishment involves passibility. Since, then, man's body 
was impassible; it does not appear how food could be 
needful to him. 

Obj. 3. Further, we need food for the preservation of 
life. But Adam could preserve his life otherwise; for had 
he not sinned, he would not have died. Therefore he did 
not require food. 

Obj. 4. Further, the consumption of food involves void- 
ing of the surplus, which seems unsuitable to the state of 
innocence. Therefore it seems that man did not take food 
in the primitive state. 

On the contrary, It is written (Gen. ii. 16) : Of every tree 
in Paradise ye shall (Vulg., thou shall) eat. 

I answer that, In the state of innocence man had an 
animal life requiring food ; but after the resurrection he will 
have a spiritual life needing no food. In order to make 
this clear, we must observe that the rational soul is both 
soul and spirit. It is called a soul by reason of what it 
possesses in common with other souls — that is, as giving 
life to the body ; whence it is written (Gen. ii. 7) : Man -was 
made into a living soul; that is, a soul giving life to the 
body. But the soul is called a spirit according to what 
properly belongs to itself, and not to other souls, as pos- 
sessing an intellectual immaterial power. 

Thus in the primitive state, the rational soul communi- 
cated to the body what belonged to itself as a soul ; and so 



Q. 97. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 340 

the body was called animal * through having its life from 
the soul. Now the first principle of life in these inferior 
creatures as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii. 4) is the 
vegetative soul : the operations of which are the use of 
food, generation, and growth. Wherefore such operations 
befitted man in the state of innocence. But in the final 
state, after the resurrection, the soul will, to a certain extent, 
communicate to the body what properly belongs to itself 
as a spirit ; immortality to everyone ; impassibility, glory, 
and power to the good, whose bodies will be called spiritual. 
So, after the resurrection, man will not require food; 
whereas he required it in the state of innocence. 

Reply Obj. i. As Augustine says {QQ. Vet. et Nov. 
Test., qu. igf) : How could man have an immortal body, 
which was sustained by food? Since an immortal being 
needs neither food nor drink. For we have explained (A. i) 
that the immortality of the primitive state was based on a 
supernatural force in the soul, and not on any intrinsic 
disposition of the body : so that by the action of heat, the 
body might lose part of its humid qualities; and to prevent 
the entire consumption of the humour, man was obliged to 
take food. 

Reply Obj. 2. A certain passion and alteration attends 
nutriment, on the part of the food changed into the sub- 
stance of the thing nourished. So we cannot thence con- 
clude that man's body was passible, but that the food taken 
was passible ; although this kind of passion conduced to the 
perfection of the nature. 

Reply Obj. 3. If man had not taken food he would have 
sinned; as he also sinned by taking the forbidden fruit. 
For he was told at the same time, to abstain from the tree 
of the knowledge of good and evil, and to eat of every other 
tree of Paradise. 

Reply Obj. 4. Some say that in the state of innocence 
man would not have taken more than necessary food, so 
that there would have been nothing superfluous ; which, 

* From anima, a soul. Cf. i Cor, xv. 44 seqq. 
+ See footnote, p. 316. 



341 FIRST MAN'S IMMORTALITY Q. 97- Art. 4 

however, is unreasonable to suppose, as implying that there 
would have been no fascal matter. Wherefore there was 
need for voiding the surplus, yet so disposed by God as to 
be decorous and suitable to the state. 



Fourth Article. 

whether in the state of innocence man would have 
acquired immortality by the tree of life? 

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article: — 

Objection i. It would seem that the tree of life could not 
be the cause of immortality. For nothing can act beyond 
its own species ; as an effect does not exceed its cause. But 
the tree of life was corruptible, otherwise it could not be 
taken as food ; since food is changed into the substance of 
the thing nourished. Therefore the tree of life could not 
give incorruptibility or immortality. 

Obj. 2. Further, effects caused by the forces of plants and 
other natural agencies are natural. If therefore the tree of 
life caused immortality, this would have been natural 
immortality. 

Obj. 3. Further, this would seem to be reduced to the 
ancient fable, that the gods, by eating a certain food, 
became immortal ; which the Philosopher ridicules {Metaph 
iii., Did. ii. 4). 

On the contrary, It is written (Gen. iii. 22) : Lest perhaps 
he put forth his hand, and take of the tree of life, and eat, 
and live for ever. Further, Augustine says {QQ. Vet. et 
Nov. Test., qu. 19*) : A taste of the tree of life warded off 
corruption of the body ; and even after sin man would have 
remained immortal, had he been allowed to eat of the tree 
of life. 

I answer that, The tree of life in a certain degree was the 
cause of immortality, but not absolutely. To understand 
this, we must observe that in the primitive state man pos- 
sessed, for the preservation of life, two remedies, against 

* See footnote, p. 316. 



Q. 97- Art. 4 THE " SUM MA TMEOLOGICA" 342 

two defects. One of these defects was the loss of humidity 
by the action of natural heat, which acts as the soul's 
instrument : as a remedy against such loss man was pro- 
vided with food, taken from the other trees of paradise, as 
now we are provided with the food, which we take for the 
same purpose. The second defect, as the Philosopher says 
(De Gener. i. 5), arises from the fact that the humour which 
is caused from extraneous sources, being- added to the 
humour already existing, lessens the specific active power : 
as water added to wine takes at first the taste of wine, 
then, as more water is added, the strength of the wine is 
diminished, till the wine becomes watery. In like manner, 
we may observe that at first the active force of the species 
is so strong that it is able to transform so much of the food 
as is required to replace the lost tissue, as well as what 
suffices for growth ; later on, however, the assimilated food 
does not suffice for growth, but only replaces what is lost. 
Last of all, in old age, it does not suffice even for this pur- 
pose; whereupon the bodv declines, and finally dies from 
natural causes. Against this defect man was provided with 
a remedy in the tree of life; for its effect was to strengthen 
the force of the species against the weakness resulting from 
the admixture of extraneous nutriment. Wherefore Augus- 
tine says {De Civ. Dei xiv. 26) : Man had food to appease 
his hunger, drink to slake his thirst; and the tree of life to 
batiish the breaking up of old age ; and {00. Vet. et Nov. 
T-est., qu. 19*) : The tree of life, like a drug, ivarded off all 
bodily corruption. 

Yet it did not absolutely cause immortality ; for neither 
was the soul's intrinsic power of preserving the body due 
to the tree of life, nor was it of such efficiency as to give 
the body a disposition to immortality, whereby it might 
become indissoluble ; which is clear from the fact that every 
bodilv power is finite ; so the power of the tree of life could 
not go so far as to give the body the prerogative of living 
for an infinite time, but only for a definite time. For it is 
manifest that the greater a force is, the more durable is its 

* See footnote, p. 316. 



343 FIRST MAN'S IMMORTALITY Q. 97- Art. 4 

effect ; therefore, since the power of the tree of life was 
finite, man's life was to be preserved for a definite time by 
partaking of it once ; and when that time had elapsed, man 
was to be either transferred to a spiritual life, or had need 
to eat once more of the tree of life. 

From this the replies to the objections clearly appear. 
For the first proves that the tree of life did not absolutely 
cause immortality; while the others show that it caused 
incorruption by warding off corruption, according to the 
explanation above given. 



QUESTION XCVIII. 

OF THE PRESERVATION OF THE SPECIES. 
{In TiL'o Articles.) 

We next consider what belongs to the preservation of the 
species ; and, first, of generation ; secondly, of the state of 
the offspring. Under the first head there are two points of 
inquiry : (i) Whether in the state of innocence there would 
have been generation ? (2) Whether generation would have 
been through coition ? 

First Article, 
whether in the state of innocence generation 

EXISTED ? 

We proceed thus to the First Article: — 

Objection i. It would seem there would have been no 
generation in the state of innocence. For, as stated in 
Phys. V. 5, corruption is contrary to generation. But 
contraries affect the same subject : also there would have 
been no corruption in the state of innocence. Therefore 
neither would there have been generation. 

Obj. 2. Further, the object of generation is the preserva- 
tion in the species of that which is corruptible in the 
individual. Wherefore there is no generation in those indi- 
vidual things which last for ever. But in the state of 
innocence man would have lived for ever. Therefore in the 
state of innocence there would have been no generation. 

Obj. 3. Further, by generation man is multiplied. But 
the multiplication of masters requires the division of 
property, to avoid confusion of mastership. Therefore, 
since man was made master of the animals, it would have 

344 



345 FIRST MAN'S STATE Q. 98. Art. i 

been necessary to make a division of rights when the human 
race increased by generation. This is against the natural 
law, according to which all things are in common, as Isidore 
says (Etym. v. 4). Therefore there would have been no 
generation in the state of innocence. 

On the contrary, It is written (Gen. i. 28) : Increase and 
multiply, and fill the earth. But this increase could not 
come about save by generation, since the original number 
of mankind was two only. Therefore there would have 
been generation in the state of innocence. 

I anstver that, In the state of innocence there would have 
been generation of offspring for the multiplication of the 
human race; otherwise man's sin would have been very 
necessary, for such a great blessing to be its result. We 
must, therefore, observe that man, by his nature, is estab- 
lished, as it were, midway between corruptible and incor- 
ruptible creatures, his soul being naturally incorruptible, 
while his body is naturally corruptible. We must also 
observe that nature's purpose appears to be different as 
regards corruptible and incorruptible things. For that 
seems to be the direct purpose of nature, which is invariable 
and perpetual ; while what is only for a time is seemingly 
not the chief purpose of nature, but, as it were, subordinate 
to something else ; otherwise, when it ceased to exist, 
nature's purpose would become void. 

Therefore, since in things corruptible none is everlasting 
and permanent except the species, it follows that the chief 
purpose of nature is the good of the species ; for the preser- 
vation of which natural generation is ordained. On the 
other hand, incorruptible substances survive, not only in 
the species, but also in the individual ; wherefore even the 
individuals are included in the chief purpose of nature. 

Hence it belongs to man to beget offspring, on the part 
of the naturally corruptible body. But on the part of the 
soul, which is incorruptible, it is fitting that the multitude 
of individuals should be the direct purpose of nature, or 
rather of the Author of nature. Who alone is the Creator of 
the human soul. Wherefore, to provide for the multiplica- 



Q. 98. Art. 2 THE '* SUMAIA THEOLOGICA " 346 

tion of the human race, He established the begetting of 
offspring even in the state of innocence. 

Reply Obj. I. In the state of innocence the human body 
was in itself corruptible, but it could be preserved from 
corruption by the soul. Therefore, since generation belongs 
to things corruptible, man was not to be deprived thereof. 

Reply Obj. 2. Although generation in the state of inno- 
cence might not have been required for the preservation 
of the species, yet it would have been required for the 
multiplication of the individual. 

Reply Obj. 3. In our present state a division of posses- 
sions is necessary on account of the multiplicity of masters, 
inasmuch as community of possession is a source of strife, 
as the Philosopher says {Politic, ii. 5). In the state of 
innocence, however, the wilK of men would have been so 
ordered that without any danger of strife they would have 
used in common, according to each one's need, those things 
of which they were masters — a state of things to be observed 
even now among many good men. 

Second Article. 

whether in the state of innocence there would h.we 
been generation by coition ? 

We proceed thus to the Second Article: — 

Objection i. It would seem that generation by coition 
would not have existed in the state of innocence. For, as 
Damascene says (DeF/fi. Orth. ii. 11 : iv. 25), the first man 
in the terrestrial Paradise was like an angel. But in the 
future state of the resurrection, when cnen will be like to 
the angels, they shall neither marry nor be married, as it is 
written Matt. xxii. 30. Therefore neither in Paradise would 
there have been generation by coition. 

Obj. 2. Further, our first parents were created at the age 
of perfect development. Therefore, if generation by coition 
had existed before sin, they would have had intercourse 
while still in Paradise : which was not the case according to 
Scripture (Gen. iv. i). 



347 FIRST MAN'S STATE Q. 98. Art. i 

Obj. 3. Further, in carnal intercourse, more than at any 
other time, man becomes like the beasts, on account of the 
vehement delight which he takes therein ; whence continency 
is praiseworthy, whereby man refrains from such pleasures. 
But man is compared to beasts by reason of sin, according 
to Psalm xlviii. 13 : Man, when he was in honour, did not 
understand ; he is compared to senseless beasts, and is 
become like to them. Therefore, before sin, there would 
have been no such intercourse of man and woman. 

Obj. 4. Further, in the state of innocence there would 
have been no corruption. But virginal integrity is cor- 
rupted by intercourse. Therefore there would have been 
no such thing in the state of innocence. 

On the contrary, God made man and woman before sin 
(Gen. i. and ii.). But nothing is void in God's works. 
Therefore, even if man had not sinned, there would have 
been such intercourse, to which the distinction of sex is 
ordained. Moreover, we are told that woman was made to 
be a help to man (Gen. ii. 18, 20). But she was not fitted 
to help man except in generation, because another man 
would have proved a more effective help in anything else. 
Therefore there would have been such generation also in 
the state of innocence. 

/ answer that. Some of the earlier doctors, considering 
the nature of concupiscence as regards generation in our 
present state, concluded that in the state of innocence 
generation would not have been effected in the same way. 
Thus Gregory of Nyssa says {De Horn. Opif. xvii.) that in 
Paradise the human race would have been multiplied by 
some other means, as the angels were multiplied without 
coition by the operation of the Divine Power. He adds 
that God made man male and female before sin, because 
He foreknew the mode of generation which would take 
place after sin, which He foresaw. But this is unreason- 
able. For what is natural to man was neither acquired nor: 
forfeited by sin. Now it is clear that generation by coition 
is natural to man by reason of his animal life, which he 
possessed even before sin, as above explained (O. XCVH., 



Q. 98. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 348 

A. 3), just as it is natural to other perfect animals, as the 
corporeal members make it clear. So we cannot allow that 
these members would not have had a natural use, as other 
members had, before sin. 

Thus, as regards generation by coition, there are, in the 
present state of life, two things to be considered. One, 
which comes from nature, is the union of man and woman ; 
for in every act of generation there is an active and a passive 
principle. Wherefore, since wherever there is distinction 
of sex, the active principle is male and the passive is female ; 
the order of nature demands that for the purpose of genera- 
tion there should be concurrence of male and female. The 
second thing to be observed is a certain deformity of 
excessive concupiscence, which in the state of innocence 
would not have existed, when4;he lower powers were entirely 
subject to reason. Wherefore Augustine says {De Civ. Dei 
xiv. 26) : We must be far jrom supposing that offspring 
could not be begotten without concupiscence. All the 
bodily members zvoiild have been equally moved by the 
will, without ardent or wanton incentive, with calmness of 
soul and body. 

Reply Obj. I. In Paradise man would have been like an 
angel in his spirituality of mind, yet with an animal life in 
his body. After the resurrection man will be like an angel, 
spiritualized in soul and body. Wherefore there is no 
parallel. 

Reply Obj. 2. As Augustine says {Gen. ad lit. ix. 4), our 
first parents did not come together in Paradise, because on 
account of sin they were ejected from Paradise shortly after 
the creation of the woman ; or because, having received 
the general Divine command relative to generation, they 
awaited the special command relative to the time. 

Reply Obj. 3. Beasts are without reason. In this way 
man becomes, as it were, like them in coition, because he 
cannot moderate concupiscence. In the state of innocence 
nothing of this kind would have happened that was not 
regulated by reason, not because delight of sense was less, 
as some say (rather indeed would sensible delight have been 



349 



FIRST MAN'S STATE Q. 98. Art. 2 



the greater in proportion to the greater purity of nature 
and the greater sensibility of the body), but because the 
force of concupiscence would not have so inordinately 
thrown itself into such pleasure, being curbed by reason, 
whose place it is not to lessen sensual pleasure, but to 
prevent the force of concupiscence from cleaving to it 
immoderately. By immoderately I mean going beyond the 
bounds of reason, as a sober person does not take less 
pleasure in food taken in moderation than the glutton, but 
his concupiscence lingers less in such pleasures. This is 
what Augustine means by the words quoted, which do not 
exclude intensity of pleasure from the state of innocence, 
but the ardour of desire and restlessness of the mind. 
Therefore continence would not have been praiseworthy in 
the state of innocence, whereas it is praiseworthy in our 
present state, not because it removes fecundity, but because 
it excludes inordinate desire. In that state fecundity would 
have been without lust. 

Reply Obj. 4. As Augustine says {De Civ. Dei xiv. 26) : 
In that state intercourse zvould have been without prejudice 
to virginal integrity ; this ivould have remained intact, as it 
docs in the menses. And just as in giving birth the mother 
was then relieved, not by groans of pain, but by the insti- 
gations of maturity; so in conceiving, the union was one, 
not of lustful desire, but of deliberate action. 



ounsTiox xcix. 

OF THE CONDITION OF THE OFFSPRING AS TO THE 

BODY. 

{In Two Articles.) 

We must now consider the condition of the offspring — 
lirst, as regard the body; secondly, as regards virtue; 
thirdlv, in knowledge. Under the first head there are two 
points of inquiry : (i) Whether in the state of innocence 
children would have had full powers of the body immedi- 
ately after birth? (2) Whether all infants would have been 
of the male sex ? 



First Article. 

whether in the state of innocence children would 
have had perfect strength of body as to the use 
of its members nimediately after birth ? 

We proceed thus to the First Article : — 

Objection i. It would seem that in the state of innocence 
children would have had perfect strength of the body, as 
to the use of its members, immediately after birth. For 
Augustine says (De Pecc. Merit, et Rejniss. i. 38) : This 
"a'eakness of the body befits their weakness of mind. But in 
the state of innocence there Vvould have been no weakness 
of mind. Therefore neither would there have been weak- 
ness of body in infants. 

Obj. 2. Further, some animals at birth have sufficient 
strength to use their members. But man is nobler than 
other animals. Therefore much more is it natural to man to 
have strength to use his members at birth ; and thus it 
appears to be a punishment of sin that he has not that 



strength, 



350 



351 STATE OF THE OFFSPRING Q- 99- Art. i 

Ohj. 3. Further, inability to secure a proffered pleasure 
causes affliction. But if children had not full strength in 
the use of their limbs, they would often have been unable 
to procure something pleasurable offered to them ; and so 
they would have been afflicted, which was not possible 
before sin. Therefore, in the state of innocence, children 
would not have been deprived of the use of their limbs. 

Obj. 4. Further, the weakness of old age seems to corre- 
spond to that of infancy. But in the state of innocence 
there would have been no weakness of old age. Therefore 
neither would there have been such weakness in infancy. 

On the contrary, Everything generated is first imperfect. 
But in the state of innocence children would have been 
begotten by generation. Therefore from the first they 
would have been imperfect in bodily size and power. 

/ answer that, By faith alone do we hold truths which 
are above nature, and what we believe rests on authority. 
Wherefore, in making any assertion, we must be guided by , 
the nature of things, except in those things which are above 
nature, and are made known to us by Divine authority. 
Now it is clear that it is as natural as it is befitting to the 
principles of human nature that children should not have 
sufficient strength for the use of their limbs immediately 
after birth. Because in proportion to other animals man 
has naturally a larger brain. Wherefore it is natural, 
on account of the considerable humidity of the brain in 
children, that the nerves which are instruments of move- 
ment, should not be apt for moving the limbs. On the 
other hand, no Catholic doubts it possible for a child to 
have, by Divine power, the use of its limbs immediately 
after birth. 

Now we have it on the authoritv of Scripture that God 
made man right (Eccles. vii. 30), which rightness, as 
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv. 1 1), consists in the perfect 
subjection of the body to the soul. As, therefore, in the 
primitive state it was impossible to find in the human limbs 
anything repugnant to man's well-ordered will, so was it 
impossible for those limbs to fail in executing the will's 



g. 99- Art. 2 THE "SUiMMA THEOLOGICA " 352 

commands. Now the human will is well ordered when it 
tends to acts which are befitting to man. But the same acts 
are not befitting to man at every season of life. We must, 
therefore, conclude that children would not have had 
sufficient strength for the use of their limbs for the purpose 
of performing every kind of act; but only for the acts 
befitting the state of infancy, such as suckling, and the like. 

Reply Ohj. I. Augustine is speaking of the weakness 
which we observe in children even as regards those acts 
which befit the state of infancy ; as is clear from his pre- 
ceding remark that even luhen close to the breast, and 
longing for it, they are more apt to cry than to suckle. 

Reply Obj. 2. The fact that some animals have the use 
of their limbs immediately after birth, is due, not to their 
superiority, since more perfect animals are not so endowed ; 
but to the dryness of the brain, and to the operations proper 
to such animals being imperfect, so that a small amount of 
strength suffices them. 

Reply Obj. 3 is clear from what we have said above. 
We may add that they would have desired nothing except 
with an ordinate will ; and only what was befitting to their 
state of life. 

Reply Obj. 4. In the state of innocence man would have 
been born, yet not subject to corruption. Therefore in that 
state there could have been certain infantile defects which 
result from birth; but not senile defects leading to 
corruption. 

Second Article. 

whether, in the primitive state, women would have 

been born ? 

We proceed thus to the Second Article: — 
Objection i. It would seem that in the primitive state 
woman would not have been born. For the Philosopher 
says {De Gener. Animal, ii. 3) that woman is a misbegotten 
male, as though she were a product outside the purpose of 
nature. But in that state nothing would have been un- 



353 



STATE OF THE OFFSPRING Q. 99- Art. 2 



natural in human generation. Therefore in that state 
women would not have been born. 

Obj. 2. Further, every agent produces its like, unless 
prevented by insufficient power or ineptness of matter : 
thus a small fire cannot burn green wood. But in genera- 
tion the active force is in the male. Since, therefore, in 
the state of innocence man's active force was not subject to 
defect, nor was there inept matter on the part of the woman, 
it seems that males would always have been born. 

Obj. 3. Further, in the state of innocence generation is 
ordered to the multiplication of the human race. But the 
race would have been sufficiently multiplied by the first 
man and w^oman, from the fact that they would have lived 
for ever. Therefore, in the state of innocence, there was 
no need for women to be born. 

On the contrary, nature's process in generation would 
have been in harmony with the manner in which it was 
established by God. But God established male and female 
in human nature, as it is written (Gen. i. and ii.). There- 
fore also in the state of inocence male and female would 
have been born. 

/ answer that, Nothing belonging to the completeness of 
human nature would have been lacking in the state of inno- 
cence. And as different grades belong to the perfection of 
the universe, so also diversity of sex belongs to the perfec- 
tion of human nature. Therefore in the state of innocence, 
both sexes would have been begotten. 

Reply Obj. i. Woman is said to be a misbegotten male, 
as being a product outside the purpose of nature considered 
in the individual case : but not against the purpose of 
universal nature, as above explained (Q. XCIL, A. i, ad 2). 

Reply Obj. 2. The generation of woman is not occasioned 
either by a defect of the active force or bv inept matter, 
as the objection supposes; but sometimes by an extrinsic 
accidental cause; thus the Philosopher says (De Animal. 
Histor. vi. 19) : The northern wind favours the generation 
of males, and the southern wind that of females : sometimes 
also by some impression in the soul (of the parents), which 

1. 4 23 



Q 99- Art. 2 THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA" 354 

may easily have some effect on the body (of the child). 
Especially was this the case in the state of innocence, when 
the body was more subject to the soul ; so that by the mere 
will of the parent the sex of the offspring might be diver- 
sified. 

Reply Obj. 3. The offspring would have been begotten 
to an animal life, as to the use of food and generation. 
Hence it was fitting that all should generate, and not only 
the first parents. From this it seems to follow that males 
and females would have been in equal number. 



QUESTION C. 

OF THE CONDITION OF THE OFFSPRING AS REGARDS 

RIGHTEOUSNESS. 

{In Two Articles.) 

We now have to consider the condition of the offspring as 
to righteousness. Under this head there are two points of 
inquiry : (i) Whether men would have been born in a state 
of righteousness ? (2) Whether they would have been born 
confirmed in righteousness? 

First Article. 

whether men avould have been born in a state of 

righteousness ? 

We proceed thus to the First Article: — 

Objection i. It would seem that in the state of innocence 
men would not have been born in a state of righteousness. 
For Hugh of St. Victor says (De Sacram. i.) : Before sin, 
the first man ivould have begotten children sinless; but not 
heirs to their father's righteousness. 

Obj. 2. Further, righteousness is effected by grace, as 
the Apostle says (Rom. v. 16, 21). Now grace is not 
transfused from one to another, for thus it would be 
natural; but is infused by God alone. Therefore children 
would not have been born righteous. 

Obj. 3. Further, righteousness is in the soul. But the 
soul is not transmitted from the parent. Therefore neither 
would righteousness have been transmitted from parents to 
the children. 

On the contrary, Anselm says {De Concep. Virg. x.) : 'As 
long as man did not sin, he li'ould have begotten children 
endowed ivith righteousness together ivith the rational soul. 

3£5 



Q. loo. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 356 

/ ajis'u.'er that, Man naturally begets a specific likeness to 
himself. Hence whatever accidental qualities result from 
the nature of the species, must be alike in parent and child, 
unless nature fails in its operation, which would not have 
occurred in the state of innocence. But individual accidents 
do not necessarily exist alike in parent and child. Now 
original righteousness, in which the first man was created, 
was an accident pertaining to the nature of the species, not 
as caused by the principles of the species, but as a gift con- 
ferred by God on the entire human nature. This is clear 
from the fact that opposites are of the same genus ; and 
original sin, which is opposed to original righteousness, is 
called the sin of nature, wherefore it is transmitted from 
the parent to the offspring; and for this reason also, the 
children would have been assimilated to their parents as 
regards original righteousness. 

Reply Obj. i. These words of Hugh are to be under- 
stood as referring, not to the habit of righteousness, but to 
the execution of the act thereof. 

Reply Obj. 2. Some say that children would have been 
born, not with the righteousness of grace, which is the 
principle of merit, but with original righteousness. But 
since the root of original righteousness, which conferred 
righteousness on the first man when he was made, consists 
in the supernatural subjection of tlie reason to God, which 
subjection results from sanctifying grace, as above ex- 
plained (Q. XCV., A. i), we must conclude that if children 
were born in original righteousness, they would also have 
been born in grace ; thus we have said above that the first 
man was created in grace (ibid.). This grace, however, 
would not have been natural, for it would not have been 
transfused bv virtue of the semen ; but would have been 
conferred on man immediately on his receiving a rational 
soul. In the same way the rational soul, which is not 
transmitted by the parent, is infused by God as soon as the 
human body is apt to receive it. 

From this the reply to the third objection is clear. 



357 STATE OF THE OFFSPRING Q- ^oo. Art. 2 



Second Article. 

whether in the state of innocence children would 
have been born confirmed in righteousness ? 

We proceed thus to the Second Article: — 

Objectioti I. It would seem that in the state of innocence 
children would have been born confirmed in righteousness. 
For Gregory says {Moral, iv.) on the words of Job iii. 13 : 
For notu I should have been asleep, etc.: If no sinful cor- 
ruption had infected our first parent, he would not have 
begotten 'children of hell' ; no children "would have been 
born of him but such as were destined to be saved by the 
Redeemer. Therefore all would have been born confirmed 
in righteousness. 

Obj. 2. Further, Anselm says {Cur Deus Homo i. 18) : // 
our first parents had lived so as not to yield to temptation, 
they would have been confirmed in grace, so that with their 
offspring they woiild have been tuiable to sin any more. 
Therefore the children would have been born confirmed in 
righteousness. 

Obj. 3. Further, good is stronger than evil. But by the 
sin of the first man there resulted, in those born of him, the 
necessity of sin. Therefore, if the first man had persevered 
in righteousness, his descendants would have derived from 
him the necessity of preserving righteousness. 

Obj. 4. Further, the angels who remained faithful to 
God, while the others sinned, were at once confirmed in 
grace, so as to be unable henceforth to sin. In like manner, 
therefore, man would have been confirmed in grace if he 
had persevered. But he would have begotten children like 
himself. Therefore they also would have been born con- 
firmed in righteousness. 

On the contrary, Augustine says {De Civ. Dei xiv. 10) : 
Happy would have been the whole human race if neither 
they — that is, our first parents — had committed any evil to 
be transmitted to their descendants, nor any of their race 
had committed any sin for which they would have been 



g. loo. Akt. 2 THE "SUMiMA THEOLOGICA " 358 

condemned. From which words we gather that even if 
our first parents had not sinned, any of their descendants 
might have done evil ; and therefore they would not have 
been born confirmed in righteousness. 

/ answer that, It does not seem possible that in the state 
of innocence children would have been born confirmed in 
righteousness. For it is clear that at their birth they would 
not have had greater perfection than their parents at the 
time of begetting. Now the parents, as long as they begot 
children, would not have been confirmed in righteousness. 
For the rational creature is confirmed in righteousness 
through the beatitude given by the clear vision of God; 
and when once it has seen God, it cannot but cleave to 
Him Who is the essence of goodness, wherefrom no one 
can turn away, since nothing is desired or loved but under 
the aspect of good. I say this according to the general law ; 
for it may be otherwise in the case of special privilege, such 
as we believe was granted to the Virgin Mother of God. 
And as soon as Adam had attained to that happy state of 
seeing God in His Essence, he would have become spiritual 
in soul and body ; and his animal life would have ceased, 
wherein alone there is generation. Hence it is clear that 
children would not have been born confirmed in righteous- 
ness. 

Reply Obi, r. If Adam had not sinned, he would not 
have begotten children of hell in the sense that they would 
contract from him sin which is the cause of hell : yet by 
sinning of their own free-will they could have become 
children of hell. If, however, they did not become children 
of hell by falling into sin, this would not have been owing 
to their being confirmed in righteousness, but to Divine 
Providence preserving them free from sin. 

Reply Obj. 2. Anselm does not say this by way of 
assertion, but only as an opinion, which is clear from his 
mode of expression as follows: It seems that if they hadwtX 
lived, etc. 

Reply Obj. 3. This argument is not conclusive, though 
Anselm seems to have been influenced by it, as appears 



359 STATE OF THE OFFSPRING Q. loo. Art. 2 

from his words above quoted. For the necessity of sin 
incurred by the descendants would not have been such that 
they could not return to righteousness, which is the case 
only with the damned. Wherefore neither would the 
parents have transmitted to their descendants the necessity 
of not sinning, which is only in the blessed. 

Reply Obj. 4. There is no comparison between man and 
the angels; for man's free-will is changeable, both before 
and after choice; whereas the angel's is not changeable, as 
we have said above in treating of the angels (Q. LXIV., 
A. 2). 



QUESTION CI. 

OF THE CONDITION OF THE OFFSPRING AS REGARDS 

KNOWLEDGE. 

{In Two Articles.) 

We next consider the condition of the offspring as to know- 
ledge. Under this head there are two points of inquiry : 
(i) Whether in the state of innocence children would have 
been born with perfect knowledge ? (2) Whether they would 
have had perfect use of reason at the moment of birth ? 

First Article. 

whether in the state of innocence children would 
have been born with perfect knowledge ? 

We proceed thus to the First Article: — 

Objection i. It would seem that in the state of innocence 
children would have been born with perfect knowledge. 
For Adam would have begotten children like himself. But 
Adam was gifted with perfect knowledge (Q. XCIV., A. 3). 
Therefore children would have been born of him with per- 
fect knowledge. 

Obj. 2. Further, ignorance is a result of sin, as Bede says 
(c/. I.-IL, Q. LXXXV., A. 3). But ignorance is privation 
of knowledge. Therefore before sin children would have 
had perfect knowledge as soon as they were born. 

Obj. 3. Further, children would have been gifted with 
righteousness from birth. But knowledge is required for 
righteousness, since it directs our actions. Therefore they 
would also have been gifted with knowledge. 

On the contrary^ The human soul is naturally like a blank 

360 



36i STATE OF THE OFFSPRING Q- loi. Art. i 

tablet on which nothing is written, as the Philosopher says 
{De Aniina iii. 4). But the nature of the soul is the same 
now as it would have been in the state of innocence. There- 
fore the souls of children would have been without know- 
ledge at birth. 

/ answer that, As above stated (Q. XCIX., A. i), as 
regards belief in matters which are above nature, we rely 
on authority alone ; and so, when authority is wanting, we 
must be guided by the ordinary course of nature. Now it 
is natural for man to acquire knowledge through the senses, 
as above explained (Q. LV., A. 2; Q. LXXXIV., A. 6); 
and for this reason is the soul united to the body, that it 
needs it for its proper operation ; and this would not be so if 
the soul were endowed at birth with knowledge not acquired 
through the sensitive powers. We must conclude then, 
that, in the state of innocence, children would not have been 
born with perfect knowledge ; but in course of time they 
would have acquired knowledge without difficulty by dis- 
covery or learning. 

Reply Obj. i. The perfection of knowledge was an indi- 
vidual accident of our first parent, so far as he was estab- 
lished as the father and instructor of the whole human race. 
Therefore he begot children like himself, not in that respect, 
but only in those accidents which were natural or conferred 
gratuitously on the whole nature. 

Reply Obj. 2. Ignorance is privation of knowledge due at 
some particular time; and this would not have been in 
children from their birth, for they would have possessed 
the knowledge due to them at that time. Hence, no ignor- 
ance would have been in them, but only nescience in regard 
to certain matters. Such nescience was even in the holy 
angels, according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii.). 

Reply Obj. 3. Children would have had sufficient know- 
ledge to direct them to deeds of righteousness, in which 
men are guided by universal principles of right ; and this 
knowledge of theirs would have been much more complete 
than what we have now by nature, as likewise their know- 
ledge of other universal principles. 



Q. ioi.Art. 2 THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 362 



Second Article. 

whether children! would have had perfect use of 

reason at birth ? 

We proceed thus to the Second Article: — 

Objection 1. It would seem that children would have had 
perfect use of reason at birth. For that children have not 
perfect use of reason in our present state, is due to the soul 
being weighed down by the body; which was not the case 
in paradise, because, as it is written, The corruptible body 
is a load upon the soul (Wisd. ix. 15). Therefore, before 
sin and the corruption which resulted therefrom, children 
would have had the perfect use of reason at birth. 

Obj. 2. Further, some animals at birth have the use of 
their natural powers, as the lamb at once flies from the 
wolf. Much more, therefore, would men in the state of 
innocence have had perfect use of reason at birth. 

On the contrary, In all things produced by generation 
nature proceeds from the imperfect to the perfect. There- 
fore children would not have had the perfect use of reason 
from the very outset. 

/ answer that, As above stated (Q. LXXXIV., A. 7), the 
use of reason depends in a certain manner on the use of the 
sensitive powers ; wherefore, while the senses are tied and 
the interior sensitive powers hampered, man has not the 
perfect use of reason, as we see in those who are asleep or 
delirious. Now the sensitive powers are situate in cor- 
poreal organs ; and therefore, so long as the latter are 
hindered, the action of the former is of necessity hindered 
also; and likewise, consequently, the use of reason. Now 
children are hindered in the use of these powers on account 
of the humidity of the brain ; wherefore they have perfect 
use neither of these powers nor of reason. Therefore, in 
the state of innocence, children would not have had the 
perfect use of reason, which they would have enjoyed later 
on in life. Yet they would have had a more perfect use 
than they have now, as to matters regarding that particular 



363 STATE OF THE OFFSPRING Q. loi. Art. 2 

state, as explained above regarding the use of their limbs 
(Q.XCIX., A. I). 

Reply Obj. i. The corruptible body is a load upon the 
soul, because it hinders the use of reason even in those 
matters which belong to man at all ages. 

Reply Obj. 2. Even other animals have not at birth such 
a perfect use of their natural powers as they have later on. 
This is clear from the fact that birds teach their young to 
fly ; and the like may be observed in other animals. More- 
over a special impediment exists in man from the humidity 
of the brain, as we have said above (O. XCIX., A. i). 



QUESTION CII. 

OF MAN'S ABODE, WHICH IS PARADISE. 
{In Four Articles.) 

We next consider man's abode, which is paradise. Under 
this head there are four points of inquiry : (i) Whether 
paradise is a corporeal place ? (2) Whether it' is a place 
apt for human habitation ? (3) For what purpose was man 
placed in paradise ? (4) Whether he should have been 
created in paradise? 

First Article. 
whether paradise is a corporeal place? 

We proceed thus to the First Article: — 

Objection 1. It would seem that paradise is not a cor- 
poreal place. For Bede* says that paradise reaches to the 
lunar circle. But no earthly place answers that description, 
both because it is contrary to the nature of the earth to be 
raised up so high, and because beneath the moon is the 
region of fire, which would consume the earth. Therefore 
paradise is not a corporeal place. 

Obj. 2. Further, Scripture mentions four rivers as rising 
in paradise (Gen. ii. 10). But the rivers there mentioned 
have visible sources elsewhere, as is clear from the Philo- 
sopher {Meteor, i.). Therefore paradise is not a corporeal 
place. 

Obj. 3. Further, although men have explored the entire 
habitable world, yet none have made mention of the place 
of paradise. Therefore apparently it is not a corporeal 
place. 

* Strabus, Gloss on Gen. ii. 8. 

364 



365 MAN'S ABODE— PARADISE Q. 102. Art. i 

Obj. 4. Further, the tree of life is described as growing 
in paradise. But the tree of life is a spiritual thing, for it is 
written of Wisdom that She is a tree of life to them that lay 
hold on her (Prov. iii. 18). Therefore paradise also is not a 
corporeal, but a spiritual place. 

Ohj. 5. Further, if paradise be a corporeal place, the trees 
also of paradise must be corporeal. But it seems they were 
not ; for corporeal trees were produced on the third day, 
while the planting of the trees of paradise is recorded after 
the work of the six days. Therefore paradise was not a 
corporeal place. 

On the contrary, Augustine says {Gen. ad lit. viii. i) : 
Three general opinions prevail about paradise. Some 
understand a place merely corporeal; others a place entirely 
spiritual; while others, whose opinion, I confess, pleases 
me, hold that paradise was both corporeal and spiritual. 

I answer that. As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii. 21) : 
Nothing prevents us from holding, within proper limits, a 
spiritual paradise ; so long as we believe in the truth of the 
events narrated as having there occurred. For whatever 
Scripture tells us about paradise is set down as matter of 
history; and wherever Scripture makes use of this method, 
we must hold to the historical truth of the narrative as a 
foundation of whatever spiritual explanation we mav offer. 
And so paradise, as Isidore says (Etym. xiv. 3), is a place 
situated in the east, its name being the Greek for garden. 
It was fitting that it should be in the east ; for it is to be 
believed that it was situated in the most excellent part of 
the earth. Now the east is the right hand of the heavens, 
as the Philosopher explains {De Coel. ii. 2); and the right 
hand is nobler than the left : hence it was fitting that God 
should place the earthly paradise in the east. 

Reply Obj. i. Bede's assertion is untrue, if taken in its 
obvious sense. It may, however, be explained to mean that 
paradise reaches to the moon, not literally, but figuratively; 
because, as Isidore says {loc. cit.), the atmosphere there is 
of a continually even temperature ; and in this respect it is 
like the heavenly bodies, which are devoid of opposing 



O. I02. Art. I THI- " SUMMA THEOLOGICA" 36(> 

elements. Mention, however, is made of the moon rather 
than of other bodies, because, of all the heavenly bodies, 
the moon is nearest to us, and is, moreover, the most akin 
to the earth ; hence it is observed to be overshadowed by 
clouds so as to be almost obscured. Others say that para- 
dise reached to the moon — that is, to the middle space of 
the air, where rain, and wind, and the like arise; because 
the moon is said to have influence on such changes. But 
in this sense it would not be a fit place for human dwelling, 
through being uneven in temperature, and not attuned to 
the human temperament, as is the lower atmosphere in the 
neighbourhood of the earth. 

Reply Ohj. 2. Augustine says {Gen. ad lit. viii. 7) : It is 
frohahle that man has no idea where paradise ivas, and that 
the rivers, whose sources are said to be known, flowed for 
some distance underground, and then sprang up elsewhere. 
For who is not aware that such is the case with some other 
streams? 

Reply Ohj. 3. The situation of paradise is shut off from 
the habitable world by mountains, or seas, or some torrid 
region, which cannot be crossed ; and so people who have 
written about topography make no mention of it. 

Reply Ohj. 4. The tree of life is a material tree, and so 
called because its fruit was endowed with a life-preserving 
power, as above stated (O. XCVII., A. 4). Yet it had a 
spiritual signification ; as the rock in the desert was of a 
material nature, and yet signified Christ. In like manner 
the tree of the knowledge of good and evil was a material 
tree, so called in view of future events ; because, after eating 
of it, man was to learn, by experience of the consequent 
punishment, the difference between the good of obedience 
and the evil of rebellion. It may also be said to signify 
spiritually the free-will, as some say. 

Reply Ohj. 5. According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. v. 5, 
viii. 3), the plants were not actually produced on the third 
day, but in their seminal virtues ; whereas, after the work of 
the six days, the plants, both of paradise and others, were 
actually produced. According to other holy writers, we 



367 MAN'S ABODE— PARADISE Q. 102. Art. 2 

ought to say that all the plants were actually produced on the 
third day, including the trees of paradise; and what is said 
of the trees of paradise being planted after the work of the 
six days is to be understood, they say, by way of recapitula- 
tion. Whence our text reads : The Lord God had planted a 
paradise of pleasure from the beginning (Gen. ii. 8). 



Second Article. 

whether paradise was a place adapted to be the 

abode of man? 

We proceed thus to the Second Article: — 

Objection i. It would seem that paradise was not a place 
adapted to be the abode of man. For man and angels are 
similarly ordered to beatitude. But the angels from the 
very beginning of their existence were made to dwell in the 
abode of the blessed — that is, the empyrean heaven. There- 
fore the place of man's habitation should have been there 
also. 

Obj. 2, Further, if some definite place were required for 
man's abode, this would be required on the part either of 
the soul or of the body. If on the part of the soul, the place 
would be in heaven, which is adapted to the nature of the 
soul ; since the desire of heaven is implanted in all. On the 
part of the body, there was no need for any other place than 
the one provided for other animals. Therefore paradise was 
not at all adapted to be the abode of man. 

Obj. 3. Further, a place which contains nothing is use- 
less. But after sin, paradise was not occupied by man. 
Therefore if it were adapted as a dwelling-place for man, it 
seems that God made paradise to no purpose. 

Obj. 4. Further, since man is of an even temperament, a 
fitting place for him should be of even temperature. But 
paradise was not of an even temperature; for it is said to 
have been on the equator — a situation of extreme heat, 
since twice in the year the sun passes vertically over the 
heads of its inhabitants. Therefore paradise was not a fit 
dwelling-place for man. 



Q. I02. Art. 2 THE " SUiMMA THEOLOGICA" 368 

On the contrary, Damascene says {De Fid. Orth. ii. 11) : 
Paradise was a divinely ordered region, and worthy of him 
who was made to God's image. 

I answer that, as above stated (Q. XCVII., A. i), Man 
was incorruptible and immortal, not because his body had 
a disposition to incorruptibility, but because in his soul 
there was a power preserving the body from corruption. 
Now the human body may be corrupted from within or 
from without. From within, the body is corrupted by the 
consumption of the humours, and by old age, as above 
explained {ibid., A. 4), and man was able to ward off such 
corruption by food. Among those things whi.ch corrupt 
the body from without, the chief seems to be an atmosphere 
of unequal temperature; and to such corruption a remedy 
is found in an atmosphere of equable nature. In paradise 
both conditions were found ; because, as Damascene says 
{loc. cit.) : Paradise was permeated with the all-pervading 
brightness of a temperate, pure, and exquisite atmosphere, 
and decked with ever-flowering plants. Whence it is clear 
that paradise was most fit to be a dwelling-place for man, 
and in keeping with his original state of immortality. 

Reply Obj. i. The empyrean heaven is the highest of 
corporeal places, and is outside the region of change. By 
the first of these two conditions, it is a fitting abode for the 
angelic nature : for, as Augustine says {De Trin. ii.), God 
rules corporeal creatures through spiritual creatures. Hence 
it is fitting that the spiritual nature should be established 
above the entire corporeal nature, as presiding over it. By 
the second condition, it is a fitting abode for the state of 
beatitude, which is endowed with the highest degree of 
stability. Thus the abode of beatitude was suited to the 
very nature of the angel ; therefore he was created there. 
But it is not suited to man's nature, since man is not set 
as a ruler over the entire corporeal creation : it is a fitting 
abode for man in regard only to his beatitude. Wherefore 
he was not placed from the beginning in the empyrean 
heaven, but was destined to be transferred thither in the 
state of his final beatitude. 



369 MAN'S ABODE— PARADISE Q. 102. Art. 2 

Reply Obj. 2. It is ridiculous to assert that any particular 
place is natural to the soul or to any spiritual substances, 
though some particular place may have a certain fitness in 
regard to spiritual substances. For the earthly paradise was 
a place adapted to man, as regards both his body and his 
soul — that is, inasmuch as in his soul was the force which 
preserved the human body from corruption. This could 
not be said of the other animals. Therefore, as Damascene 
says (loc. cit.) : No irrational animal inhabited paradise ; 
although, by a certain dispensation, the animals were 
brought thither by God to Adam ; and the serpent was able 
to trespass therein by the complicity of the devil. 

Reply Obj. 3. Paradise did not become useless through 
being unoccupied by man after sin, just as immortality was 
not conferred on man in vain, though he was to lose it. 
For thereby we learn God's kindness to man, and what 
man lost by sin. Moreover, some say that Enoch and Elias 
still dwell in that paradise. 

Reply Obj. 4. Those who say that paradise was on the 
equinoctial line are of opinion that such a situation is most 
temperate, on account of the unvarying equality of day and 
night ; that it is never too cold there, because the sun is 
never too far off ; and never too hot, because, although 
the sun passes over the heads of the inhabitants, it does 
not remain long in that position. How^ever, Aristotle dis- 
tinctly says (Meteor, ii. 5) that such a region is uninhabit- 
able on account of the heat. This seems to be more prob- 
able ; because, even those regions where the sun does not 
pass vertically overhead, are extremely hot on account of 
the mere proximity of the sun. But whatever be the truth of 
the matter, we must hold that paradise was situated in a most 
temperate situation, whether on the equator or elsewhere. 



1 4 24 



Q. I02.ART. 3 THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 370 



Third Article, 
whether man was placed in paradise to dress it and 

KEEP IT? 

We proceed thus to the Third Article : — 

Objection i. It would seem that man was not placed in 
paradise to dress and l^eep it. For what was brought on 
him as a punishment of sin would not have existed in para- 
dise in the state of innocence. But the cultivation of the 
soil was a punishment of sin (Gen. iii. 17). Therefore man 
was not placed in paradise to dress and keep it. 

Ob/. 2. Further, there is no need of a keeper when there 
is no fear of trespass with violence. But in paradise there 
was no fear of trespass with violence. Therefore there was 
no need for man to keep paradise. 

Ohj. 3. Further, if man was placed in paradise to dress 
and keep it, man would apparently have been made for the 
sake of paradise, and not contrariwise ; which seems to be 
false. Therefore man was not placed in paradise to dress 
and keep it. 

On the contrary^ It is written (Gen. ii. 15) : The Lord 
God took man and placed him in the paradise of pleasure, 
to dress and keep it. 

I answer that, As Augustine says {Gen. ad lit. viii. 10), 
these words of Genesis may be understood in two ways. 
First, in the sense that God placed man in paradise that He 
might Himself work in man and keep him, by sanctifying 
him (for if this work cease, man at once relapses into dark- 
ness, as the air grows dark when the light ceases to shine) ; 
and by keeping man from all corruption and evil. Secondly, 
that man might dress and keep paradise, which dressing 
would not have involved labour, as it did after sin ; but 
would have been pleasant on account of man's practical 
knowledge of the powers of nature. Nor would man have 
kept paradise against a trespasser ; but he would have 
striven to keep paradise for himself lest he should lose it 



37i MAN'S ABODE— PARADISE Q. 102.. Art. 4 

by sin. All of which was for man's good; wherefore 

paradise was ordered to man's benefit, and not conversely. 

Whence the Replies to the Objections are made clear. 



Fourth Article, 
whether man was created in paradise? 

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article: — 

Objection i. It would seem that man was created in 
paradise. For the angel was created in his dwelling-place 
— namely, the empyrean heaven. But before sin paradise 
was a fitting abode for man. Therefore it seems that man 
was created in paradise. 

Obj. 2. Further, other animals remain in the place where 
they are produced, as the fish in water, and walking animals 
on the earth from which they were made. Now man would 
have remained in paradise after he was created (Q. XCVII., 
A. 4). Therefore he was created in paradise. 

Obj. 3. Further, woman was made in paradise. But man 
is greater than woman. Therefore much more should man 
have been made in paradise. 

On the contrary, It is written (Gen. ii. 15) : God took 
man and placed him in paradise. 

I answer that, Paradise was a fitting abode for man as 
regards the incorruptibility of the primitive state. Now this 
incorruptibility was man's, not by nature, but by a super- 
natural gift of God. Therefore that this might be attributed 
to God, and not to human nature, God made man outside 
of paradise, and afterwards placed him there to live there 
during the whole of his animal life ; and, having attained to 
the spiritual life, to be transferred thence to heaven. 

Reply Obj. 1. The empyrean heaven was a fitting abode 
for the angels as regards their nature, and therefore they 
were created there. 

In the same way I reply to the second objection, for those 
places befit those animals in their nature. 



Qio2. Art. 4 THE "SU.MMA THEOLOGICA " 372 

Reply Obj. 3. Woman was made in paradise, not by 
reason of her own dignity, but on account of the dignity of 
the principle from which her body was formed. For the 
same reason the children would have been born in paradise, 
where their parents were already. 



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